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The main purpose of this volume is to publish, and thus to publicise, 
the factual material contained in a series of consultancy reports 
commissioned by the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) between 1992 and 
1994 (Banks 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Bonne1l1994). These reports 
dealt with the social and economic impact of the Porgera gold mine on 
the population of the Porgera Valley during the period which had 
elapsed since the Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) signed a 
Mining Development Contract with the PJV in April 1989. They were 
commissioned as part of what became known as the Porgera Social 
Monitoring Programme, which was itself intended to satisfy some of 
the conditions which the PNG Department of Environment and 
Conservation (DEC) had attached to its approval of the company's 
Environmental Plan (NSR 1988) and Environmental Management and 
Monitoring Programme(PJV 1991). The substance of these reports has 
been revised and edited to form Chapters 2-7 of the present volume. 
The last two chapters have been specially commissioned from two 
other social scientists who have studied the social impact of the 
mining project, and who were asked to provide their own comments 
on the design, management and output of the Porgera Social 
Monitoring Programme. 
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The Porgera Social Monitoring Programme, 1992-94 
Condition 21 of the Porgera Environment Plan approval requires the 
PJV to undertake 'periodic studies of the socio-economic impacts of 
the mine development on the people directly affected by the mine'. 
Condition 22 states that 'the Company shall report to Department of 
Environment and Conservation on the studies in 21 above as part of 
the approved Environmental Management and Monitoring 
Programme'. By the time that this second approval was granted, the 
construction phase of the mining operation was almost complete, and 
the PJV had already commissioned one of the contributors to this 
volume to undertake a census of the local population (Burton 1991), 
which had been rapidly swollen by immigrants from other parts of 
Enga Province. 
In May 1992, the PJV's Environment Manager, Charlie Ross, asked 
the University of Papua New Guinea's business arm, Unisearch PNG, 
to propose a more comprehensive programme of work to monitor the 
social and economic impact of the mine. In my capacity as the 
Unisearch Projects Manager, I promptly sought the assistance of my 
former university colleague, John Burton, whose previous consultancy 
for the PJV had also been undertaken through the university's 
business arm. Burton's original proposal, submitted in June 1992, had 
two main components. 
• The first was for him to resume and complete the social 
mapping and census exercise which he had started under the 
previous contract, and which the PJV's management had 
apparently placed on the proverbial back burner (see 
Chapter 9). 
• The second was for the PJV to commission Glenn Banks, 
then a PhD student at the Australian National University, to 
study the local economic impact of the mine, with assistance 
from Engan staff and students at the University of Papua 
New Guinea. 
In discussion of this proposal, it transpired that the PJV had 
already made a separate arrangement with Susanne Bonnell, who had 
previously been employed in the company's Community Affairs 
Division, to collect 'social statistics' in the mine impact area, and her 
work was then absorbed into the design of the overall programme. 
Glenn Banks and his team began their first period of fieldwork in 
November 1992, but it was only in March 1993 that DEC staff were 
finally persuaded to convene a Steering Committee which 
2 I Dilemmas of Development 
retrospectively approved the terms of reference for both of these 
consultancies. The meeting in question was attended by represen-
tatives of the PJV, the PNC Department of Mining and Petroleum, the 
PNC Department of Finance and Planning, the Department of Enga 
Province, and the Porgera Landowners' Association. Susanne Bonnell, 
John Burton and I were also present at that meeting, and after further 
consultation with Clenn Banks, we finalised the design of the Porgera 
Social Monitoring Programme, and presented our proposals to the PJV 
in June 1993 (Burton and Filer 1993). 
However, for reasons discussed at greater length in Chapter 9 of 
this volume, the only elements of this programme which had borne 
fruit by the end of 1994 were those which had already been initiated in 
1992. After completing the first report of the 'Economic Modelling 
Project' in May 1993 (Banks 1993), Clenn Banks went on to produce 
three more reports in February, July and December 1994 (Banks 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c). Revised versions of these reports appear as Chapters 3, 
5,6 and 7 of the present volume, in that order. Susanne Bonnell 
presented her own findings on 'Social Change' in a single report 
(Bonnell1994) which was submitted to the PJV in August 1994. The 
findings of her study are presented as Chapters 2 and 4 of the present 
volume. 
The documented impact of the mine 
According to Banks (1996:223), the Porgera gold mine, from a 
technical and financial point of view, is 'one of the most spectacular 
successes of the mining industry in recent times'. Annual output of 
gold reached a peak of almost 1.5 million ounces in 1992 (the first fun 
year of production), but fell to about 850,000 ounces per annum in 
1995 and 1996 (PJV 1997). The value of this output was almost K500 
million in 1992, but was still more than K440 million in 1996, due to 
the slide in the value of the kina which began in 1994. 
According to the national census, the Porgera Valley had a resident 
population of approximately 10,000 in 1990 (excluding mining 
company personnel), most of whom appeared to belong to ten 
'traditional' rural communities outside the limits of Porgera 
government station. This was almost twice the number recorded in 
1980, which shows that there had been substantial immigration into 
the area during the exploration and construction phases of the project 
(Burton 1991). No-one knew how many people were living in the 
Porgera Census Division by 1993, but Banks (Chapter 5) makes a 
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(probably conservative) estimate of 12,000. By the end of 1994, over 
4,000 of these people had been 'relocated' by the PJV in order to make 
room for the development of the mine (Banks 1996). By that stage, 
almost 3,000 hectares of land had been leased from local landowners 
for this purpose (see Map 1.1). 
By the end of 1996, the PJV had paid about K40 million to local 
landowners in the form of general compensation for relocation and 
environmental damage (Banks and Bonnell1997a),land had spent 
another K13 million on various forms of community infrastructure in 
the Porgera Valley, aside from the Kll million which was spent in 
various parts of Enga Province under the national government's Tax 
Credit Scheme. By that point in time, about K35 million had been paid 
out in royalites, of which KZ4 million had accrued to the Enga 
Provincial Government, while the remaining Kll million had been 
shared between local landowners and the Porgera Development 
AuthOrity. The number of Engans (including Porgerans) directly 
employed by the PJV had risen from 638 in 1990 (out of a total 
workforce of 1,191) to 1,141 in 1996 (out of a total workforce of 2,087). 
The gross value of 1,942 business contracts awarded by the PJV to 
Porgeran companies in the period from 1992 to 1996 was approx-
imately K70 million. By the end of 1996, the PJV had also spent 
another KZO million on various forms of education and training, much 
of which was directed towards the population of the Porgera Valley 
(PJV 1997). 
These figures provide some indication of the sheer scale and 
intensity of the social and economic impact of the Porgera mine on the 
Porgera Valley. The studies conducted under the Porgera Social 
Monitoring Programme provide a more detailed picture of the 
outcomes of this process, as they were observed in 1993 and 1994. 
In Chapter 2, Bonnell illustrates the dramatic transformation of the 
physical environment, including the construction of the mine and its 
associated infrastructure, the creation of the new 'towns' of Suyan and 
Paiam, and the construction of schools, health facilities, roads and 
bridges, and Kairik airstrip (see Map 1.1). She then proceeds to discuss 
some of the major social changes which accompanied this 
transformation. Local health services, for example, were greatly 
improved, when measured in terms of the growth of facilities and staff 
to deal with curative medicine, but the demands of Porgerans for this 
kind of medicine, combined with weakness in the government system, 
led to a corresponding neglect of the field of preventive medicine. By 
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1993, there was an obvious need for community health extension 
programmes to deal with sexually transmitted diseases, basic hygiene 
issues, family planning, substance abuse and environmental sanitation. 
Porgera's educational bases did not really take off until the 
construction of new schools and classrooms in 1992. While the growth 
of facilities, especially community schools, was impressive, there was 
a major quality of education problem due to unacceptably high pupil-
teacher ratios in Grade 1 and the lack of curriculum materials. But by 
1993, Porgera did have the necessary mix of educational institutions to 
cater for most of the pre-tertiary education needs of the popUlation: 
vernacular pre-schools, community schools, an international primary 
school, technical high school, vocational centre and College of 
Distance Education. 
Bonnell found that the impact of large amounts of cash, especially 
in the form of compensation payments, had a negative impact on 
women and on marriage. Adultery, abandoned wives and children, 
and domestic violence became major concerns. At the same time, loss 
of land for food gardening purposes led to specific forms of 
economic hardship for many women living in the Special Mining 
Lease (SML). 
The deteriorating law and order situation was found to be the main 
problem affecting the quality of life in Porgera. However, at a time of 
rapid social change and breakdown in traditional clan discipline, the 
government system had little to offer. While the national government 
had got more directly involved in the business of mining, the PJV had 
been simultaneously forced to become more involved in providing 
government services. By 1993, it was evident that a number of other 
problems would need further attention during the life of the mining 
project: the distribution of benefits to children of the SML landowners, 
a non-mine-related economic base for 'life after the mine' in Porgera, 
and the ongoing debate about commuter mining. 
In Chapter 3, Banks focuses his attention on the mine-related 
economic base which had developed by the end of 1992. The main 
sources of direct income to local people in that year were wages, royalites, 
compensation (despite a decline from the peak year in 1991), and other 
fees, and together amounted to just under K7.5 million. Business contracts 
to the value of K35 million had been awarded to locally-based companies 
since the start of construction. Local employment with the PJV was over 
450, while five large local firms dependent (directly or indirectly) on the 
PJV employed another 300 local employees. 
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Yet only some of the value of these inputs into the local economy 
was retained within Porgera and re-spent or redistributed there. Much 
of it was either spent on trade store goods sourced outside the area, 
whose prices had the added impost of transport from distant 
distribution centres, or given to 'wantoks' from outside Porgera, or 
transferred to other towns to purchase large items, such as vehicles, 
which could not be obtained in Porgera. As a result, the rate of local 
capital accumulation was hardly any greater than it was in other parts 
of Papua New Guinea which were peripheral to the main centres. 
Banks also found that there were significant economic inequalities 
within Porgera-between communities, between men and women 
(female income being less than a third of male income), and between 
individuals, with the most affluent 10 per cent of his survey sample 
earning 60 per cent of the income, and the bottom 50 per cent earning 
just 2 per cent of the income. Another notable feature was short-term 
temporal variations, with regular fortnightly 'pulsing' of the economy, 
and longer-term fluctuations in the value of PJV inputs. 
In Chapter 4, Bonnell concentrates on the social impact of the PJV's 
relocation programme. She recounts the way in which the Relocation 
Agreement was negotiated directly between the landowners and the 
PJV as part of a larger compensation package, and goes on to tell how 
420 families were moved into relocation houses between 1989 and 
1993. Relocation provided a large number of people with a dramatic 
improvement in their standard of housing, and the benefits were 
certainly appreciated by the majority of home owners. Relocation 
houses have locked people who were previously more mobile into 
their new places of residence. The growing population density of the 
newly created relocation villages, which was due to high birth rates 
and the immigration of relatives, had brought about a shortage of food 
gardening land and other forms of environmental degradation. At the 
same time, the relocated families exhibited high rates of marital 
breakdown, which were associated with a substantial increase in the 
practice of polygyny amongst the men who had reaped the economic 
rewards of their status as SML landowners. 
In Chapter 5, Banks provides a more detailed account of the 
problem of population pressure which Bonnell mentions in both of 
her chapters. He found that subsistence agriculture continued to be 
the base of the Porgeran economic system for the bulk of the 
population, which meant that mine-derived money was still only a 
'second garden' for many Porgerans. In the SML, he found the 
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potential for a looming crisis in the agricultural system, as population 
increase and loss of land combined to place pressure on the existing 
subsistence base. Particular problems were already being experienced 
in two of the relocation villages which he cites as case studies. The 
immigrant population, which accounted for roughly 40 per cent of the 
population of the valley, and was certainly an integral part of the 
Porgeran economy, was clearly contributing to the rapid increase in 
pressure on subsistence resources. 
In Chapter 6, Banks provides another case study of the Kewai 
people resident in the Kaiya 'Lease for Mining Purposes', which was 
about to be added to the total area leased by the PJV because of the 
predicted physical impact of a new waste dump. The relatively 
marginal position of the Kewai in relation to the development of the 
mine was reflected in the fact that incomes and assets were generally 
lower than in other parts of the Porgera Valley, with alluvial mining 
providing the major source of income. Access to the area was difficult, 
and residents had to travel some distance to reach health and 
education services. There was little evidence of population pressure 
on the agricultural land resource. However, the Kewai were about to 
lose a significant proportion of their lower altitude land and gardens 
to the spoil from the proposed dump. A new compensation and 
relocation agreement was intended to ensure that, in return, they 
would receive significant benefits in the form of cash payments, some 
relocation homes, a road, and various other items of infrastructure. 
In Chapter 7, Banks enlarges on some of the points made in his first 
report (Chapter 3), by detailing the growth and development of the 
business sector at Porgera since the start of construction in 1989. 
Despite large amounts of cash compensation and business contracts 
with the mine, an increasingly skilled and sophisticated population, 
and the assistance of the PJV Business Development section, the 
business sector at Porgera had not developed as it might have done. A 
number of constraints were impinging on businesses at Porgera-
economic, financial, educational, cultural and land-related. Some of 
these could be expected to diminish over time. Contracts were a 
particular focus for the local community, but they had not provided 
the anticipated benefits to the community, largely because of a poor 
understanding of what a contract is. 
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The influence of 'custom' on the impact of the mine 
Neither Banks nor Bonnell is an anthropologist, and both authors were 
therefore reluctant to engage in an extended discussion of the 
traditional culture and social organisation of the Ipili-speaking people 
who inhabit the Porgera Valley. Yet we still need to recognise that the 
local landowners and their sundry 'guests' have by no means been 
purely passive recipients of the 'impacts' visited upon them. Indeed, 
as I have previously argued 
the word 'impact' needs to be treated with some caution, mainly 
because it suggests that relationships between the project and its social 
environment are not only dramatic but strictly unidirectional-as if the 
project were a stone thrown into a pond, and all the ripples in the 
pond should then be seen as the results of this particular event. In 
order to recognise the possibility of interaction between the project 
and its social environment, we should also think of the project as a big 
fish swimming in the pond, rather than a stone thrown into it, and 
thus allow that other, smaller fish can also make some ripples of their 
own (Filer 1996:59). 
The relationship between the PJV and the local population has been 
characterised by a level of noise, and even occasional violence, which 
may owe as much to the traditional 'political culture' of this part of the 
central highlands as it does to the social and economic impact of the 
mine itself (Filer 1997a). 
Then again, it might owe something to the previous history of 
contact between the indigenous population and various external 
forces. As Bonnell points out in Chapter 2, the Ipili of Porgera had 
already been adapting to changes resulting from trade, warfare, 
disease and famine before the European invasion began in the 1930s. 
The documented history of events which have since influenced Ipili 
society includes the 'first contact' patrols which marked the beginning 
of the modem area, local involvement in a millenarian 'cult' imported 
from another part of Enga Province, early gold prospecting activities 
in the Porgera Valley, the establishment of a government patrol post, 
the arrival of Christian missionaries, the construction of the road 
linking Porgera to Lae, the escalation of large-scale mining 
exploration, and the Mount Kare gold rush of 1988. 
If it is still possible to disentangle the effects of recent history and 
ancient tradition, we should have to ascribe a substantial part of the 
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Porgeran reaction to 'development' to a form of traditional social 
organisation which seems to reflect the peripheral position which Ipili-
speakers formerly occupied within the wider 'culture area' which is 
dominated by the far more numerous Enga-speaking population to 
the east and Huli-speaking population to the south. The flexibility of 
the rules or principles by which Ipili 'clans' recruit their members 
received a good deal of attention in Burton's (1991) social mapping 
study 
.. first because of the problems which had already arisen from 
the tendency of company and government personnel to treat 
these 'clans' as if they were corporate descent groups with 
clearly demarcated social and territorial boundaries; and 
.. second because the absence of such demarcations had 
enabled thousands of epa atene ('come stay') people to justify 
their presence in the impact area by reference to distant ties 
of kinship with the people who were officially recognised as 
the 'true landowners'. 
In Chapter 8, Aletta Biersack explores the ramifications of this 
flexible form of social organisation in greater detail, showing how it 
functions as a form of resistance to the complex process of territorial 
demarcation, group incorporation and economic stratification which 
has been set in train by the development of the mine, and how it 
serves to explain some of the aggressive postures adopted by 
community leaders in their dealings with the mining company. In this 
way, she is able to cast new light on some of the evidence of 'social 
disorder' discussed in the earlier chapters by Banks and Bonnell. 
From this account, we are led back to the problem which John 
Burton articulates in the final chapter of this volume, which is the 
PJV's failure to invest in a deeper understanding of 'traditional' 
Porgeran society during the exploration and planning phase of the 
project. More to the point, perhaps, Burton and Biersack might both 
agree that there is even more of a puzzle in the fact that this apparent 
lack of interest has continued to the present day. 
Social monitoring programmes as a matter of policy 
In the period preceding construction of the Porgera mine, the PNG 
government and the industry itself had shown little or no interest in 
monitoring the social impact of mine construction and operation 
anywhere in PNG. Neither of the industry's two main operators, 
Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) and Ok Tedi Mining Limited, 
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were required to take any responsibility for this activity under the 
terms of their separate agreements with the state. The government had 
made a commitment to monitor the social impact of the Ok Tedi mine 
when construction work began in 1980, but this was soon forgotten. A 
belated study of the social and environmental impacts of BCL's Panguna 
mine (AGA 1989), which was undertaken during the period in which 
the PJV was negotiating its various agreements with the national 
government and the local landowners, came far too late to prevent the 
outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion and the end of BCL's mining 
operations (Filer 1990). On the other hand, the rebellion itself prompted 
a new wave of interest in the question of whether social monitoring 
programmes could help to prevent the relationships between mining 
companies and local communities from deteriorating beyond the point 
of no return. 
As the stormclouds gathered over Bougainville, PNG's National 
Executive Council coincidentally decided that the production of 
'socio-economic impact studies' of all kinds should no longer be the 
sole responsibility of government, or the joint responsibility of 
government and developer, as had previously been the case, but 
should henceforth be part of the developer'S responsibility to comply 
with the Environmental Planning Act of 1978. 
However, the DEC has never yet been able to produce any detailed 
set of guidelines regarding the manner in which questions of social 
impact are to be addressed in an Environmental Management and 
Monitoring Programme. Developers have been left to formulate their 
own answers to these questions, with the result that quite different 
mechanisms for monitoring and mitigating social impacts have been 
adopted in respect of successive mining projects, without any 
consistent or concerted L.'1put from government. Although the DEC has 
normally required the establishment of a Social Impact Monitoring 
Committee in respect of each project, with a brief to identify and 
address social issues through the resources of its members, there has 
been no policy framework or procedural mechanism for relating one 
issue to another, for recognising causal connections between social 
impacts and mitigation measures, or for resolving differences of 
opinion on the way that social problems should be handled. 
In 1992, the European Union agreed to fund a Mine Monitoring 
Project within the DEC which was intended, amongst other things, to 
strengthen the department's own capacity to monitor the social impact 
of mining projects by appointing specialist field staff to a newly 
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established Social Policy Unit. This experiment has not been a great 
success. The new unit has not had the human or financial resources to 
conduct any kind of effective research programme, but the tantalising 
prospect of eventually doing so has diverted its staff from the task of 
policing and evaluating the research programmes funded by the 
mining companies themselves, and from seeking the active collaborat-
ion of other government or non-government organisations in putting 
their recommendations into practice. Mining companies have been left 
with the impression that social monitoring programmes are things 
which they fund and organise for their own internal use, and if funds 
are in short supply, they do not need to organise them at all. 
In the absence of any clear guidelines from government, there is 
still little evidence that mining companies are developing a consistent 
and sustained approach to the design and implementation of social 
monitoring programmes. Instead, we find a mixture of idiosyncratic 
organisational responses to specific social settings and community 
demands. This is not so surprising when one considers that 
.. mining projects differ from each other in several basic 
dimensions, especially their scale and their duration, which 
affect the nature and extent of their social impact; and 
.. their local social environments also vary in several basic 
dimensions, from the experience of colonial administration 
to local forms of leadership or current patterns of 
development. 
On the other hand, the companies also share some organisational 
features which make it difficult for all of them to adapt to the problem 
of social impact mitigation or risk management in the somewhat 
peculiar local environments which they encounter in Papua New 
Guinea. 
In Chapter 9, John Burton presents a detailed analysis of the causes 
and consequences of this 'performance evaluation gap', with specific 
reference to the development of the Porgera project. As he points out, 
the mining companies have commonly failed to develop the 'new 
competencies' which are necessary to bridge this gap because of the 
typical separation of an 'environmental monitoring' section or 
division, which is normally run and sometimes exclusively staffed by 
natural scientists, and a 'community affairs' section, which is normally 
staffed by individuals with 'local knowledge'. It is then left to the 
general manager to make the cerebral connections between these two 
limbs of the corporate body, but the most senior levels of project 
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management in this sector are normally reserved for engineers or 
accountants, and these individuals have even greater difficulty in 
understanding the concepts and methods of applied social science 
than do the natural scientists and public relations personnel who work 
at lower levels in the hierarchy. This corporate blind spot therefore 
duplicates and reinforces the lack of appropriate expertise in relevant 
government departments. 
Comparison of the Misima and Porgera projects, both of which 
have been developed under the conditions laid down in the 
Environmental Planning Act, shows how the same operator (in this case 
Placer Dome), presumably guided by the same general conception of 
its aims and objectives, is liable to adopt quite different approaches to 
the problem of social impact monitoring in different local contexts 
(Filer 1998). In the Misimacase, the company initially left its own 
community affairs staff to do all the social impact monitoring work (if 
such it can be called), without any assistance from external 
consultants. Their reports to the DEC consisted primarily of a record 
of the benefits which the company had provided to the local 
community, and the minutes of meetings between the authors and 
various community representatives. In the Porgera case, as this 
volume testifies, there has been greater recognition of the need for 
external assistance in the design and implementation of a social 
monitoring programme, because the community affairs staff have 
been totally absorbed by the day-to-day business of fighting the 
metaphorical fires created by a far more menacing collection of local 
stakeholders. On the other hand, as Burton explains in Chapter 9, the 
vagaries of this struggle seem to have produced a situation in which 
the programme is continually interrupted or fragmented by the 
limited attention span of senior management. It is tempting to 
attribute the whole of this contrast between Porgera and Misima to the 
difference in political style, and even political strength, between the 
two local populations surrounding the respective mines, but part of it 
is also due to the difference between the size, the likely duration, and 
the actual profitability of the two projects. 
Even where mining companies recognise that 'social monitoring' is 
something which they cannot do by themselves, as part of the routine 
practice of managing 'community affairs', there is a tendency for 
company managers and government officials to treat the monitoring 
and mitigation of social impacts in the same 'mechanical' way as the 
monitoring and mitigation of bio-physical impacts, by assuming that 
Introduction I 13 
the work consists essentially of measuring those 'things' for which 
quantitative data are already available or can readily be acquired. The 
resulting pile of numbers may obscure some of the most important 
factors in the social dynamics of a project impact area, providing little 
or no guidance to the formulation of mitigation or risk management 
strategies. The changing attitudes and values of the local community 
are an unpredictable but essential element in determining the very 
nature of the impacts which they experience, and the choice of 
strategies for dealing with them. One cannot simply establish social 
impact 'thresholds' which are comparable to something like an 
acceptable particulate level, and then require the 'triggering' of 
specific mitigation strategies as these thresholds are approached, since 
the nature of the problem and its solution will nearly always be a 
matter for negotiation between the interested parties. 
Burton makes the same point in Chapter 9, when he argues that the 
mining companies which fund and organise social monitoring 
programmes need to transcend the attitude which merely looks for the 
least cost of compliance with government standards. To which we may 
add the need for all interested members of the local community to 
have access to all the outputs of such work except insofar as this 
would constitute a breach of corporate confidentiality. Consultant 
social scientists experience a conflict of interest in the conduct of such 
work, which is typically revealed by the refusal of community 
representatives to accept the 'objectivity' of their findings, and the 
failure of government representatives to act on their 
recommendations. Both of these revelations have been characteristic of 
the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme from the time of its 
inception. The organisation of such work must therefore make 
allowance for various forms of 'feedback' to take place between the 
measurement of change in the project impact area and the evaluation 
of relationships between all stakeholders in the development 
process-including its managers and regulators. This means' speaking 
truth to power', and that truth may not always be welcome. 
In our long experience of organising or undertaking this kind of 
work for mining companies in Papua New Guinea, Burton and I have 
done our best to ensure some mutual recognition of the need to place 
the results in the public domain, and to use these results in a broader 
discussion of corporate policy. While the companies have had some 
trouble in formally ensuring this freedom, because of their own 
obligations to shareholders, they have normally been prepared to 
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acknowledge that 'secret' social monitoring studies are self-defeating. 
The PJV's endorsement of the present publication is a pleasing 
example of such transparency. 
The Porgera Social Monitoring Programme, 1996-97 
At the end of 1994, the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme entered 
a two-year period of hibernation, during which I secured the PJV's 
approval to begin the long task of preparing the reports for 
publication. For reasons unconnected with events at Porgera, 
completion of this task has been delayed to the point at which it has 
been necessary for me to convert the present tense, as used in the 
original consultancy reports, into the past tense, which now makes 
their findings seem like a contribution to the early history of the 
Porgera mine. However, the issues raised by the social and economic 
impact of the project over the last five years have been no different to 
those which were raised in the first five years of its existence. The 
more important question is the one which Burton raises in Chapter 9, 
which concerns the continued absence of a consistent institutional 
approach to the documentation and mitigation of these impacts. 
While Burton attributes this lack of consistency to the 
organisational culture of the mining company, some part of the blame, 
in this particular case, would appear to be due to the failure of the 
DEC to sustain its own role as the notional coordinator of the Porgera 
Social Monitoring Committee. In August 1996, the PJV once again took 
the initiative, by asking Glenn Banks to submit a proposal for a second 
phase of the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme. His proposal 
observed that the first phase of the programme had comprised a series 
of 'one-off' reports, without the elements of coordination and feedback 
which had been a central feature of its original design (Burton and 
Filer 1993), and went on to argue that these elements should be more 
firmly embedded in the design of a second phase. In particular, he 
emphasised the potential significance of the programme as a 
'community development planning tool', as well as a means of 
compliance with the government's environmental regulations, and 
revived the argument for regular (annual) reports which would not 
only monitor the activities of all the major stakeholders in the impact 
area, but would also supply recommendations for action to be taken 
by all of these stakeholders. At the same time, he suggested that the 
definition of the impact area be expanded to include the Lagaip-
Strickland river system, downstream of the mine, and the powerline 
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linking the mine to the Hides gas plant, because groups of 
downstream and 'upstream' landowners had both been embroiled in 
conflict with the PJV over the distribution of compensation and 
benefits from the project. 
In November 1996, three members of the original design team-
Banks, Bonnell and myself-assembled once again in the offices of the 
Community Affairs Division to hammer out the details of this 
proposal. At this stage, the new mine manager raised the possibility of 
subsuming the Social Monitoring Programme within the remit of the 
'Stakeholder Monitoring Committee' which had recently been formed, 
on the company's initiative 
• to address the conflicts which had arisen over the 
downstream impact of the waste material being discharged 
into the Porgera River 
• to implement the recommendations contained in the 
CSIRO's report on the bio-physical dimensions of this impact 
(CSIRO 1996; see also Chapter 9); and 
• to establish a new forum for dialogue between the PJV and 
those non-government organisations which had been taking 
the company to task on this issue.2 
Although we were prepared to include the Lagaip-Strickland river 
system in our own definition of the impact area, we found this 
suggestion to be inappropriate, because the geographical distribution 
of social and economic impacts could not be equated with its bio-
physical impact on the river system, and the institutional mechanisms 
required to mitigate these impacts would therefore need to involve a 
different set of stakeholders. In particular, we argued that the social 
and economic impacts of the mine were still concentrated within the 
Porgera Valley or (more broadly) within the Porgera District, and 
many of them had little or nothing to do with the discharge of waste 
material into the Porgera River. 
This argument was accepted by PJV management-not least 
because one of the most contentious issues at that time was the 
company's desire to maintain the 'fly-in/fly-out' system of commuter 
mining (see Chapter 2) against local demands for the further 
development of Payam township to accommodate a larger proportion 
of the project workforce. The company was hoping to resolve this 
issue by exchanging a reduction in the number of commuters for a 
local undertaking to reduce the incidence of 'law and order' problems 
which would otherwise dissuade its employees from taking up 
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residence in the township. The Social Monitoring Programme was 
seen as one of the devices which might assist in setting the terms of 
this reciprocal arrangement, and then making sure that both sides kept 
to their respective parts of the bargain. At the same time, the company 
recognised the need to address a variety of other issues which had 
been documented in the first phase of the programme, and our own 
design of the second phase was built around the need to determine 
what had or had not been done to implement the long list of 
recommendations appended to those earlier reports. For this reason, 
we proposed that each Annual Report would henceforth be 
accompanied by a Draft Action Plan which would continually update 
this list of recommendations, and which would then cease to be a mere 
draft once it had gained the acceptance of all the stakeholders 
represented on the Social Monitoring Committee. As in the design of 
the first phase (Burton and Filer 1993), it was envisaged that more 
detailed studies of specific problems, such as demographic change or 
'law and order', would be commissioned by the PJV as part of the 
agreed Action Plans, and that their findings would then be absorbed 
into subsequent Annual Reports. 
Once again, the design document was accepted by PJV 
management. Banks and Bonnell then set about collecting the data 
required for the 1996 Annual Report, which was duly submitted to the 
company, along with a Draft Action Plan, in July 1997 (Banks and 
Bonnell1997a, 1997b). Some weeks later, both documents were 
presented to a meeting of the Social Monitoring Committee, whose 
membership had now been extended to include the Porgera District 
Administration, Porgera Development Authority, Porgera and Paiela 
Local Government Councils, Porgera Landowners Association and 
Porgera Women's Association, as well as the PJV, the DEC, the 
Department of Mining and Petroleum, and the Department of Enga 
Province. Agreement was reached on most of the measures proposed 
in the Draft Action Plan, which was then redrafted as the Action Plan 
in September 1997 (Banks and Bonnell1997c). But we do not know 
how many of the planned actions have since been taken, because the 
consultants have not yet been asked to produce an Annual Report for 
1997, let alone for 1998, nor have we yet seen any sign of the detailed 
studies which they recommended. 
Rather than speculate on the reasons for this second period of 
hibernation, I shall simply note that our own reason for not including 
a revised version of the 1996 Annual Report as a separate chapter in 
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the present volume is that we thought this ought to constitute the first 
substantive chapter in a second volume devoted to the findings of the 
second phase of the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme. Besides 
which, we have yet to secure the PJV's approval for publication of this 
material, and there is reason to believe that the volume of noise and 
heat which has been generated by some of its recommendations 
would cause the company to hesitate. On the other hand, there is also 
reason to expect that further studies of the social and economic impact 
of the mine will be undertaken during the course of the next decade, 
whether or not these are commissioned by the PJY, and we trust that 
the publication of this volume will serve to encourage and guide the 
formulation of these studies. 
Notes 
1 This is much higher than the 'official' figure of about K18 million 
contained in the company's own information booklet (PJV 1997), 
but there are good reasons to suppose that Banks and Bonnell have 
got closer to the mark. 
2 This committee has since been renamed the Porgera Environmental 
Advisory Komiti, and presently includes three company 
representatives, three government representatives, four non-
government organisation representatives, with an independent 
chairperson acceptable to all parties (see Atkinson 1998; Van den 
Brand and Parkop 1998). 
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Social change in the Porgera 
Valley 
Susanne Bonnell 
This chapter is based on the observations which I made during my 
period of employment with the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV), from 
February 1989 to October 1991, and an additionalll-week period of 
fieldwork in the Porgera area between October 1992 and May 1993, 
conducted as part of the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme. 
According to the terms of reference established for my own 
contribution to this programme, I was to 
'" describe and provide information on the changes which took 
place in the social environment of the Porgera mine impact 
area from the end of 1988 to the present (i.e. to mid 1993) 
'" identify undesirable impacts and trends and where possible 
recommend strategies to eliminate or minimise these 
impacts and trends; and 
'" identify existing and potential resources in the community, 
government and PJV which could be utilised for long term 
social deve10pment strategies for the mine impact area. 
Fourteen separate components of the Porgera social environment were 
simultaneously identified as the objects of my study, from 'relocation 
and settlement patterns' through to 'socially disruptive influences'. 
My study is thus concerned with the processes of social change 
from the beginning of 1989 to mid 1993. Although the Special Mining 
Lease (SML) was not granted until May 1989, the building and 
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Economic Impact Study:
Social and
statistics on health and education in Wabag and told not to interview 
provincial public servants located there. By the time this problem was 
sorted out, the buildings which would have contained this 
information had been destroyed by the fire which followed the 
suspension of the Enga Provincial Government. Police in Wabag kept 
no crime statistics. I was never able to find out if the data I was 
looking for existed or not. Fortunately the very informative Enga Six 
Year Education Plan (1992-97), written in 1991, had been widely 
distributed. Otherwise, the search for the elusive data which should 
have existed as part of the standard national data collection system (1 
was not looking for state secrets) was time consuming and frustrating. 
Apart from the survey interviews conducted in the relocation 
houses (see Chapter 4), I interviewed a wide variety of other 
individuals, including public servants, PJV employees, church leaders, 
school teachers and heads of various organisations. I attempted to 
seek out as wide a range of opinion as possible. Those with anti-mine 
sentiments appeared to speak quite frankly. My visits coincided with 
those of Father Phil Gibbs (a well-known Catholic priest who had 
done genealogical work in the area) and Chris Ballard (a researcher 
from the Australian National University in Canberra) who gave me 
some very interesting insights into the evolutionary context of certain 
changes occurring in Porgera. 
A study of this kind necessarily has serious limitations. The broad 
terms of reference combined with a one-person research approach 
means that a lot of areas were not investigated or were incompletely 
investigated. It is hoped that the breadth of my study does something 
to compensate for its lack of depth. I have tried to show the various 
ways in which the development of the mine had either directly or 
indirectly introduced social benefits and social costs. The presence of 
the mine may also have accelerated social trends which were already 
present. However, it must also be stressed that many of the social 
problems identified in this study were not unique to Porgera-they 
were national problems. These included: a high birth rate which 
showed no sign of decreasing; the large percentage of population 
under the age of 15, which put further stress on the already stressed 
health and education systems; an increasing law and order problem; 
the breakdown of clan discipline; trade stores; alcohol abuse; and 
domestic violence. My original report to the PJV contained a long list 
of recommendations which were intended to spark discussion and 
debate between Porgerans themselves and the staff of relevant 
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national and provincial government agencies, as well as those of the 
mining company, which might lead to an improvement in the 
socioeconomic situation of Porgera District and Enga Province. These 
recommendations have not been included in the published version of 
the report, in case they serve to embarrass some of the relevant 
stakeholders, but the reader will not find it difficult to infer their 
general character from the findings presented here. 
The Ipili of Porgera 
This brief sketch is intended to highlight aspects of Ipili culture and 
the impact of events since foreign intrusion in 1938. While the 
development of the mine has led, either directly or indirectly, to 
considerable change in Ipili society, change and adaptation have 
always been a feature of any existing culture. Prior to European 
intrusion, Ipili society would have been adapting to changes resulting 
from trade, warfare, disease and famine. Although Pacific 
Agribusiness (1987), Gibbs (1977), Meggitt (1957) and Biersack (1980, 
1982,1987,1991) have written at greater length and depth about 
aspects of Ipili culture, there is still a need for a more comprehensive 
anthropological study of the Ipili of Porgera. 
Environment and culture 
The Ipili are a cultural and linguistic group located in two census 
divisions of the Porgera District of Enga Province. The Eastern Ipili of 
Porgera occupy land of a generally higher elevation than the Western 
Ipili of Paiela. The disadvantage of malaria prevalent in the Paiela area 
is offset by the less productive land of the Porgera area. 
The Porgera Valley is characterised by steep mountains at altitudes 
ranging from about 1,800 to 3,500m. Soil fertility is variable, but 
generally of poor quality compared with the rest of Enga Province. 
Both the altitude and soil fertility limit the types of crops which can be 
grown. Porgera has an average annual rainfall of about 3,500mm, with 
no marked dry season. This high rainfall is linked to extensive cloud 
cover, particularly at higher altitudes (see Chapter 5). The high rainfall 
often leads to soil saturation and landslides. The average daily 
temperature of 11-22° celsius varies little throughout the year. The 
Porgera Valley is also characterised by low wind speeds, and there 
have been no reported frosts in the area. 
The origins and length of occupation of the Ipili are not known. It 
has been suggested that the Ipili originated from migrations westward 
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from Enga and northwards from the Tari basin. While there are many 
similarities with their neighbours, there are also striking differences in 
terms of kinship, land tenure, beliefs and ceremonies. 
The Ipili practise a form of cognatic kinship in which individuals 
trace their descent through both male and female links to a founding 
ancestor (Burton 1991:10). An Ipili is therefore a member of many 
descent groups. This form of kinship offers a great deal of flexibility 
for land usage rights. As the Ipili were subsistence horticulturalists, 
this would be particularly advantageous where soil fertility is poor. 
On the other hand, cognatic kinship divides an individual's loyalties 
between various descent lines. This reduces the possibilities for a 
strong clan leadership system, and tends to fragment society into 
smaller groups. Leadership, as in other parts of the highlands, is 
achieved as opposed to inherited. The Ipili had male leaders who were 
big men, akali andane, and wise men, nembo yene. These leaders had 
accrued wealth, spoke well, interpreted events, and advised on the 
best course of action. But the outside influences of cash and education 
has led to a conflict between traditional values and new forces (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[1]:19). Today, the road to becoming a big man is 
through success in business or politics or, as is usual in PNG, the 
combination of both. 
Recent history 
European intrusion into Porgera has mainly been from three sectors: 
mining, government and Christian missions. It was generally 
accepted that Porgera's first contact with the outside world was the 
Taylor /Black patrol of 1938. Banks (Chapter 3) suggests that the 
first European intruders were the Fox brothers on an 'unauthorised 
expedition' in 1934. Gibbs (1977:11) reports that the arrival of James 
Taylor and John Black had a profound impact on the Ipili of 
Porgera 
Older men told me of their fearful reactions when they first witnessed 
the arrival of the 'redmen'. The 'redmen' were immediately thought to 
be yama or spirits and women and children were sent to hide in the 
forests while some of the men killed pigs as propitiatory offerings. 
Aircraft were used for reconnaissance in conjunction with the patrol 
and people told me how fearful they were of these noisy flying objects. 
Men also told me that several people were shot and killed by the 
patrol. 
Although the Taylor /Black Hagen-Sepik patrol was a government 
exploration patrol, gold prospecting also featured as part of the 
Social change in the Porgera Valley I 23 
patrol's activities. It was during this patrol that gold colours were 
found in the Porgera River. John Black wrote in his diary on 31 March 
1939, 'After finding gold today I am not elated but rather awed with 
the dangers of wealth if it should turn out to be wealth' (Handley 
1993:3). Although Black was of course referring to himself, it was 
somewhat prophetic in view of the future impact of gold wealth on 
the lives of the Ipili. 
The next recorded impact on the Ipili was the cult from Lyeimi 
about 1942 (Meggitt 1957; Gibbs 1977). A Taro Enga prophet appeared 
preaching change, and carried the message that the earth was going to 
end and the people who practised the new way of life would go to live 
in the sky. This millenarian cult paved the way for the acceptance of 
Christian missionaries who carried a similar message. 
After World War U, and while the Ipili were still under the 
influence of the Lyeimi cult, the first gold prospectors entered the 
Porgera Valley. Jim Taylor, who was then a District Officer in the Central 
Highlands, issued permits to enter Porgera to Joe Searson, Mick and Jim 
Leahy, Elphinstone and John Black. This expedition ran out of supplies 
and failed to find gold. Joe Searson remained behind in 1946 and settled 
among the Ipili people. There was a minor gold rush in 1948, which 
resulted in a number of European miners seeking their fortune (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[1]:6). The Ipili were introduced to a cash economy by 
these early prospectors, and they purchased goods at a local trade store 
which was opened by Jim Taylor, who also had mining leases in the 
area. The Ipili learned the skills to become alluvial miners themselves. 
During the 1950s, Catholic and Lutheran missionaries made regular 
patrols to Porgera. Shortly after Porgera was de-restricted in 1962, the first 
permanent Christian mission stations were established. Catholic 
missionaries acquired land for their stations at Mungalep and Tipinini 
(see Map 1.1). Lutheran missionaries acquired land at Yuyan, then located 
near the government's patrol post and airstrip, which had both been 
established in 1961. Apostolic missionaries took out leases at Anawe and 
Ingau, and the Seventh Day Adventists at Yendakali and Kairik. 
Missionaries played an important role in the early social and economic 
development of Porgera. They introduced new vegetables and cash crops, 
built roads, promoted cash cropping and sawmilling, and established 
schools and health facilities (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:7). 
In the 1960s, mining leases were granted to companies for 
exploration. Companies involved in early exploration included Bulolo 
Gold Dredging, which was amalgamated with Placer in 1966, Mount 
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Isa Mines, Anaconda Australia, and Ada Explorations. In 1972, the 
four-wheel-drive vehicular track reached Porgera from Laiagam. This 
led to further intrusions and influences from the outside world, and 
no doubt assisted in the intensification of local mining activities in the 
1970s. Initial involvement of the Ipili in alluvial mining began when 
they were hired as labourers for the colonial gold works. Later, Ipili 
alluvial gold miners worked on existing leases on a tribute basis, 
sharing profits with expatriate leaseholders. This tribute system lapsed 
in 1983, after a major gold strike at Waruwari triggered a gold rush. By 
this time, Yuyan had become a major informal gold buying centre, and 
Ipili miners panned gold which they sold directly to official or unofficial 
buyers. Gold became known as the 'second garden' for the Ipili. 
In 1988 there was a major, and totally Melanesian, gold rush at 
Mount Kare, only a day's walk from Porgera. Here many Ipili from 
both Porgera and Paiela made and lost fortunes. The events of Mount 
Kare will no doubt become legends to occupy night time story-telling 
in Ipili households for years to come. 
The Ipili and the Porgera Mine 
By 1993, the development of the Porgera mine could already be 
broken down into five stages, each of which could be characterised by 
different attitudes and responses to change, particularly from the SML 
landowners as well as the wider community.1 
The exploration stage lasted until about 1987. The change from 
individual prospectors to company mining leases and the escalation of 
exploration activity were relatively gradual and benign. Porgerans 
benefited from increased employment and trade. Knowledge was 
increased, producing a greater desire for the perceived benefits of the 
outside world. This change was easily absorbed and the gains exceeded 
the costs. Mining activity injected some cash into the economy 
primarily in the form of wages and some compensation. Profits from 
alluvial mining were an important source of cash. 
In the pre-construction stage, from 1987 to mid 1989, the possibility 
of a mine became a reality. Tension increased in the community. Different 
vested interest groups, both within and without the SML and Porgera 
District, jockeyed for support and negotiated for benefits, often 
exacerbating the unrealistic expectations of benefits to be acquired. 
Landowners shifted, built, and planted to increase their chances for 
compensation. Disputes over land boundaries escalated, as did 
conflicts between the young and the old for leadership. In 1988, 
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tension was defused to a certain degree by the Mount Kare gold rush, 
which divided the energies of many SML landowners and offered 
alternative possibilities for non-SML landowners. In Porgera itself, 
preparations for mining injected more cash into the economy in the 
form of wages and increasing compensation payments. The large 
compensation payments began just as cash from Mount Kare was 
decreasing at the end of 1988. 
In the construction stage, from mid 1989 to 1991, tension between 
the landowners and the PJV was increased by the insensitivities and 
carelessness of the 'fast tracking' construction contractors who were 
rearranging the Porgera geography. No amount of education or 
familiarisation trips to other mines can really prepare people for the 
impact of the loss of use (or permanent loss of land), for the impact of 
a large work force, and the indecent haste of construction. This was a 
period of maximum social disruption. Anger was directed towards the 
mine by people who either received no benefits or benefits below the 
level of expectation. Mining activity injected a great deal of cash into 
the local economy in the form of wages, business contracts, and 
compensation payments, while income from Mount Kare largely 
ceased. Categories of 'haves' and 'have-nots' were created, leading to 
jealousy and greed. 
The first phase of operations, which began in 1991, was a period of 
adjustment, adaptation and re-evaluation. Cash income from wages 
and compensation was still significant but already declining. Royalty 
payments began, but there were fewer business contracts after 
construction had been completed. 
The second phase of operations, which showed signs of emerging 
in 1992, was characterised by the anger of the children of the first 
generation of landowners who felt cheated by the greed or ignorance 
of their parents. Cash availability was greatly reduced: wages and 
royalties were the major source of cash income, but business contracts 
continued to diminish in value. The SML landowners were placed 
under additional stress by the problem of having so little time to 
adjust to the anger and frustration of their children. 
Urban development and physical infrastructure 
The Ipili of Porgera felt left out of the many changes taking place in 
Papua New Guinea. The mine represented the chance to catch up and 
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enter the modem world. This led Porgerans to focus their energies on 
demands for physical infrastructure and economic gains. Anger and 
frustration continued to boil to the surface as limitations of finance 
and institutional capacity failed to cope with the seemingly endless list 
of demands for buildings on and near the government station and 
permanently closed Porgera airstrip. 
Towns and urban services 
The Porgera government station was established in 1961 by a land 
purchase from the Maipangi clan. The amount of land purchased, 
while adequate for the time, was not adequate for all the services and 
facilities needed for a town to service a large mine. From late 1989 to 
April 1991, Porgera Station experienced a building boom: several new 
residences, a guest house (Mountain Lodge), a police station with 
cells, a community centre, a women's resource centre, an office 
complex for the PDA, plus improvements to the health centre. There 
were also several improvements to the community school on land 
adjacent to the station but under a lease to the Lutheran church. In 
April 1991, there was a major landslide which lasted a couple of 
weeks. The slide destroyed the airstrip, the new police station and the 
women's centre, and threatened many other buildings before the 
ground stopped moving. 
While growth had been substantial, there were still several 
amenities that Porgera Station did not have, even in 1993. 
.. Public toilets. Given the number of people who were 
congregating in the town on pay fortnights in an area with 
endemic typhoid, this was a major concern. 
.. Public telephones. The national government gave an 
undertaking in the Development forum that the Post and 
Telecommunications Corporation would be directed to 
install public phones within six months of the signing of the 
forum agreements in May 1989. Phones anywhere in the 
Porgera area were problematic in 1989. Public telephones 
were installed in Suyan for the use of PJV residents in 1991. 
But the delay in installing public phones at Porgera Station 
angered landowners and public servants alike. 
.. Post Office. This was also promised under the Porgera forum 
agreements. A post office agency was acquired by Ipili 
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Porgera Investments' (IPT's) Sullivan's Store (later known as 
Supa Store) but since it operated out of Wabag it did not 
work. The PJV took out a box, and even altered its new 
address on stationary and business cards, but since the 
postal agency was inefficient the company ceased using it. In 
May 1993, public servants in Porgera still had to drive to 
Wabag to pick up mail-another source of frustration for 
themselves and local landowners. 
With the subsequent development of Paiam township, it was assumed 
that a post office with public telephones would be constructed there, 
but there would still be a need for public toilets at Porgera Station. 
In 1989, Westpac operated limited banking services from a 
container located in the yard of Sullivan's store. Bank agents did not 
always arrive for their scheduled fortnightly visits, which were 
meant to coincide with both PJV and government paydays. At that 
time, the government cash office also served as a Papua New Guinea 
Banking Corporation (PNGBC) agency which offered limited savings 
account transactions (for example with a maximum K200 
withdrawal), but it was frequently unmanned. At a time when 
Porgerans had large amounts of cash from selling gold excavated at 
Mount Kare and from the large PJV compensation payments of 1989, 
the limited banking services did not support efforts to encourage 
savings. The armed hold-ups at the Westpac container certainly were 
a problem, but no more so than the armed hold-ups in other parts of 
the country. In 1990, the PNGBC opened a full branch in Porgera. 
Initially there was much chaos, as everyone who had Westpac 
accounts changed over to PNGBC, but this bank provided a much 
needed service. The bank manager was a popular guest speaker at 
women's leadership courses, and did a lot to encourage women to 
save their share of the compensation payments made for the Paiam 
land purchase. 
As there was insufficient land at Porgera Station for urban growth 
relating to mine development, the national government purchased 
land at Paiam to cater for this need. The proposed services and 
facilities represented a new beginning, and even Porgera's entry into 
the 'modern world'. The development of Paiam Town was the 
responsibility of the PDA and the Enga Provincial Town Planning 
Board. Funding for public buildings came from vario.us tied grants. 
The standard of commercial buildings was likely to be problematic. 
History has shown that most Engans and Porgerans do not invest in 
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real estate in Enga Province because of the risk factor, so it was not 
clear in 1993 how successful the town would actually be. It promised 
to provide even more amenities (including a hospital, high school, and 
recreational facilities) to draw even more outsiders into the Porgera 
area. Some Porgeran leaders had an unrealistic picture of a 
peaceful, integrated town with no fences and a strict building 
code to ensure attractiveness. Yet one had only to look at the 
neighbouring towns of Laiagam, Tari, Kandep and Wabag to see 
the difficulties ahead: steel buildings with unsightly security 
fences; buildings burned and destroyed in payback or random 
violence; betel nut stains, graffiti and overflowing rubbish bins 
and litter. 
Suyan, the other 'township' in the area, was really not a town at 
all-it was an accommodation compound for PJV employees. The land 
had not been purchased but had been leased by the PJV from the 
Aipakane clan. By mid 1993, Suyan consisted of six eight-room 
'motels', 44 eight-room 'bunk houses', 30 three-bedroom married 
houses (of which 16 were actually occupied by families), a mess and 
an indoor sports complex. Many Porgerans were resentful that Suyan 
was a fenced enclave rather than an open, integrated town, but it was 
ironic that the very Porgeran leaders who wanted the fence removed 
from Suyan (and wanted no fences in Paiam town either) had fences 
around their own homesteads. 
In 1993, the Porgera Local Government Council was operating a 
truck for rubbish collection in Porgera and Suyan, and was due to 
extend this service to the new Paiam township. Collecting rubbish is 
one thing-disposing of it is another. The problem of rubbish disposal 
was a mixture of the NIMBY ('not in my back yard') factor and the 
general instability of land in the Porgera Valley. Initially, the council 
was adding to the unsightly nature of Porgera Station by dumping 
rubbish into the Maiapam creek at the edge of the station. 
Furthermore, the council was not providing a rural village service, and 
this meant that rubbish disposal was a growing problem in the 
relocation areas (see Chapter 4). 
Road construction 
The equation 'roads equal development' has a long tradition in PNG. 
Indeed roads do bring access to services and provide the means for 
marketing cash crops. Porgerans, like people of any other neglected area 
of Papua New Guinea, are keen for road development. There are two 
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perspectives on road development in Porgera-one is the PJV's need for 
a lifeline to the coast, and the other is Porgerans' own desire for access. 
The responsibility for the upgrading and maintenance of the 
Highlands Highway as far as Wabag has been the responsibility of the 
PJV The road to Lae is the mine's very vulnerable lifeline. Indeed, if 
there had been no mine in Porgera, it is quite reasonable to assume 
that the Maip road would have collapsed, leaving the Porgerans 
without road access to Wabag, Mount Hagen and Lae. As popular as 
the upgrading of the Porgera-Wabag-Hagen road has been, the 
Porgerans have long wished for alternate access to Mount Hagen 
through Tari in order to ensure free access to Mount Hagen when clan 
tensions in the Laiagam District make road travel hazardous. While 
the road to Tari would provide an alternate route to Mount Hagen and 
Lae, the downside is that it would probably bring in more outsiders 
from the Southern Highlands and alcohol for the black markets which 
flourish in Porgera. 
Road links to Paiela (under construction in 1993) are also a mixed 
bag of benefits and disadvantages. While many Paielans wanted easy 
access to Porgera and the benefits thought to derive from this access, 
some Paielans did not want the road. While it would possibly provide 
the means for some Paielans to live only part-time, as opposed to full-
time, in Porgera, and would open up potential for agricultural 
development (betelnut comes to mind), some Paielans rightly felt that 
they would pay too high a price in social disruption. On the other 
hand, the bridge and road access to Yuyan and Politika was 
undoubtedly popular, since the people of Yuyan felt slighted once 
their position as the commercial centre for gold-buying shifted to 
Mungalep and Alipis. 
People, both landowners and outsiders, gravitate to roads. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than along the Tipinini-Kairik-
Paiam-Suyan corridor. The same trend had also become a problem on 
the Waile Creek road. Yet the main problem with road development 
was the demand for instant construction. This was simply not 
feasible, and the outcome was that, in order to meet these demands, 
inadequate money was budgeted for road maintenance. The Yuyan 
road was barely trafficable in a four-wheel drive vehicle in May 
1993. Another problem with the indecent haste of road construction 
is that machines tend to be used in situations where hand labour 
contracts could be issued. Hand labour may be slower, but it does 
spread the wealth. 
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The most unusual feature of roads in and around Porgera was that 
some were literally paved with gold. Stockpiles of ore of too Iowa 
grade to be economically processed in Porgera were crushed and used 
to surface roads. Whenever this happened, people risked the danger of 
the dump trucks to try their luck mining the road. 
Despite all the road-building activity, most local people still walked 
long distances, and often pedestrians were often overlooked in the 
demands for roads. Pity the pedestrian in Porgera. Heavy traffic made 
the roadside dangerous, as well unbelievably dusty when dry (two 
hours without rain would do), and muddy when wet. This dust and 
danger was a source of constant complaint from landowners and the 
Porgera Women's Association. The sealing of the road at Paiam town, 
and from Suyan to the mine site, made life easier for the pedestrian, 
and proposals had been made to construct pedestrian foot paths from 
Kairik to the minesite. 
Both the PDA and PJV supported efforts to construct footbridges 
over rivers. Footbridges are a tremendous advantage for dangerous 
creeks and rivers, although they were not always utilised. One day, at 
the footbridge at the end of the Suyan relocation road, I watched in 
apprehension as a woman with bilum and baby on her back led her 
other children across the river. She was only about 100 metres from the 
footbridge. People do not change habits easily. 
Commuter mining 
Porgerans wanted a residential mining town to be built as one of the 
conditions for their approval of the mine. This requirement is contained 
in the Porgera forum agreements, as well as the Mining Development 
Contract between the State of Papua New Guinea and the PJV. Under 
the Mining Development Contract, the PJV is required to actively 
promote the residence of mine operations personnel in the Porgera area. 
In 1993, most PJV employees were still working a shift of 20 days 
on and ten days off, commuting to and from their place of recruitment 
by plane or road. This arrangement is normally called commuter 
mining, but tends to be known in PNG as 'fly-in/fly-out' (FIFa) 
because of the fact that most employees commute by plane or 
helicopter. The FIFa issue has been a long standing grievance of the 
Porgeran landowners. 
The PJV constructed Kairik airstrip as required under the mining 
agreements. Opening of the airstrip was delayed due to arguments 
over the standard of the airstrip-both basic construction standards 
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and the question of how the design limited the category of aircraft 
which could use the strip. Another source of grievance concerned 
terminal facilities. It was left to the PDA, the managers of the airstrip, 
to develop facilities for regular passenger services. The PJV 
constructed a terminal for its own employees who departed daily on 
charter flights. At this facility, everyone had to suffer the indignity of 
being searched for alcohol on the way in and gold on the way out. 
Table 2.1 shows that the PJV had 720 non-Porgeran staff in 1993, 
and another 376 non-Porgeran award employees. It is not known how 
many of these employees were married. By May 1993, the PJV had 
constructed 30 married houses at Suyan, of which 15 were occupied 
by the 2 per cent of staff employees who were residing permanently in 
Porgera with their families. The remaining non-Porgeran work force 
was commuting by plane or road.2 
The primary reason that Porgeran landowners wanted employees 
to reside in a town in Porgera was so that they could profit from 
business spin-offs. A second reason, though not often heard, was that, 
if most PJV employees and their families lived in Porgera, this would 
demonstrate a commitment by the PJV to remain for a 'long time'. The 
PJV's preference has obviously been for commuter mining. I say 
'obviously' because the company could have made more efforts to 
comply with its commitments to urban development. While much of 
the PJV's cautious approach could be attributed to economics, the 
company had some other very valid reasons. 
.. The primary reason was the law and order situation. The 
PJV could not guarantee the safety of its employees. To add 
families would have made the situation even more difficult. 
.. Many non-citizen and coastal employees would not be 
willing to move their families to Porgera because of the law 
and order problem and lack of amenities. 
.. Another factor was the availability of land at Suyan and 
Paiam. Full compliance would have required further land 
acquisition, which might not have been in the best long-term 
interests of landowners. 
There also appeared to be a lack of commitment by the national 
government to ensure that the PJV (in which it had a 25 per cent stake) 
actively promoted the residence of mine staff in the area. In one of his 
1992 reports on the implementation of the Porgera forum agreements, 
the Porgera District Manager, Graham Taylor, wrote that the national 
government 
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has not written to the Board of Management of the PJV outlining its 
requirements in this matter. Whilst we recognise that the PJV is taking 
steps to locate its staff in Porgera despite the constraints that exist, the 
onus in this matter is one for the National Government to spell out to 
the PJV what basic facilities the Government will bring to Porgera, 
what it will do to bring serenity to the place (and this must include 
reducing the migration in of squatters) and what timetable, what 
standard of houses it expects the PJV to put up. The National 
Government can not ensure the promotion of residence of mine 
personnel without giving a direction to the PJV and allowing the PJV 
to respond to the policy and the landowners to respond. This matter is 
unclear. 
Members of the Porgera Landowners Association expressed concern 
in quarterly review meetings that the delays might lead to non-
implementation; and they were right. 
Health 
The difficulty in obtaining health data was extremely frustrating. I was 
initially denied access to information in Wabag. By the time this 
difficulty was overcome, the information had been destroyed when 
the provincial government office complex was burned to the ground 
in early 1993. Despite the fact that health staff in Porgera were very 
cooperative, reports on file were patchy. I was unable to locate any 
annual reports for Porgera District for the years 1987, 1988 and 1990, 
and for some reason, at the last minute, was denied access to 
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maternal and child health data. Maternal and child health 
information was not included in the Porgera District Annual Reports 
for 1989, 1991 and 1992. By 1993, record keeping at the Porgera 
Health Centre had greatly improved due to the efforts of the new 
medical officer, Dr Padraig Kramer. A computerised system had also 
been introduced by Dr Michael Hohnen at the Anawe Medical 
Centre. 
Besides the absence of health data, another problem in 
examining the health situation in Porgera was the lack of recent 
and reliable census information. With the unknown number of 
outsiders moving into Porgera, population projections previously 
used were meaningless. No one knew how many people were 
living in Porgera Census Division, nor the sex and age breakdowns 
which would be necessary to analyse infant welfare clinic coverage, 
supervised births, family planning acceptors, disease frequency 
and so on. In hindsight, time would have been more profitably 
spent investigating the aid posts in Porgera instead of pursuing the 
fruitless paper chase. 
Anecdotal evidence supports the impression that health services in 
Porgera deteriorated from 1987 to 1989. As a result of the Mount Kare 
gold rush, many of the staff of both the Porgera and Paiela health 
centres and the aid posts left to try their luck on the gold fields. 
Health services in Paiela were reportedly the hardest hit. In 
addition, in early 1989, tribal fighting and tensions between clans 
in the Laiagam and Porgera districts led to frequent closures of the 
Porgera Health Centre because most of the health staff were non-
Porgeran Engans. A further problem was shortage of drugs, which 
was (and still is) a nation-wide problem. From mid 1989, as a direct 
result of mining development, the health services in Porgera began 
to improve. The first improvement was long overdue maintenance 
on the health centre undertaken by the PJV's construction 
contractors. In mid 1989, the PJV's medical officer, Dr Michael 
Hohnen, arrived. In order to strengthen rather than compete with 
the government health services, he conducted clinics at the health 
centre and provided much needed medicine. His presence 
undoubtedly prevented many deaths during the 1989-90 typhoid 
outbreak as well as the continuing problem of infant pneumonia. 
This arrangement remained in place until the government medical 
officer, Dr Padraig Kramer, assumed duties in Porgera in 1991, thus 
fulfilling another of the long-awaited provisions of the 1989 forum 
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agreements between the government and the landowning 
community. 
Health facilities and staffing 
According to the 1992 Annual Report, the Porgera Health Centre had 
40 beds and a staff of 23 headed by a medical officer. There was no 
classification of staff by qualifications-for example Health Extension 
Officer, Nursing Officer and Community Health Worker. The 23 staff 
included six casual workers who I assumed to be the cook, cleaners 
and driver. 
PJV's Anawe Medical Centre provided medical and occupational 
health services to PJV employees, contractors and subcontractors-
approximately 1,800 people altogether, including local Porgeran 
employees. The centre staff would also treat referrals from the Porgera 
Health Centre and would treat emergencies presenting at the mine site 
gate. The staff of the centre included two medical officers, three health 
extension officers, one anaesthetic technician/nurse/first aid trainer, 
one ambulance driver / first aid trainer, and three aid post orderlies / 
nurse aids. The centre was better equipped than the Porgera Health 
Centre and provided services to a much smaller population. Because 
the centre was not a government facility, it had the organisational 
capacity to hire and fire staff and to obtain the drugs and equipment 
needed to provide an effective service. 
Construction on the new multi-million kina Paiam Hospital 
commenced in early 1994. This facility was negotiated by Porgera 
landowners as part of the Porgera forum agreements. The desire for 
such a major facility was a reflection of Porgerans' desire for curative 
medicine when what was really required was more preventive 
medicine. While there was no question that Porgera health facilities 
needed improvement, there were good reasons to think that the plan 
for this hospital was inappropriate for local needs. The anticipated 
benefits of the new hospital were 
• an improvement in diagnostic facilities which should 
prevent people from shopping around for 'cures' in Mount 
Hagen and Lae 
• an improvement in operating facilities 
• an improvement in labour wards and maternity facilities 
• a possible improvement in staff morale (if improved housing 
were also provided); and 
• the availability of dental treatment. 
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On the other hand, criticisms of the proposed hospital included 
the following points 
.. it was a high-tech flashy solution which did not address the 
basic problems of health care 
.. it might attract even more outsiders to Porgera 
.. it would be difficult to keep clean 
.. it was not clear who would be running the hospital, and if the 
government were running it, that would be another problem 
.. given the general reputation of Enga Province and the 
prevailing attitude of some Porgerans towards the existing 
health staff, it would be difficult to recruit new outside staff 
for the hospital 
.. it would be costly to operate.3 
The Porgera hospital thus showed every indication of becoming an 
administrative and financial nightmare. Another concern would then 
be the community response when the unrealistic expectations of the 
benefits of this hospital were not realised. 
In 1987, aid posts servicing the Porgera Census Division were 
located at Politika, Yuyan, Mungalep, Tipinini, Pakoandaka, Kairik, 
Yapatep and Waruwari (mine) (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). In 1993, the 
aid posts were located at Politika (unmanned), Nekeyanga, Mungalep, 
Tipinini, Pakoandaka, Kairik, Yapatep, Kulapi and Yarik. The 
Waruwari aid post was moved to Yokolama #2 in 1989, until the 
Anawe Medical Centre was completed on the plant site in 1990. As 
mentioned above, aid post services in the district were severely 
affected by the Mount Kare gold rush. There was a great deal of 
subsequent improvement and upgrading of aid posts and houses for 
aid post orderlies in all of Porgera District by the PDA under the PJV's 
Community Facilities Grant. In addition, as part of the relocation 
agreement, the PJV constructed aid posts and relocation houses for the 
government supplied staff at Yarik and Kulapi. The old aid post at 
Kairik, which was vandalised and virtually destroyed, was located on 
the site of the new airstrip. 
Disease patterns 
The leading causes of admissions to the Anawe Medical Centre were 
pneumonia, malaria, typhoid and trauma. The leading in-patient 
diagnoses at the Porgera Health Centre from May 1992 to February 
1993 were pneumonia, diarrhoea/ gastroenteritis, measles, typhoid 
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fever, obstetric problems and anaemia (see Table 2.2). Typhoid was 
no longer as prevalent as it had been in the recent past. Dr Michael 
Hohnen (pers. comm.) reported that in 1989/90, 40 per cent of 
Table 2.2 In-patient diagnoses at Porgera Health Centre, May 1992 to 
February 1993 
Diagnosis ICD Code Frequency Percentage 
Pneumonia 321 287 21.78 
Diarrhoea/gastroenteritis 016.1 149 11.31 
Measles 042 109 8.27 
Typhoid fever 011 80 6.07 
Obstetric problems 39 to 41 71 5.39 
Anaemia 200 62 4.70 
Oral candidiasis (thrush) ? 45 3.41 
Influenza/URTI 312 35 2.66 
Heart problems 25,283 31 2.35 
Assault injury E 551 30 2.28 
Open wounds 50 29 2.20 
Dysentery 016.2 26 1.97 
Eye problems 23 20 1.52 
Chronic obstr. airways disease 323 20 1.52 
Skin problems 42 17 1.29 
Perinatal problems 45 17 1.29 
Pelvic inflammatory disease 372 16 1.21 
Ear problems 24 15 1.14 
Musculoskeletal problems 43 15 1.14 
Internal injuries 49 15 1.14 
Fractures 47 14 1.06 
Scabies 079.1 11 0.83 
Psychiatric problems 21 8 0.61 
Meningitis 220 8 0.61 
Malaria 052 6 0.46 
Accidental injury E 52 6 0.46 
Miscellaneous bacterial diseases 03 6 0.46 
Motor vehicle accident E 474 3 0.23 
Abortion 380 2 0.15 
Cancer 08 to 14 2 0.15 
Miscellaneous viral diseases 110 0.08 
Leprosy 032 1 0.08 
Tuberculosis 02 0 0.00 
Other 161 12.22 
Total 1,318 100.00 
Source: Dr P. Kramer. 
Social change in the Porgera Valley I 37 
patients spending the night at health centres were being treated for 
typhoid. 
The main diagnoses among out-patients at Anawe Medical 
Centre were respiratory diseases, diarrhoea and influenza. As was 
the case with Porgera Health Centre, domestic violence-related 
injuries were common, but were not separately recorded. The 
Porgera Health Centre's 1992 Annual Report recorded 29,617 
treatments at the out-patient clinic. Dr Kramer indicated that out-
patient data, including diagnoses, was unreliable for a variety of 
reasons, but that the main out-patient diagnoses would have been 
respiratory diseases, cuts and sores, diarrhoea and other 
gastrointestinal diseases, and that injuries from domestic violence 
were common. It may also be noted that there were eight cases 
diagnosed as psychiatric problems during this period. While not 
viewed as a major problem, this diagnosis was probably on the 
increase due to the demands of the church, alcohol, marijuana, and 
stress in a rapidly changing society. 
From May 1992 to February 1993, there were 23 in-patient deaths 
at Porgera Health Centre, the causes of which are shown in Table 
2.3.4 It can be seen that pneumonia was the main cause of childhood 
admission and death. Children who died in hospital usually had a 
poor nutritional status and poor immunisation record, and tended to 
present late. Of a total of 354 under-five admissions, 19 (5.4 per cent) 
died after an average admission duration of 2.7 days. Of these 
deaths, eight (42.1 per cent) died within 48 hours of admission, 
before any effect from antibiotics could be expected. 
The general trends in the pattern of disease may be summarised as 
follows 
.. scabies had declined due to improved water supply in 
relocation houses 
.. childhood pneumonia was still a serious problem 
.. typhoid, although endemic, had stabilised 
.. asthma was increasing along with the abuse of ventilators 
.. dental problems, especially in children, were on the increase 
due to the junk food syndrome 
.. new clustered living patterns and increased personal 
mobility were causing the spread of communicable disease 
such as measles 
.. domestic violence injuries were frequent, fracture of the ulna 
being the most common. 
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Maternal and child health services 
In 1987, infant welfare clinics were conducted at Yapatep, Alipis, 
Suyan, Porgera Station, Waratore/ Apalaka, Inginene/Politika, 
Palipaka/Paiam, Pakoandaka, Tipinini, Yuyane, Kairik, Anawe, 
Kakandaka, Mungalep (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). In 1993, clinics 
were conducted at Yapatep, Suyan, Porgera Station, Apalaka, 
Palipaka, Paiam, Pakoandaka, Tipinini, Yuyan, Kairik, Anawe, 
Kakandaka, Mungalep, Panandaka, Yarik, Kulapi. The 1993 clinic 
locations reflected changed settlement patterns. For example, Alipis 
village no longer existed, but there was a higher density of people in 
the Panandaka area. Kulapi and Yarik were newly created relocation 
villages. 
The main activities undertaken in the monthly village clinics were 
the immunisation and weighing of babies. Clinic schedules were 
followed more regularly after the provision of transport by the PDA. 
The clinic nurses reported no major problems except that mothers 
working at the mine were not bringing their babies to the clinic. No 
problems were reported with regard to the immunisation programme, 
which covered Triple Antigen, Sabin, Pigbel, BCG and Measles. The 
government was out of Hepatitis B vaccine, which is needed to 
prevent liver cancer, and which is normally given to infants to reduce 
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the disease pool. Protein energy malnutrition amongst children has 
not been a major problem in Porgera, but there was probably some 
under-reporting in the clinics due to inaccurate weighing methods-
for example weighing an infant in a bilum and not subtracting the 
weight of the bilum. Anecdotal evidence suggested there might be an 
increasing problem of malnutrition due to parents feeding infants and 
toddlers chocolate milk and lolly water. Junk food was certainly 
contributing to an increase in dental problems in young children. 
As there was no qualified midwife, antenatal clinics were only 
conducted at the Porgera Health Centre. A cultural constraint to art 
antenatal programme in Porgera was women's shame to admit they 
were pregnant during the first trimester. Although there were 193 
supervised births recorded at the health centre in 1992, it is not known 
how many unsupervised births there were in this period. Complaints 
about the conditions for giving birth at the health centre were often 
brought up at meetings of the Porgera Women's Association. Women 
did not want men to attend them during childbirth, and some (not all) 
of the staff treated the women in labour with contempt. These were 
justifiable concerns that could have been solved by the recruitment of 
a competent and caring midwife. 
No data were available on the number of family planning acceptors. 
Staff at the family planning clinic appeared to be competent in their job 
and had the standard range of family planning methods available. Most 
women in the community appeared knowledgeable with regard to the 
benefits and methods of family planning, with Depo Provera being a 
popular option. Family planning services were not offered to single 
women or to married women without the consent of their husbands. This 
was not an outdated moral response, but a very pragmatic decision based 
on fear of payback from husbands or fathers. A common complaint from 
women was that they were tired of always being pregnant. Women lost 
control over their reproduction with the breakdown of the post-partum 
sex taboo. In Porgera there are no known traditional methods of 
contraception or abortion other than magic spells. 
Sexually transmitted diseases 
According to the SEIS, there were 18 recorded cases of sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs) at the Porgera Health Centre in 1986, and 
26 for the first quarter of 1987. It was felt that the low incidence was 
due to people travelling to Wabag or Mount Hagen for treatment. It 
was also predicted in the SE IS that there would be a considerable 
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increase 'with the influx of a transient population of predominantly 
single males'. However, it is arguable that the subsequent increase in 
STDs was attributable to the Mount Kare gold rush. There was a rich 
storehouse of anecdotal evidence concerning the prostitution at Mount 
Kare, as well as the excesses of the successful Porgeran miners on their 
trips to Mount Hagen, Port Moresby, Australia and the Philippines. 
Porgera Health Centre records indicate that 531 STD cases were 
treated in 1989, 201 in 1990, 520 in 1991, and 523 in 1992. The 
unusually low figure in 1990 was attributed to the loss of relevant 
records. The records contained no breakdown by sex or by disease 
(gonorrhoea, syphilis and donovanosis). The STD figures from the 
Anawe Medical Centre show a marked increase in 1992, from a 
reported 4-6 per month in 1991 to a total of 523 for 1992 (which is 
coincidentally the same number recorded by the Porgera Health 
Centre in the same year). The 1992 total was divided between 422 
cases of gonorrhoea, 88 of syphilis, and 13 others. The increase was 
attributed to non-Porgeran national employees on field break not 
being treated in their home areas because government health centres 
had run out of the standard treatment. There was a decrease again in 
1993, with a reported 173 cases up to 20 June (gonorrhoea 147, syphilis 
25, and others 1). This decrease was attributed to greater awareness as 
a result of the medical staff giving health lectures on STD /HIV, and to 
the increased purchase of condoms from the medical centre (Dr M. 
Hohnen, pers. comm.). Most of the diagnosis for STDs at both health 
centres was clinical, but deemed to be fairly accurate. The Anawe 
Medical Centre figures are probably more reliable than the Porgera 
Health Centre figures due to the latter's problems with recording-as 
well as some suspected 'back door' treatment. 
By 1993, there were no known cases of HIV in Porgera, but testing 
was not being done at either health centre. All overseas staff working 
in PNG were required to undergo HIV testing in order to obtain work 
permits. Diagnosis of AIDS in a 'payback' society would be a problem, 
and this was an argument against routine testing for HIV. With the 
high STD rate and the two confirmed deaths from AIDS in Laiagam 
(Post Courier 22 January 1993), it is probable that the HIV virus was 
already present in the Porgera population.5 There was a lot of gossip 
in Porgera about confirmed AIDS cases and the need to build a special 
house for 'these AIDS people' in order to isolate them from the 
community. In 1993, the government's own STD/ AIDS education 
effort was limited to those attending the STD clinic. 
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Health extension programmes 
Staff at the Anawe Medical Centre began a health education 
programme in 1992. The programme included monthly lectures to the 
PJV staff (including over 500 Porgerans) in 16 locations throughout the 
mine site, and the 'Health Corner' feature in the PJV's Ipili Wai Pii 
monthly magazine. Topics covered by mid 1993 included personal 
hygiene, typhoid, nutrition, smoking, heart disease, STDs and first aid. 
PJV's Social Development staff had also done some health extension 
work (primarily with women) during the relocation programme and 
through the Porgera Women's Association. This focused on scabies, 
infant and child feeding, STDs and family planning, and on hygiene to 
prevent typhoid. At the Porgera Health Centre, some health advice 
was being given during treatment at the STD clinic, and also to 
women who attended the maternal and child health services and 
family planning clinics, but there had otherwise been no community 
level health extension programme conducted between 1989 and mid 
1993. 
The 1991 Porgera District Annual Report mentioned the formation 
of a 'Health Committee', and the 1992 Report mentioned that it had 
been disbanded, but neither mentioned its function. It was suggested 
that this committee might be reformed under the Porgera Local 
Government Council as part of a larger exercise to revitalise that body. 
Local government councils do have the power to make and enforce 
health rules, which then gives a health committee some teeth. It was 
not difficult to think of a list of topics which might have been included 
in a community level health extension programme for the Porgera 
area, to be implemented by a Health Extension Officer with the 
assistance of other medical personnel and even the PJV's media unit. 
Existing networks for implementation of the programme included the 
local government councils, aid posts, infant welfare clinics, literacy 
schools, youth and women's associations and their member groups, 
churches and schools. 
Health care delivery problems 
The health care delivery problems existing in 1993 could be 
summarised as follows 
.. Government provision of drugs and equipment ranged from 
inadequate to non-existent (for example the lack of Hepatitis 
B vaccine in the country). Porgera Health Centre obtained 
assistance from the Anawe Medical Centre with X-rays and 
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oxygen. Due to efforts and finance from the PJV and PDA, drug 
shortage was no longer a problem. However, there were still 
problems with drug theft, the unnecessary use of antibiotics, 
and petty pilfering of equipment by staff and patients. 
.. Although there had been significant improvements with 
regard to maintenance of staff housing since 1989, staff 
housing was still inadequate. 
.. In-service training still needed to be improved. 
.. Medical staff of the Porgera Health Centre had been verbally 
and physically abused by members of the community. 
Working under constant threats and intimidation was one 
cause of low staff morale. 
• Nearly 85 per cent of the staff at the Porgera Health Centre 
were non-Porgeran Engans who were traditional enemies of 
the Porgerans. Some of the staff were blatantly 
contemptuous of the Porgerans, whom they regarded as 
inferior. Although one could recognise a need to transfer 
these staff and seek a better staff mix, this was likely to be 
difficult because coastal people are reluctant to work in the 
highlands. 
Education 
As with health services, the development of the Porgera mine was the 
catalyst for a significant improvement in education services in Porgera 
District. Porgera's poor educational situation received further setbacks 
in 1988 as a result of the Mount Kare gold rush, when teachers and 
students left to try their luck on the gold fields. However, after 1991, 
there were dramatic improvements in education for the whole district 
.. an increase from four community schools in 1986 (Porgera, 
Yuyan, Paiela and Tokopa) to ten in 1993 (Porgera, Yuyan, 
Tipinini, Mungalep, Apalaka and Paiam in Porgera Census 
Division, and Tokopa, Paiela, Alumanka and Andita in 
Paiela Census Division) 
.. the opening of the Porgera Vocational Centre in 1991 
.. access to the College of Distance Education from 1991 
.. introduction of the Free Education Policy in 1993 
.. the opening of the Paiam Independent Primary School in 
1993 
.. an increase in district enrolments from 443 in 1986 to 1,943 
students in 1993 
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.. the planned 1994 opening of Porgera Technical High School 
at Paiam. 
By 1994, Porgera District would have achieved the necessary mix of 
educational institutions to cater for most of the pre-tertiary education 
needs of its people: vernacular pre-schools, community schools, 
international standard primary school, technical high school, 
vocational centre and access to the College of Distance Education. 
As with health, there was the difficulty of obtaining information, 
especially with regard to high school enrolments. The lack of census 
information was also a problem. Visits were made to all schools in the 
Porgera Census Division. As no visits were made to schools in Paiela, 
the following discussion deals only with Porgera Census Division. 
Vernacular pre-schools 
Vernacular pre-schools are commonly known by the Tok Pisin 
translation Yak PIes Pri Skul. The Enga Provincial Division of Education 
called its vernacular pre-school programme Wambaa Enga Pii Sikulu 
(WEPS), which had been adapted to Wambaa Ipili Pii Sikulu (WIPS) for 
Ipili vernacular pre-schools in Porgera District. The Enga Six Year 
Education plan regarded vernacular pre-schools as a component of the 
community school system, so WIPS in Porgera was seen to represent a 
contribution to the overall goal of universal primary education. 
Promotion of vernacular pre-school education is based on the 
premise that children who first read and write in their own language 
achieve better results in primary education. The introduction of WIPS 
in Porgera was facilitated by the efforts of linguist Terry Borchard, 
who had studied and was fluent in the Ipili language, and supported 
by PJV funding. If there had been no linguist, then the introduction of 
WEPS would either have been delayed or would have been 
introduced using a dialect of the main Enga language (which did seem 
possible at one stage). If there had been no PJV, then there would have 
been no funds to produce the teaching materials. 
The first school to introduce WIPS was Mungalep in 1991, 
followed by Apalaka in 1992 and Yuyan in 1993. Both Paiam and 
Tipinini were hoping to start WIPS in 1994.6 The main problem 
facing the expansion of WIPS education in Porgera Census Division 
was the problem of finding suitable teachers, though I understand 
this was not such a problem in Paiela. It seems that people who had 
the required maturity and educational background often preferred to 
seek out higher paying jobs at the mine. 
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Community schools 
Prior to 1989, there were four community schools in Porgera Census 
Division, all of which were church agency schools: the Lutherans had 
schools at Porgera and Yuyan, the Catholic Church had one at Tipinini, 
and the Seventh Day Adventist Church operated a school at Kairik 
from 1974 to 1978. The Tipinini school was closed in 1984 due to low 
attendance (see Pacific Agribusiness 1987, Appendix E) but re-opened 
in 1989. The Yuyan school opened in 1974 or 1975, but closed down in 
1988 due to tribal fighting and perhaps also the effects of the Mount 
Kare gold rush; it re-opened for two months in 1990 then closed again 
until the beginning of 1992. The next school to open in Porgera Census 
Division was the Catholic agency school at Mungalep in 1991, 
followed by the government schools at Apalaka in 1992 and Paiam in 
1993. In 1993, Porgera Community School became the first school in 
the district to have a non-teaching headmaster. 
Funding for classrooms and teachers' houses for the new schools, 
as well as for more facilities in the existing schools (for Paiela as well 
as Porgera), came from the PJV's K4 million Community Facilities 
Grant to the PDA. Funds for teachers' salaries come from the Enga 
Provincial Division of Education. The PDA became committed to a 
heavy annual works programme to provide classrooms and teachers' 
houses for the schools which needed to expand to Grade 6, and this 
meant that it needed to concentrate its resources on improving the 
existing schools rather than bow to public pressure to open new 
schools in Porgera District. 
According to the SEIS, Porgera Community School had seven staff 
and 210 pupils (113 males, 97 females) in 1986, while Yuyan 
Community School had five staff and 141 pupils (89 males, 52 
females). Table 2.4 shows the overall pattern of enrolments by school 
grade in the six community schools operating in Porgera Census 
Division in May 1993, with the numbers of teachers in each grade 
shown in brackets after the number of pupils. 
The low number of students in Grade 6 at Porgera Community 
School can be attributed to the Mount Kare gold rush, since 1988 
would have been the Grade 1 intake for that year. The overall increase 
in enrolments is attributed to the growth of new schools, the 
increasing number of people moving to Porgera, a growing awareness 
by parents of the value of education, and the introduction of the free 
education policy in 1993. However, while we can clearly see that there 
had been an increase in total enrolments in schools in Porgera Census 
SOCial change in the Porgera Valley I 45 
Division from 351 in 1986 to 1480 in 1993, it was still not known what 
percentage of school-age children were attending school. A standard 
education indicator used to analyse community school enrolments is 
the gross enrolment rate, which is the percentage of children aged 7 to 
12 enrolled in schools. Without reliable census figures, this indicator 
was impossible to calculate, and it was therefore impossible to assess 
Porgera's progress toward universal primary education. 
Because there was a lot of talk that outsiders were taking up 
valuable space in the community schools, I asked headmasters to 
indicate what percentage of their students were local Porgerans. This 
question was complicated, especially in Tipinini, by the problem of 
defining what constitutes a local Porgeran, and was more difficult in 
those schools with no Porgeran teachers. The results were 
• no outsiders in Apalaka, Mungalep or Yuyan community 
schools 
• 31 per cent outsiders at Porgera Community School 
.. 16 per cent outsiders at Paiam Community School; and 
• 4 per cent outsiders at Tipinini Community School. 
The high percentage of outsiders in Porgera Community School is not 
surprising since this school was catering for children of residents of 
Porgera Station, as well as residents in the nearby communities. 
Table 2.4 also shows that the increase in the number of teachers had 
not kept pace with the increase in enrolments. The SE IS reported a 
teacher/pupil ratio in 1986 of 1:29, compared with the overall 1993 
teacher/pupil ratio of 1:44. The Enga Six Year Education plan stated 
that Enga Province had an overall teacher/pupil ratio of 1:31, which 
was below the World Bank recommended maximum of 1:35. But most 
Porgera schools were in excess of the World Bank recommendation in 
1993. Grade 1 ratios were particularly high, indicating that these 
classes were little more than child minding centres. The intake of too 
many Grade 1 pupils reflected an inability of Boards of Management 
to say no to parents, and the belief that Porgera would continue to 
have a high wastage rate between Grades 1 and 2. The introduction of 
free education undoubtedly contributed to the problem. When I 
queried the teachers at Yuyan about the ludicrous figure of one teacher 
for 96 pupils, the response was that it was not so bad, because only an 
average of 50 pupils attended each day! There was a definite quality of 
education problem here. 
Of the 33 teachers for 1993 (including WIPS teachers), eight were 
women and 25 were men. Bearing in mind the problem in defining 
46 I Dilemmas of Development 
Table 2.4 Community school enrolments by grade in Porgera Census 
Division, 1993 
School WIPS Grd 1 Grd 2 Grd 3 Grd4 Grd 5 Grd 6 Total 
Porgera 198 (3) 148 (3) 152 (3) 101 (3) 91 (2) 29 (1) 719 (15) 
Yuyan 48 (1) 96 (1) 59 (2) 22 (1) - 225 (5) 
Tipinini 84 (2) 34 (1) 35 (1) - 153 (4) 
Mungalep 31 (1) 34 (1) 63 (2) - 128 (4) 
Apalaka 41 (1) 104 (2) - 145 (3) 
Paiam 110 (2) - 110 (2) 
Total 120 (3) 542 (9) 364 (9) 174 (4) 135 (4) 126 (3) 29 (1)1480 (33) 
Source: School records. 
'what is a Porgeran', 27 of these teachers were non-Porgerans. The high 
percentage of non-Porgeran teachers meant that it was difficult to 
achieve the policy goal of having native speakers as Grade 1 teachers. 
Demand for more teacher housing could certainly have been eased if 
more local Porgerans became teachers. I do not know how many (if any) 
Porgerans were enrolled in teacher training colleges in 1993. 
Table 2.5 shows the percentage of female pupils in each school 
grade in May 1993. The proportion of female enrolments shows a 
slight decline at Porgera Community School, from 46 per cent in 1986 
to 42 per cent in 1993, and at Yuyan from 37 per cent to 32 per cent in 
the same period. But the Mungalep case shows a countervailing trend 
to equal or higher female enrolments. The overall 42 per cent female 
enrolment level compares well with the 1991 Enga provincial average 
of 39 per cent, but it could be argued that female enrolments needed to 
be improved at Yuyan and Apalaka. 
Apart from the unacceptably high teacher-pupil ratios in some 
grades, and the lack of native speakers as Grade 1 teachers, the main 
problems with community schooling in Porgera in 1993 were 
• Lack of curriculum materials-most schools visited had 
absolutely no textbooks or teachers' aids other than the 
WIPS reader printed by the PJV. The District Education 
Officer (who looked after the three districts of Porgera, 
Lagaip and Kandep) advised that this problem afflicted the 
whole province. This was particularly a problem for new 
schools which would, of course, have nothing left over from 
previous year's supplies when the system may have worked. 
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.. Lack of community support-This was listed as a major 
problem by teachers at all six schools visited. It appeared to 
be common for parents to pay a K20 fee to the school rather 
than show up for community work days. The PJV's 
Community Relations Section had assisted schools with 
library books, used computer paper (conspicuous in all 
schools), and minor maintenance and improvements such as 
water supplies to some schools. 
.. Vandalism and tribal fighting-Mungalep School had 
problems with vandals damaging classrooms, and there was 
also an attempt to bum the school down. Yuyan School 
suffered severe damage to classrooms and had to be 
virtually rebuilt. Destruction of schools as a result of law and 
order problems is a main constraint to extending education 
in Enga Province. There has always been the possibility of 
similar problems in Porgera. 
.. School lunches-teachers said that many parents did not 
provide their children with lunch. Some parents gave their 
children money which they spent on junk food or 
gambling. There were no school lunch programmes in any 
of the schools. 
.. Other-problems with subsidy cheques and teachers' pay as 
a result of the fire in the government offices at Wabag; lack of 
student desks; lack of sporting facilities; teachers' 
dissatisfaction with conditions and salary; and the school 
bus issue with Porgera Community School. 
Table 2.5 Female community school enrolments by grade in Porgera 
Census Division, 1993 
School WIPS Grd 1 Grd 2 Grd 3 Grd4 Grd 5 Grd 6 Total 
Porgera 51 50 34 45 42 45 45 
Yuyan 48 39 15 14 32 
Tipinini 48 38 23 40 
Mungalep 58 68 50 57 
Apalaka 29 38 36 
Paiam 47 
Total 44 47 43 31 43 36 45 42 
Source: School records. 
I Dilemmas of Development 
It was pointed out in the SEIS (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[2]:36) that 
the limited education base of the Ipili people was a constraint to their 
participation in the employment and business opportunities associated 
with the Porgera mine. The SEIS concluded that the main education 
need for Porgera was to improve the quantity and quality of students 
being prepared in the community school system for secondary and 
technical training. While the subsequent expansion of community 
school education (including WIPS) had been impressive, there was 
still a very definite quality-of-education problem in 1993, and there was 
still a need to find ways of inducing greater community participation. 
In response to Kundapen Talyaga's 1979 study of educational 
problems in Enga Province (Runawery and Weeks 1980:5-6), the Enga 
Division of Education developed the Community-Based Education 
Policy. This policy stressed community involvement and participation. 
The PJV was part of the Porgera community and made significant 
contributions to community school education, especially in Porgera, 
but in other areas of Enga Province as well. Besides the Community 
Facilities Grant which enabled the building programme, other areas of 
PJV assistance included: library books, school prizes, celebrations, and 
assistance with school improvements such as minor maintenance 
needs and water supplies. But there was still a vast pool of human (as 
opposed to financial) resources in the mining community which could 
have been utilised to work with teachers and school boards of 
management to help improve the quality of education. 
Paiam Independent Primary School 
The construction of an international standard primary school by the 
PJV in Porgera was a condition set out in the Porgera forum 
agreements. Paiam Independent Primary School, which opened in 
1993, was a dramatic contrast to the community schools in terms of 
facilities and resources. In 1993, there were three teachers for 28 
students, and an impressive array of text books and teaching aids, 
including video and photocopying machines. This school was meant 
to be part of the community services which would encourage more 
families of expatriate mine workers to live in Porgera. However, better 
education is a goal of many Porgerans, and those who could afford it 
wanted to send their children to this school. In 1993, 13 of the 28 
pupils were children of Porgeran landowners, and the proposed 
school expansion for 1994 was primarily to cater for the increased 
demand from local Porgerans. In this respect, the Independent 
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Primary School promised to provide the foundation for an educated 
elite within the local community, and thus to create another division 
between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' in Porgera. 
High schools 
Most of the Porgeran students who have gone on to high school have 
attended Laiagam High School. As part of their overall development 
goals, Porgerans wanted a high school in their own district. The desire 
for a local high school is a common request throughout Papua New 
Guinea. Besides the obvious advantages (and prestige value) of 
having a local high school, Porgerans were concerned about the law 
and order problems that frequently affected their children attending 
Laiagam High School. In addition, many parents felt that the Engan 
teachers discriminated against Porgeran students. 
Porgerans were successful in their negotiations to have a local high 
school in Porgera, in spite of the fact that they did not have the 
catchment level which is normally required for this purpose. 
According to the Enga Six Year Education Plan, Porgera Technical 
High School was due to open in 1994, with Grade 7 students from 
Porgera and possibly other nearby areas in Enga Province such as 
Mulitaka. The school would offer the standard national academic 
subjects together with two practical subjects-possibly mechanics and 
electricity. The plan also indicated that this school would gradually be 
blocked through to Grade 12. 
1 was unable to obtain any figures as to the number of 
Porgerans actually attending high school. It should have been 
possible to obtain these figures, as the PJV was providing 
financial assistance to Porgerans for high school education. 
Without figures for at least 1991, 1992 and 1993, it was not 
possible to assess if there was still a high wastage rate from 
Grades 7 to 10, as previously reported in the SEIS. Another 
problem was the proportion of Porgeran and non-Porgeran 
children selected to go to high schools from Porgera and Tipinini 
community schools. At the end 1992, angry Porgeran parents 
claimed that the original selections were all outsiders, and the 
numbers from Porgera were subsequently increased.7 
Porgera Vocational Centre 
According to the Enga Six Year Education Plan (Ahai et al. 1991:90), 
three basic types of vocational centres have evolved in Enga 
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.. traditional vocational centres with a 'back to the village' 
focus 
.. specialised training centres; and 
.. mini or pseudo-high schools. 
The Porgera Vocational Centre would be an example of a specialised 
training centre, since it focused on mechanics and carpentry, with 
limited formal classes in the curriculum of the national College of 
Distance Education (CODE). 
Enrolments increased from 16 in 1991 to 30 in 1992, and 52 in May 
1993. The centre was receiving technical support from the PJY, as 
well as financial support from both the PJV and the PDA. In support 
of the basic skills training, the centre made desks for the community 
schools and ran a vehicle repair workshop for minor repairs and 
service. 
The Porgera Women's Association Resource Centre was rebuilt in 
the vocational centre compound after the 1991 earthquake. The plan 
was to build a larger women's resource centre at Paiam and hand this 
building over to the vocational centre for home economics training. 
The first female students were enrolled in the vocational centre in 
1993, and with the female CODE teacher formed a small sub-group 
within the association. 
College of Distance Education 
As stipulated in the Porgera forum agreements, and in order to assist 
those Porgeran students who either were not selected to go to high 
school or who did not complete high school, the CODE opened a 
registered study centre in Porgera in 1991. Up to the end of 1993, the 
CODE centre shared the facilities at the vocational centre, but was due 
to move from this temporary home to a newly built centre in Paiam 
township. This centre was providing support services to students 
(including the vocational centre students) who were taking Grade 7 to 
10 subjects by correspondence. The centre obtained financial 
assistance from both the PJV and the PDA. The number of students 
registered with the centre increased from 23 in 1992 to 102 in mid 
1993, but 53 (51 per cent) of these 1993 students were non-Porgerans. 
The lower percentage of Porgerans could have meant that this school 
was catering primarily to the needs of outsiders, but it could have 
meant that Porgeran Grade 6 leavers were not interested in furthering 
their education, or that their numbers were insufficient to fill the 
places available. 
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Tertiary education 
The PJV had a scholarship programme which provided financial 
assistance to selected students undertaking tertiary studies. According 
to PJV records, three out of 30 sponsored students in 1992 were 
Porgerans, and only one Porgeran (out of a total 42) was being 
sponsored in 1993. As qualified Porgerans would have been given 
preference, this number indicates just how few Porgerans were 
undertaking tertiary studies. 
Literacy and non-formal education 
The provincial non-formal education function had moved from the 
Division of Education to the Division of Community Services and back 
to the Division of Education. Non-formal education focused on 
training programmes for youth and women and on adult literacy. In 
Porgera non-formal education programmes for youth and women 
have been undertaken through the district's youth and women's 
associations. The PJV Community Affairs Division has employed staff 
specifically to assist with these programmes. Porgeran churches have 
also been involved in youth training programmes. 
Adult literacy has been a provincial priority, since 'over 90 per 
cent of the population of Enga cannot read or write' (Ahai et al. 
1991:104). In 1991, the Adult Literacy Programme coordinated by the 
Porgera Women's Association began. In addition to course fees, the 
PJV and PDA also allocated funds to operate the programme. 
Besides administrative difficulties, the main problems encountered 
were the lack of teachers, arguments over which language to uses 
and access to buildings in which to conduct the courses. There was a 
need for a full time Adult Literacy Coordinator responsible to the 
women's association, but the difficulty of obtaining a suitably 
experienced Porgeran for the position suggested that it might be 
necessary to recruit an overseas volunteer with a Porgeran 
counterpart. 
Women, marriage and the family 
The argument here is that women are the key element to family 
stability, especially during periods of rapid social change. Mine 
development had negative impacts on the lives of local women, but 
paradoxically also had the potential to provide opportunities for 
women to gain more control of their lives and influence the course of 
social change. Although the United Nations proclaimed 1994 as the 
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International Year of the Family, the discussion in this section suggests 
that the family in Porgera had some serious problems in that year. 
The time which Porgeran women were spending on domestic 
duties associated with their roles of mother, wife, food producer and 
tender of pigs was relatively unchanged. Meanwhile, outside 
influences (the steel axe, bisnis, education) had a significant impact on 
men's traditional roles. Porgeran women were therefore raising 
concerns that men were opting out of their traditional duties as they 
explored their own avenues to find the road to success. These 
traditional duties included heavy clearing, fencing, digging drains, 
house building and repairs, and care and discipline of children, 
especially male children. 
Concerns raised by Porgeran women at formal meetings of the 
Porgera Women's Association, as well as in informal discussions, 
focused on 
" the problems associated with polygyny 
" deserted wives 
" domestic violence 
" problems of alcohol abuse and black markets 
" access to family planning methods 
" the need for money in an ever-growing cash economy 
.. the breakdown in law and order (especially the increase in 
rape and police violence); and 
.. concern for the future of their children. 
Many of these concerns were similar to those raised by women in 
other parts of Papua New Guinea. 
Women and subsistence 
Women's primary economic activities still focused on the subsistence 
sector of the economy, with a great deal of their time spent on tending 
food gardens and raising pigs-though pig raising was no longer an 
activity for women who had adopted the Seventh Day Adventist 
religion. In addition, those women who had rights in areas of alluvial 
mining activity, or whose husbands had such rights, were 
accomplished gold panners. Some women also operated trade stores 
or engaged in informal trading activities which included the sale of 
home-made scones, second-hand clothes, and surplus food crops. 
Women's primary traditional responsibility was food production. 
Subsistence agriculture was still the economic basis of Ipili society. 
Gold may have been the Ipili's second garden, but food was still the 
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first garden. Not everyone in Porgera was an alluvial miner, and even 
for those families who did regard gold as their 'cash crop', it was still 
secondary in importance to subsistence agriculture. Older women 
especially liked the security of having and working their food gardens. 
It was a known source of control for them in a changing society. 
Whatever the goals for rural transformation are, it is essential not 
to lose sight of the importance of subsistence agriculture. Trade stores 
and cash crops do not substitute in either the short or long-term for 
the value of food gardens. The problems of subsistence agriculture in 
the SML area have already been discussed. If the man was a wage 
earner, he would not necessarily give his wife the cash she needed to 
purchase food. Provision of food for daily meals was still viewed as a 
woman's duty. It was not unusual for a woman to be hit by her 
husband if she failed to produce a meal for him. 
My own observations of food gardens in Porgera, both within and 
outside the SML, indicated that there was plenty of scope for 
improvements to subsistence agriculture in terms of variety, yields and 
agricultural practices. The SEIS and Robinson (1988:58) acknowledged 
the need for a didimeri (female agricultural officer) to assist primarily 
with the anticipated food garden problems of relocated landowners. 
The death of the under-qualified didimeri who worked first for the 
government and later for the PJV's Women's Division left a gap which 
was still waiting to be filled in 1993. 
Women in employment 
Women liked cash and the sense of control that went with it. Many 
younger women preferred to buy store food rather than work in the 
garden. Many women of all ages in Porgera were seeking 
employment. These women had even copied their menfolk and joined 
together to demonstrate for employment. However, while women 
appeared to enjoy the prospect of escaping the constant drudgery of 
child care and gardening, they faced similar problems to those of 
working women in the Western world. These problems included 
sexual harassment, male backlash, and child care arrangement 
problems. 
In a predominantly male working environment, sexual harassment 
is almost inevitable, and was certainly reported by the PJV's female 
employees and those of their catering contractor, IPI-Poons. Laundry 
women working in bunk houses reported sexual harassment by male 
shift workers. There were also a few reported cases of sexual 
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harassment of female employees, both national and expatriate, by 
male co-workers. Complaints of this sort were normally dealt with by 
the PJV's Welfare Officer or staff in the Women's Section. The male 
backlash for working women came from their husbands and from 
other male employees. For example, as a consequence of a domestic 
dispute, a husband might request that his wife's employment be 
terminated. There were also cases in which rumours were started that 
female laundry workers would be replaced by men. 
Child care is a particular problem for working women everywhere. 
This has been especially true in Porgera and other areas of Papua New 
Guinea, where breast-feeding for one to three years is the norm. Older 
children can usually be taken care of at home under traditional 
arrangements, but babies who are being breast-fed need to be near 
their mothers. The centrally placed PJV creche was not successful, 
because the working environment was so widely dispersed, and this 
created difficulties of access by the mothers. The Social Development 
Officer dealt with problems on a case-by-case basis. The most serious 
problems were with the PJV's catering contractor, IPI-Poons, which 
employed the largest number of local women. Women feared that they 
would lose their jobs if they took too much time off to feed their 
babies. Another problem for working mothers was that of time lost 
when a child was sick. Going to the health centre at the government 
station virtually became a full-day chore. The clinic sister also 
reported that mothers working at the mine were not bringing their 
babies to the infant welfare clinics. These problems were not as serious 
for women employed by the government, because these women were 
nearer to their homes, and their failure to appear at work was not 
taken so seriously because public servants were seldom penalised for 
absenteeism. 
losing control 
The breakdown of the custom requiring women to seclude themselves 
from men while menstruating brought women greater freedom. But 
the breakdown of the post-partum sex taboo brought them greater 
hardship. Women did not like to have children one after the other. This 
added to their workload. It was hard to do garden work and look after 
more than one child at the same time. Porgeran women appeared to be 
well aware of the advantages of family planning and the availability 
of contraceptives, but complained that access was denied by their 
husbands. The women in charge of family planning services at the 
Social change in the Porgera Valley I 55 
government station would not give women contraceptives without the 
husbands' consent due to fears of payback. Men did not want their 
wives to have contraceptives because they feared that they might be 
promiscuous, and because men gained prestige from fathering lots of 
children. 
Traditionally, women's influence was in the private realm, while 
men exerted their influence in public. This system may have been 
appropriate in the past because 'by remaining in private affairs and 
exerting indirect influence on public matters, women were sheltered 
from the risks of public life and left to concentrate on their primary 
goals-bringing up their children in safety and providing subsistence 
and wealth to their families' (Kyakas and Wiessner 1992:178). 
However, modernisation produced changes which women were 
unable to influence because they had no public voice. The new 
political, legal and economic institutions were all dominated by men. 
The need for women to have a public voice to influence change was 
the rationale behind the Porgera Women's Association. Women's 
associations have the potential to provide the support for women to 
take risks and enter the public debate. If women lose control of 
everyday events in their lives, not only are they further 
disadvantaged, but the future of the family is at risk. 
Domestic violence 
The subject of domestic violence as a national problem is well 
documented in a series of studies undertaken by the PNG Law Reform 
Commission (see Toft and Bonnell1985). The stress created by rapid 
social change due to the development of the mine had probably 
increased the rate and severity of domestic violence in Porgera. This 
was due to men's anxiety over their own ability to cope with rapid 
change, women's anger over men taking new wives, and the problems 
related to relocation houses in polygynous marriages (see Chapter 4). 
While wives did hit their husbands, wife-beating was a bigger 
problem because it was more common and more severe. The doctors 
at both the government and PJV health centres reported their own 
concern about the number and severity of wife-beating cases. Rarely 
did battered men need treatment. 
Women were not against domestic violence if a wife failed in her 
obligations-provided the beating was not too severe. When women 
felt aggrieved, they would provoke their husbands into hitting them. 
Either this would clear the air or the woman would then appear in 
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public (enhancing the damage by not washing or tidying up in any 
way) to testify against unfair treatment. In marriages that were 
working, the husband would feel shame and compensate his wife. 
Women were especially concerned with alcohol-related domestic 
violence, as this was unpredictable and usually more severe, and they 
were also concerned about husbands who beat their wives in order to 
make them run away and thus avoid the obligation to repay bride-
price. 
Fighting between co-wives was common. In an extreme case, in 
1992, a young Porgeran woman, who had recently become a third 
wife, was murdered by the jealous second wife. Fighting was also 
common between a wife and a woman who was felt to be in an 
adulterous relationship with her husband, as adultery usually led to 
marriage between the adulterous partners. That women appeared 
more often to take action against a co-wife or other woman, rather 
than the husband, is a reflection of women's powerlessness in society. 
But the incidence of domestic and sexual violence also needs to be 
placed in the wider cultural context where 'bouts of violence ... were 
not only frequent in husband-wife relations, but in virtually all 
categories of relationships in Enga regardless of sex, age and 
relationship' (Kyakas and Wiessner 1992:165). 
Raising children 
Children are highly valued in Ipili society, as in most of Papua New 
Guinea. I am not aware of any customary practice of infanticide nor 
any recent cases of infanticide which would be an indication of stress 
in society. It was anticipated in the SEIS that an increase in the 
numbers of illegitimate children would be a problematic consequence 
of mine development, but this issue was not raised by the Porgera 
Women's Association, nor did the PJV Welfare Officer report any 
cases. However, problems of this kind could yet be a matter of concern 
in view of the reported increase in promiscuity among the younger 
generation. 
The care of young children is generally seen as the role of women, 
but men also have a role in childcare, especially in the discipline of 
older children, and boys in particular. At a women's association 
meeting in October 1992, women said that, with more husbands 
abandoning their wives, they were worried about the discipline of 
their children. The general impression was that a lot of young children 
were very badly behaved-the most obvious example being those 
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very young children, mostly male, who threw rocks, used obscene 
language, and flashed penises. My observations over a three year 
period were that young children of both sexes were generally left to 
their own devices, and were not disciplined until an adult, usually 
male, could no longer tolerate their behaviour, when the discipline 
was often over-reactive. The freedom of boys continued into 
adolescence, while girls soon adopted the female roles of caring for 
younger children and working in the gardens. 
Apart from the general pattern of socialisation, the more specific 
factors which could have led to discipline problems included the 
growth of family size (too many children too closely spaced), domestic 
violence, alcohol abuse, and the practice of bribing children to go to 
school, giving in to their temper tantrums, and buying them junk food. 
There is also an argument that lack of discipline could be attributed to 
the abandonment of male initiation rights. Male initiation rights were 
very important in the past as a means to instil discipline and teach 
men the rules and responsibilities related to adulthood. The bottom 
line is that undisciplined children grow into undisciplined adults. 
Inter-generational conflict 
Although conflict between generations is not uncommon anywhere, 
the problem was particularly evident in the mine impact area. Areas of 
conflict centred around leadership, ownership of relocation houses, 
and distribution of mine benefits. 
et Leadership conflicts were already much in evidence when 
people had to decide who would be their nominated 
representatives on the original Landowners' Negotiating 
Committee, and this type of conflict resurfaced with the 
subsequent formation of the Kaiya Landowners' Negotiating 
Committee (see Chapter 6). The big question was how and 
when should leadership be transferred to the younger 
generation. 
et A second major area of conflict was the relocation house (see 
Chapter 4). Adult children of relocated landowners were 
demanding that they should have their own relocation 
house. It is normal in many societies for children to expect to 
live as well as or better than their parents. 
et A third area of conflict was cash benefits. The substantial 
once-only compensation payments went to the parents. The 
next generation wanted its cash benefits as well. The 
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situation was not helped by the lack of clear decisions over 
the future allocation of benefits from the trust fund set up for 
the children of SML landowners. 
At the same time, the conflict between generations was only one 
aspect of the overall youth problem affecting Porgera and the rest of 
Papua New Guinea as well. 
It was the next generation of landowners (and there were many 
adults already) who felt that they were sold out by their parents and 
would therefore cause problems in the future. Add to this the lack of 
gardening land, unemployment, lack of discipline, and the presence of 
alcohol, guns and outsiders who have nothing to lose-and you had a 
recipe for disaster. 
The Children's Trust Fund 
Under the conditions of the Porgera forum agreements, 10 per cent of 
the total mining royalties were being paid to a trust fund for the 
children of the SML landowners. According to the Department of 
Mining and Petroleum, this fund had received K1,315,730 by the end 
of 1992. The whole amount had been placed in interest-bearing 
deposits; there had been no disbursements. As of May 1993, the 
following matters relating to the trust were outstanding 
.. the trust deed had not been signed by the Minister for 
Finance 
.. a manager for the trust had not yet been appointed 
.. the updated list of SML landowners' children (the 
beneficiaries) had not been completed 
.. no decision had been reached as to the form of benefits. 
In May 1993, it was planned to complete updating the list of SML 
landowner children. The list would be published and circulated for 
appeals. After this, it would be up to landowners to register their 
children. What was not clear to me was whether the beneficiaries 
would also include the grandchildren of registered landowners. There 
were already a significant number of grandchildren in 1993. 
The delay in deciding what benefits would be distributed under 
the trust fund was likely to compound the feelings of dissatisfaction 
amongst the adult children of landowners. The main benefit for which 
these children were agitating in 1993 was relocation-type houses. It 
had been suggested that the fund could be used to provide such 
housing for landowners' children, but if this were to be done, then the 
fund would soon be depleted. Another suggestion was that this fund 
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could be used to provide international-level primary education for the 
landowners' children. This would be problematic as it would lead to 
another form of distinction between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' in 
Porgera society. In addition, many children could end up being excluded 
because of their age or scholastic ability. One thing was certain: when the 
time came to distribute the benefits, there would be disputes. 
law and order 
The deteriorating law and order situation in Porgera was the main 
problem affecting the quality of life of Porgerans and the long-term 
viability of the mine. The 'law and order' problems in Porgera need to 
be seen in the national context (see Clifford, Morauta and Stuart 1984), 
but Enga Province as a whole has had a particularly bad reputation for 
lawlessness. Most of the inhabitants have been affected by tribal 
fighting. There have been pockets of anarchy such as the Tsak Valley. 
In 1991, the situation in Laiagam town became so bad that public 
servants abandoned it to mob rule. 
In Porgera, when discussing the law and order situation, it is 
important to bear in mind the different perspectives of the state, the 
Porgeran community and the PJY. 
• Most Porgerans, like most people in Papua New Guinea, are 
concerned with restoring harmony and patching up relations 
which have deteriorated, or else with being a winner in a 
situation of conflict. The emphasis is on restitution and 
compensation rather than punishment. There is also no 
distinction made between civil and criminal offences. 
• The state is concerned with the rule of law through the 
formal police-court-corrections system. The state punishes 
those who have broken its own laws, but this may not 
necessarily satisfy the victim. 
• The PJV wants to run its own business of mining gold with a 
minimum level of civil disruption and crime affecting its 
operations. 
These perspectives can be and often are in conflict. 
The justice system 
In 1989, the local police detachment was housed in Panandaka. As this 
land was required for mine expansion, the police station moved 
temporarily to the government station, then to containers located at 
the Anawe boom gate.9 In 1990, a new police station was opened at 
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the Porgera government station. However, this impressive concrete 
building was only briefly occupied before being totally destroyed by 
the 1991 landslide. Police then operated out of houses on the station 
until the new police station at Paiam was completed later in 1992, by 
which time another police station had been built at Suyan.10 Many 
records were lost in these moves. 
The local police detachment was backed up by the mobile squad. 
During 1989 and 1990, the mobile squad was frequently present in 
Porgera, primarily to clean up criminal activity on the road between 
Porgera and the Western Highlands borderY This squad also assisted 
in preventing a serious tribal fight from deteriorating into a blood 
bath. In 1989 and 1990, the mobile squad had a reputation, with both 
the PJV and the more law-abiding segments of the Porgera 
community, of being a tough but responsible organisation. 
Because of the problems facing the police, the PJV assisted with 
accommodation, transport, fuel and overtime pay. While the PJV had 
the ability to call upon police-as did anyone-the PJV did not in any 
way direct the police. However, community perceptions were such 
that any excesses of police action were blamed on the PJv. For 
example, in June 1991 police went to Laiagam High School to retrieve 
a PJV vehicle which had been 'impounded' by teachers and students. 
Police-both local and mobile squad-met with community 
resistance, and in the ensuing fracas, the police shot several high 
school students. In retaliation, decking on the nearby bridge was 
removed, thus cutting the road access into and out of Porgera. For 
several days there was a stand-off between the community and the 
police, and the whole incident was blamed on the PJv. 
When the state increased its equity stake in the Porgera mine from 
10 per cent to 25 per cent in 1993, the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) 
was created to protect such large 'national investments'. When the 
RDU arrived in Porgera, they were housed at the PJV camp in 
Tipinini. The community now had three different police forces to 
contend with-not counting the PJV's own Security Department. The 
local police detachment was viewed as the most benign. The mobile 
squad was feared or cheered depending on what action was taking 
place. But the RDU appeared to have absolutely no support at all from 
the local community. The RDU came into further disrepute when one 
of the men allegedly shot a Suyan landowner, and this resulted in 
community retaliation against the Suyan residential camp. I would 
argue on the side of the community, although not necessarily for the 
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same reasons, that three different police forces were unnecessary. The 
state should have put its resources into strengthening the local police 
and the mobile squad, which could be called upon whenever the 
situation got out of hand. 
Papua New Guinea's court system consists of the National Court, 
which handles most civil cases and criminal cases, the district courts, 
which handle summary offences, the land courts, and the village 
courts.12 In Porgera there was no resident District Court Magistrate 
until late 1993. Some of the Provincial Affairs officers at the 
government station were gazetted magistrates. However, in spite of 
the backlog of cases which built up when the visiting magistrate failed 
to appear, they did not often use their powers. Once Porgera had its 
own district court and resident magistrate, the main priority became 
the improvement of the village court system. An efficient village court 
system should not only handle the bulk of community level disputes; 
it should be able to defuse situations before they become major 
problems, act as a force for discipline in the community, and hopefully 
help to prevent some tribal fights. In 1993, only the Suyan Village 
Court was reputed to be functioning in a satisfactory manner. 
The main problems with the operation of village courts in Porgera, 
including Suyan Village Court, were 
• lack of training for village court officials 
.. lack of supervision and inspection of court proceedings and 
decisions 
.. problems with financial accounting 
.. discrimination against women 
• a preference for adjudication over mediation 
.. bureaucratic problems at provincial level which have 
obstructed the gazettal of new magistrates. 
Although Village Courts are not a traditional method of dispute 
settlement, they were an accepted and well-used system in Porgera. 
Nevertheless, women were very vocal in their criticisms of 
victimisation in village court decisions. They did not want the courts 
abolished; they wanted them to respond to women's complaints. 
Women also demanded that female magistrates approved by the 
Porgera Women's Association be appointed to all village courts. This 
was agreed, and women were appointed, but their appointments, 
along with those of new male magistrates, were not gazetted 
because of problems at the provincial level (Porgera District 
Annual Report 1992). 
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The SEIS (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:18) recommended that the 
village court system be strengthened by appointing' a strong and 
capable Provincial Village Court Officer with the mandate to hire and 
fire staff, implement an effective system of supervising and training, 
and ensure sound financial accounting and control procedures are 
followed'. The Acting Assistant District Manager reported in 1992 that 
there had been no permanent officer to coordinate the Enga Provincial 
Village Court Office, thus casting doubt on the feasibility of any 
further recommendation for institutional strengthening at the 
provincial level. However, the PJV was indicating its own willingness 
to assist in strengthening the Porgera village court system by 
providing a temporary officer to work with a District Village Court 
Inspector appointed by the Division of Enga. The local system could 
also have been strengthened by the appointment of a police liaison 
officer, a gazetted welfare officer, a nominee from the Porgera Local 
Government Council and a nominee of the Porgera Women's Association. 
All rural lock-ups in Enga province had been closed by 1993. The 
nearest correctional institution was Baisu, just outside Mount Hagen. 
Since Porgera already had a resident magistrate, court house, police 
station and police cells in 1993, there was an argument in favour of 
constructing a rural lock-up (in Paiam) to house minor offenders 
serving short sentences, who could then be made to do community 
work. 
Tribal fighting 
Tribal or inter-group fighting can be viewed as both a law and order 
problem and a method of conflict resolution. Prior to European 
intrusion, inter-group fighting was common throughout the whole of 
Papua New Guinea. Today it is primarily a highlands practice. Tribal 
fighting was harshly repressed in coastal areas by an authoritarian 
colonial regime. By the time the highlands were brought under the Pax 
Australiana, a more enlightened form of colonial rule had emerged. 
This led to a dramatic reduction in tribal fighting during the 1950s and 
1960s. With the approach of self-government and independence in the 
1970s, however, tribal fighting re-emerged as the primary method of 
conflict resolution. 
Meggitt (1957:32) reported that, in 1957, the Ipili of Porgera were 
involved in continuous inter-clan feuding, even though 'the many clan 
fights appear to by-pass the mining claims'. By contrast, Gibbs 
(1977:22) observed that 'one of the changes brought by the 
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government most appreciated by the people is the cessation of 
fighting, enabling them now [i.e. 1974] to move about much more 
freely and without fear'. 
By noting the presence or absence of inter-group fighting in each 
census division the Clifford Report made a rough estimate of the 
percentage of population affected by this phenomenon (Clifford, 
Morauta and Stuart 1984). On this criterion, 20 per cent of PNG's total 
population, but 89 per cent of the people in Enga Province, were 
affected by tribal fighting in the early 1980s. By this criterion, it can be 
said that 100 per cent of Porgera Census Division's population was 
affected by tribal fighting in each year from 1989 to 1993. 
Tribal fighting was a constant source of social disruption in 
Porgera. It was disruptive to the community because it resulted in 
deaths, injuries, and destruction of property, and because it restricted 
freedom of movement. It was disruptive to the mine because fighting 
often took place on the road, or encroached into the company's 
residential areas. Employees then took time off work either to 
participate in the fights, protect families, or flee due to fears of 
payback. As clashes often occurred between Porgeran and other 
Engan clans, and most public servants and teachers were from other 
parts of the province, government services were consequently 
interrupted. In 1993, the PJV's Community Affairs Section created a 
position for an officer to monitor civil unrest in the community, and to 
liaise with the police and kiaps for intervention and mediation. 
As tribal fighting was so pervasive, I felt this was an area worthy of 
investigation. Tribal fighting was supposed to be reported in the 
monthly 'Situation Reports' submitted by each district office, but no 
such reports had been filed in Porgera since 1985 due to lack of 
directives from Provincial Headquarters (Jeffrey Puge, pers. comm.). I 
therefore attempted to compile basic information on fights from 1988 
to mid 1993 by asking people who had knowledge of these fights-
kiaps, lands and community relations officers for exampleY 
Porgeran tribal fights differ significantly from those in 
neighbouring Enga-speaking areas in that they are of shorter duration 
and involve comparatively little damage to property. This can be 
attributed to lack of manpower, because it takes a lot of warriors to 
create the devastation seen after Engan wars. Furthermore, the 
cognatic kinship system in Porgera would tend to dilute clan loyalties 
in fights (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:18; Burton 1991:12). But the 
impact of outsiders on Porgeran fighting was evident in the Kairik 
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fight of 1992-93. This was an intra-clan fight in which each group had 
Engan allies, and the result was a fight of lengthy duration and 
destruction. Alcohol and motor vehicle accidents were new triggers 
for fighting. In addition, the gun had finally arrived in Porgera. This 
was inevitable, as guns were so pervasive in tribal fighting in other 
areas of Enga (and the highlands in general). While I did observe 'a 
gun' in one fight in Panandaka in 1993, I do not know if anyone had 
already been injured or killed by one in a local clan fight. 
Compensation was the normal way to achieve a reconciliation 
between the warring parties. Cash could lead to an inflation in 
compensation payments and groups could opt out of compensation by 
saying that it was against their religion (if they belonged to the 
Apostolic or Seventh Day Adventist churches); but the biggest 
problem was that the increase in the actual number of fights, 
combined with the introduction of 'the gun', may have meant that the 
number of deaths and injuries outstripped a group's capacity to pay. 
At a meeting with women of the Maip-Mulitaka Women's Association, 
the women complained that all their efforts were going to produce 
sweet potato to raise pigs for compensation payments. 
Crime 
One problem in analysing any trends in crime is the lack of any annual 
crime statistics for Porgera before 1992 (see Table 2.6).14 Even the 1992 
figures may underestimate the number of cases reported to the police, 
as there was a reference in the Annual Report to a 'tom' Occurrence 
Book. There was also the usual problem of trying to determine how 
much crime was reported to the police. Police attributed the low arrest 
rate to victims preferring compensation. 
The reported wilful murders do not include deaths in tribal 
fighting. The three murders recorded in 1992 were those of a young 
woman by a co-wife, the pack rape and murder of a young woman 
after a disco, and the murder of a man during compensation 
negotiations. I am unsure if the co-wife was convicted or still awaiting 
trial in 1993. There were no convictions for the other two murders. 
As is true world-wide, it was difficult to document whether the 
incidence of rape was increasing or not. However, Porgeran women 
felt that it was increasing in Porgera. As the victim received no justice 
under the legal system, rape was often not reported to the police. 
Restitution was achieved by compensation and reputedly through the 
village court, even though this offence is outside this court's 
Social change in the Porgera Valley I 65 
66 
jurisdiction. Pack rape is a recent and unfortunately common practice 
in many parts of Papua New Guinea, not just the highlands. However, 
until the two vicious pack rapes of 1990, this practice was not common 
inPorgera. 
There were three types of arson committed in Porgera: police arson, 
arson in tribal fights, and payback arson. Most arson from 1989 to 
1993, in terms of the total number of houses burned, had been done by 
the police. In one case, the police burned and looted approximately 39 
houses in the Mungalep area after the official opening of the Porgera 
mine on 20 October 1990. In late 1993, the police burned over 300 
houses at Paiam in retaliation for the killing of a fellow policeman 
(Laurie Martin, pers. comm.). Arson was not a feature of tribal fighting 
until the Kairik fight in early 1993. 
Incidents of theft ranged from armed robbery to minor thefts of 
anything that was left unattended for the briefest moment. The two 
largest robberies in Porgera were the 1990 armed robbery of the 
Table 2.6 Porgera crime statistics, 1992 
Indictable offences Reported Arrests 
Armed robbery 2 0 
Wilful murder 3 4 
Arson 4 0 
Attempted robbery 3 0 
Break and enter and stealing 9 0 
Attempted murder 
Rape 5 4 
Carnal knowledge 2 2 
Grievous bodily harm 4 4 
Indecent assault 2 0 
Wounding 6 3 
Summary offences 
Common assault 102 44 
Stealing (minor) 49 21 
Fighting 19 21 
Tribal fighting 3 0 
Drunk 1 1 
Drunk & disorderly 2 2 
Threatening behaviour 28 3 
Adultery 2 0 
Escape iO 9 
Source: Porgera District Annual Report, 1992. 
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Westpac bank agency and the 1990 New Year's Day riot and looting of 
the IPI Supa Store. Armed robbery and hijacking of vehicles with 
goods for the PJV and Porgera stores was less common in 1992-93 
than in 1989-90. However, the PJ\1, banks and stores were not the only 
victims of theft; it was pervasive in the community and was even 
common within families. Women carried the family bank passbooks in 
their bilums as it was not safe to leave them at home, and even then 
women often had these passbooks stolen. The 1992 figure of 49 
reported 'minor' stealing offences indicates that most thefts were 
either unrecorded or unreported. Minor theft charges were also heard 
in the village courts. 
Riots, roadblocks and demonstrations 
This is another area in which it proved difficult to obtain information. 
As with tribal fighting, there were no Situation Reports which might 
mention major riots and demonstrations. The PJV's Community 
Affairs and Security section reports only mentioned those events 
which had or could have had an impact on mine operations. Incidents 
which might be noteworthy in more peaceful areas of the country (for 
example riotous behaviour at the Lands Office or minor roadblocks) 
were accepted as part of daily life in Porgera. 
Mob action and violence was common at Porgera Station, 
especially on pay days. Roadblocks were another common method of 
airing grievances. Most roadblocks in Porgera were directed at the 
mine. This was frequently the case during the indecent haste of 
construction, when foreign contractors overstepped agreed land 
boundaries. Many grievances could have been sorted out first through 
discussion. While I witnessed some pretty scary mob action, all the 
roadblocks I encountered were relatively peaceful events. The object 
was to air a grievance, not to engage in combat, but this in no way 
condones what was usually an illegal action. 
Examples of serious riots which took place in Porgera include 
• the looting of IPI store on New Year's Day in 1991 
• the riot stemming from the union strike at the mine in May 
1991 
• the attack on the mining camp at Suyan on the night of 14-15 
October 1992. 
The only surprising thing about this serious attack on Suyan was that 
it had not happened sooner. It was an event waiting for a trigger. In a 
place of known violence and with grievances against the mine, it was 
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not strategically sound to house employees so far from the mine site. 
When trouble occurred, mine employees either stayed in camp or ran 
the gauntlet. Even with all the new security arrangements which now 
give Suyan the appearance and ambience of a prison, it would be hard 
to say that the risk of such an attack has been removed. IS There are 
plenty of Porgerans with grievances against the mine and vast 
numbers of idle outsiders ready to fuel these grievances or join in 
demonstrations. The rent-a-crowd mob have nothing to lose. 
Outsiders 
A squatter is a person who settles on land without authorisation. As 
most non-Porgerans residing in Porgera have had landowner 
permission to reside, it is more accurate to say that Porgera has had an 
'outsider problem'. While there are no census data to indicate just how 
many outsiders were living in the Porgera Census Division during the 
period of this study, there was agreement by all (the Porgeran 
landowners, the provincial government officers in Porgera, and the 
PJV) that the numbers were considerable. It also appeared that most of 
the outsiders were western Ipili people from the Paiela Census 
Division, Enga-speaking people from the Maip-Mulitaka, Kera-Lagaip 
and Wage census divisions of Enga Province, and Huli people from 
the Tari Census Division of the Southern Highlands Province. People 
from all these areas had traditional links with the Ipili of Porgera. The 
Ipili granted permission to outsiders to reside for reasons of culture 
and commercial gain. Relatives and families of the person obtaining 
residence then moved in, and this led to a chain migration problem. 
A distinction must be made between the more permanent outsiders 
who resided in Porgera and the considerable number of temporary 
outsiders who came to Porgera during the fortnightly pay day period, 
known locally as the 'thank you market'. Six provinces have highway 
access to Porgera: Morobe, Madang, Eastern Highlands, Simbu, 
Western Highlands and Southern Highlands. While the highway 
provided easy access to Porgera, it also meant that people could 
easily return to their homes. It is quite possible that Porgera would 
have had even more outsiders and a larger 'squatter problem' if 
there was no highway. A programme to reduce the number of 
outsiders in the Special Mining Lease was actually undertaken by 
the PJV in their capacity as the leaseholders. The two most positive 
features of this programme were landowner support and lack of 
violence. 
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The permanent and temporary outsiders had different reasons for 
coming to Porgera. Many permanent outsiders came to Porgera for 
quality of life factors: employment possibilities, access to health and 
education facilities, and even to reside in a more peaceful place. 
Temporary outsiders came for economic gains, which included selling 
goods at pay day markets, obtaining part of the wages of relatives or 
friends, and prostitution. Many came simply for the excitement, and 
these formed the bulk of the ever-ready rent-a-crowd that joined in the 
fights and riotous behaviour which became a standard feature of pay 
day. As previously mentioned, the social and environmental problems 
caused by excessive numbers included overcrowding, shortage of land 
for food gardens, lack of firewood, and pollution of creeks and rivers 
(see Chapter 5). As outsiders could return to their own land and 
communities, they had little to lose on their own account, but might 
gain by joining forces with Porgerans and encouraging them to take 
action over real or perceived grievances. 
Unemployment 
Unemployment has been a major issue in Porgera. It was the cause of 
an unknown number of demonstrations, mostly peaceful, some of 
which were staged by local women. The mine and its contractors 
were the major employers in Porgera. Employment preference was 
given to Porgerans but, due to the lack of education in the 
community, most employed Porgerans were in unskilled or semi-
skilled positions. Many Porgerans were resentful at the number of 
outsiders employed by the mine. However, given the education base at 
Porgera, it would be many years before there would be enough qualified 
and experienced Porgerans to occupy skilled and senior positions in the 
mine work force. There were very few wage employment opportunities 
in Porgera besides those offered by the PJV and its contractors. Some 
Porgerans were involved in alluvial mining and business activities, but 
most Porgeran-owned businesses were spin-offs from the mine (see 
Chapter 7). In 1993, there was virtually no agricultural base in the district 
other than a few small-scale coffee and vegetable growers, though the 
government had already set up an agricultural base camp at TIpinini for 
coffee and vegetable extension programmes. 
All this pointed to large numbers of unemployed or under-
employed people living in a valley which was very much geared 
towards the life-styles of a cash economy. Easy money from the Mount 
Kare gold rush, and from PJV and government land compensation, 
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meant that people's expectations for a reasonable wage were definitely 
too high from 1988 to 1991. Add grievances and mix with rent-a-
crowd, and you had a recipe for civil unrest. 
Alcohol and drug abuse 
Money made at Mount Kare led to an increase in alcohol-related 
problems in Porgera. In response to this, the Enga Provincial Govern-
ment banned both the sale of alcohol and its importation into Porgera 
in late 1988, with the sole exception of the restricted club licence at the 
mining camp. In 1989, the escalating law and order problems in Enga 
Province led to a province-wide ban on the sale and importation of 
alcoholic beverages.16 While there were pressures to ban alcohol, 
there were pressures to remove the ban, once it was in place, due to 
loss of revenue by the provincial government and the inability of the 
police to control black markets. Alcohol black marketing was 
common in Porgera due to the wealth of the population. Large 
compensation payouts were generally followed by periods of 
alcoholic haze. There were also indications that the local black 
market was well organised. 
Alcohol abuse was primarily a male problem in Porgera. The 
Porgera Women's Association, like its counterparts throughout 
Papua New Guinea, frequently had alcohol-related problems on 
its agenda. Women in Porgera knew the who, how and where of 
alcohol black marketing, but did not wish to report this 
information to the police for fear their houses would be burntY 
The women's main concerns regarding alcohol abuse were the 
resulting incidents of domestic violence, loss of family income, 
motor vehicle accidents, and the numbers of children and 
adolescents who were learning to drink with their male relatives. 
While prohibition leads to black markets, the alcohol-related 
problems in Porgera would probably have been much worse if 
alcohol had been sold in legal outlets. In 1993, the Enga and 
Porgera women's associations both wanted the alcohol ban to 
remain in place throughout the province. 
In 1993, there was only one recorded case of someone growing 
marijuana in Porgera, and this was ironically on the government 
agricultural station. However, marijuana was easy to obtain and was 
thought to be imported into Porgera along with the fortnightly influx 
of people on pay days. 
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Prostitution and promiscuity 
Obtaining any specific information on the subject of prostitution was a 
real problem. There were reports of two female prostitutes operating 
from an Alipis disco in 1987, as well as reports of prostitutes operating 
in the gold fields of Mount Kare. I heard many stories of Porgeran 
men spending Mount Kare and compensation money on the good life 
in Mount Hagen, Port Moresby, Cairns and the Philippines. There 
were also a few stories of Porgeran women soliciting in Mount Hagen. 
Prostitution in Porgera itself appeared to be primarily a problem 
caused by the pay day influx of outsiders. There were unconfirmed 
reports of prostitution being conducted out of one or two houses in 
Porgera government station. 
Concerns expressed by women did not focus on prostitution per 
se, but on the incidence of adultery, the possibility of contracting 
AIDS from unfaithful husbands, and the increasingly promiscuous 
behaviour of young people. Adultery was a major issue with 
women because it usually led to marriage. My impression was that 
more men were committing adultery than women, and that the 
increase in adultery was correlated with the influx of wealth from 
Mount Kare and mine compensation payments. Adultery was not 
only socially disruptive because of its association with polygyny, 
but also because it led to domestic violence and an increased risk of 
sexually transmitted diseases. As we have seen, domestic violence 
was a serious social problem in its own right, and one that could 
not be easily overcome, given the overall level of violence in the 
community. 
Other socially disruptive factors 
Three other causes of social disruption may also be mentioned here: 
quarrels over land compensation, the incidence of gambling, and the 
conduct of local 'discos'. In order for construction of the mine to begin, 
the PJV needed to acquire land and compensate the owners for the 
temporary or permanent loss of land use and for improvements to the 
land-mainly food gardens, economic trees, and buildings. 
Investigations by PJV's lands officers resulted in disputes over land 
boundaries and the rights to receive the compensation-whether in 
the form of cash payments or relocation houses. This was a major 
source of social disruption in the SML in 1989, and in Suyan and 
Kairik in 1990. 
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Unlike alcohol consumption, gambling was an activity widely 
practised by both sexes. High stake gambling was common after 
compensation payments. It was also common for children to gamble. 
The most common form of gambling was card games, although 
snooker and darts were also quite popular.18 The Porgera Women's 
Association expressed concern that some women were gambling to 
such an extent that they were neglecting their children. This appeared 
to be a new problem in Porgera, which was associated with the recent 
inflow of cash. My own observations of card games in Porgera 
indicated that there was less cash involved in 1993 than in 1989-90, 
though when I remarked on this, one woman pointed out that the 
players hid the paper money when I came around. The President of 
the Enga Women's Association, ScholIa Warai, reported that many 
women living in Wabag town were spending a lot of time gambling, 
and consequently neglecting their children and household duties. 
It was (and still is) common in many parts of Papua New Guinea 
for a community to raise funds by charging admission to dances held 
in a fenced-off area. In some parts of the country these dances to raise 
money have been called 'six to sixes' (i.e. dusk to dawn), but today the 
more common name is 'disco'. A major change in the conduct of discos 
in Porgera was that they were no longer supervised community fund-
raising events, but a form of private business where security 
arrangements were designed to protect the property of the owner, 
rather than to ensure communally acceptable forms of behaviour. As 
with alcohol, there was nothing inherently wrong with discos; it was 
the activities and behaviours associated with them that caused 
problems and community concern. Discos were as popular with 
young people in Porgera as they are world wide. The problems in 
Porgera were black market alcohol, marijuana, prostitution, and the 
fear that attendance would lead young people into promiscuous 
behaviour-not to mention the problem of noise pollution. A disco 
was blamed for the dreadful pack rape and murder of a young girl in 
October 1992. The problem was that in Porgera, with the increased 
number of outsiders and the general breakdown of family discipline, it 
was virtually impossible to obtain an acceptable level of supervision 
and security to ensure that discos were both fun and socially acceptable. 
Institutional strengthening 
In the period covered by this study, there had been a disproportionate 
amount of energy and resources directed towards works programmes 
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in Porgera to the neglect of quality of life issues. This was 
understandable, as Porgera was one of the least developed districts in 
Enga Province. But once many of the infrastructure demands had been 
met, the time had come for institutions to direct their resources and 
energies to the following quality of life investments 
.. establishing peace and good order in the community-a 
fundamental prerequisite for social and economic 
development 
.. providing more education, formal, non-formal and informal 
.. improving the health status of the community by 
concentrating on preventive rather than curative measures 
.. improving income-earning opportunities for the majority 
and not the few, while ensuring that immediate economic 
gains would not be achieved at the expense of future 
generations 
.. improving the status of women so they could participate in, 
and benefit from, development. 
National and provincial government 
The national government's mineral revenues are supposed to be 
directed towards development in various social and economic sectors. 
However, as Jackson (1993:169) comments in his review of the Ok Tedi 
mining project 
... the hope that mining would kickstart more desirable and 
appropriate forms of development around the country has clearly been 
disappointed. In the twenty years since BeL opened there are very few 
indications that general development levels in the country have shown 
anything more than sluggish, partial growth. Agricultural 
performance, admittedly in the face of almost continually declining 
world prices, has been particularly abysmal. Like almost all other 
developing countries heavily dependent on metal exports, the PNG 
government has not been able to utilise mining revenues to raise 
productivity elsewhere in the country. 
This suggests that the national government is unlikely to have the 
political will or institutional capacity to assist Enga Province to 
maximise the benefits that can be obtained from having a world class, 
profitable mine within its boundaries. 
The main financial benefits of the project to the Enga Provincial 
Government have been the royalties paid on mine production and a 
Special Support Grant from the national government. Royalties 
initially represented 1.25 per cent of the export value of the mine's 
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outpuU9 These were paid by the PJV to the national Department of 
Mining and Petroleum, and the provincial government then received 
77 per cent of the total, while the remaining 23 per cent went to: the 
SML landowners (8 per cent), the PDA's community development 
fund (5 per cent), and the 'Landowners' Children's Trust Account' (10 
per cent). In addition, the national government has agreed to pay the 
provincial government a Special Support Grant which represents 1 per 
cent of the export value of the mine's output. According to the Porgera 
forum agreements, Special Support Grant expenditures are subject to 
national government approval and are supposed to be accountable on 
a quarterly basis. 
According to the Department of Mining and Petroleum, the 
provincial government had received K6,665,000 from the Special 
Support Grant and K10,154,229 from mining royalties by the end of 
1992. I was unable to find out how this K16 million had been used.20 
This highlights three problems 
.. the lack of accountability for public monies 
.. institutional incapacity to design and implement 
infrastructure construction projects; and 
.. Engan attitudes to mine benefits. 
Many angry Engan people were complaining that they had 
received no benefits from the PJV. This attitude was understandable. 
The provincial government's failure to direct the above K16 million to 
infrastructure projects in Laiagam, Kandep, Wabag, Wapenamanda 
and Kompiam districts placed the PJV in a difficult situation. In order 
for the PJV to secure road access through Enga province, Engans 
needed to perceive that they were receiving benefits from the PJY. The 
PJV's response was firstly to increase its public relations and 
community development assistance to areas outside Porgera District, 
and then to introduce the Resource Development Tax Credit Scheme 
(later known as the Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme), as an 
arrangement between itself and the national government, under which 
it could deduct the cost of infrastructure construction projects up to 
the value of 0.75 per cent of gross income from its corporate tax 
liability. 
Lack of accountability and corruption have been allegations 
frequently made of both the national government and various 
provincial governments. The main difference between the targets of 
these accusations is that the national government has had the power to 
suspend provincial governments. The Enga Provincial Government 
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was suspended twice for financial mismanagement in the decade 
preceding this study. The problem with suspending provincial 
governments, and replacing the elected provincial politicians with a 
caretaker administrator, is that this rarely did anything to improve the 
performance of the provincial public service. The effectiveness of 
public servants in the Department of Enga did not improve, despite 
the efforts at institutional strengthening under the province's 
integrated rural development project, called Enga Yaaka Lasemana, 
which operated for most of the 1980s.21 
Problems facing the Enga public service included 
.. lack of middle management skills to get things done, which 
was exacerbated by the problem of attracting skilled public 
servants to work in Enga 
.. tribal fighting, which not only prevented the delivery of 
services and destroyed infrastructure, but also became an 
excuse for public servants, especially extension staff, to fail 
to perform their duties 
.. buck-passing between the national and provincial 
government, the opportunities for which were further 
increased when functions were decentralised to the district 
level 
.. an excessive number of policies and policy changes 
.. regional divisions between eastern and western parts of the 
province; and 
.. poor staff morale. 
Deficiencies in the public service were recognised, but the 
proposed remedies had not made much difference 
.. divisions were restructured, and functions decentralised to 
the district level, without the staff and resources required to 
make the system work22 
.. staff were reshuffled without the means or the will to get rid 
of 'dead wood' 
.. conferences, workshops and planning exercises became an 
end unto themselves. 
The experience of integrated rural development projects in Enga and 
other provinces (East Sepik, Southern Highlands, Milne Bay) suggests 
that sustainable institutional strengthening was not achieved because 
these projects operated alongside of, instead of being integrated into, 
the provincial public service, and because expatriate contract officers 
were placed in line positions in order to achieve immediate results. 
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The improving performance of the public service in Porgera itself 
(known as the Division of Porgera) was reflected in the Annual 
Reports. Had it not been for the presence of the mine, it is doubtful 
whether there would have been any improvements, and arguable that 
there might even have been a further decline. Most probably, the road 
connecting Porgera to Laiagam would have become untrafficable, 
leading to a further deterioration of services. While there had been 
significant improvements in health, education and agricultural 
extension staffing, other rural extension services were still almost non-
existent. Many of the significant improvements in Porgera could be 
credited to the efforts of the PDA rather than the provincial 
government. Nevertheless, Division of Porgera staff, with assistance 
from the PDA and the PJY, had the potential to strengthen other 
institutions to be models for the rest of Enga Province, specifically: the 
local government councils, the village court system, and government 
extension programmes. 
The Porgera Development Authority 
The PDA was formed in 1989 as a fourth level of government between 
the provincial government and the two local government councils in 
Porgera District. The PDA's general functions, as specified in its own 
legislation, were to 
.. control, manage and administer the Porgera District 
.. ensure the welfare of its residents 
.. assist the local government councils in carrying out 
functions within the district 
.. maintain the Kairik airstrip 
.. receive and distribute royalties from the provincial 
government 
.. administer the spending of monies under the PJV's 
Community Facilities Grant (K4 million by 1993) 
.. advise on liquor licensing matters in Porgera District; and 
.. assist the Provincial Town planning Board in planning any 
township in Porgera District. 
The rationale for creating a fourth level of government was to 
overcome the bureaucratic constraints of local government legislation 
in order to get things done, and to ensure that both local government 
council areas received their due share of mine-related benefits. In the 
short term, the PDA was an effective institution for getting things 
done. The PDA demonstrated accountability for the money it 
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received.23 The PDA was responsible for the building and upgrading 
of community schools, aid posts, recreation facilities, minor roads and 
bridges, as well as the development of Paiam township. However, the 
formation of the PDA compounded the institutional weakness of both 
Porgera and Paiela-Hewa local government councils. 
The Porgera local Government Council 
The development of provincial governments weakened the local 
government system. The focus of centralisation merely moved from 
Port Moresby to provincial capitals, while the quantity and quality of 
services to rural areas declined. By 1993, this outcome had been 
officially recognised by the national government with its launching of 
the Village Services Programme. Although this programme appeared 
to be specifically aimed at revitalising local or community government 
councils, it also seemed to make some provision for by-passing these 
bodies. 
Following the creation of the PDA, the activities of the Porgera 
Local Government Council were mainly confined to the operation of 
garbage collection contracts at Porgera Station, Suyan and the mine 
site, the construction and maintenance of market facilities, and the 
cleaning of Porgera town. In addition, the council was receiving the 
village court fines and using this money to upgrade village court 
facilities. But local councils have the potential for engaging in a 
wider range of activities. The 1992 Porgera District Annual Report 
indicated that the Porgera council had an interest in both law and 
order and public health issues. Since 1990, it had passed the 
following rules 
.. Litter Rule 1990 
.. Offensive Weapon Carrying Rule 1990 
.. Animal Keeping Rule 1990 
.. Fighting in Public Rule 1990 
.. Pig Trespass Rule 1990 
.. Street Selling Rule 1990 
.. Aerodrome Trespass Rule 1990 
.. Tax Rule 1991 
.. Disco Control Rule 1991. 
However the council had problems with documentation and gazettal 
of the rules, and it is not clear from the Annual Report which rules, if 
any, had been gazetted. Even if all rules were gazetted, there was still 
the problem of finding the manpower to enforce them. 
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In 1993, the Porgera council had new council chambers at Paiam, 
indicating perhaps that the town itself would come under the council's 
jurisdiction. However, the council did not have adequate staff or 
finance to undertake its existing functions, even after its works 
function had been taken over by the PDA. The council needed more 
permanent staff to manage its affairs and programmes, and some 
additional temporary staff to tackle outstanding administrative and 
organisational problems, as well as any new proposed activities. 
The Porgera landowners' Association and Community Issues 
Committee 
According to the SEIS (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[2]:12), 'the Porgera 
Landowners' Association [PLA] was formed in January 1986 to 
represent clans owning land within the SML area, but has since been 
weakened by conflict between "true" landowners and invited guests 
who subsequently gained control of the executive for political 
purposes'. Because of this problem, the Landowners' Negotiating 
Committee was formed, in early 1987, specifically to negotiate the 
compensation and relocation agreements for the SML. The SEIS 
suggested that 'such single purpose groups are likely to succumb to 
conflicting purposes once the immediate aim is fulfilled'. In fact, 
after the agreements were negotiated and signed, the Negotiating 
Committee continued to meet, and became a successful forum for 
debating issues and grievances between the PJV and the landowners. 
The committee then expanded to include the original 23 members 
and their alternates, plus the nine local councillors who took part in 
the Development forum and signed the Mining Development 
Contract. This expanded group was renamed the Community Issues 
Committee (CIC). This committee was still meeting regularly with 
the PJV in 1993, and had grown into a responsible and effective 
group, though this did not mean that the two parties were always in 
agreement. 
Meanwhile, the PLA-which still represented the Porgeran 
landowners at the quarterly review meetings coordinated by the 
Department of Mining and Petroleum-was suffering (at least until 
1992) from a lack of credibility due to organisational problems. 
According to its chairman, the PLA only became a registered 
organisation in 1991 (Nixon Mangape, pers. comm.). In 1992, it 
became a more professional organisation, and began producing 
written documents relating to its concerns and demands. 
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While I am still unclear as to the structure and membership of the 
PLA, I assume that it was supposed to represent the interests of all 
landowners in the Porgera Census Division, not just the SML. In 1993, 
it appeared that the PLA and the CIC were really one and the same 
group. In 1992-93, the same person was chairman of both groups, and 
many of the PLA executives were attending CIC meetings. Issues 
debated with the PJV were often the same issues presented to the 
national government at the quarterly review meetings. Therefore, the 
CIC could be viewed as the unofficial forum for debate, and the PLA 
as the official body which monitored progress on the conditions of the 
Porgera forum agreements, as well as the other concerns of Porgeran 
landowners. This appeared to be a very satisfactory arrangement. 
The Christian churChes 
The Christian churches in Papua New Guinea have always had an 
important role in social development. This has included mission-run 
schools and health services, youth and women's programmes. In 
addition, all churches bring the basic message of peace and preach 
against socially disruptive influences such as polygamy, tribal fighting 
and adultery. In 1962, after Porgera was de-restricted, four Christian 
denominations entered the valley: Apostolic, Roman Catholic, Seventh 
Day Adventist and Lutheran. These remain the four main churches in 
the Porgera District. Gibbs (1977:23) wrote that in 1974 'mission bodies 
exert a considerable influence, though this is truer in the Paiela valley 
than in Porgera'. Interviews with church leaders in Porgera indicated 
that this situation still existed in 1993. 
The Apostolic Church was a strong, peaceful influence in the 
community until the split in its membership in 1992. The breakaway 
church, led by a couple of Apostolic pastors from Kandep, was called 
the Apostolic Pentecostal Church of PNG, while the parent church was 
called the Christian Apostolic Fellowship, and still belonged to the 
worldwide body of Apostolics. In 1993, this division was causing 
problems in the Porgera area-especially in Paiam, Kulapi and 
Anawe--but the influence of the breakaway church had apparently not 
yet extended to Paiela. One result of the conflict was a court case over 
who should conduct services at the newly built Paiam Apostolic Church 
and the closure of the literacy classes at Paiam and Anawe. According to 
Pastor Patimo Kolape, there were about 1,000 active Apostolic church 
members in the Porgera District in 1993, and about another 1,000 who 
had been baptised but were no longer attending services. 
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The Lutheran Church came into Porgera District in 1962, and 
acquired leases at Mungalep, Yuyan, Yendekale and Kolombi (Paiela). 
The conflict in the Lutheran church in Enga had not affected Porgera, 
as only the Maramuni church was represented in the district. In 1993, 
the church had three agency community schools at Yuyan, Porgera 
Station and Takopa (Paiela). According to Pastor Pes Kiwale, there 
were between 750 and 950 active church members in the Porgera 
District. The Roman Catholic Church was based at Mungalep, and 
was running three community schools at Mungalep, Tipinini and 
Kolombe (Paiela). According to Father Peter, there were about 2,000 
active church members in the district, and the membership was 
stronger in the Paiela area than in Porgera Census Division itself. The 
Seventh Day Adventist Church was based at Yendekale. According to 
Pastor Lambu, there were about 2,000 active members in 1993, and the 
Adventists had been actively recruiting new members since 1992. 
All churches appeared to have gained strength since 1989. 
However, according to some church leaders, the 1988 Mount Kare 
gold rush had a very negative impact on their activities. Church 
leaders also agreed that weekly church attendance and other church 
activities were more common among women than men. This 
difference was explained by the fact that men were practising 
polygamy, which is against the principles of all four churches, and 
were involved in compensation practices which were contrary to the 
principles of the Seventh Day Adventist and Apostolic churches. All 
four churches had very good programmes for youth and women in 
other parts of Papua New Guinea, but these programmes were very 
weak in the Porgera District, possibly because of the lack of an 
educated congregation to implement community programmes. 
The Porgera Women's Association 
The Porgera District Women's Association, generally known as the 
Porgera Women's Association (PWA) or Ipili Wanda Yame, was 
formed on 18 October 1989. The basis for the association was the 
small group activities under the PJV's Women's Relocation 
Programme in the SML and the small number of women's groups 
which already existed in the district. The association started out with 
six member groups, but this had increased to 36 by July 1992. Besides 
the village women's groups (wanda yame), there were separate 
groups representing Porgera and Paiela government stations, and 
one group for women employees working at the mine, while the girls 
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attending the CODE centre had also formed a group and joined the 
association. Many, but not all, of the member groups were church-
based groups. Church-based groups were encouraged because these 
groups generally have greater strength, or greater potential for 
strength, as they are based on and supported by existing church 
programmes. 
The PWA was an incorporated association managed by a nine-
woman executive or management committee which met monthly. 
General meetings were held monthly for ten months, with a two-
month break over the Christmas period. The association had been 
recognised and supported by the PJV, the Division of Porgera, the 
PDA, and the Porgera Local Government Council. It was also a 
member of the Enga Council of Women. 
The initial success of the PWA can be attributed to the social 
disruption in the community caused by both the Mount Kare gold 
rush and mining development at Porgera itself. Local women had 
many problems or issues of common concern. In addition, Porgera 
society was fluid and flexible in the face of change, and since there 
had never been any previous attempt to form a district-level women's 
council in Porgera, there were no historical problems to be overcome. 
The association also had the support of a few leading Porgeran men 
who prevented any organised male backlash. 
The primary purpose and function of a district-level women's 
association was to give women the leadership skills and public voice 
which would enable them to participate in decision making, and 
eliminate discrimination against half the population, in a world 
populated by an increasing number of non-traditional, male-
dominated institutions. Where rapid social change is taking place, as it 
was in Porgera, a strong women's association is necessary to ensure 
that women are not further disadvantaged by male decision-makers. 
In Porgera, the newly created institutions included the PLA, the ClC, 
the PDA, the Porgera Allied Workers Association, and of course the 
PJV itself. These were additions to the existing non-traditional 
institutions, like the provincial government, the local government 
councils, and the village courts. 
A second function of the PWA was to promote relevant formal, non-
formal and informal education programmes to meet the needs of 
women, their families and the wider community. A third function was 
to identify and promote economic activities-improving subsistence 
agriculture, business skills and income-generating opportunities for 
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women. 
The President of the PWA was the elected women's representative 
on the PDA.24 The first project undertaken by the PWA was the 
successful lobby of the PDA to construct a Women's Resource Centre. 
Women wanted a building of their own for the association's activities, 
as well as for prestige. This resource centre was constructed by the 
PDA using funds from the PJV's Community Facilities Grant. It took 
one year to progress from project approval to occupancy in mid 
November 1990. The centre was officially opened on 8 March 1991, as 
part of the association's Women's Day activities, and was dismantled 
in May 1991 to prevent its total destruction by the Porgera landslide. 
The PDA rebuilt the centre next to the existing classrooms at the 
vocational centre. The resource centre, a modified relocation house, 
was now too small for the association's needs. The District Manager 
suggested that, when Paiam town was built, a new and larger 
Women's Resource Centre should be located there, and the present 
centre could then be turned over to the vocational centre as a home 
economics building. 
Programmes and projects organised by the PWA from October 1989 
to May 1993 included 
• International Women's Day celebrations in 1990 and 1991 
• lobbying the PDA for the appointment of women as village 
court magistrates 
• a 'Women and Law Day' on 2 October 1991 
.. the Porgera literacy project 
• women's leadership and skills courses 
.. business awareness and book-keeping courses 
.. a screen printing project 
• an ore sample bag-making business 
.. a second-hand clothing business 
• poultry and vegetable projects; and 
• an artefact business. 
Some of these programmes and projects were on-going in 1993, and 
some were one-off affairs. Some were highly successful, while some 
had problems.25 
The Porgera Paiela Youth Association 
The Porgera Paiela Youth Association (PPYA) was formed on 28 
August 1989. Over the next four years, its affiliation grew from eleven 
to 51 member groups, approximately half of which were church-based 
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groups, and 12 of which were based in Paiela Census Division. The 
PPYA was specifically formed as an independent youth association 
outside of the National Youth Movement Programme (NYMP) and the 
Enga Youth Council. In 1989, the Enga Provincial Youth Council was 
experiencing many problems, and was dominated by 'grey-bearded' 
youth-a fact which supported the suspicion that most member 
groups were in fact not youth groups at all, but family business groups 
registering with the NYMP in order to access money under the latter's 
grant scheme. This grant scheme encouraged a 'handout mentality' 
and an atmosphere of conflict and competition, as opposed to 
cooperation, between member groups. In addition, there were many 
groups, especially in the Tipinini area, which had been ripped off by 
investing in the now defunct National Youth Development Fund 
which was part of the NYMP. 
Youth associations are more complex than women's associations. 
The first problem is defining just what the term 'youth' means. The 
'adolescence' definition of youth is the period between childhood and 
acceptance of the full responsibilities of adulthood, but this becomes 
problematic when one considers the early age of marriage in Porgera. 
When one hears references to the 'youth problem' in Papua New 
Guinea, the reference is normally to unemployed, out of school, males 
between the ages of 16 and 25. A rigid definition of youth simply is not 
possible if one is trying to develop youth programmes which are 
integrated into, rather than separate from, the community. In Porgera 
this problem was tackled by defining 'youth' as people between the 
ages of 13 and 25. Anyone older was classified as an 'adviser'. In order 
to register with the PPYA, youth groups had to have more 'youth' 
members than 'adviser' members. 
The second problem is appeal. For example: in areas where women's 
concerns tend to focus on their roles as mothers and wives, older teenage 
girls may feel they have more in common with women's groups. At the 
same time, very 'naughty' male youth are unlikely to join youth groups, 
while older male 'youth' who are married have a different agenda to 
younger teenagers. Youth associations are also more vulnerable than 
women's associations to being manipulated for political purposes. 
In order to discourage the 'handout mentality' syndrome 
associated with grants to youth groups, a Youth Contract Scheme was 
initiated by the PJY. Under this scheme, youth groups registered with 
the PPYA undertook labour contracts to earn money. For some reason, 
this programme lapsed in 1992, but was being revitalised at the time 
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of the present study. 
Youth and women's groups often have money-making projects. 
The PJV's Youth Coordinator reported that in 199317 youth groups 
had vegetable projects, 50 had poultry (meat bird) projects, 12 were 
involved with trade stores, and three with tyre services. There were 
often unrealistic expectations as to the outcomes of these projects. At 
best, they offered skill training and a fund-raising source for group 
activities; at worst, they failed due to lack of knowledge and support 
or misuse of project funds by a member of the group. The members of 
the PPYA also wanted a project to give them a 'name'. They decided 
on a didiman (agricultural supply) store. This was funded by the PDA, 
and had a government business development officer attached to the 
project. By 1993, the store, which was located in Porgera market, had 
expanded to include a bookstore, as well as the sale of agricultural 
supplies. 
Youth training courses to mid 1993 had concentrated on sporting 
skills (basketball, volleyball, badminton and table tennis), business 
management skills, and leadership. In 1990, the association organised 
a law and order rally at Porgera Station, but this was not very 
successful for a variety of reasons, which included heavy rain. Youth 
groups and the PPYA were very effective as organisers of the 
Independence Day celebrations in Porgera, which included a Youth 
Show. Both the PPYA and the PWA had extensive social networks 
which had tremendous potential for extension work. 
PJV's Community Affairs Division 
The primary function of the Community Affairs Division was to 
handle all matters relating to relationships between the PJV and 
landowners in Porgera, as well as the wider community in Enga 
Province and in the vicinity of the Hides transmission line. In early 
1989, the division consisted of three separate but closely related 
sections-Community relations, Lands, and Business Development. 
These three sections were gradually being strengthened and brought 
up to full divisional status on a par with the other two divisions-
Production and Administration. The elevation of the 'people side' of 
mining was due to the strong leadership and capabilities of the 
Community Affairs Manager, Noel Waiters. The process was probably 
also facilitated by the closure of the Bougainville mine in mid 1989, 
which sent shivers around the mining community, and by the law and 
order problems in Porgera and along the highway to Lae, which was 
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the lifeline of the mine. In early 1989, the company's efforts had been 
concentrated on land investigation and acquisition, relocation and 
business development. With the notable exception of business 
development, which had an office in Wabag, all programmes were 
aimed at the Porgera Valley. The hijacking of a truck loaded with mine 
equipment in 1990, near the Kera bridge in Laiagam District, triggered 
the beginning of a wider community relations programme in Enga 
Province, and later in the Tari District around the Hides-Porgera 
power transmission line. 
By mid 1993, the Community Affairs Division had a staff of about 
85 working in the following sections 
.. Lands and relocation 
.. Community relations-Porgera 
.. Community relations-other (i.e. the rest of Enga Province 
and the transmission line) 
.. Business development: Porgera and Wabag 
.. Social development and women's affairs 
.. Youth and recreation (i.e. community level as opposed to site 
services for PJV employees) 
.. Media unit. 
Local community relations staff were recruited to work in their 
own home areas, for example Porgera, Laiagam, Sirunki, Wabag and 
Tari. 
There is a growing awareness that the lands, community relations 
and business development functions are an integral component of 
modem mining development in Papua New Guinea. However, many 
senior staff in this field (and not just in the PJV) have felt that they are 
viewed as a necessary evil-heavily supported when there are 
problems, but ignored and under-resourced at other times. This is to 
some degree understandable, as expatriate mine developers are in the 
business of mining-this is their area of training and expertise. 
Weaknesses in the government system have forced mining companies 
to undertake what are traditionally government activities-the most 
notable being land investigation, land acquisition and business 
development. Other activity areas, such as welfare services and 
community development programmes, were gradually added as the 
need was identified. The reality is that a strong Community Affairs 
Division staffed with experienced field officers is critical for the short, 
medium and long-term viability of the mine. 
One problem affecting the Community Affairs Division in 1993 was 
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inadequate and inappropriate office facilities, with its sections divided 
between two locations, thus making coordination between staff more 
difficult. The division's future was also under a cloud because an 
increase in production costs was forcing the senior management to 
look for savings in the non-mine production areas. Future concerns 
also included the sensitive issue of localisation. There would be a need 
for strong expatriate representation in the Community Affairs 
Division, though not necessarily in the top position, throughout the 
life of the mine. If Community Affairs is totally localised there is a 
danger of senior mine management becoming isolated from the needs, 
concerns and attitudes in the community. This would have an adverse 
impact both on the community and on mining operations-as appears 
to have been the case in Bougainville. 
Notes 
1 I am grateful to Glenn Banks for pointing out the general economic 
characteristics for each stage of this model. 
2 The PJV had requested the allocation of 48 residential blocks at Paiam 
as part of its Home Ownership Programme. This option would most 
likely be taken up by Porgeran and possibly by Engan employees. 
3 For example, it was estimated that K500,000 per annum was 
required for staff salaries alone, and this figure did not include 
Item 10 funds needed for hiring cleaning staff. 
4 These figures do not include deaths soon after arrival of which the 
cause was unclear, nor bodies brought in after death. Nor do they 
include the significant number of Porgeran deaths due to road 
accidents, tribal fights and murders. 
5 Dr Kramer reported that in the African model, one confirmed AIDS 
case equals 350 HIV positive. If the African model is applicable to 
Papua New Guinea, then that would indicate a pool of at least 700 
HIV positive persons in the Laiagam area by 1993. 
6 The reason given for the absence of WIPS at Porgera Community 
School was that this school was catering for non-Ipili speaking 
children from Porgera Station. However, my own visit to the school 
in May 1993 revealed that an estimated 77 per cent of Grade 1 
students were Ipili-speakers. 
7 I was told that seven of 12 selected from Tipinini Community 
School were outsiders. 
8 The women wanted Tok Pisin literacy as Porgera had so many non-Ipili 
speakers, while educationists wanted Ipili literacy as most women did 
not speak Tok Pisin. A compromise was being initiated in 1993. 
9 At this time, the boom gate was in operation to control movements 
into and out of the SML. 
10 The Suyan station was the first building to be completed in the PJV 
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compound. 
11 The Suyan station was the first building to be completed in the PJV 
compound. The worst area for armed hold ups and hijacking was 
the Kera River area near Laiagam. 
12 Village courts were established in 1973 to deal with minor offences 
and customary disputes. Village court decisions can be appealed in 
a district court. 
13 The task proved to be more time-consuming than I expected, and I 
cannot say that my information is complete. 
14 The 1991 Annual Report did contain some crime statistics, but they 
were patchy. 
15 The cost of the attack in 1992-for losses, repairs and upgrading of 
the facility-was reputed to be K1 million. 
16 The PDA retained the right to maintain this ban if it were to be 
lifted by the Enga Provincial Government, but it did not have the 
power to permit sales and importation during a provincial 
government ban. 
17 Women in Association meetings also alleged that some police were 
involved with black market alcohol activities-at least on the 
consumption end. 
18 Snooker tables were common in the larger trade stores, and local 
children had begun making mini-snooker tables where marbles 
were used in place of snooker balls. 
19 The royalty rate has since been raised to 2 per cent of export value. 
20 By contrast, the records concerning the 23 per cent share of 
royalties paid to landowners and community institutions are 
readily available for public scrutiny. 
21 In 1995, the national parliament passed a new Organic Law on 
Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments which 
radically transformed the whole system of provincial government. 
The impact of these reforms is beyond the scope of this study. 
22 The Department of Enga was restructured twice between 1989 and 
1993. 
23 Sources of revenue for the PDA included a Special Support Grant from 
the provincial government, Community Facilities Grant from the PJY, 
and tied grants from both the provincial and national governments. 
24 There was only one woman on the CIC, and none on the PLA 
executive. I was tempted to suggest that there should be more, but 
I did not hear this demand from the PWA. 
25 One problem that had never been successfully resolved was the 
status of women's groups in Paiela Census Division. There was no 
Paielan woman on the PWA Management Committee, and there 
was poor attendance by Paielan members at the general meetings 
because of the area's remoteness from Porgera. Paielan women 
indicated that they would like an association of their own. 
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The economic impact of the 
Glenn Banks 
A common observation from around mining projects in Papua New 
Guinea is that the local communities become stratified as 'different 
members of the local community will experience the different aspects 
of the development process in different forms and degrees, and the 
process as a whole will give rise to new forms of inequality, division 
and conflict within the community' (Filer 1992:6). This observation 
influenced the focus of the fieldwork reported in this chapter, which 
aimed to identify some of the inequalities developing within the 
Porgeran community. 
The objectives of this initial piece of fieldwork were defined as 
.. collection and analysis of information from all available 
documentary sources (especially mining company records 
and local business records) relevant to construction of a 
model of the local economy 
.. design, testing and refinement of household survey 
instruments which measured local patterns of income 
and expenditure and other relevant variables, plus 
tabulation and analysis of data collected by these 
methods 
.. design, testing and refinement of additional methods of 
collecting information at the level of the household, for 
example diaries 
88 I Dilemmas of Development 
.. direct observation and open-ended questioning of local 
informants in respect of transactions which occurred at 
critical or nodal points in the local economy, such as the 
market places on pay fortnights. 
The primary task of this fieldwork was thus to establish a set of 
baseline data, and a system for collecting measures of economic 
change, with the intention of constructing a 'model' of the workings of 
the Porgeran economy.1 
Methodology 
Economies, even local ones, are complex, dynamic entities, and so 
their modelling and monitoring requires the use of a variety of 
methods which can provide information on the mechanics of their 
different elements. This chapter is largely based on six weeks of 
fieldwork conducted in Porgera in November and December 1992. In 
the case of this portion of fieldwork, the need for a variety of 
methods was doubly important, as one of the objectives was the 
testing of these different methods. Questionnaires, interviews and 
the analysis of company records were used as part of a wider effort 
to build up baseline data against which future changes could be 
measured. 
The contribution of the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) to local 
employment levels and wage incomes was calculated for the whole 
period in which records had been kept. This meant making a monthly 
record of the levels of Porgeran employment at the mine from early 
1990 (when the records began) to the end of November 1992 (when the 
fieldwork began), and then taking a random sample of local 
employees and using the value of their wages for the first 11 months 
of 1992 to calculate the total local annual, monthly and fortnightly 
wage contribution of the company. Two problems were encountered 
with this approach 
.. there was some doubt amongst local community members 
and company staff alike as to whether all the 'Porgerans' 
employed were in fact Porgerans, and representatives of 
both sides were taking steps to resolve this question 
.. the high local employee turnover rate may have affected the 
validity of using a random sample of employees to calculate 
the total wage contribution of the PJv. 
Neither of these factors is thought to have had a significant effect on 
the results. 
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The PJV Business Development Office records were analysed to try 
and establish the value of local goods and services purchased by the 
company. The supply of services was relatively easy to establish, as 
the bulk had been let by contracts recorded in the quarterly reports 
submitted by the company to the government. There were a number 
of smaller contracts (predominantly labour only) for which records 
were less accessible, but total values were still available. The value of 
goods locally supplied to the company was harder to establish, mainly 
because these were low-value items provided at irregular intervals. 
The PJV Business Development Office also had records of a trade store 
survey carried out in early 1991, which are discussed below. 
The company records relating to compensation were analysed in 
order to calculate the amounts of cash injected into the local 
community from this source. A problem encountered here was that, 
while there were detailed records of each individual payment for the 
most recent years, there were no aggregate figures for annual 
compensation payments since the start of construction. The figures 
that were available represented internal company transactions, and 
included the cost of items such as relocation houses and even some 
wage payments. Wherever possible, I excluded all but cash payments 
made to local people, but in some cases it was impossible to determine 
exactly what the itemised figures represented and, as a result, my own 
figures may err on the side of underestimating the amount of 
compensation actually received by Porgerans. 
Department of Enga royalty payment records at Porgera Station 
were also examined. An attempt was made to get figures from the 
Porgeran branch of the PNG Banking Corporation (the only alluvial 
gold mining in Porgera) relating to the levels of deposits at various 
dates, but no response was forthcoming. 
Questionnaires were utilised to determine both the significance of 
the PJV contribution to the local economy and the way in which 
money circulated within it. Three separate questionnaires were 
developed for this purpose. The first questionnaire focused on 
households and their assets. This included demographic questions 
relating to the make-up of the respondent's household the previous 
night, and examined household assets, sources of income, 
contributions to traditional exchange, and trips to various places. The 
objective was to provide some basic economic data on the local 
communities around the mine and to establish a baseline of 
quantitative measures against which future changes could be 
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measured. Wherever possible, this questionnaire built on earlier 
surveys which had been carried out in the area. 
Four distinct areas were targeted with this survey, and these were 
chosen to represent four differently impacted communities. Apalaka 
and Yarik were relocated communities within the Special Mining 
Lease (SML). Mungalep was just outside the SML and was relatively 
out of the way, having previously been a centre for alluvial mining. 
Anawe was also just outside the SML, but this 'community' was rather 
less marginalised, since it was located between the mine and the 
government station. Tipinini was the least 'impacted' of the four 
communities, being located ten kilometres down the valley from the 
township and mine (see Map 1.1). A fifth sample was made up of PJV 
Porgeran employees, as it was felt that daytime visits to the different 
communities might miss employees at work. 
The original plan had been to visit each of these communities and 
interview people inside their own homes. Very early on, it became 
apparent that this was unrealistic as people tended not to be in their 
homes during the daytime. Instead, it was found necessary to 
interview people in the central areas within these communities, where 
they tended to congregate on our arrival. As a result, the survey 
samples were not random in the statistical sense, but they do generally 
represent a cross-section of the community. Whenever possible, 
interviewers carried out the interviews in private, taking their subjects 
away to a quiet corner. However, this was not always possible. 
Interviews typically lasted around 15 minutes. Since Susanne Bonnell 
was engaged in a parallel round of interviews with local women (see 
Chapter 4), and since the interviewers in this economic study were all 
males, it was decided to focus largely (but not exclusively) on male 
respondents.2 
The second questionnaire focused on the recall of income and 
expenditure categories for the previous fortnight, as well as basic 
demographic information. For reasons discussed below, the sample 
used for this questionnaire was different from (and larger than) that 
for the household survey. The objective here was to understand both 
sources of income and patterns of spending, and hence the circulation 
of money within the community. Originally, it had been hoped to 
follow up the household survey with weekly or fortnightly visits to 
determine income and expenditure patterns. However, given the 
changes that were made to the household survey method, this proved 
impractical. Instead, an attempt was made to cover all the areas in the 
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valley, including those in the household survey. Basic demographic 
questions were included in this questionnaire, to allow a comparison 
of this sample with that of the household survey. A sample of the 
crowd at the government station one pay Wednesday was also 
surveyed. 
The third questionnaire was directed at the sellers of goods and 
produce at either the markets or along the roadside. The intention was 
to record the goods being sold, the origin of both the seller and the 
goods, and an estimate of the average daily income of the seller. All 
the major markets were surveyed at least once, and the main market 
(Yanjakale) several times, including two pay Wednesdays. 
Unstructured interviews were carried out with company and 
government workers, and other individuals (such as Father Phil 
Gibbs), to gain information on particular aspects of the local economy. 
Thus, the role of women in the economy, the workings of the 
Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme, the contribution of commercial 
agriculture, and the role of the Porgera Development Authority (PDA) 
were addressed in this way. A series of semi-structured interviews was 
also carried out with the recipients of large, recent compensation 
payments made by the company in order to establish what had 
happened to the money. As will be seen below, 12 payments accounted 
for around 50 per cent of the K3 million paid in compensation during 
1992. This obviously represented a large proportion of the money that 
the company injected into the local economy. 
Finally, a search was carried out of all literature relating to the pre-
mine Porgera Valley. This included the early patrol reports, the 
anthropological studies of Meggitt and Gibbs, and the reports 
commissioned by the company as part of its Social and Economic 
Impact Study (SEIS). The objective was to build a picture of the pre-
mine economy against which the current situation could be compared. 
Validity 
Social surveys, questionnaires, and any other research which depends 
on information from individuals have a widely acknowledged blind 
spot-much of the information collected is inaccurate. There are three 
main reasons for this-respondents cannot remember accurately, they 
deliberately mislead, or they misunderstand the intent of the questions 
being asked. 
In relation to the first, few people can remember exactly their 
expenditure patterns for the last two weeks. The problem is 
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exacerbated when asking about income for the previous 12 months 
(see Overfield 1993:24). In the case of our own household survey, 
however, the bulk of the questions related to large, very irregular 
payments such as compensation, royalties and traditional exchange, 
with the implication that these were more likely to be remembered 
with a fair degree of accuracy. 
Previous work in Porgera (Meggitt 1957; Gibbs 1977; Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987) has made much of the secrecy of the Ipili. In 
addition, the PJV, the mine, and money in general had become very 
political topics in the survey area, and people may have been 
presenting figures to match their particular view of the changes that 
were occurring in the area. For these and other reasons, respondents 
may have deliberately provided inaccurate information. Against this 
possibility, we have the comment of Jackson (1987) in respect of his 
earlier social survey work in the area-where 'respondents appear to 
have been unexpectedly frank' when discussing household assets. In 
our surveys, we found that people were usually only too willing to 
discuss personal financial matters with the interviewers, and certainly 
keen to air their grievances. 
Another potential problem was the misunderstanding of the 
questions being asked. This does appear to have occurred with some 
of the information, particularly in regard to 'profits' from businesses, 
and with older respondents. In most cases, however, the interviewers 
felt that they had few 'understanding' problems with their 
interviewees. 
For much of the data collected, direct questioning of individuals 
was the only practical method available. In some cases, it was possible 
to cross-check the survey data against figures from other sources. As 
we shall see, the aggregate survey figures appear to be remarkably 
close to figures obtained by other means. This gives greater weight to 
the other figures from the survey. Figures on alluvial gold mining 
balances (total personal accounts, rather than individual balances) 
would have been useful, but the PNG Banking Corporation branch at 
Porgera, while not averse to the idea, did not provide access to the 
information. 
Several small design problems were discovered during the use of 
the survey questionnaires. This was particularly the case with the 
market survey, which should have gone into more detail on both the 
interviewee (with more information on their length of stay in Porgera, 
whether they were male or female, who they were staying with, etc.), 
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and the goods being sold. In the case of the last, it would have been 
useful to have listed the value and the quantity of goods that the 
sellers had with them for sale. This would have given a more reliable 
estimate of the value of daily sales. The demo graphics pages of the 
household survey could have been simplified somewhat, and 
extended to allow for more names to be included, even though details 
of up to 22 family members were recorded by the interviewers. In the 
income and expenditure survey, specific questions about expenditure 
on alcohol would also have been useful, given the level of anecdotal 
evidence about both the price and quantity of alcohol in the area.3 
Finally, the methods of sampling used for the surveys were not 
random, reflecting the practicalities of working around Porgera. Biases 
may have crept in, particularly those associated with using relatively 
young male interviewers. In some cases (though certainly not the 
majority), there was an element of self-selection on the part of the 
respondents. All the areas surveyed were accessible by road, which 
again may have introduced an element of bias into the sample, 
although it appears that most people in the valley were within easy 
walking distance of a road. 
The pre-mine economy 
The Ipili of the Porgera Valley have a relatively short history of European 
contact, but during this period they have had almost continuous exposure 
to the gold economy. It is now thought that the Fox brothers, on an 
(unauthorised) expedition in 1934 down the Lagaip Valley seeking gold 
and other minerals, were the first Europeans to enter the Porgera Valley. 
However, it is likely that they crossed the Porgera River at a low level, 
just above the junction with the Lagaip, and thus missed the bulk of 
the population in the valley (Chris Ballard, pers. comm.). 
The first documented contact occurred during the 1938-39 Hagen-
Sepik patrol, though the interim patrol report, somewhat 
prophetically, mentions the 'Poredigar' only in the context of mineral 
resources. Black examined 'the area very closely and ascertained that 
his gold discovery was of very little value and had no commercial 
possibilities' (Taylor 1971:43). H.J. Ward, an Australian Bureau of 
Mineral Resources geologist, located the source of the gold and 
mapped mineralised areas on the east side of Waruwari in 1943 
(Handley and Henry 1990). 
Meggitt (1957) describes the subsequent history of contact in the 
valley, with the first of the gold claims being staked in 1946 on the 
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upper Porgera, near Mungalep, by Joe Searson. A small 'rush' 
followed in 1948, with about half a dozen prospectors entering the 
area (with Administration permission), though none seriously 
worked their claims. Soon after, an Administration geologist and a 
party of Bulolo Gold Dredging Company officers surveyed the 
valley, but decided that there was insufficient gold to warrant large-
scale commercial activity. A patrol post was manned at Mungalep 
during 1948-49 to ensure the prospectors' safety, but this was 
withdrawn in 1949. There was a break between 1949 and 1952, when 
the area was only visited a couple of times by patrols. In 1952, the 
establishment of a permanent patrol post at Laiagam meant more 
regular Administration visits (twice a year), and a permanent post was 
re-established in the area in 1961. Sears on transferred his leases on the 
Kogai (Kakai) and Porgera rivers to Jim Taylor in 1955, and Taylor ran 
them on a tribute system for many years (Pacific Agribusiness 
1987[1]:6). Missions were allowed into the area in 1962, when it was 
de-restricted, and four moved in immediately (Gibbs 1977). 
Placer Pacific and Mount Isa Mines (MIM) first entered the area in 
the mid 1960s, and the latter, with Ada Explorations Pty Ltd, put two 
adits into Waruwari in 1970. MIM acquired Searson's leases in 1973, 
and operated a medium-scale sluicing operation which ran at a loss 
until 1985, when the leases were transferred to a trust for the PJV 
(Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:7). The PJV consortium carried out 
extensive exploration work on the Porgera lode from the late 1970s. 
However, it was not until October 1985 that the high-grade zone was 
discovered and a sizeable mine became a viable prospect. 
It is important to note that local labour was used from the 
beginning, first by the individual miners (often on a tribute system), 
and subsequently on a larger scale by the companies. For example, in 
1974, MIM alone employed between sixty and one hundred local men. 
In addition, occupation fees were paid to the local landowners on the 
mining leases. This meant a fairly continuous supply of trade goods 
and cash to the local community for over thirty years. Smalley (1983:4) 
noted that 
Joe Searson introduced the people to a cash economy. They were paid 
cash with which goods were purchased at the local tradestore owned 
by Jim Taylor. The people soon developed a taste for Western products. 
Gibbs (1977) recorded that, during 1974, up to A$20,OOO a month 
was paid into the local economy, with A$lO,OOO paid in a single week 
at one point. By his estimate, the annual total was made up of 
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• A$4,SOO in annual occupation fees paid by MIM 
• A$3,SOO earnt by small-scale miners on the claims of MIM 
and Taylor 
• A$1,200 in fortnightly wages from MIM 
• A$SOO in compensation paid by government and mission for 
damage to pandanus 
• A$200 in monthly wages for mission workers. 
Three studies which describe aspects of the local economy were 
carried out in the Porgera area during the mid 1980s. These can be 
used to build up a picture of the pre-mine environment and allow 
comparison with the more recent situation. The first of these was the 
Department of Enga's 'Subsistence Systems of Enga Province' study, 
carried out by Paul Wohlt between 1982 and 1986 (Wohlt 1986). This 
was primarily directed at subsistence agriculture, though it also 
covered some socioeconomic measures. It is useful as a comparison 
with the current study, because it also involved sampling households 
in different parts of the Porgera Valley. In total, 47 households (279 
residents) in Porgera were sampled, ten each from Paiam, Pandami 
and Yanjakale, eight from Tipinini, and nine from Yuyan. 
The second study was coordinated by Richard Jackson, and 
involved a series of social surveys in the Porgera Valley for the PJV in 
1986-87 (see Jackson 1987).4 Like the Wohlt report, the Jackson study 
included a number of questionnaire surveys in different parts of the 
valley. The actual numbers of households surveyed varied in each of 
the different surveys, though ten was the target number. Five separate 
areas were covered-Paiam, Mungalep, Suyan, Anawe and Alipis. The 
SEIS utilised some of this earlier work, and described the economy of 
the area in some detail. Much of the material in that report can be used 
for comparative purposes. 
In summarising these studies, four points are emphasised. First, the 
opportunities presented by the presence of gold in the valley (alluvial 
mining and employment with the miners) had been utilised by some 
Porgerans for over forty years. This had led to a gradual shift away 
from dependence on subsistence activities-gold was a 'second 
garden' for some Porgerans before the PJV began operations. Second, 
and balancing this, the bulk of the population were still dependent on 
the subsistence sector for food and housing. Related to this were the 
inequalities in access to cash-earning opportunities within Porgera, for 
only some areas had access to the gold. Third, the scant data available 
confirms the anecdotal evidence that consumption patterns in Porgera 
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have long focused on food and alcohol, rather than investment or 
consumer goods. Finally, local business aspirations tended to be 
relatively modest, primarily directed to the establishment of family-
based businesses such as trade stores and transport. 
The picture given by these studies of the pre-mine Porgeran 
economy is generally one in which subsistence agriculture was still the 
predominant activity and major source of livelihood. However, the 
impact of at least forty years of contact with the gold economy was 
evident. The gold economy, both for alluvial miners and wage 
employees, was virtually the only cash-earning opportunity available 
to the local Porgerans. In 1986, it was estimated that local incomes 
from alluvial gold came to at least Kl million per annum (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[1]:39). A time budget survey reported in Jackson 
(1987) showed that, at Mungalep and Alipis, male and female 
respondents spent 12-14 per cent of their time (excluding absences 
and sleeping) engaged in alluvial mining. The maximum reported 
paid employment (amongst males) was 14 per cent for Paiam and 
Alipis, and averaged 9 per cent for the five sites. Although it is not 
specified, the bulk of this employment was likely to have been with 
the PJV, the only alternatives being the missions and the government, 
or some other limited opportunities with local businesses. 
These figures compare with averages of 15 per cent for males and 
31 per cent for females engaged in gardening, bush work and tending 
pigs, primarily subsistence activities. In summary, the SEIS and 
Jackson's report give the impression that Porgeran males, at least, 
while still heavily dependent on the subsistence sector, were spending 
almost as much time on cash-earning activities as they were on 
subsistence (44 per cent of their time on cash earning, 56 per cent on 
subsistence) . 
Given the importance of the gold economy noted in both the SEIS 
and Jackson's study, it is perhaps surprising that Porgera, the major 
source of gold in Enga, does not stand out from the rest of the 
province economically in the findings from Wohlt's (1986) study. Only 
one respondent reported (a possible) income from sale of gold, and the 
(possible) contribution of gold to household income was well below 
the provincial average (0.4 per cent compared to 1.8 per cent). As sale 
of gold was included in the 'other' category, it is hard to be definitive; 
yet these findings point to a far less significant role for alluvial mining. 
The contribution of wages to household income in Porgera was 
marginally greater than the provincial average, with a greater 
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proportion of wage-earners (4 per cent of residents compared to 2.5 
per cent) and lower average earnings (K20 per wage-earner compared 
to K32). In total, the implied annual per capita cash income for 
Porgera of K81 was less than the provincial average of K87. Likewise, 
the survey of non-traditional economic indicators reported in Wohlt's 
study shows little difference between Porgera and the province as a 
whole, with Porgera generally coming in behind the provincial 
averages. 
A possible reason for the discrepancy between the Wohlt and 
Jackson findings is that Wohlt's study was targeted at 'ordinary' Enga 
farming households and specifically excluded urban areas, rural non-
village areas (such as aid posts, schools), successful businessmen or 
large-scale commercial ventures. In contrast, the Jackson study 
included a representative sample in areas already affected by mining 
and exploration activity. Both suffer from the small sample size used 
in the different areas, which could also account for the differences in 
their findings. 
The SEIS made the following comments in relation to the impact of 
earnings from gold. 
The gold economy reverberates through Ipili society. People often 
equate gold with consumption ... Tradestores symbolise the wealth and 
consumption made possible by gold ... Cash is now very much a part of 
traditional payments ... Gold-induced inflation is apparent in most 
aspects of daily life ... Cash has greatly weakened traditional 
leadership in Ipili society ... 
From school-age children who are cashing in gold at tradestores to buy 
luxury food and drink, to the adults who are gambling, drinking and 
discoing, there is heavy consumption financed by a finite asset. When 
asked about this, many people seem both aware and worried (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[1]:40). 
The report also commented on the consumption patterns 'creating 
wealth for a growing Ipili elite' -the gold buyers and trade store 
owners. They noted an 'untapped desire for secure investments' and 
widespread hoarding of gold. In 1974, Gibbs had also noted that the 
availability of cash from gold was promoting a switch from 
dependence on garden produce to food bought at trade stores, with 
5,000 pounds (2.3 tonnes) of foodstuffs and 50 cartons of beer being 
brought in each week by plane (Gibbs 1977:22). 
Business activity in Porgera was limited before the start of the 
mine. Trade stores were common. A PJV survey in 1987 found 143 
established trade stores in the Porgera Valley (including Muritaka)-
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93 still operating and 50 which had closed. This amounted to one 
trade store for every ten families (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). Wohlt 
(1986) records a frequency of one trade store per 16.7 households for 
Porgera, compared to one trade store per 5.2 households found for Enga 
as a whole. The SEIS found that, apart from Ipili Porgera Investments 
(IPI), business activity in Porgera was limited to small-scale activities, 
including gold buying and sawmilling, and most of the numerous 
business groups which had been formed in the area had, for one reason 
or another, failed. This had left many Porgerans viewing such activities 
with suspicion, and contributed to gold hoarding. In spite of this, 
bisnis, along with employment, were the two most sought-after aspects 
of mine development. 
From the Jackson survey, and from the general comments in the 
SEIS, it is clear that different parts of the Porgera Valley have had 
uneven access to cash-earning opportunities. Initially, Yuyan and 
Mungalep, being closest to the alluvial areas, were the focus of the 
cash economy, and people in these communities became relatively 
more wealthy than people elsewhere in the valley. Mungalep's 
dominant position was reinforced by the presence of the mission, then 
fell as Yuyan took over as the gold-buying centre. From the early 
1980s, Alipis became more important, being the site of intense 
exploration. Jackson notes that independent gold panning may have 
been the principal reason for the greater accumulation of wealth by 
families in Mungalep and Alipis, and that inequality of assets 
appeared to be a well-established feature of life in Porgera. Certainly, 
the results of the Jackson survey point to significant differences 
between the various communities covered. 
Similarly, all the studies noted the different cash-earning opportunities 
available to men and women, and the consequent marginalising of 
women from the cash economy. Alluvial mining was one lucrative 
activity where women (and children) could become involved. 
The main points to be taken from the above review of material on 
the pre-mine economy are 
.. The area had been a significant gold producer since the 
1950s, and Porgerans had thus had a relatively long 
exposure to cash and the gold economy. In some areas, 
significant amounts of cash had been earned by the local 
communities. The PJV was therefore not suddenly 
introducing money into a cashless society-Porgerans had 
being dealing in cash for many years. 
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• For as long as Porgerans had been earning cash, there had 
been opportunities for them to spend it quickly-food, drink 
and gambling have a history in Porgera that goes back 
longer than the influence of the missions. 
.. Aspirations in Porgera focused strongly on bisnis-generally 
trade stores, public motor vehicles (PMVs) and machinery-
in spite of several recent disappointments. 
.. Variations in access to cash-earning activities were well 
entrenched in the valley, in terms of both gender and 
regional differences. The focus of these activities in the cash 
economy had shifted several times. Inequality (and jealousy) 
were well established before the arrival of the PJv. 
The Porgeran economic base in 1992 
One way to approach the analysis of the Porgeran economy in 1992, 
and the one adopted here, is by breaking down the various input and 
output components of the economy to gain an idea of their relative 
contributions and the broad-scale flows within the community. Vail 
(1995) carried out a similar exercise for the distribution of monies from 
the Mount Kare gold rush. When this is combined with the household-
level data collected, a good understanding of the workings of the local 
economy can be obtained.5 
A convenient and measurable starting point for analysis of the 
cash economy is the range of inputs into the system. At Porgera, the 
PJV was clearly the engine of the local economy, with direct 
payments of wages and occupation fees, compensation, donations, 
and royalty payments, and indirect contributions through business 
contracts to local Porgeran companies and individuals, and through 
the support provided for the PDA. The figures given below, despite 
their apparent precision, are nevertheless approximate. They do, 
however, give an indication of the relative importance of the various 
types of inputs. 
Compensation6 
Landowners were paid by the company for loss of land, for damage to 
land or improvements (including 'economic plants'), and for various 
other losses (such as livestock killed by vehicles, various kinds of 
nuisance, and the loss of alluvial earnings). Annual occupation fees 
paid to SML and LMP (Lease for Mining Purposes) landowners are 
also covered under the heading 'compensation'. Rates paid were in 
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accordance with a schedule negotiated between the PJV and the major 
landowning clans of the SML, which was agreed on 31 January 1988. 
Strictly speaking, compensation payments were not a benefit of the 
mine, but represented reimbursement for costs incurred by the 
recipients due to damage caused by the company. Compensation 
payments could also represent a shift from the subsistence sector to 
the cash economy on the part of the recipient, since the cash could be 
used as seed capital to establish trade stores or other businesses. 
One feature of the compensation payment process at Porgera 
which distinguished it from the Ok Tedi situation was that the 
assessment, negotiation, administration and payment process itself 
was carried out by PJV employees on Department of Enga letterhead, 
rather than by the Department of Enga itself. The practical effect of 
this had been a much more rapid response to landowner claims at 
Porgera than at Ok Tedi Oohn Burton, pers. comm.). 
Compensation registers, detailing the amount of each 
compensation claim paid, had been kept by the PJV since August 1987. 
In total, the PJV had paid 6,605 compensation claims totalling K25.9 
million between August 1987 and the end of December 1992. It is 
important to note, however, that each individual claim was usually 
distributed among a number of recipients at the payment stage. That 
is to say, each payment form usually had a list of recipients receiving 
differing amounts from the payments. For large payments, or where 
the area affected involved several families, the list could be 
extensive-up to sixty people. On the other hand, there were a 
number of individuals who featured prominently amongst the lists of 
recipients, usually collecting a substantial proportion of the payments. 
This made it very difficult to determine just how many people had 
received PJV compensation, although it appeared that the majority of 
Porgerans within or close to the SML or the LMPs would have 
received at least some cash over this five-year period. 
Figure 3.1 provides a breakdown of the payments made by quarter 
for the period 1987-92. The pattern matches the stages of development 
of the mine-large amounts are associated with the construction 
phases of the plant site, the Anawe spoil, the relocation roads and 
houses, Kairik airstrip, the Hides transmission line, Suyan, the open 
pit expansion, and the waste dumps. The implications of these 
variations for the local economy are very significant-when combined 
with irregular royalty payments, it is clear that short-lived periods of 
'boom' were frequently followed by relatively lean times. When these 
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Figure 3.1 PJV compensation payments by quarter, 1987-92 
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Table 3.1 PJV compensation payments made during 1992 by type 
Type of compensation Number of payments 
Lands General Compensation 107 
Kairik area 11 
Suyan area 10 
Maiapam area 31 
Hides Line 5 
Open pit compensation 152 
Northern waste dump compensation 76 
Highway compensation 27 
Pangalita limestone compensation 6 
Pangalita limestone royalty 9 
Waile Creek Rd and dam compensation 3 
Starter dump 'C' compensation 5 
Paiela Bypass Rd compensation 66 
PA 60 compensation 4 
PA 860 compensation 10 
SML occupation fees 1989 20 
SML occupation fees 1991-92 20 
Hides Power Line occupation fees 1992 61 
Other occupation fees 1989-92 142 
Total 785 
Source: PJV I Department of Enga records. 
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temporal variations are broken down by location, the pattern is one of 
a dynamic, continuously changing flux, with different parts of the 
valley experiencing large cash inflows at different times. 
Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of compensation by area and type 
of payment in 1992. It is important to note that 'one-off' payments for 
'improvements' and areas of bush made up the bulk of these 
payments. This had been the case for each year following the start of 
construction. The implication was that once the mine and its waste 
dumps were fully established, compensation would drop dramatically 
as a source of income for the valley. 
The remaining big compensation payments would have been for 
the lower Porgera and Kaiya river systems, which were expected to be 
made in 1994, and some ongoing additions to the open-pit and waste 
dumps. It was expected that the value of compensation would 
stabilise at around K700,000 per annum after this, comprising general 
compensation, occupation fees, and ongoing payments linked to 
volumes of tailings and incompetent waste rock placed in the Anjolek 
and Anawe failing dumps. Landowners in the Kaiya and lower 
Porgera would also have additional compensation-derived income 
from the trust funds set up to manage the compensation paid for the 
loss of alluvial gold in these areas. While these payments would 
provide a reasonably regular source of income for a limited number of 
landowners in one or two communities, the real 'boom years' of 
compensation were almost over. 
Porgeran wage income from the PJV 
Employment records started late in 1989, with the exception that the 
origin of Operations staff was not reported regularly until July 1990-
the explanation for a statistical 'hollow' in Porgeran employment in 
early and mid 1990 (see Figure 3.2). 
Since I do not have direct figures for the total wage income 
received by Porgerans, I have estimated this by multiplying figures for 
the average numbers of Porgeran employees over the year by an 
estimate of the average wages paid to them. In 1992, a random sample 
of 50 of the PJV Operations staff between January and November 1992 
had an average income of K6,925 per annum. Making the assumption 
that wage levels had grown at 10 per cent a year, through wage 
increases and increasing skill levels within the local workforce, Table 
3.2 sets out my calculations for previous years, and gives an 
approximation of the total value of Porgeran wage income (after tax). 
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Within the Porgera Valley, employment was relatively evenly 
spread, as shown in Table 3.3, though the company acknowledged that 
their records, based on information provided by the employees 
themselves, might not be completely accurate. 
The figures for the sample of 50 PJV employees for 1992 show a 
high employee turnover rate, with 18 of the sample having being 
employed for less than the full 11 months. Table 3.4 shows that, of 
the total workforce at 18 November 1992, over 65 per cent had been 
with the company for less than two years. These figures 
undoubtedly over-estimate the turnover of staff, as a number of 
employees had been re-employed several times. The implication is, 
however, that few Porgeran staff were realising the benefits 
(promotion, pay rises and so on) of long-term service. This is 
important, as it casts doubt on the ability of the company to meet 
local expectations in regard to the localisation of senior positions 
within the company? 
In addition to the formal employment figures cited above, there 
were a large number of casual labourers employed for short periods 
who do not appear in these tables. These included people employed 
on small road maintenance and upgrade contracts for the road 
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between Porgera and Wabag, contracts for the construction of new 
gardens for relocation (worth over K600,OOO, all to locals), and 
labour-only contracts let through the Community Affairs Division 
(over KI0,OOO for the September-December 1992 quarter). In total 
these would have contributed up to KI0,OOO a month to the local 
economy.8 
A small survey of non-Porgeran PJV employees (both PNG 
nationals and expatriates) revealed, as expected, that these employees 
did not spend money in the local economy while on site. Even the few 
families on site (16 at December 1992) did the bulk of their shopping at 
Mount Hagen on a monthly basis, and thus made no significant 
contribution to the local economy. 
Royalties 
Under the agreements between the national and provincial 
governments and the SML landowners signed in 1989, 23 per cent of 
the royalties from the mine were to go to landowners in the Porgera 
Valley. This was to be split three ways-8 per cent to SML landowners, 
5 per cent to the Porgera Development Authority, and 10 per cent to an 
investment fund set up for the children of SML landowners.9 The 
direct royalties were paid by the company to the national government, 
and the landowner share was then redistributed by the Department of 
Enga. This process meant that the quarterly payments were often 
several months late. For example, the second quarter 1992 payment 
was made in late November 1992. Payments were divided amongst 
SML landowners on the basis of the proportion of the lease area they 
owned. Payments were made to 192 nominated SML representatives, 
either in cash or by cheque. The only exception to this was the January 
1992 payment of K40,470.77, which was used to send a delegation to 
Port Moresby for discussions with the Prime Minister. The exact 
amount paid each quarter varied depending on the value of gold 
produced, with a maximum quarterly payment of K143,710.58 for the 
third quarter of 1991. 
All the sources of income discussed above can be added to show 
the total cash benefits to the community arising from the mine. More 
than KI0 million a year made its way into the community in the peak 
years of compensation payouts during the construction phase. 
Depending on future compensation assessments and Porgeran 
participation in the PJV workforce, the annual flow was likely to settle 
at K6-8 million a year during the operation phase (Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.2 Wages paid to Porgeran employees, 1989-92 (estimated) 
Year Employees Average wage Total wages 
(average) (kina) (million kina) 
1989 285 5,263 1.50 
1990 488 5,717 2.79 
1991 639 6,371 4.07 
1992 585 6,925 4.06 
Source: PJV records. 
Table 3.3 Distribution of PJV employment within the Porgera Valley 













Source: PJV records. 
Table 3.4 Porgeran PJV employees by length of service as of 18 
November 1992 
Start year Service Employees (per cent) 
1992 <1 year 151 (31.9) 
1991 1 year 168 (35.5) 
1990 2 years 79 (16.7) 
1989 3 years 53 (11.2) 
1988 4 years 16 (3.4) 
1987 5 years 3 (0.6) 
1986 or earlier >6 years 3 (0.6) 
Total 473 (100.0) 
Source: PJV records. 
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Business contracts 
The role and contribution of PJV business contracts to the economy 
was a controversial topic at both the local and national level. Unlike 
the compensation, wages and royalties discussed above, they were not 
direct cash payments made to the community, although they tended to 
be discussed in these terms. The local community repeatedly 
questioned the figures presented by the PJV at meetings with the 
government, on the basis that these over-emphasised the value of 
business contracts for Porgerans. These figures included joint ventures 
between Porgeran companies and national or international companies, 
and community representatives argued that the bulk of the profits 
from these (generally) large joint ventures did not accrue to the 
community. 
Table 3.6 shows the breakdown of contracts by origin compiled 
from PJV Quarterly Reports to the Department of Trade and Industry. 
This shows that national companies (including joint ventures) won 
over half of the construction contracts, while the size of the Porgeran 
share (K27.96 million to September 1992) is also significant. For the 
operations contracts, which were generally ongoing (unlike the 
construction contracts), Engan contractors (including joint ventures) 
had picked up the greatest share to date, with the Porgeran share 
again being significant (K6.59 million). On a per capita basis, the 
contracts were worth K3,455 for Ipili speakers against K180 for other 
Engans. As with the labour figures, there are also a number of small 
contracts which were not included in the formal figures. The PJV 
Quarterly Report for the period to September 1992 noted that 
K191,774 was expended on plant contracting, but it is not clear 
whether this was included in the above contracts, or what proportion 
was accounted for by Porgeran contractors. 
The figures given in Table 3.6 are for work completed to date. The 
estimated value of committed costs on Porgeran contracts current in 
September 1992 was K8.08 million. When combined with the value of 
work to date from the above table (K34.55 million), the total value of 
contracts awarded to Porgeran companies (including joint ventures) 
totalled K42.63 million. This was the figure publicised by the company 
and criticised by some of the landowners, as they believed that the big 
Porgeran contracts included here were all joint ventures, with the 
profits going mainly to the other partners. However, because profits 
from contracts are generally a small component of their total value 
(between 6 and 10 per cent was likely in the Porgeran setting), a large 
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Table 3.5 Cash inputs into the local economy originating with the 
PJV, 1989-92 (kina) 
Year Wages Compensation Royalties Total 
1989 1,499,977 3,444,228 4,944,205 
1990 2,794,589 7,725,918 10,520,507 
1991 4,072,651 8,769,395 279,703 13,131,748 
1992 4,056,713 3,309,356 483,464 7,849,533 
Total 12,423,930 23,248,897 763,167 36,445,993 
Source: PJV IDepartment of Enga records. 
Table 3.6 Value of contracts by origin of contractors, 1990-92 
(million kina) 
Construction 1990 1991 1992 (to Sept) Cumulative 
Porgera 13.71 10.14 4.11 27.96 
Enga 19.92 10.86 2.36 33.14 
Other PNG 52.29 34.77 13.20 100.26 
Overseas 10.48 1.98 1.96 14.42 
Sub-total 96.40 57.75 21.63 175.78 
Operations 
Porgera 0.46 2.33 3.80 6.59 
Enga 0.32 1.02 10.29 11.63 
Other PNG 0.07 1.75 6.17 7.99 
Overseas 0.18 0.10 2.73 3.01 
Sub-total 1.03 5.20 22.99 29.22 
Source: PJV records. 
proportion of the value of these contracts, in particular through local 
wages, probably did accrue to local interests. Although it is impossible 
to put a figure on this, my survey of the larger local businesses 
(discussed below) gives some idea of the contribution of PJV-related 
work to the local economy. 
Indirect and secondary sources of income 
The PDA was established under the Mining Development Contract, 
using K4 million from the PJV's Community Facilities Grant. Ongoing 
income included an annual KO.5 million unconditional grant from the 
Enga provincial government, and a 5 per cent share of mineral 
royalties. In 1992, spending in the Porgera area was approximately 
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K3.5 million. The bulk of this was spent on infrastructure 
development-roads, community schools and aid posts. The PDA 
employed 20 Porgerans in primarily unskilled positions. 
Donations from the PJV to schools, organisations and individuals 
were worth well over KlOO,OOO a year. However, their impact on the 
Porgeran economy was limited for two reasons: they were largely to 
groups or individuals outside Porgera, and they were usually 
earmarked for goods or services from outside Porgera, so their value 
very quickly left the Porgera area. Thus, while they served an 
important community and public relations role, their local economic 
impact was minimal. 
The Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme, which was instituted during 
1992, was largely focused on projects outside Porgera. The scheme 
enabled the PJV to get tax deductions from the national government 
for infrastructure projects which it funded within Enga Province, as 
approved by the provincial government. In 1992, around K250,000 of 
this funding had been spent in Porgera, with another K900,000 worth 
of projects planned for the local area-K80,000 for the College of 
Distance Education, K400,000 for road sealing near Paiam, and a 
K400,000 contribution to the Porgera-Paiela road. 
A final source of money for the local economy was alluvial gold 
earnings. Although it is very difficult to put a figure on this, 13 (15 per 
cent) of the 87 households we interviewed in Apalaka/Yarik, 
Mungalep and Anawe reported earnings from alluvial mining over 
the previous 12 months. Average reported earnings were K1,400. 
Given that there were approximately 1,200 households in the whole 
valley Gohn Burton, pers. comm.), there were probably 900 
households in the upper part of the valley with potential access to the 
alluvial areas. On this basis, it was likely that current production was 
still worth K189,000 per annum. 
Circulation 
Once the direct cash payments from the company entered the local 
community, the money was used for a number of purposes. It could be 
invested (inside or outside Porgera), used for consumption, or for 
traditional exchange purposes. The results of the household survey 
and the income and expenditure survey give some indication of the 
extent of these alternative uses. 
The household survey covered 122 households, concentrated in 
four areas. The demographics of the sample are described statistically 
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in Table 3.7. Of note in the table are the lower household size in 
Tipinini compared to the rest of the valley, the higher proportion of 
Porgeran born people in Apalaka than elsewhere, the relatively 
consistent proportion of children in the households (between 39 and 
46 per cent), and the consistent male bias in the sex ratio. On the basis 
of these figures, the following trends can be inferred. 
.. The SML area had a higher proportion of people of Porgeran 
origin, probably as a result of the relocation agreement 
negotiated between the SML landowners and the PJV, which 
largely excluded non-Porgerans from relocation areas. 
.. There had been a movement of people within the valley 
towards the mine area, borne out by the fact that Apalaka 
and Mungalep both had higher proportions of households 
with 'other relatives' staying with them (41 and 44 per cent 
respectively, compared to 26 per cent for Tipinini). 
.. The male/female ratio may have been a result of the influx 
of males to the valley in search of employment and other 
benefits, or it may reflect the under-reporting of females as a 
result of the predominantly male-male interviews carried 
out (though under-reporting of children does not appear to 
have occurred). A greater number of males is the reverse of 
what one would expect in a polygamous society.lO 
From previous studies of the Porgeran population (John Burton, 
pers. comm.), it appears that the sample was demographically 
representative of a cross-section of the population. On this basis, the 
results of the household survey can be treated as a 10 per cent sample 
of the whole population (given that there are approximately 1,200 
households in the valley). 
Table 3.7 Household survey statistics, 1992 
Location Total Relocated Total Mean Mean no. M/F % with % born in 
h'holds h'holds persons h'hold of children ratio wantoks Porgera 
Apalaka 32 23 228 7.1 2.9 120:100 40.6 93.0 
Mungalep 23 8 177 7.7 3.7 130:100 43.5 81.4 
Anawe 24 7 164 6.8 2.7 135:100 33.0 72.0 
Tipinini 35 0 198 5.7 2.6 133:100 26.5 84.6 
Total 122 41 832 6.8 3.0 125:100 36.4 82.9 
Source: Porgera household survey. 
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The income and expenditure survey involved interviewing 231 
individuals aged over 16 years, and questioning them as to sources of 
income and patterns of expenditure over the previous two weeks. The 
aim was to carry out as many of these interviews as possible, and, as a 
result, the demographic section of the questionnaire was kept small. 
The sample included 180 individuals who lived permanently in 
Porgera (or 3 per cent of the adult Porgeran population), and 51 who, 
for one reason or another, were visiting. The latter group included 
some national PJV employees, but most were individuals who had 
come from other parts of the highlands and were interviewed at the 
government station on a pay Wednesday. This combination of 
interviews was intended to show how much money the permanent 
residents contributed to the local economy, and whether the 'visitors' 
carried significant amounts out of the area. There were 129 Porgeran-
born people in this sample, and 99 who were born elsewhere; there 
were 198 males and 32 females; and there were 144 household heads 
as against 86 non-household heads. ll The average household size 
reported was 7.96, slightly higher than in the household survey. 
Sources of income 
Sources of income for the local population can be determined from a 
mixture of the household and income and expenditure survey results. 
Table 3.8 shows the distribution of income from various sources 
reported in the household interviews. Given that the sample 
represented around 10 per cent of the population (122 households 
surveyed from an estimated 1,200 households), the validity of the PJV 
payments reported in the interviews could be cross-checked with the 
amounts documented in the company and government records. The 
PJV's figures for compensation payments (which included occupation 
fees) came to around K3 million, while a scaled-up estimate from the 
compensation payments and occupation fees reported in the 
interviews amounted to K2.49 million. Likewise, the documented 
royalty payments for 1992 came to K483,463, while the interview 
findings would suggest a total of K413,080. These approximations 
lend a similar level of confidence to the other survey findings. 
There are some anomalies in the data (for example, all those who 
received royalties should presumably also have received occupation 
fees), but these are unlikely to affect the overall figures, given the 
sample size. The picture that emerges from Table 3.8 is largely what 
one would expect: people in Apalaka received the bulk of the 
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royalties, compensation and occupation fees, while those in Tipinini 
receive none. The latter engaged in more sales of produce (though 
incomes from this source appeared to be low), while involvement in 
business was relatively evenly spread throughout the valleyY 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the sources of fortnightly income and 
their value, as revealed by the income and expenditure survey. Several 
points are worthy of note. 
III Wantoks (outside the household) were the most common 
source of income, although Figure 3.4 shows that this source 
of income was very small in monetary terms. For 54 (23.4 per 
cent) of the sample, income from household members or 
other wantoks was the only source of income. 
III PJV wages, the second most common source of income, 
accounted for 34 per cent of the value of income, the highest 
from any source. The role of PJV inputs (in this case wages) 
in driving the local economy is again highlighted, as they 
were virtually the only money entering the system from 
outside-all the other sources relied on redistribution (even 
'other wages', as discussed below). 
III Sales of goods and produce, and money from other members 
of the household, were the third and fourth most common 
sources of money in the previous two weeks, accounting for 
15 and 12 per cent respectively. However, the value of both 
these sources was relatively small, just 9 and 4 per cent 
respectively. 
.. Forty-one individuals (17.7 per cent) reported no income for 
the previous two weeks, and another 25 (10.8 per cent) 
reported less than KlO. 
.. There were great inequalities in income across the sample, 
with the top 10 per cent of the sample earning 58.8 per cent 
of the income, and the bottom 50 per cent earning just 2 per 
cent of the income. 
Significantly for the purposes of the economic modelling exercise, 
there was a total of K200 reported for alluvial gold earnings, K209 
reported for compensation (though respondents did not specify if this 
was PJV compensation), and K451 reported for royalty payments. 
Given that the sample was approximately 3 per cent of the adult 
population in the valley, these equate to total annual figures of 
K173,333 for alluvial gold, K181,133 for compensation, and K390,866 
for royalties. Both the alluvial gold earnings and the royalty payments 












































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.3 Numbers of individuals reporting income from different 
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Source: Porgera income and expenditure survey. 









Source: Porgera income and expenditure survey. 
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PJVwages 
34% 
correspond well with the figures calculated earlier. The compensation 
figure, however, is well short of the annual total of approximately K3 
million for 1992. This relative absence of PJV compensation payments 
in the sample is not surprising, given the small number of payments 
which had been made (631 for the first 11 months of 1992). The 
additional K2.8 million in compensation would have been equivalent 
to about K14 per adult per fortnight. 
Average fortnightly income reported in the income and 
expenditure survey was K183.53 per adult. When the figure for PJV 
compensation is added to this average, adult income rises to K197.53 
per fortnight. By highlands standards, this figure is very high, and can 
be directly attributed to the presence of the mine. However, as 
previously noted, the income distribution was highly skewed. Clearly, 
the presence of the company had greatly increased cash incomes for a 
minority of the local population, while the bulk were still dependent 
on the subsistence sector and on relatives for their survival. 
Expenditure patterns 
Expenditure patterns were addressed through both the household and 
income and expenditure surveys. The household survey questioned 
respondents on household assets, investments, and contributions to 
traditional exchange ceremonies. Table 3.9 shows the distribution of 
respondents in the different areas reporting ownership of various 
items, and for comparison, the figures found by Jackson (1987) and 
Wohlt (1986). The latest figures show no increase (even a slight 
decrease) over Jackson's figures, but a definite increase over those 
presented by Wohlt. 
The latest figures do not show the pattern which might have been 
expected within the valley, with those who have received the bulk of 
the compensation and other direct benefits having a greater number of 
material items. Apalaka only showed a significantly higher score in 
the case of watch ownership. Thus, while the distribution of income 
was unequal, this did not manifest itself in the obvious material status 
of householders. Clearly, levelling factors were at work. Exactly what 
these were and how they operated is open to further inquiry. Cultural 
traits could, in part, be responsible, with customary obligations to 
redistribute compensation and other income among family and 
wantoks. Likewise, people may have been unwilling to invest in 
material items which they knew would have demands for use placed 
on them by relatives. A high attrition rate may also have been partly 
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responsible for the results. For most items (excluding cars and videos), 
even Tipinini ranked alongside the other areas. 
Table 3.10 shows the pattern of investments (largely passbooks and 
IPI shares) held by people within the areas covered in the household 
survey. The value of investments per household matches the expected 
pattern, with Apalaka having the highest score. However, it is worth 
noting that Mungalep was only a short way behind, which may have 
represented a legacy of the alluvial mining boom, and that the figure 
for Tipinini was higher than that for Anawe, the former having a 
Table 3.9 Percentage of households with particular assets, 1992 
lamp Sewing Radio Car Video Watch 
machine 
This study (1992) 
Apalaka 44 9 34 19 3 44 
Mungalep 42 17 42 4 8 21 
Anawe 57 17 48 26 4 26 
Tipinini 37 9 46 26 
Various 75 50 63 25 25 50 
Jackson (1986-87) 
Alipis n.a. 20 60 50 n.a. 40 
Anawe n.a. 10 40 20 n.a. 40 
Mungalep n.a. 40 80 60 n.a. 40 
Suyan n.a. 40 n.a. 40 
Wohlt (1986) 6 8 n.a. 4 
Source: Porgera household survey. 
Table 3.10 Patterns of household investment, 1992 
Area Total value (kina) Value per Per cent 
households households with 
investment 
Apalaka 104,220 3,256.88 50.0 
Mungalep 69,310 3,150.45 54.6 
Anawe 12,410 517.08 29.2 
Tipinini 24,250 692.86 60.0 
Various 6,852 856.50 50.0 
Total 217,042 1,779.03 50.0 
Source: Porgera household survey. 
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greater number of people with lower value investments against the 
latter's smaller number with larger investments. 
One other surprising feature of these figures is a lack of correlation, 
at the household level, between cash benefits from the mine 
(compensation and royalties) and levels of investment-with a very 
low correlation coefficient (r) of 0.09. This poses two further questions: 
what happened to the compensation payments, and where did the 
investors get their funds? The answer to the second question may be 
related to the Mount Kare gold rush, or to earlier compensation 
payments which were not recorded by this survey, either because 
interviewers did not go far enough with their questions or because 
respondents were unwilling to reveal the payments. But the answer to 
the first question is partially answered by another part of the 
household survey, which asked about contributions to traditional 
exchange (brideprice, compensation) in the last 12 months, as well as 
to national election expenses. Table 3.11 shows that people living 
closer to the mine spent more money on both types of contribution, 
and that Tipinini spent much less than the rest. This is not surprising, 
as one might expect greater demands to be placed on those who had 
received cash from the mine. The relationship between cash benefits 
received and cash contributions made (r = 0.26) was closer than with 
levels of household investment, though it was still not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the proportion of house-holds engaged 
in such contributions was much the same in all four areas. 
Expenditure patterns revealed by the income and expenditure 
survey are illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
Table 3.11 Cash contributions to national elections and traditional 
exchange, 1992 (kina) 
Area Total value of Value per Per cent 
contributions household households 
contributing 
Apalaka 70,500 2203.13 62.5 
Mungalep 68,840 3129.01 63.6 
Anawe 78,320 3263.33 62.5 
Tipinini 11,903 340.09 57.1 
Various 39,163 4895.38 87.5 
Total 268,666 2202.18 63.1 
Source: Porgera household survey. 
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• Taken together, household members and other wantoks were 
very significant expenditure sinks, accounting for almost a 
quarter of all reported expenditure by category and by 
value: 37 per cent of the sample had given money to 
household members, and 30 per cent to other wantoks. 
• Over 50 per cent of the sample had bought food at a trade 
store, and a third had bought food at the local markets. Such 
purchases accounted for 12 per cent of the total expenditure. 
El Almost 20 per cent of the sample reported gambling in the 
previous two weeks, though this accounted for just 2 per 
cent of the total expenditure, while 21 per cent reported that 
they had invested money in the alluvial gold mining, 
accounting for 22 per cent of total expenditure. 
Compensation funds 
A series of interviews was carried out with known recipients of 20 large 
compensation payments made during 1992, in order to try and establish 
if there were any general patterns in their use of the money. In total, 
these payments accounted for almost 60 per cent of the compensation 
paid during that year. During the interviews, several of the respondents 
also gave details of how they had spent earlier payments, while some 
actually denied having received any payments in 1992. All but one of 
those interviewed distributed the bulk of their payments to family 
members (up to 80 per cent in one case), retaining amounts which 
ranged from K15,000 to K165,000. This redistribution, based on 
cultural expectations, presumably reduced the funds available for 
investment, rather than immediate consumption. A significant (though 
unquantified) proportion of this redistribution was directed to 
'wantoks' living outside Porgera-mainly in the neighbouring Paiela 
area or in Southern Highlands Province. 
Of the money which they retained, most recipients had invested 
some in a range of businesses-there were at least five trade stores 
and PMVs, three contracting businesses, a sawmill, a signwriting 
business, and a service station. Most of these required a minimum 
investment of K10,000-15,000. Most of those interviewed also stated 
that they had invested some of their cash in the alluvial gold mining, 
and one still held the whole of his payment in this form (mainly in 
interest-bearing deposits). Five had purchased vehicles (one had 
bought two), and most had contributed to campaign funds for wantoks 
during the 1992 national election. 
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Several interviewees stated that they believed the other members 
of their family had used their share of the payments for 
consumption: 'they drank their money in Tari, Hagen and Moresby', 
'men spent their money on prostitution, sleeping in hotels in Hagen 
and drinking alcohol in Tari', 'the others consumed their money in 
beer and women', and 'others spent their money on vehicles that are 
now run-down, and on brideprice for more wives, and on alcohol-
they have spent it all'. Only three of those interviewed admitted to 
practicing this kind of consumption themselves-/I ate them up', as 
one put it. 13 
From this set of responses, we may derive an approximate picture 
of the way in which the compensation money was used. 
.. 10-15 per cent was invested with alluvial gold mining 
.. 25-30 per cent was invested in local businesses 
.. 10-15 per cent was consumed by the primary recipient 
(including vehicles, brideprice, etc.); and 
.. 40-55 per cent was redistributed, of which 75-80 per cent 
was consumed. 
With the redistribution and consumption, our primary concern 
was with how much of this money left Porgera. Consumption 
primarily involved buying goods originating outside Porgera, 
although a small proportion was retained (as profit) when 
purchases were made within the area. Much of the redistributed 
money passed through several pairs of hands, following 
traditional obligation networks, and was eventually consumed or 
passed out of the area. 
Given the assumption that smaller amounts are more likely to be 
used for consumption than for investment, it is thus possible to 
estimate the final use made of the total compensation funds (K23 
million) which had so far been paid by the PJV 
• 5-10 per cent (between K1.625 million and K2.3 million) had 
been invested with alluvial gold mining 
• 20-25 per cent (between K4.6 million and K5.75 million) had 
been invested in local business; and 
.. 65-75 per cent (between K14.95 million and K17.25 million) 
had been consumed directly, redistributed and consumed, or 
redistributed to relatives outside Porgera. 
The estimate of alluvial gold mining deposits corresponds closely with 
the figure of K2.1 million derived from the household survey. 
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Local businesses 
Directly or indirectly, the PJV had certainly stimulated local business 
development in the Porgera area. In general, these businesses depended 
either on trade generated by PJV inputs (wages, compensation and 
royalties), or on direct dealings with the PJV. As an indication of the 
latter, PJV figures for April 1990 show there were an additional 354 
Porgerans employed by contractors to the mining company.14 Assuming 
that wages for local contractors would have been lower than those 
offered by the PJV-say an average of K3,500 per annum-this would 
have amounted to K1.2 million annually. 
Five of the largest businesses in Porgera were investigated in terms 
of their role in the Porgeran economy, their current levels of 
employment, and their dependence on the PJv. 
.. Ipili Porgera Investments is the company formed in 1983 to 
act as an umbrella company through which local landowners 
could take advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
mine. Shareholding in the company was reserved exclusively 
for Porgerans, but the exact details of the shareholding were 
not obtained. After a period of serious financial difficulties, IPI 
had been reduced to a core of four activities: the IPI Supa 
Store in Porgera, the Mountain Lodge accommodation, some 
plant hire to the PJV (which was leased to Kulapi Holdings), 
and a 30 per cent share of the IPljPoons Joint Venture. 
Employment in 1992 (excluding Poons) was around 80, with 
over half of these being Porgerans. The Supa Store was the 
largest store in Porgera, and acted as a wholesaler for many of 
the smaller trade stores. Turnover was reputedly up to 
Kl0,000 on pay Wednesdays, and the store carried around 
K400,000 in stock. 
.. The IPljPoons Joint Venture won the tender for the supply 
of catering services to the PJV camps in mid 1992. 
Employment totalled 229 in December 1992, 121 of these 
being Porgeran. The value of the three-year contract was in 
excess of Kl million. Figures provided by Poons show that 
the bulk of their supplies were sourced through PNG 
companies. K17,000 was spent on local vegetable supplies 
during 1992, though this figure includes some supplies from 
other parts of Enga. K30,000 was spent on Australian 
sourced goods, around 10 per cent of the total. 
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.. Kulapi Holdings was owned and managed by Yanis Polopa 
and family, local Porgerans who began operations in 1989. 
Initially, Kulapi was involved in plant hire contracts for the 
PJv, and then expanded into freight (again for the PJV) and 
servicing of heavy vehicles (through Porgera Motors). More 
recent diversifications had included a fuel depot, a 
mechanical spare parts retail section, investment in Port 
Moresby real estate, a building and civil works section, and 
helicopter services (with a leased helicopter). The company 
had 120 employees at the end of 1992, including 39 
Porgerans. Turnover for 1991 was K1.5 million, increasing to 
a projected K5.5 million for 1992. 
.. The Porgera Bakery was a (50/50) joint venture between a 
local business group and Golding and Company of 
Australia. The company began as a gold-refining business in 
1988, and became a bakery in 1990. Due to alleged 
misappropriation and the deportation of the Australian 
partner, the local partners were trying to establish full 
ownership in 1992. In that year, 17 Porgerans and six non-
Porgerans were employed. Goods were sold throughout the 
valley, and efforts were being made to extend supply to 
other parts of Enga and to the Southern Highlands. 
.. Kumbi Enterprises was registered in 1989 by an expatriate 
married to a local Porgeran woman. The primary activity of 
the company was a laundry service for the PJv, and for this 
they employed 23 staff, 19 of them Porgerans. Kumbi had an 
associated company, Porgera Catering, which supplied 
catering services to the PJV Tipinini camp, and employed 
another ten people, eight of them Porgeran. 
In total, these five businesses employed 308 Porgerans and a 
substantial number of non-Porgerans who lived permanently in the 
valley (unlike the PJV's non-Porgeran employees). In addition, the 
PDA employed 20 Porgerans and 20 non-Porgerans, and other 
government departments accounted for approximately 20 additional 
staff. On a conservative estimate, these people would have accounted 
for at least KlOO,OOO a fortnight in wages, or another K2.6 million per 
year in total. Much of this income, however, represented the 
redistribution of money initially spent by the PJy' lS 
In addition to these large businesses, small business appeared to be 
flourishing in Porgera. A count revealed almost 150 operating trade 
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stores in the valley, excluding Yuyan and Tipinini. The bulk of these 
were owner-operated, and most served a socio-cultural function in 
addition to an economic one-indeed, several owners told us they 
were not running their stores for the money. Turnover ranged from a 
few kina a day for smaller operations up to several thousand kina a 
day for the IPI Supa Store. Of those surveyed (around thirty), the 
average daily turnover was approximately K100. Many of the smaller 
ones, however, were only open two or three days per fortnight, so a 
more realistic figure may be K350 per week, giving a total annual 
turnover for the valley of K2.5 million. This approximates the figure 
from the income and expenditure survey. A more comprehensive 
survey by the PJV Business Development Office in early 1991 found 
103 stores with an average turnover of K622 per week, or a total 
annual turnover of K3.3 million. This higher figure ties in with the 
anecdotal evidence that trade store owners felt people were buying 
less in 1992 than they had done in the past. This could have been due 
to increasing competition (due to a greater number of stores), or to the 
substantially lower amount of compensation money entering the local 
economy, or simply a romantic view of the past. 
A quick survey of owners indicated that soft drinks, tinned fish, 
rice, coffee, sugar and cigarettes were the biggest sellers. Some of the 
more sophisticated stores also offered hot food. All trade store goods 
were imported from Mount Hagen, Lae or Port Moresby, and the 
markup on prices at Porgera was high-in most cases at least 100 per 
cent over the cost of similar goods in Lae or Port Moresby. This meant 
that half of the value of sales was the wholesale cost, and on average a 
further 25 per cent represented transport costs for the store owner. 
Both these cost components were lost to Porgera when the store owner 
restocked. Most of the other 25 per cent (the profit) tended to be spent 
on consumer goods, food from trade stores, and meeting demands 
from family members and wantoks. 
The markets were another form of small-scale business activity of 
some importance in the area. Surveys were carried out of sellers at 
both the main Yanjakale market at Porgera Station, and several of the 
smaller markets in the area. In total, 116 sellers were interviewed. 
Average reported daily income was K62.90, ranging between K5 and 
K400. On pay Wednesdays, it was not uncommon to have 200 sellers 
at the main markets, and another 200 spread across the other half-
dozen markets in the valley. If we assume that these Wednesday 
markets accounted for around half of the total market activity for the 
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fortnight, then the total value of market sales must have been around 
K1.3 million a year, which also agrees with the figure obtained from 
the income and expenditure survey. Of the sellers interviewed, 25 per 
cent were local Porgerans, almost 60 per cent were from other parts of 
Enga, and the remainder came from as far away as Goroka and Tari. 
The average reported daily sales of Porgerans (K30) were less than 
those of non-Porgerans (K73), so these sales must have represented a 
direct leakage of at least K1 million from the local economy. 
Even less formal activities included roadside sellers (usually 
betelnut, cigarettes and greens), small-scale petrol sales (30 seen 
between Karik and Anawe Police Station), firewood sellers, 'bakeries' 
(selling deep fried flour balls for 10-20 toea a piece), poultry sellers 
(buying chicks from Mount Hagen and selling 8-10 weeks later for 
KlO-12), and the cooking and sale of 'lambflaps'. 
All of the above activities-from redistribution to trade store and 
market sales-point to a very low multiplier effect, with little capital 
accumulation in the Porgera Valley, as money was shifted rapidly out 
to other parts of the province and the country. It must be stressed that 
this is likely to occur in any remote area with a limited population 
base. However, the effect was highlighted at Porgera due to the large 
amounts of money which had been injected into the economy over a 
short period of time. 
Conclusions 
This review of the Porgeran economy in 1992 points to significant 
continuities with the pre-mine situation. This is not to say that nothing 
had changed in the area: clearly the value of cash inputs had increased 
significantly. However, many features of the local economy had seen 
little change since the start of production. The bulk of the population 
was still dependent on the subsistence sector for survival; 
consumption patterns were still focused on food, drink and gambling; 
bisnis aspirations were still dominated by trade stores, PMVs and 
machinery; and there were still significant patterns of inequality 
within the valley. 
Although the surveys focused primarily on male household heads, 
significant gender differences showed up in the income and 
expenditure survey. Average female income for the fortnight was K60, 
compared to just over K200 for males. The primary source of income 
for women was sale of goods and produce (38 per cent of the total), 
with over 50 per cent of women reporting sales ranging between K5 
124 I Dilemmas of Development 
and K300 for the fortnight. Eight per cent of male income came from 
the same source. Money from household members was more 
important for women than men (16 and 3 per cent of income 
respectively), while PJV wages and business profits accounted for 3 
and zero per cent for women, compared to 36 and 29 per cent 
respectively for males. There were few differences in terms of 
expenditure patterns, the most significant being a smaller proportion 
being banked by women (23 per cent against 9 per cent), and a larger 
proportion still being held (31 per cent against 13 per cent). 
As previously noted, differences in access to cash earning 
opportunities were established in the Porgera Valley prior to the 
arrival of the PJY. As early as 1948, people in the lower part of the 
valley had the advantage of access to alluvial gold, and Mungalep and 
particularly Yuyan developed as major centres of the local cash 
economy. Jackson (1987) found that households in Mungalep and 
Alipis had significantly greater values of possessions than those in 
Anawe and Suyan, and attributed this to the emphasis on 
independent gold panning in these communities. Our own surveys 
shows that, since the arrival of the pJV, the focus had shifted further 
up the valley and was now centred on the SML. This came out most 
clearly in the household survey: Apalaka had received over 70 per 
cent of compensation and the bulk of other direct PJV payments, while 
Tipinini had received virtually none. On the other hand, there was no 
simple relationship between the amount of compensation received 
and household assets, investments, or contributions to traditional 
exchange obligations. Clearly, Tipinini was lagging behind the other 
parts of the valley in terms of cash earning opportunities, but its 
residents appeared to make good use of the smaller incomes to which 
they had access. It is also important to note that, although there were 
significant differences between the various communities surveyed, 
there were more marked differences within each of these communities. 
In other words, inequality was greater at the level of the individual or 
household than at the level of the community. 
Another feature of the local economy was the marked fluctuations 
in inputs over time, dominated by those sourced with the PJY. 
Compensation payments peaked in 1991 at K8.77 million, but were 
more than K5 million down from this peak in 1992. The records for 
1992 also show that roughly half the compensation for the year was 
paid in the three-month period from May to July. Royalties were being 
paid approximately each quarter, while business contracts were 
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awarded on an irregular basis. The most visible fluctuation was the 
fortnightly payment of PJV wages, which injected over K100,OOO into 
the economy on a regular basis. For two or three days a fortnight, this 
drew people to the area from other parts of Enga, and stimulated 
market and trade store activity. These patterns were significant for the 
long-term development prospects of the local economy, because the 
irregular variations made forward planning difficult. 
Notes 
1 This chapter is concerned primarily with the economy of the 
Porgera Valley, though reference is occasionally made to 
contributions at the provincial, regional and national levels. 
2 These interviews were largely carried out by Ben Imbun and five 
male students from the University of Papua New Guinea, in either 
Enga or Tok Pisin. 
3 One of the more successful businessmen interviewed as part of this 
survey reported alcohol sales of K1,500 in the past fortnight. 
4 Unfortunately, Jackson's report was not sighted until the fieldwork 
for this chapter was already under way, which was too late to 
directly influence the methodology used, though there is no major 
inconsistency between the two. 
5 This section deals almost exclusively with the cash economy at 
Porgera, in keeping with the objectives of this stage of fieldwork 
and the methodology adopted. See Chapter 5 for discussion of the 
subsistence and non-cash economy around the mine. 
6 This section includes reference to some data collected during my 
second trip to Porgera in June 1993, when I was able to complete 
the records of compensation payments made in 1992, and to 
consult the detailed compensation registers and code books for the 
whole period from 1987 to the end of 1992. These sources had their 
own problems-illegibility, clerical errors and alterations-but 
were a better source than the aggregated records which I had 
consulted during my first field trip (see Banks 1993). 
7 A similar situation existed at Ok Tedi (Jacks on 1993). 
8 Employment created by the PJV through local contractors was also 
significant, but this is discussed in the subsequent section on 
business contracts. 
9 The Porgera SML Landowners' Children's Investment Fund was 
set up to administer the 10 per cent share of the royalties which 
were to go to the children of the SML landowners. By the end of 
1992, the value of this share was around K1 million, and the fund 
was expecting to start paying out benefits to 7-18 year olds in 1995 
(with some small payouts during 1993 and 1994 to 19-21 year olds). 
10 The number of polygamous households was greatest at Apalaka 
(five, or 15.6 per cent), and averaged 8 per cent across the valley. 
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11 These figures do not add up to 231 because the occasional survey 
form omitted the relevant information. 
12 No figures were collected on business turnover or profitability in 
this survey (see Chapter 7 for further discussion). 
13 The focus on consumption of gold money has parallels in Clark's 
(1993) account of Huli involvement in the Mount Kare gold rush, 
and may have occurred for similar cultural reasons. 
14 Figures had not been kept by the company since that date. 
15 Direct purchase of Porgeran goods by the PJV was minimal, 
reflecting both the specialised needs of the mine and the lack of 
local suppliers. However, the September 1992 Business 
Development Office's quarterly report noted that 32 per cent of 
purchases made by the warehouse were sourced from within 
Papua New Guinea. 
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The landowner relocation 
programme 
Susanne Bonnell 
The history of relocation 
In order to construct the mine, the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) had to 
relocate landowners living in the area of proposed mining activity and 
provide these landowners with improved housing. The Relocation 
Agreement was negotiated directly between the landowners and the 
PJV as part of the total compensation package programme. The 
Porgera relocation programmes was of a massive scale unprecedented 
in Papua New Guinea's mining history. In 1988, those planning for 
relocation never envisaged just how massive it would be. The original 
number of families planned for relocation grew progressively from 230 
to 420. Relocation houses and new villages were the most visible 
change to Porgeran lifestyle brought about by the development of the 
mine. By the time the fieldwork for this chapter was undertaken, more 
relocation was being planned for the new Kaiya Lease for Mining 
Purposes (LMP) (see Chapter 7). It then looked as if something like 
600 relocation houses would have been built by the end of 1994. This 
new relocation programme should have benefited from the experience 
gained in the previous programmes. But the sheer size of the 
relocation programme complicated the foreseen and unforeseen 
consequences of planned change. The landowners who negotiated a 
better lifestyle for themselves now had to deat not only with the 
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jealousies of the 'have-nots', but also the judgments of their children 
and grandchildren. And for the PJv, relocation was a bit like grabbing 
the tiger by the tail. The PJV had to take hold, it could not let go, and 
the eventual outcome was uncertain. 
Background 
The Social and Economic Impact Study (SEIS) for the Porgera project 
recommended that relocation should be kept to a minimum as 'the 
relocation of people under other mining developments in PNG has 
inevitably resulted in considerable misunderstanding, conflict and 
social hardship' (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:92; see also Jackson 
1987). This was certainly the case with Bougainville, the only 
landowner relocation programme which had been undertaken by a 
mining project at this time. But relocation was unavoidable in Porgera 
because, unlike Ok Tedi or Misima, a large number of people were 
living in the area proposed for mine development. 
The SEIS recommended the 'design of the mine infrastructure and 
operations so as to minimise relocation of families', and that 'those 
families unavoidably relocated be supplied by the PJV with housing 
equal to or better than their existing housing, with an upper limit 
established by negotiation between the PJV and community 
representatives, with government arbitration if necessary' (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[2]:39). Both Jackson's 1987 report and the SEIS 
recommended that Alipis village be assisted to develop into 'an 
informal Melanesian mining community'. Other than that, the reports 
left the mechanics of the inevitable relocation unresolved. 
Placer duly contracted Fritz Robinson, who had been part of the 
SEIS study team, to undertake an in-depth relocation study which 
began in January 1988 and lasted six weeks.! Robinson's study was 
based on the assumption that a relocation programme, in which 
people moved house but remained on their own land, was preferable 
to a resettlement programme, which would have meant moving 
people onto purchased or leased land. The relocation option was seen 
to be less socially disruptive, and its feasibility in the Porgera context 
was enhanced by the cognatic kinship system of the Ipili, which 
provided considerable flexibility for people to find alternative land on 
which to build their new houses. 
Robinson's study included a survey of existing houses on and near 
the proposed plant site area, the proposed open pit area, and Alipis 
village. He also surveyed land and gardens in Yarik, Olonga and 
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Timorope. Besides meeting with male landowners, he met with 
women's groups to ascertain their opinions and needs. The latter was 
probably a first for the mining industry. The comprehensive report 
included details of plans with costings of various house design 
options; relocation areas; compensation arrangements; and the 
physical aspects of relocation, including garden contracts, rations and 
infrastructure needs. The main deficiency in this study was the 
author's estimate that only 230 families would need to be relocated. 
This was due to 
.. changes in mine development plans which Robinson had not 
been aware of 
.. an increase in the number of eligible persons previously omitted 
from the lists compiled by clan leaders; and 
.. failure to consider the relocation of Alipis village because the 
land on which it was situated was not needed for mine 
development.2 
Nevertheless, Robinson's report provided the framework for Placer's 
negotiations with the landowners for the relocation agreement. 
Negotiations 
Placer employees Dave Moorhouse and Graham Hogg set up the 
Landowners' Negotiating Committee (LNC) in early 1987 for 
landowners of the clans and sub-clans within the Special Mining Lease 
(SML). This committee was composed of 23 representatives of the 
clans and sub-clans and their agreed alternates.3 The LNC was 
originally set up to negotiate the Compensation Agreement which was 
concluded at the end of January 1988, and it then went on to negotiate 
the Relocation Agreement. Involvement of the LNC was critical in the 
negotiations, and the members soon developed in confidence as the 
negotiations continued. Vic Botts' laconic comment (Davis Film and 
Video 1990) that the Porgerans were accomplished negotiators rather 
understates the aggression, intimidation and chaos of the negotiation 
process. The LNC had the capacity to stop proceedings, but did not do 
so because they wanted the mine. Many Porgerans perceived the mine 
to be their only possible chance to catch up with the rest of Papua 
New Guinea after years of neglect. In addition, there was also an 
element of personal greed in the negotiations from some landowners 
seeking additional benefits. Despite disagreements which were often 
violent, both parties always returned to the negotiating table. 
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The establishment of criteria for eligibility to receive a relocation 
house was the most contentious subject of negotiation between the 
two sides. An arbitrary decision had to be made which was acceptable 
to the company and to Ipili culture. The outcome is best summarised 
by Robinson (1991), who was not only responsible for the relocation 
study, but also for implementing the relocation programme itself. 
Some of the criteria for inclusion in the relocation programme 
included: 
1. A residential status of longer than 3 years (originally 5 years). 
2. Inclusion in one of the seven clans on the SML. 
3. The presence of a 'habitable' house. 
4. One relocation house per head of family. 
5. Only married people to be eligible. 
These apparently simple criteria were not simple in practice. There were 
a number of different perceptions operating. Someone who had been 
living with relatives in Paiela or Tari, but who had visited the SML (and 
perhaps stayed a month or two) considered themselves fully eligible. 
Inclusion in one of the clans in the genealogy books said nothing 
about residential status. In several cases genuine members of the clan 
were not in the genealogies. There were a significant number in the epo 
atene-invited guest-group. These people have the rights to garden 
and build houses and to participate in most of the life and actions of 
the clan. But they are not part of the clan by blood, and do not appear 
in the genealogies. There are individuals in this group who have lived 
and worked with the clan for 15 years or more. 
The 'habitable' house was very difficult to determine. The way houses 
developed is either purpose built as a dwelling (which is not a 
problem); or developed from a garden house (or in some cases a 
piggery), which is a problem. What begins as a garden house can end 
as a major family residence. This often happened. 
For six months preceding the relocation another of the several waves 
of immigration occurred. Many of the garden houses and piggeries 
became occupied by relatives and were upgraded and made habitable. 
During the survey which determined eligibility for relocation, the 
average household size was 13. Wiessner's figure for Wabag in the 
Central Enga is 5 per household. 
Various other anomalies appeared: widows who have remarried 
outsiders, abandoned women and children, unmarried men and 
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women of nearly marriageable age who suddenly declared themselves 
married, and unmarried men and women of middle age who had a 
well-established household. 
When these anomalies appeared and continued to appear, decisions 
were made quickly and in consultation with the Landowners' 
Negotiating Committee .. .I suspect up to 8 relocation packages should 
not have been given to the individuals concerned. 
The long term Epa Atenes were included for full relocation if they had 
been resident for 10 years or more. Shorter terms were given lesser 
benefits. 
Another problem to overcome was that of the design of the 
relocation house. Robinson felt the men would have been just as 
happy with the cash, but the PJV viewed the relocation house as a 
family benefit. Robinson's research had shown that most people 
lived in houses between 25 and 32 square metres in area. Most 
people to be relocated lived in bush material houses, but some lived 
in houses partially or totally made of permanent materials. In 
addition, some houses in Alipis had electricity. There was a need to 
find a compromise between the style of Frank Faulkner's house on 
the government station, which was the preference of the LNC, and a 
semi-bush material house suggested by the PJv.4 The LNC insisted 
on electrical wiring and running water, and many members also 
requested six bedrooms. The LNC and PJV finally came to an 
agreement for a four-bedroom house with a total living area of 42 
square metres and sidings made of 'V' crimp aluminium as 
protection against fire and theft (see Map 4.1). An internal shower was 
optional. 
Village trade stores were another major issue. There were 42 trade 
stores in Alipis alone. These stores varied from small bush material 
buildings selling a limited variety of goods to quite large buildings 
made of permanent materials. The larger trade stores carried a wide 
variety of goods, including frozen meat, often had a snooker table, and 
had huge turnovers. Owners wanted compensation for loss of trade 
while these stores were being moved and/ or rebuilt. The outcome was 
that trade store owners either received compensation in cash or their 
stores were moved and rebuilt to the same or higher standard. There 
was no compensation for loss of trade. 
With the exception of Alipis village, most Porgerans lived in small 
hamlets or homesteads. This settlement pattern tends to lower social 
stress due to the distance between neighbours. However, the cluster 
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settlement pattern had attractions to both landowners and the PJV. 
From the people's viewpoint, clusters or villages would mean better 
services and utilities. From the PJV's viewpoint, this reduced the cost 
of building a large number of houses. In the end, the two parties 
agreed to focus on the creation of new villages within the boundaries 
of the SML at Apalaka, Kulapi, Yarik, Olonga and Timorope, with the 
PJV providing access roads and services. 
The Relocation Agreement 
The Relocation Agreement for the SML between Placer (PNG) Pty Ltd 
(on behalf of the Porgera Joint Venture) and Landowner Agents of the 
Tieni, Waiwa, Tuanda, Pulumaini, Angalaini, Mamai and Anga clans 
of Porgera was signed in September 1988. Some of the main points in 
the agreement were 
.. 'The PJV and the Landowners have agreed that if the mine is 
developed the PJV will in addition to making payments under 
the Compensation Agreement make certain payments and grant 
certain benefits to assist in the relocation of those landowners 
whose rights of residence or occupation are affected by the 
development of the mine. This payment represents a once only 
event to residents affected by the developments. No further 
payments for relocation will be considered' (p.2). 
.. 'The PJV agrees to pay compensation for hardship and 
disturbance as follows: to the head of each family of Re-Located 
Landowners One thousand Kina (K1,OOO); and to the head of 
each family of Epo Atene Residents Five hundred kina (KSOO)' 
(p.3).5 
.. Construct housing to the standard of attached plan (see Figure 
4.1). 
.. 'Seek Elcom's agreement to provide assistance or funding to 
erect a standard Elcom pole and transformer where the houses 
in the new locations are clustered near enough to transmission 
lines to make this feasible' (p.4).6 
.. 'Construct a road from Yokolama to Apalaka and an access 
road linking the Pulumaini new location with the Anawe by-
pass road: and to maintain them in a trafficable condition' 
(p.4). 
.. 'Clear small, flat areas adjacent to housing clusters in new 
locations for use as community meeting places' (p.4). 
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.. 'Provide professional geotechnical officer to inspect, and advise 
on the stability of house sites in order to minimise any future 
problems from landslide damage' (p.4). 
.. 'Relocate two churches and provide one relocation house for 
each to be used by the respective pastors' (p.5). 
.. 'Relocate two aid posts and provide one relocation house for 
each to be used by the respective Government Health worker, 
subject to government approval' (p.5). 
The PJV was not obliged to 
.. 'Maintain or repair houses other than failure caused by poor 
workmanship or materials for the first six months' (p.5); or 
.. 'To pay for the connection of individual houses to the power 
supply or for the supply of power to such houses' (p.5). 
With regard to rations 
.. During the period of relocation the PJV agrees to provide 
rations to relocated landowners if necessary as follows: 'Such 
rations will be in accordance with prescribed Government 
scales; Rations will be delivered weekly to a representative of 
each family at a designated point ... ' (p.6). 
.. 'The supply of rations will commence on the date the family no 
longer has access to traditional garden land and shall continue 
until the food gardens in the new locations are ready to harvest 
or for a maximum period of nine (9) months' (p.6).7 
Similar relocation agreements were later negotiated between the 
PJV and landowners for the Suyan Townsite and Kairik Airstrip. The 
Suyan townsite was a lease for mining purposes outside the SML, 
while Kairik was a state land purchase. While the state paid the Kairik 
landowners for the land, the PJV paid for all improvements at the 
same rate of compensation as for land within the SML, and provided 
relocation houses in the same way as for the SML and Suyan 
landowners. This action was felt by some to be a dangerous precedent 
for future state land purchases. 
The PJV entered into a relocation agreement before they knew the 
extent of the ore deposit, and faced the dilemma of committing large 
amounts of money before they had a mining agreement. Construction of 
the relocation houses began in late 1988. The first 49 houses, most of 
which were in Kulapi, were ready for occupancy in February 1989, with 
an additional 71 houses under construction. By the time the SML was 
issued in May 1989, nearly 120 families had already been relocated. 
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The move 
In view of the anticipated social disruption caused by mine 
development, especially to women and the family, Robinson (1988:7) 
recommended in his report that a female social worker be based in 
Porgera. Although this was originally envisioned to be a government 
position, mine management agreed to hire a temporary consultant to 
assist initially with the settling-in process of the relocation families, 
especially the women. I arrived in February to take up this position 
during the week in which the first families were moving into their 
new homes. 
The relocation programme consisted of lands and relocation staff 
assisting families with the physical move, relocation staff purchasing 
and distributing rations to households, and the social development 
staff visiting each household to assist with settling in. Programmes to 
relocate landowners were coordinated from the chaotic Yokolama 
Lands Office complex, which more often than not resembled a fighting 
zone. High decibel arguments, physical fights and threatening 
behaviour were centred around grievances concerning compensation 
payments and relocation houses. 
Social development staff visited each house as soon as possible 
after the owners moved in. The programme was primarily aimed at 
assisting women with the adjustments. Most of the families relocated 
had never lived in permanent material houses before, and needed 
advice on use, care and maintenance of the relocation house and its 
contents; this included demonstrations on operation and care of the 
stove, cleaning S-bend of sink, care of mattresses, how to clean floors, 
and so on. In addition, the house was checked for any construction 
faults, and those found were referred to the construction contractors. 
This was also a time to discuss any other concerns brought up by the 
women.s Settling-in visits were followed up with workshops. These 
workshops were conducted in one house with occupants from nearby 
houses attending. Workshops covered house care, hygiene, consumer 
awareness plus general discussion on any matters women raised. 
These workshops formed the basis for starting women's groups and 
the Porgera Women's Association. 
Three relocation villages were built within the SML boundaries. 
The first was Kulapil Area 6 (on Pulumaini and Angalaini clan land), 
followed by Yarik/Tunorope/Olonga (on Tieni clan land), and in 1990 
the first houses were constructed at Apalaka (on Tuanda and Waiwa 
clan land). Construction at Suyan began in 1990, and at Kairik in 1991. 
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Besides the relocation villages, houses were constructed on or near 
existing roads, either scattered among existing houses or in small 
extended family clusters. In mid 1993, relocation houses were located 
along the Yokolama-Panandaka-Mungalep-Kakendaka road on 
Mamai and Angalaini clan land, and along the Wendegonga-Anawe-
Poare section of road to Porgera Station on Pulumaini and Anga clan 
land. From Porgera Station, houses were located on the road between 
Suyan and Kairik and between Suyan and Ingau. A few houses were 
constructed off-road, the most notable being the single house across 
the Kaiya River. 
The impact of relocation 
My own relocation survey was conducted between January and May 
1993. By this time, many relocation houses, especially those in Kulapi 
and Yarik, had been occupied for about four years. The purpose of this 
survey was to observe the condition of the relocation houses and to 
find out what changes had taken place in the lives of the people who 
had been relocated. The survey was aimed primarily at getting the 
women's viewpoint. Mogom TIli and More Aliana, PJV Community 
Affairs staff who also lived in relocation houses, assisted me with the 
interviews. Mogom, More and I had worked together for nearly three 
years with most of the people interviewed, and we were able to reflect 
with the women on the changes that had taken place. In spite of 
explanations, I am sure that people I interviewed still considered me 
to be a PJV employee, and this may have affected some of their replies. 
The survey sample 
As of January 1993, 420 relocation houses had been built. Out of this 
total, one house was destroyed in 1989 during a family dispute, and 
two houses at Kairik were burned down early in 1993 during tribal 
fighting. The relocation survey covered 96 houses in all the main 
cluster areas except Mungalep and Kairik (see Table 4.1). This 
represents 23 per cent of the total number of relocation houses 
constructed. Mungalep and Kairik were not surveyed due to tribal 
fighting in these areas during the survey period. 
The number of people (actual residents) living in relocation houses 
ranged from two to twenty, with an overall average of 8.1 persons per 
house. This would indicate that approximately 3,400 people were 
relocated (i.e. 8.1 people times 420 houses). John Burton (pers. comm.) 
estimated that there were approximately 7,000 Porgerans in the 
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Table 4.1 Relocation survey sample, 1993 
Location Houses Persons Mean hlh size Range of h/h size 
Kulapi 24 204 8.5 2-16 
Anawe 15 111 7.4 3-11 
Suyan 11 97 8.8 2-11 
Apalaka 15 120 8.0 3-10 
Yarik 21 148 7.0 3-13 
Olonga 10 99 9.9 5-20 
Total 96 779 8.1 2-20 
Source: Relocation survey data. 
Porgera Census Division in 1993, which would suggest that about half 
of them were living in relocation houses. However, my survey did not 
attempt to differentiate between 'Porgeran' and 'non-Porgeran' 
residents. Many of the landowners, male and female, were married to 
non-Porgerans, and their children might also have been married to 
non-Porgerans, and the relatives of these non-Porgerans might also 
have been living in the relocation houses. Therefore, it is probably 
more accurate to say that somewhere around one-third of 'Porgerans' 
were living in relocation houses in 1993. 
Settlement patterns 
Prior to relocation, most Porgerans (with the notable exception of 
Alipis village) lived in scattered family hamlets. The preferred 
relocation option was cluster-style living. This option was preferred 
by the landowners because the company agreed to construct access 
roads and supply electricity connection points to clustered 
settlements. The option was also preferred by the company because 
it would simplify the logistics of constructing the relocation houses. 
Some people, however, did opt for living outside the main cluster 
areas. The reasons for this included personal preference and the fact 
that some people were obliged to settle on land to which they had 
traditional rights. 
The result of the people's decision to have their houses built in 
cluster areas was the creation of new villages. Many people during the 
survey said that they liked this new style living pattern because they 
felt more secure living close to other clan members. On the other hand, 
the creation of new villages created new problems. These problems (as 
discussed below) include rubbish disposal, firewood availability, easy 
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access to food garden land, toilets, and so on. Most of these problems 
were compounded by the influx of non-Porgeran relatives. 
Overcrowding 
It was difficult to come up with a criterion for defining overcrowding. 
One option to define overcrowding is to use the average number of 
people per house prior to relocation. In his 1988 study, Robinson 
found the average household size to be six, and he used this number 
for all the planning options for relocation, which included house size, 
rations, etc. However, the relocation houses were larger than the 
average pre-existing houses-42 square metres as opposed to 25-32 
square metres. Therefore, a second option is to use the average of two 
people per bedroom, or eight people per house, which was the 
average number of occupants in the survey. A third option, suggested 
by Robin Hide (pers. comm.), was to find out how many houses had 
more than twice the number of occupants that were originally 
envisaged, i.e. more than 12 people per house. Table 4.2 shows the 
level of 'overcrowding' on each of these three criteria. 
Other factors in the definition of overcrowding would be adult/child 
ratios and the relationships between the people living in the house. One 
example of overcrowding was an unhappy household with 12 occupants: 
the husband, his first wife and their six children; the recent young second 
wife whom the first wife disliked; and the oldest daughter'S husband and 
their two children. Customarily, a man would have separate houses for 
wives who did not get along, and married children would also have 
separate houses, all in the same compound. If custom had been followed, 
there would probably have been only seven people in this house. 
Table 4.2 Number of relocation houses with more than 12,8 or 6 
residents 
Location Houses Over 12 (%) Over 8 (%) Over 6 (%) 
Kulapi 24 3 (12.5) 12 (50.0) 16 (66.6) 
Anawe 15 0(00.0) 4 (26.7) 10 (66.6) 
Suyan 11 2 (18.1) 6 (54.5) 10 (90.9) 
Apalaka 15 1 (06.7) 7 (46.7) 11 (73.3) 
Yarik 21 1 (04.8) 6 (28.6) 12(57.1) 
Olonga 10 3 (30.0) 4 (40.0) 8 (80.0) 
Total 96 10 (10.4) 39 (40.6) 67 (69.8) 
Source: Relocation survey data. 
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Another example of overcrowding was a house with 20 occupants: 
the owner and his family plus the owner's brother and his family, who 
were not entitled to a relocation house. A third example was a 
household with 16 people: the owner and his wife and children, plus 
two children from a previous marriage and four non-Porgeran relatives. 
These examples illustrate the main causes of overcrowding 
.. polygamy, especially the case of men who had taken new wives 
since moving into relocation houses 
.. Porgeran relatives moving in because they felt they were 
entitled to relocation houses 
.. non-Porgeran relatives moving in to gain the advantages of 
living near the mine 
It married children continuing to live with parents because they 
wanted relocation houses of their own. 
The effects of this overcrowding were family disputes, wear and tear 
on the house itself, plus the damage caused during these disputes. It 
was also a strain on already limited water resources and food 
gardening land. There were possible health consequences from 
communicable diseases. 
Condition of houses 
The way that the houses were maintained was itself a reliable 
indication of the people's attitude to a new way of living, and the 
relative success of the relocation programme. The houses were 
generally well looked after, especially when one considers the ratio 
between the total area of the house and the number of people living in 
it. 
On the survey form, I gave each house a subjective rating of either 
excellent, good, fair or poor. 'Excellent' was for an outstanding 
example of cleanliness and care for the house and its surroundings. 
'Good' meant the house was above average, very clean and well 
looked after. Houses with a 'fair' rating could have done with an 
improvement in housekeeping. The 'poor' rating was for houses 
which were basically uninhabitable due to filth or damage or both. 
There was some criticism, especially in the Community Issues 
Committee meetings, that the relocation houses were too small-that 
they were 'matchboxes'. This was certainly a valid complaint for the 
40 per cent of households with more than eight occupants. However, 
all but one of the women interviewed liked the new houses, and this 
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was reflected in the care they were taking of them. If the people did 
not like the houses, they would have destroyed them or not cared for 
them. The demand for relocation houses by those who did not qualify, 
as well as the adult children of those who did, indicates that the 
relocation house was definitely the status symbol of Porgera. 
The following is a list of the reasons which women gave for liking 
their relocation houses, in order of their relative frequency. Many 
women gave more than one reason. 
Good stove, no smoke and saucepans are clean 
Water inside the house 
No lice, fleas or cockroaches 
No rats 
Electricity 
Easy to clean 
Shower inside the house 
We sleep well 
The houses last a long time 











We do not get sick, we are healthier 4 
Lots of space, 4 bedrooms 2 
They look nice 2 
Another advantage of the relocation houses that many women 
mentioned was that they no longer had to carry heavy loads of 
firewood. This confused me at first, until I realised that they had no 
firewood to carry because they were buying it. There were very few 
negative responses, but they are noteworthy. 
The house is too small for more than one wife 
The bush material houses are warmer 
Table 4.3 Condition of relocation houses 
Location Excellent Good 
Kulapi 0 7 
Anawe 7 
Suyan 9 
Apalaka 0 8 
Yarik 4 10 
Olonga 7 
Total 7 48 
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A haus kapa (permanent materials house) 
is no good if you do not have money 2 
Many house owners had made extensive and interesting alterations 
to the basic relocation house design. The most common change was 
the addition of a veranda, which was usually covered and sometimes 
enclosed to make additional rooms. Other alterations noted were the 
removal of internal walls to make fewer, but larger rooms, the 
addition of a septic toilet, and a larger concrete shower block. Nearly 
all owners had built a bush material kitchen (haus kuk) near their 
relocation house. This was encouraged by relocation staff for the 
following reasons 
.. older people and sick people were more comfortable sleeping in 
more traditional style houses, with the open fire on the floor 
.. it was a good place to house excess visitors or unruly children 
.. at times, it was more appropriate for cooking 
.. it was handy during domestic disputes. 
In the house of an old couple, the husband said he preferred to sleep 
in the haus kuk, but his wife said she preferred to sleep in the 
relocation house. The matter of the haus kuk is best summed up by one 
woman who said that she liked both houses-the relocation house was 
good for sleeping, and the haus kuk was good to sit in and tell stories. 
Four years after house occupancy, the lino on the floor was 
beginning to show some signs of wear and tear, but otherwise the 
houses still appeared to be structurally sound. As previously 
mentioned, the PJV had no responsibility for maintaining relocation 
houses under the terms of the Relocation Agreement. The rationale 
behind this was not just the convenience and cost savings to the 
company, but also because it would encourage self reliance. The 
problem was the lack of any custom or history of maintaining 
traditional houses-one merely lived in a house until it fell down, and 
then built a new one. The concept of preventive maintenance was hard 
to get across, as was the problem of gaining the skills and access to 
materials needed for repairs. 
Owners appeared to have no problem in accepting responsibility 
for specific damage caused by people, such as the broken louvres and 
flywire often caused by owners who had lost or misplaced their keys. 
But they were not inclined to accept responsibility for damage caused 
by landslips or routine wear and tear. Despite the Relocation Agreement, 
PJV Community Affairs relocation staff were assisting landowners with 
maintenance needs, for example providing materials for minor repairs, 
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referring home owners to local plumbers and carpenters, and replacing 
rotten timber on tank stands (a contractor fault discovered long after the 
six-month deadline had passed).9 Furthermore, any landslip problems 
were being referred to the PJV's geotechnical staff for investigation. The 
dilemma was in trying to find the balance between developing a sense of 
home owner responsibility and assisting owners with maintenance 
problems as they developed over time. 
Water supply 
It appeared that the 500-gallon water tanks connected to the relocation 
houses were adequate for no more than three rain-free days for small 
families, and required daily rain for larger families. This problem was 
recognised during the first dry spell in Porgera in 1989. It was a 
constant issue with the women, who were the primary users of water, 
and was raised with the PJV Site Manager during a meeting of the 
Porgera Women's Association in July 1991. Later, this issue was raised 
by the men during a Community Issues Committee meeting. 
New style houses and increased income for buying clothes, 
bedding and improved personal hygiene made the Ipili more intensive 
users of water than they had been before relocation and compensation. 
Other factors compounding this problem were 
• overcrowding 
• traditional alternative water sources affected by mine 
development and the influx of outsiders 
• obligations to relatives who did not have tanks 
• stealing of water 
• tanks filling up with silt 
.. leaking taps 
• no cultural history of water conservation; and 
ID people just used more water because it was there. 
The size of the water tank was a point lost amongst the various 
trade-offs made in the negotiations over the relocation house design. 
While it is certainly arguable that the water tanks were too small, the 
results of the survey in Table 4.4 show that an unreasonable number of 
people were using them, especially when compared with the number 
of occupants recorded in Table 4.2. 
Many relocation house owners were providing water for other 
people who lived nearby or in their homestead. Most of these were 
outsiders, with the notable exception of Olonga, where the owners 
were providing water primarily to other sub-clan members who were 
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Table 4.4 Numbers of people using water tanks 
Location Houses Users Average users/ Range of users/ 
house house 
Kulapi 24 277 11.5 2-21 
Anawe 15 215 14.3 3-39 
Suyan* 11 121 13.4 3-23 
Apalaka 15 129 8.6 3-13 
Yarik 21 178 8.5 3-17 
Olonga 10 125 12.5 5-20 
Total 96 1,045 11.1 2-39 
Note: *Figures for Suyan are for nine houses. Two houses had tanks that were damaged 
beyond use. 
Source: Relocation survey data. 
not eligible for relocation houses. With the benefit of hindsight, it may 
have been better to install 1,000 gallon tanks with the relocation 
houses, but access to a safe, clean water supply was not just an issue 
for people in relocation houses; it was a widespread concern 
throughout the valley.lo 
Food gardens 
The loss of land for food gardening purposes was recognised as a 
probable negative consequence of mine development by several experts. 
A 1986 garden survey Oackson 1987:B-1) showed an average of four 
gardens per household, ranging from a low of 2.8 gardens per household 
in Suyan up to 5.2 gardens per household in Alipis,u Robinson's 1988 
survey also indicated an average of four gardens per household, with an 
average household size of six persons (no details of household size had 
been given in Jackson's study). In the 1993 relocation survey, I asked 
household occupants how many sweet potato gardens they had. The 
results shown in Table 4.5 indicate a significant decrease in the 
number of gardens since 1988. In Yarik, there was a distinct difference 
between the number of food gardens belonging to the Tieni Wuape 
and the Tieni Waingalo households, with an average of 1.6 gardens per 
household and 8 gardens per household respectively. The one household 
with 25 gardens was a one-off case which I cannot explain. 
Even though I made no attempt to measure the total area of the 
gardens reported by each household, the decrease from an average of 
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Table 4.5 Number of food gardens per relocated household 
Location Houses Gardens Average gdns/ Range of gdns/ 
house house 
Kulapi 24 28 1.2 0-2 
Anawe 15 18 1.2 0-4 
Suyan 11 21 1.9 0-6 
Apalaka 15 34 2.3 1-10 
Yarik 21 83 4.0 0-25 
Olonga 10 21 2.1 0-5 
Total 96 205 2.1 0-25 
Source: Relocation survey data. 
of four to two gardens per household, as well as the reported 15 
households with no food gardens at ail, indicated the need for further 
investigation. 
e How many families actually did not have enough land for food 
gardening due to loss of land from mine development? 
.. How many families had alternate land they could use, but not 
within reasonable access of their relocation houses? 
.. How many women were not gardening by choice because they 
had adequate income to meet their present needs? 
.. How many women were not gardening because their husbands 
were not clearing, fencing and draining new garden land? 
.. What was the effect of garden land shortage on the traditional 
fallow system? 
Reduction in the number of food gardens was a concern because 
food gardens were the economic base of Ipili society. Removal of this 
economic base created a situation of economic dependency and 
problematic relationships between the landowners and the mining 
company, especially when combined with unmet employment 
expectations. This had already happened on occasions, especially 
with the Pulumaini landowners at Kulapi. There was certainly 
nothing to indicate any alternatives for the majority of landowners, 
other than to return to a subsistence lifestyle when the mine finally 
closed or if they were unemployed. Yet women who were not 
gardening were not passing their skills on to their daughters. With a 
projected further mine life of approximately 15 years (in 1993), this 
could mean a generation losing its gardening skills. Furthermore, 
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food gardens were the main area of control that women had in 
society, and their loss could have negative consequences for the 
family. 
With regard to food garden land, the people of Kulapi were 
disadvantaged compared to the other relocation areas (see Chapter 
5). The people of Kulapi had to clear primary rainforest to make 
their new gardens. Soil was poor, with a high water table, and there 
was excessive leaf mould with a high nitrogen content. This, 
combined with the comparatively high altitude, inhibited the 
formation of tubers in sweet potatoes. When this problem was 
recognised in early 1989, experts from the national Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock were brought in to make 
recommendations. It was felt that time would cure the problems of 
excessive nitrogen and draining of the soil, but improved agricultural 
practices would be the only way to improve soil fertility. In the 
meantime, a programme was initiated to grow potatoes as a substitute 
staple crop. From September 1989 to April 1991, free seed potatoes 
and fertiliser were distributed under a programme supervised by the 
Women's Section of the PJV. The programme was suspended because 
of the increasing numbers of outsiders requesting seed, and because a 
few women who had persevered with their sweet potato finally had 
gardens that were producing tubers. It was also recommended in 1989 
(and periodically re-recommended) by relocation staff that the PJV 
release unused Pulumaini land in the SML to Kulapi landowners for 
gardening purposesY The PJV had already paid compensation for 
the use of this land, and there was concern that, if the PJV needed to 
use this land in the future, there would be further compensation 
demands by landowners. 
The creation of the Anjolek dump site and excision of the Kaiya 
LMP also threatened to have a negative impact on the availability of 
gardening land. During the survey, several women in Apalaka and 
Yarik expressed their concern about losing their remaining garden 
land to the expansion of the mine. This included 
.. loss of land due to the Kaiya LMP surveying 
.. fear of increased landslides due to mining activities 
.. possible loss of land if the mine expanded to the ridge behind 
and above Yarik; and 
.. loss of access to their gardens which lay on the other side of the 
proposed Anjolek dump site (see Chapter 6). 
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Rubbish disposal 
While most houses in the relocation areas and their immediate 
surrounds were tidy and free of rubbish, this was not the case for 
trade stores, public areas, or tracks leading to the houses. People were 
encouraged to build rubbish pits as part of the relocation programme, 
and there was extensive extension work on the 'effluence of affluence' 
problem, but any improvements were short-lived. Kulapi village was 
even the target of a special improvement programme, mounted by the 
PJV's Community Affairs Division, in which the community was 
provided with centrally located rubbish bins, but these were still being 
dumped in the bush. 
The main problems with rubbish disposal throughout Porgera, and 
not just in the relocation areas, were 
.. people not perceiving rubbish to be a problem 
.. the local government council's inability or lack of will to enforce 
council rules pertaining to rubbish disposal 
.. the new clustered settlement pattern which made rubbish more 
visible; and 
.. increased affluence which produced more rubbish than in the past. 
Some people were using rubbish pits which they had dug themselves, 
but most threw their rubbish in the bush or in creeks, and most of this 
rubbish, unlike that of the past, was not biodegradable. Only two 
people interviewed during my relocation survey (one man in Apalaka 
and one woman in Yarik) perceived rubbish in the community as a 
problem, and both suggested that the PJV arrange for rubbish collection. 
Toilets 
The relocation house came with a pit toilet built on a cement slab, 
enclosed by a moveable steel shed. In the first 49 houses, the shed was 
not moveable, but the design was subsequently changed. Pits were 
shallow in construction due to the high water table. The actual hole in 
the cement slab was quite small, and while this ensured that children 
did not drop in, it did make hygiene a bit difficult. Toilets did not 
come with a lid for the hole, but many people constructed lids as 
recommended during the relocation settling-in programme. 
The theory behind the relocatable slab and shed was that when the 
pit was full, the owner would then dig a new pit and move the slab 
and shed. The results of my survey, as shown in Table 4.6, indicate that 
this was not happening. Out of the 96 households in the survey, 37 
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Table 4.6 Toilet facilities of relocation hOLlses 
Location New pit Old pit Dug out Blocked Flush None Total 
Kulapi 4 1 14 4 0 24 
Anawe 8 5 0 0 15 
Suyan 3 4 0 3 0 11 
Apalaka 7 2 3 2 0 15 
Yarik 9 4 7 0 0 21 
Olonga 6 2 0 0 10 
Total 37 18 25 11 4 96 
Source: Relocation survey data. 
(38.5 per cent) were actually using a new pit; 18 were still using the 
old pit in its original formp 25 were using a 'dug out' version of the 
old pit, in which the owner had dug a hole beneath the latrine and 
poured water in to flush out the pit;14 and 11 were no longer able to 
use the old pit because it was blocked, but the owners were not 
interested in constructing a new one (Table 4.6). In one case, the owner 
had installed a septic flush toilet in the house. In four cases, there were 
simply no toilet facilities at all. One person reported to me that he got 
rid of his toilet because his neighbours' children were using it and 
soiling the area. 
Firewood availability 
As a result of the influx of outsiders into Porgera, and the new 
clustered settlement patterns, there were very obvious areas of 
deforestation in the Porgera Valley. This had led to a shortage of 
firewood and building materials. As indicated in Table 4.7, many 
people in the main relocation areas were beginning to feel the 
effects of the shortage of firewood in 1993. This was obvious in the 
houses which used to have a lot of firewood stored underneath. 
Four years previously, when I began the relocation work, the stoves 
were in constant use, but during this later survey, I found that most 
of the stoves were cold, suggesting a marked decline in the 
frequency of use. People were now buying firewood at Kulapi 
(Waile Creek road area), Paiam, Kairik, Tipinini, and as far away as 
Tumudan and Mulitaka. While this would have provided some 
additional income for the people in those areas, it was tough on 
those people who had to buy firewood but did not have an income 
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earner in the family. One woman actually said the relocation houses 
were cold.ls 
Electricity 
Jackson (1987) reported that electricity was an anticipated benefit of 
mine development, and indeed the provision of electricity to relocation 
areas was a major consideration in the negotiations for both the 
Relocation Agreement and the Porgera Development Forum agreement 
between the landowners and the national government.16 At the time of 
my survey, the national Electricity Commission was only just starting to 
connect relocation houses to electricity generated from the Hides gas 
plant. Houses in Kulapi had not yet been connected, but 26 of the 46 
houses visited in Yarik, Olonga, Tunorope and Apalaka had beenP 
Prior to electricity connection, landowners protested-at times 
violently-that they wanted the connection and electricity supply to 
be free. However, once connection was underway and the first 
electricity bills were received, this became rather a dead issue. The 
initial connection fee was K80, which included a K20 deposit. If only 
lights were being used, the cost was about K5 per month. The accounts 
shown to me during the survey were as follows: K19.40 for 74 days; 
K12.7S for 90 days; Kl1.68 for 81 days; KI2.72 for 90 days; K14.08 for 
90 days; and KSS for 90 days (but this last house had security lights, a 
TV-video, and connection to a chicken project). Kerosene cost between 
SOt and Kl per bottle, and the women said that they were using one or 
two bottles a night for lamps, which would have meant a monthly 
expenditure of KlS-30. The advantages of electricity were obvious to 
all. Besides the cost factor, other reasons people gave for liking 
Table 4.7 Availability of firewood in relocation houses 
Location Enough Short supply Must buy Total 
Kulapi 12 11 1 24 
Anawe 2 3 10 15 
Suyan 11 0 0 11 
Apalaka 4 9 2 15 
Yarik 4 16 21 
Olonga 0 9 10 
Total 30 28 38 96 
Source: Relocation survey data. 
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electricity were its cleanliness and the convenience of having light at 
night whenever they felt like it. On the other hand, a few people still 
expressed concern about finding the money to pay their electricity 
account. The first overdue account notices were about to be issued, 
and if there were many defaulters, there would probably have been a 
resurgence in the demand for the PJV to foot the bills. 
Electricity could mean a quantum leap in consumerism. As 
electricity had only recently been connected, and only to Apalaka and 
Yarik, the results of the survey were rather inconclusive on this score. 
Many women appeared happy just to have electric lights. Some 
expressed interest in purchasing washing machines and electric 
cookers, and this would be related to the lack of firewood in the area. 
Problems and concerns 
The problems and concerns listed below, in order of stated frequency, 
were those of the women interviewed during the survey. The numbers 
do not add up to 96 because women often had more than one concern. 
It is also interesting to note that many of the women who listed tank 
water as one of the primary benefits of living in the relocation house 
also listed lack of water as their main concern. 
Concerned about food gardens 
No work or no money 
Concerned about water 
Want electricity 
Lack of firewood 
Concerned about children's future 
(in housing or employment) 
Just worried about the future 









Concerned about outsiders stealing 5 
Concerned about drinking and gambling 4 
Other concerns mentioned by three or less women included 
It is hard living in Yarik 
How do we fix things if our husbands have left us? 
It is too crowded 
Miss the old house (life?) 
Water used to taste better (than tank water) 
The clinic fees are too high 
Worried about new sicknesses (AIDS). 
One of the problems that came out strongly in the survey was the 
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conflict between parents and children. Older children were putting 
pressure on their parents by bringing their spouses to live with them 
in the relocation houses. The children wanted their own relocation 
houses, and were accusing their parents of selling them short when 
they entered into the relocation agreement. Many women said that 
their big worry was, 'Where are our children going to live?' This was 
expressed as part of their concern for the children's future in the 
survey form, as well as in informal meetings with groups of women in 
the relocation areas. Some women were very concerned that their sons 
were idle, and all they did all day long was drink and play cards. The 
problem of idle, unemployed youth, who felt they had been left out of 
all the benefits of compensation and relocation that their parents 
received, was considered by some to be near the explosive pOint. Some 
people I spoke to thought it was quite possible that in the near future 
some relocation houses in Kulapi and Mungalep would be destroyed 
by angry children. 
Many women in Kulapi were very concerned and anxious about 
the future. They were concerned about how long the mine was going 
to operate, was the PJV going to stay or go, would they ever be able to 
go back to their land. It was suggested by one prominent Porgeran 
landowner that this concern was related to the 'fly-in/ fly-out' issue. 
He said that, because the company was not bringing the families of 
employees to live in Porgera, people were worried that the mine wasn't 
going to last a long time. Another explanation of this anxiety could be 
related to the 'end of the world' beliefs that crop up from time to time 
in Ipili culture. Perhaps the most logical explanation is that, because 
the women's expectations were not met, they were merely wondering 
'What next?' It should be pointed out that not everyone was in a state 
of anxiety. Residents of 12 houses in the survey said they had no 
problems and were happy with their new lives. 
The dilemma of the relocation house 
It could be said that the relocation programme was too successful. The 
objective of the relocation programme was to move landowners from 
the area of proposed mining activities, and to provide these 
landowners with an improved house as part of the total compensation 
package. The result was that the relocation houses provided a 
dramatic improvement in the standard of living for a large number of 
people. The improved standard of living for owners of relocation 
houses then created new problems. People who did not get relocation 
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houses were jealous of those who did. Children of parents who had 
relocation houses were demanding that they too be provided with 
relocation houses. The relocation houses locked people who were 
previously more mobile into their new places of residence. The newly 
created relocation villages, with increasing population density due to 
high birth rates and the immigration of relatives, were facing problems 
of environmental degradation and a shortage of gardening land to 
meet the needs of the inhabitants. 
Relocated marriages 
A separate marriage survey was conducted in the relocation areas to 
shed further light on the problems which had been a central concern 
of the Porgera Women's Association since it was founded in mid 1989. 
The main complaint was that Porgeran men had been using 
compensation money to 'buy' new wives, most of whom were 
'outsiders', and then deserting their Porgeran wives and children (see 
Chapter 2).18 The sample for this survey was the first 100 relocated 
married men-approximately 25 per cent of the relocated men with 
extant marriages. Informants were asked 
1. How many wives did this man have before relocation (which 
roughly equates to the time when the large compensation 
payments were made)? and 
2. How many wives did this man marry after relocation? 
Notes were made as to the place of origin of each wife, deaths, 
divorces and wives who left their husbands. 
Increase in polygyny 
Meggitt reported a 30 per cent polygyny rate for Porgera in 1957, 
based on a sample of 41 men, while Kyakas and Wiessner (1992:153) 
have more recently estimated a 20-25 per cent polygyny rate for 
Enga Province as a whole. Glenn Banks reported a figure of 8 per 
cent for Porgera in his own 1993 survey (see Chapter 3), but this 
figure cannot be related to the others as it relates to households 
rather than marriages. 
The results of my own survey (Table 4.8) indicate a dramatic 
increase in polygyny from 19 per cent before relocation to 43 per cent 
by mid 1993. Between 1989 and 1993, a further 7 per cent of men in the 
sample had at some time been married to more than one wife, but 
were now in monogamous marriages because they had divorced one 
or more of the previous wives, or because one or more of the wives 
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had left the marriage (meri i ranawe). This meant that, at some time 
between 1989 and 1993, 50 per cent of the men in the sample had been 
practising polygamy! 
The 100 men in the sample had a total of 135 wives prior to 
relocation, and acquired 75 new wives between 1989 and mid 1993, 
making a total of 210 wives. This meant that the average number of 
wives had increased from 1.35 to 2.1 over that period. It is probable 
that this polygyny rate would decrease again, as there was an increase 
in the failure rate of the marriages contracted after relocation. Of the 
135 marriages contracted prior to relocation, 15 (11 per cent) had 
already failed, with 13 wives divorced and two who ran away. Of the 
75 marriages contracted after relocation, 15 (20 per cent) had already 
failed, with five wives divorced and ten who ran away. Nine of the 
post-relocation wives who left their husbands were non-Porgerans. 
One practical reason for 'traditional' polygyny was the high male 
death rate due to warfare. The economic basis of polygyny was the 
need to cultivate more sweet potatoes to increase the number of pigs 
in the household herd. More wives meant that more sweet potato 
could be cultivated to feed more pigs, and pigs were the essential 
means for men to increase their personal wealth and prestige. But 
even in the past, the failure rate of polygynous marriages was high 
because of conflicts which stemmed from the opposing interests of 
men and women. 
For a man, marrying more than one wife was one of the roads to 
success ... For a woman, having a co-wife meant sharing her husband 
with another woman, sharing the family's garden land and sharing 
the family's pigs to be given away in exchange between her relatives 
and those of her co-wife. The road to success for men thus divided the 
Table 4.8 Types of marriage before and after relocation (per cent) 
Type of marriage Before After 
Monogamy 76 41 
Polygyny 19 43 
Serial monogamy 5 8 
Polygyny to monogamy a 0 7 
Now single 0 
Note: a These were men who had previously had more than one wife at the one time, 
but who now only had one wife. 
Source: Marriage survey data. 
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possessions and territory of women. Only wealthy leaders, skilled in 
handling social and personal relations were able to manage lasting 
polygynous marriages (Kyakas and Wiessner 1992:154). 
The modem forces of money and education have distorted the 
practice of polygyny in ways which have had a further adverse impact 
on women and the family. Cash provides the means to literally buy 
wives. Men now marry for sexual purposes rather than the more 
economic purposes of the past. In Porgera, men could formerly only 
acquire additional wives if the first wife agreed or if she failed to have 
children. On the other hand, there was now very strong evidence that 
men were using the village courts (an introduced institution) to 
rewrite custom in their favour. This was made possible because 
women had no traditional voice in the public arena. 
Today, throughout the highlands, cash is being used for brideprice 
payments, either directly or indirectly (when it is used to buy tradit-ional 
wealth). When cash only is used for marriage, Porgeran women classify 
that as an inferior marriage and say contemptuously: 'em i-bairn long rnoni 
tasol' ('he bought them with money only'). As women gained increasing 
freedom to marry the man of their choice, one may well ask why they 
agreed to marry a man who already had a wife or wives. The women 
may either have truly desired the man or merely wanted a rich husband 
with the idea that they would oust the previous wife or wives. The 
Western colloquialism 'gold digger' has been particularly apt in Porgera. 
Women, although often victims, are not without power. A strong 
first wife can influence a husband to leave his second wife. For 
example, one woman I knew left her husband after he took a second 
wife. She took the children and moved in with relatives until (she said) 
he came to his senses. The new wife was felt to be no threat as she was 
'lazy and only after money'. In this case, the first wife won. However, 
the more common result in Porgera has been the abandonment of the 
first wife (and her children) and/ or increased domestic violence. Porg-
eran women also said that, when a husband wanted to take a new 
wife and get rid of the old one, he would beat her so that she would 
leave and return to her relatives. According to custom, if the wife 
leaves, the husband does not have to refund the brideprice. 
Although Porgeran women were very vocal in their condemnation 
of polygyny, in principle they were not totally opposed to it (in spite of 
their professed Christian values) if the husband followed custom and 
looked after all his wives and children. However, I only met two women 
in polygynous marriages in Porgera who indicated they were happy 
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with their situation. Both these women were first wives who main-
tained their prestige and were in charge of the subsequent wives. I do 
not know what the co-wives thought of the situation. 
The relocation house added further stress to the polygynous family. 
Often, there was a dispute as to which wife should occupy the 
relocation house. If more than one wife occupied the house, this 
frequently led to disputes between co-wives. This unhappy situation 
was common. In 1989, I tried unsuccessfully to convince a badly 
beaten woman to come with me to the hospital. She refused, as she 
said that, if she left her new relocation house, her husband would 
move in his new wife. She still had the house in 1993, but her husband 
was living elsewhere with his other wives. 
Many women in Porgera (indeed throughout the highlands) have 
been suffering the effects of an increase in, and distortion of, the 
practice of polygyny. I support their viewpoint that this practice has 
no place in modem Papua New Guinea. Polygyny is as socially 
repugnant as other local 'customs' such as cannibalism, infanticide, 
domestic violence and tribal fighting for example. It is in violation of 
Christian beliefs, the National Constitution and the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights. Cynics will rightly point out that 
legislation has not diminished tribal fighting or domestic violence, and 
that the Christian churches have had little effect on polygyny, 
especially in the highlands.19 Laws of this country are made by men, 
many of whom do, or would like to, practice polygyny themselves-
especially the members from the five Highland provinces. Although it 
is not possible to legislate morality, nevertheless the problem still 
needs to be dealt with. 
Increase in marriage to outsiders 
Table 4.9 shows the extent of the increase in marriages to 'outsiders'. 
This table compares the place of origin of the wives whom the 100 
surveyed men had married before the start of the relocation 
programme in 1989, with the place of origin of the wives whom they 
married after it had started. The results show that 64.5 per cent of the 
wives acquired after relocation (that is after receiving large 
compensation payments) were non-Porgerans, and 64 per cent of the 
wives were from non-Ipili speaking areas. The greatest increase was 
for wives from the Tari District of the Southern Highlands. As 
previously mentioned, there had been a high failure rate for the recent 
marriages to outsiders. 
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Table 4.9 Wives' place of origin before and after relocation (per cent) 
Place of origin Before After All wives 
Porgera 79 (58.5) 19 (25.3) 98 (46.7) 
Paiela 25 (18.5) 8 (10.7) 33 (15.7) 
Laiagam 14 (10.4) 13 (17.3) 27 (12.9) 
Tari 8 (5.9) 22 (29.4) 30 (14.3) 
Wabag 4 (3.0) 2 (2.7) 6 (2.8) 
Kandep 3 (2.2) 7 (9.3) 10 (4.8) 
Chimbu 2 (1.5) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.9) 
Hagen 0 (0.0) 3 (4.0) 3 (4.1) 
Kopiago 0 (0.0) 1 (1.3) 1 (0.5) 
Total 135 (100.0) 75 (100.0) 210 (100.0) 
Source: Marriage survey data. 
While most Ipili marry other Ipili, it was also traditionally common 
for Ipili men or women to marry outsiders--especially their Huli or 
Engan neighbours. This was to increase their population for defence 
purposes, to help with customary obligations, and to increase the 
potential for survival in a harsh environment. With the sudden influx 
of cash, the Ipili became more attractive as marriage partners, while 
their customary practice became dysfunctional. Because Porgera was 
now an attractive place to outsiders, family members of the non-
Porgeran spouse would take advantage of the marriage ties and move 
in. This led to chain migration which compounded the outsider 
problem. Taken to the extreme, this could cause the Ipili culture to be 
extinguished through marriage. 
Impact of marital breakdown 
When marriages broke down, the two most common consequences were 
either divorce or abandoned wives and children. Other consequences 
were murder, suicide, or the wife abandoning husband and children. 
During the period of this study, divorce in customary marriages 
was normally conducted through the village courts. Women claimed 
that the village courts were making it too easy for men to divorce. 
There was no mediation. This situation usually occurred when a man 
wished to take a new wife. The most serious allegation had to do with 
the repayment of brideprice. Village courts were making orders for 
women to repay the brideprice to their husbands in the event of 
divorce (1 saw several such court orders). Failure to repay meant jail 
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for the woman. This was certainly not custom. Women did not pay 
their brideprices in the first instance.2° This was an example of men 
using the village court system to rewrite custom. 
While men were finding it fairly easy to obtain a divorce in the 
village court, women were not. As women had no say in the courts, 
when a husband took a subsequent wife, they were forced to stay in 
polygynous marriages against their will and their religious beliefs. 
There had been cases of women being forced to stay in violent 
marriages. In one marriage, the wife either committed suicide or was 
murdered, which led to a tribal fight. She had repeatedly gone to the 
village court to try to end this marriage. There are methods of appeal 
under the Village Courts Act against decisions which do not follow 
custom, or where the aggrieved party was not permitted to present his 
or her case. Many women were still ignorant of the grounds for 
appeal. Even if appeals were lodged, the appeal system did not seem 
to work. 
A second consequence of marriage breakdown was abandoned 
wives and children. The marriage survey, unfortunately, did not 
obtain figures on the number of wives who were still married by 
custom, but who were no longer being looked after by their husbands. 
This problem had been a concern of the Porgera Women's Association. 
The PJV's Welfare Officer confirmed that he spent most of his time 
dealing with complaints from women who stated that they had been 
abandoned by their husbands. These complaints were not only from 
Porgeran women, but also from the wives of PJV employees who did 
not see their husbands on their rostered days off work or receive 
money from their paychecks. 
Notes 
1 The terms of reference were based on the suggestions made by Dave 
Moorhouse, then on Placer's Porgera staff, in consultation with other 
individuals with extensive local knowledge-Polly Wiessner, Frank 
Faulkner, Phil Gibbs, Kurubu Ipara and Graham Hogg. 
2 The mutually acceptable decision to relocate the residents of Alipis had 
been reached by the time that Robinson's final report was submitted. 
3 The LNC is not to be confused with the Porgera Landowner's 
Association which, though formed in 1986, was suffering from 
credibility problems (see Chapter 2). 
4 Frank Faulkner was the Senior Liaison Officer employed by what 
was then the Department of Minerals and Energy (later Mining 
and Petroleum). 
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5 The K1,000 disruption allowance was determined at a rate which 
would furnish a house using furniture made at Wanepop 
Vocational Centre in the Lagaip District of Enga. Only two houses 
were furnished before Wanepop was burned down. 
6 This is not to be confused with clause 18.1 of the agreement 
between the National Government and the Porgeran Landowners 
which states: 'The Porgera Joint Venture is to be directed to make 
all necessary arrangements to ensure supply of electricity to 
individual houses-(a) in existing relocation cluster settlements 
with 12 months of the execution of this Agreement, [and] (b) in all 
similar future settlements necessitated by the issues of any mining 
tenements at the time of the construction of those settlements.' It is 
my understanding that the National Government did not in fact 
direct the PJV to do this, but it did become an issue, especially in 
Mungalep, Suyan and Kairik. 
7 Garden contracts were issued by the PJY. Relocating families were 
encouraged to make gardens to replace the ones on land required 
for mine development. Payment for garden contracts was in three 
instalments; after garden cleared and fenced, when garden was 
prepared for planting, and when the planting was completed. In 
anticipation of a Relocation Agreement, 17 garden contracts had 
already been let by February 1988. 
8 One problem noted during the first visit to the new houses was the 
lack of an outside water tap. Women complained it was too hard to 
wash clothes and all their small children inside the house. The 
outside tap became the feminist issue in the relocation programme. 
After 120 houses had been built, the outside tap was finally 
incorporated into the house design for all subsequent relocation 
houses, though it took several months before the original 120 
houses had outside taps installed. 
9 A number of specific maintenance problems were noted during the 
relocation survey and discussed with PJV's Community Affairs 
staff so that they could take remedial action. 
10 In 1993, the PJV was favouring two methods of dealing with water 
supply problems. Where there was an available clean source, a 
gravity feed system with a free-flowing outlet would be installed. 
This method was in the process of being piloted at Kulapi at the 
time of this research. Where this first option was not feasible, the 
alternative was the installation of rainwater tanks connected to 
public buildings with good catchment areas, such as churches, 
schools or community centres. Tanks had already been installed in 
many areas of Porgera, as well as other areas outside of Porgera 
covered by the PJV's community relations programme. 
11 Most Alipis residents relocated to Yarik. 
12 The women of Kulapi, without exception, still listed the lack of 
good gardening land as their biggest concern in 1993. Those of the 
Pulumaini clan were especia11y aggrieved by their perception that 
the Tieni clan had gained an unreasonable advantage by moving to 
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Alipis to be near the company, and then being moved back to Yarik 
and given relocation houses near their existing food gardens. 
13 This is what they told me, though it is hard to believe that they 
were not yet full after four years of use. This remains a mystery 
that I did not investigate! 
14 This expedient, which was only feasible on hilly sites, could be 
regarded as a serious health hazard in high density living areas, 
because the effluent simply drained down the hillside. 
15 Staff in the PJV's Community Affairs and Environment 
departments had long been aware of the problem, and had started 
programmes to produce seedlings for distribution and for youth 
reforestation projects in the SML. It was reasonable to assume that 
many people would become increasingly dependent on purchasing 
firewood for some or most of their needs. 
16 Many residents of Alipis village had free electricity provided by the 
company before the relocation programme started. 
17 Elcom staff did provide some education during connection, but this 
appears to have been patchy, and the leaflets that were distributed 
were in English. 
18 Many Porgeran men received large amounts of money from the 
Mount Kare gold rush, as well as compensation money from the 
PJv. However, it was generally felt that gold rush money was spent 
on loose women, while compensation money was used to buy new 
wives. This fits with the notion that Kare money was not 'real' 
money (Davis Film & Video 1990). 
19 A significant number of Porgeran pastors and other church leaders 
had entered into polygynous marriages since 1988. 
20 According to Chris Ballard (pers. comm.), this trend was also 
evident in the Tari area, where men were divorcing their wives and 
obtaining a refund on the brideprice to finance a new wife. 
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Gardens and wantoks 
Glerm Banks 
This chapter is designed to illuminate the significance of the 
subsistence sector in the local economy during the development of the 
Porgera mine. I begin by detailing the physical environment at 
Porgera which acts as the ultimate constraint on the productivity of 
the subsistence system. The Porgeran gardening system prior to the 
start of mine construction is then described, and the effect of the mine 
development on the gardening system is investigated, firstly in 
general terms and then focus sing on two areas within the Special 
Mining Lease (SML) where the agricultural system is under stress. 
The basic demographic and economic information on the 
'outsiders' (epa atene-'come stay') from the surveys carried out in late 
1992 and mid 1993 as part of the Economic Modelling Project within 
the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme is then presented. The epa 
atene make up a significant proportion of the population, and play a 
key role in the dynamics of the local economy. Finally, I draw together 
the material on the subsistence sector and the epa atene, placing both of 
them in the context of the total Porgeran economy at that point in 
time. 
The results of a number of separate investigations are described in 
this chapter, drawing on primary and secondary sources. A review of 
the literature on local gardening systems forms a basis from which the 
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effects of the mine can be discussed. Most of the substantive work was 
commissioned by the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) prior to mine 
development, though some information also exists in patrol reports 
and in other studies by anthropologists and agriculturalists. 
A central part of our own investigations was a survey which 
questioned people as to the food they had eaten in the previous 24 
hours. For convenience, it is referred to as the' diet survey', although I 
stress that it was not a full dietary or nutritional survey. The aim was 
to investigate the contribution of the subsistence component of the 
economy or, put another way, the extent to which the population was 
still dependent on food from their gardens. In total, 350 interviews 
were completed by the team, each lasting between 10 and 15 minutes.1 
Three areas within the SML (Apalaka, Yarik, Kulapi) and five outside 
the SML (Mungalep, Anawe, Paiam, Porgera Station, Tipinini) were 
visited. This represents a cross-section of the communities within the 
Porgera Valley. The survey was carried out from Wednesday to 
Saturday in a week in June which was a government (but not a PJV) 
pay week. 
My previous comments on the accuracy of data from such surveys 
(see Chapter 3) apply to this one as well, although the very immediate 
and non-sensitive nature of the questions being asked should provide 
information that is more reliable than the average. There were no 
independent means by which to confirm the information given, 
though casual observation of cases of tinned fish and large bags of rice 
being carried by people in all parts of the valley confirmed their 
popularity. No information was collected on the amount of each food 
type consumed-the survey asked only whether or not the respondent 
had eaten various types of food in the previous 24 hours. Ultimately, 
this must limit the conclusions which can be drawn from the data, but 
the survey still provides a useful indication of consumption patterns 
across certain groups. 
During the first week of fieldwork at Porgera we encountered 
community concern within the relocation areas over the pressure on 
gardening land. This concern was acknowledged as genuine by PJV 
Community Affairs staff, and the impact of future dumping in the 
Anjolek was seen as worsening this problem. As a result, the second 
week of fieldwork was directed towards a study of the availability and 
suitability of gardening land within the SML. Kulapi and Apalaka 
were the two areas investigated in detail. Twenty-two households in 
Apalaka and 18 in Kulapi were surveyed as to the extent of their 
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garden holdings. The households chosen were simply those whose 
heads happened to be around on the three days we visited each 
settlement. The investigations involved interviewing the head of 
household as to the make-up of the household, the numbers of its pigs, 
access to land in other parts of the valley, and the number of gardens 
held, and then visiting the gardens with the interviewee. Wherever 
possible, all the gardens belonging to these households were visited, 
though some respondents did not want to visit their more distant 
gardens. At each garden we visited, the size, shape and intensity of 
cultivation were measured. Air photo analysis was used to compare 
the extent of gardens in 1971 (for Apalaka) and 1986 with the situation 
in December 1991, and contour maps provided a means of assessing 
the average slope angle for the various gardening areas. 
The subsistence sector in the economy 
The subsistence sector at Porgera has been described in a number of 
studies. However, these papers and reports all pre-date the mine, and 
no available information documents the changes in the subsistence 
system since the start of mine construction in 1989. From the earliest 
European contact, Porgera's subsistence agriculture has been viewed 
as less productive than that practised in other parts of the highlands. 
The early patrols from Wabag to Porgera in the late 1940s described 
the gardens of Tipinini and Porgera as being poor compared to the rest 
of Enga. Patrol reports noted the 'blue shale' rocks from which the 
'poor' soils derive, and also the lack of surplus food available for 
exchange with the patrols. In the first ethnographic study of the Ipili, 
Meggitt (1957) also noted the blue shale soils of the Upper Porgera, 
with better, blacker soils downstream-though neither type was 
regarded as particularly fertile. 
In spite of its low productivity, subsistence agriculture was still the 
most important element in the Porgeran economy prior to the start of 
the mine, its output being valued at an estimated K3 million in 1987 
(Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:41,45). In 1993, it remained a key 
element of the economy, even in those communities most affected by 
the mine and the consequent influx of cash. 
The physical environment 
The physical environment exercises a basic constraint on Porgeran 
agriculture. Soil fertility, slope angles, altitude and climate all act to 
inhibit the productivity of the gardening system. Recent changes, such 
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as the massive in-migration and the loss of gardening land to the mine 
operation, have exaggerated the effect of these environmental factors. 
Generally speaking, soil fertility is lower at Porgera than in valleys 
to the east, although soils exhibit extreme variability in fertility within 
small areas. The greatest fertility occurs on the flatter ridges and in 
pockets on steeper slopes (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:29). Soils in the 
area are derived from sedimentary and colluvial material, and lack the 
depths of volcanic ash which appear in profiles to the east. Goldsmith 
and Mules (1990), in their geomorphic mapping of the Porgera area, 
distinguished between the colluvial bench land terrain (derived from 
the steep limestone terrain behind), which covers much of the lower 
portions of the valley, and the mudstone ridge and V-valley terrain of 
the Kaiya River area. These differences are significant for the Apalaka 
and Kulapi examples discussed below. For the moment though, this 
distinction highlights general variations in soil types, with the 
colluvial material tending to have relatively deep, peaty / clayey soils, 
and poor drainage. This compares with the generally shallower, 
better-drained soils which developed from the mudstone shales 
(Mules 1993). 
The Porgeran climate is characterised as lower montane perhumid 
(McAlpine and Keig 1983, cited in NSR 1988). The meteorological data 
recorded at the Alipis mine site since 1974 shows average annual 
rainfall to be 3,678 mm per year. Data for 1991, from three other 
stations within a 10 km radius, reveal the marked influence of local 
topography and orographic effects on rainfall magnitude and intensity 
(PJV 1993:6). Although there is little seasonality in rainfall, the 
monthly totals can vary significantly, with the highest and lowest 
monthly totals recorded being 909 mm and 84 mm respectively. There 
are relatively few rainless periods of more than four days and 
droughts are rare. The absence of a distinctive drier season limits the 
occurrence of frosts relative to other parts of the highlands.2 Linked to 
the high rainfall is regular extensive cloud cover, particularly in the 
higher altitudes. The mean daily temperature range for the Alipis 
mine site is 11-220 celsius, with little variation through the year. There 
is an average of 3.9 hours of sunshine per day, also with little annual 
variation. Wind speeds in the Porgera Valley are generally low. 
The Porgera Valley has an altitudinal range from around 1,800 m 
(at the Kaiya River) to 3,500 m. According to Hughes and Sullivan 
(1988:5) the lower temperatures at higher altitudes limit the number of 
food crops that can be grown, as well as their yields. They compared 
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the altitudinallimits of sweet potato gardens elsewhere in the 
highlands (productive to 2,700 m, with an absolute limit of 2850 m) 
with their observation that the upper limit of gardening averaged 
2,400 m at Porgera. On this basis, they proposed that there was 
... a strip of forested land about 60 km2 in area and up to 3 km wide 
around the rim of the valley which may be capable of being cultivated, 
depending on factors such as soil fertility, but which is at present not 
utilised for that purpose. This area represents about 25 per cent of the 
potentially cultivable land in the valley. 
This observation was used as the basis for statements in the Porgera 
Environmental Plan (NSR 1988) to the effect that expansion of 
agriculture above the existing altitudinallimits up to 2,700 m was one 
way to ease the increasing stress that would be placed on the 
agricultural system. 
While the altitude/temperature relationship generally holds true, 
the relationship in any given location is also significantly affected by 
factors such as topography, aspect, rainfall and cloudiness. More 
specifically, at Porgera it is likely that the greater cloudiness and 
rainfall, compared to most other parts of the highlands, will 
significantly reduce the altitudinallimits of crops (and their yields) 
below the maximum levels recorded elsewhere. Significant expansions 
of productive gardens above 2,400 m may well not be feasible. During 
fieldwork in November 1992, it was noted that the highest house and 
garden on the Waile Creek road was at 2,650 m. However, this is not 
conclusive evidence that widespread expansion of gardens to this 
altitude is generally possible, since the garden there was very recent, 
and it is not clear how productive such gardens are in the Porgeran 
context. 
The topography of the upper Porgera area necessitates that gardens 
are often constructed on slopes that would be considered steep 
elsewhere in the highlands. Allen (1982:98) and Scott and Pain 
(1982:137) both report findings from elsewhere in Enga where slopes 
over 35° are considered unsuitable for cultivation and are only used 
for hunting and pig foraging. The average slope of the gardens 
measured at Apalaka was 27°, and a quarter were 35° or over. Meggitt 
(1957:36) described Porgeran gardens as being on steep slopes, 
although his observation that 'few gardens are less than 40° to 50° 
from the horizontal, most are 50° to 60°, and a few are from 70° to 75°' 
is clearly an exaggeration. According to Bourke and Lea (1982:82), all 
the evidence shows that yields are greatest on slopes of 10° or less. 
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Slope angle acts as a constraint on the productivity of an agricultural 
system in several ways. Most obviously, the long-term productivity of 
the garden is reduced through the increased soil erosion which is 
likely to occur on slopes over 15° (AlIen 1982:103-4). Gardening on 
steep slopes also probably requires greater energy inputs from 
gardeners than the equivalent garden on the flat. 
The gardening system 
As with the rest of Enga, the Porgeran subsistence agricultural system 
(as it existed before the development of the mine) is based on the 
sweet potato, which is universally grown in mounded gardens. A 
range of other crops-primarily pitpit, sugarcane, 'true' (indigenous) 
taro, corn, beans, cabbage, several species of greens and potatoes-are 
generally pfanted between, or on the periphery of, these sweet potato 
mounds. 
Three main types of garden are generally distinguished (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[1]:26-7). 
.. First, there are the initial mixed gardens which are 
established after clearing of primary forest or secondary 
growth. A wide range of food and fibre plants are grown, 
though few if any sweet potato mounds are present. 
.. Mounded sweet potato gardens are generally established 
during the second cultivation of a mixed garden. The range 
of secondary crops is reduced as the area given over to sweet 
potato mounds increases (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:28). 
.. The final type of garden is a house (or kitchen) garden 
surrounding the house, usually planted with vegetables 
(beans and cabbages are common) and sugarcane. 
As in the rest of Enga (see Waddell1972:42-49), two main types of 
sweet potato mounds are found at Porgera-composted (mondo) 
and uncomposted (yukusi). Composted mounds are formed by 
placing compost between existing mounds, allowing it to 
decompose, and then covering it with soil (Bourke and Lea 
1982:80-1). Composted mounds at Porgera are up to 2 m in 
diameter and one metre high. Uncomposted mounds are found on 
steeper slopes, and are generally thought to be either an initial 
stage prior to the establishment of a mondo garden, or a simple 
rotational fallow with one or two successive plantings followed by 
lengthy fallows (Bourke and Lea 1982:81). These uncomposted 
mounds are smaller, often little more than 75 cm in diameter and 
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20 cm in height, and are 'usually associated with soils deriving from 
sedimentary bedrock' (Wohlt 1986:8). 
Data collected by Wohlt (1986) showed the average Porgeran 
composted mound to be 1.46 m in diameter, significantly less than the 
average for Enga of 2.7 m, resulting in a smaller area per mound (1.7 m 2 
compared to 5.7 m 2). Mounds were also lower in height in Porgera 
(61 cm compared to 75 cm), were more tightly grouped (2.29 m average 
spacing between mounds compared to 3.39 m for Enga), resulting in a 
higher mound density per hectare (1,901 compared to 866). They tended 
to have fewer vines planted per mound (28.1 compared to 48.7), but had 
higher planting densities per square metre of mound (16.8 compared to 
8.5), and consequently a higher planting density of vines per hectare 
(53,443 compared to 42,291). Wohlt comments that 
[tJhe Porgera figures make sense if the low proportion of garden in 
mounds implies poor soils or thin topsoils ... and the high numbers of 
vines per square metre on the mound is an attempt to maximise the 
use of the soil thus concentrated. 
Pandanus (Pandanus jiulianetti), the nuts of which are highly prized as 
food, are common within these sweet potato gardens, and are 
managed by a form of silviculture (Pacific Agribusiness 1987[1]:26). 
Plantings of yar trees (Casuarina oligodon) for timber generally occur 
within or on the fringe of the gardens, and these trees also have 
nitrogen fixing properties (Bourke and Lea 1982:80). 
After three or four years with composted sweet potato mounds, the 
land is left to fallow.3 Tall sword grass (Miscanthus fioriudus), shrubs 
and trees dominate the fallow regrowth (Hughes and Sullivan 1988:9). 
The length of fallow is dependent on soil fertility and population 
pressure. Historically, Meggitt (1957) described the fallows as 'inter-
generational', while the Social and Economic Impact Study (SEIS) 
describes fallows as being' generally within the five to ten year range' 
at Porgera (Pacific Agribusiness 1987:29). A systematic survey of PNG 
agricultural systems has recently estimated the Porgera fallows to last 
longer than 15 years (Allen et al. 1995). 
As in other parts of Enga, pigs are an integral part of the 
agricultural system (Bourke and Lea 1982:85). Wohlt (1986) shows that 
Porgera had the lowest ratio of pigs per person (0.61:1) in Enga 
Province. The gardens in use in 1993 were fenced to exclude pigs, but 
it is likely that pigs till and manure old gardens, as they do in the rest 
of Enga. They generally forage in forests and around houses during 
the day and are fed on inferior garden produce. 
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The garden surveys carried out by Jackson (1987) covered 43 
households in the Porgera area and provided detailed information on 
the gardening system. Table 5.1 shows the approximate crop 
intensities which Jackson derived from the survey. He noted that the 
figures are inclusive, in the sense that all the crops were found 
together. Various other minor crops were also found, including pitpit, 
corn, pumpkin, greens and some crops, such as 'grass skirt' and 'rope' 
plants, which are normally 'bush' plants but are occasionally 
cultivated. There were variations in the figures for different 
communities-Suyan, for example, was found to have 60 per cent 
more crops per cultivated hectare than the average, compensating 
perhaps for that community's lower garden area per household. The 
ratio between sweet potato and taro also varied considerably, from 9:1 
and 8:1 for Anawe and Alipis respectively down to 2:1 for Mungalep, 
and Jackson thought that there might be a link between recent in-
migration and the predominance of sweet potato. 
Various estimates have been made of the amount of gardening 
land available per household. The Porgeran agricultural system has 
generally been described as a low intensity system prior to the 
development of the mine, with a refined population density4 of 
about 22 persons per square kilometre (Lea and Gray 1984, cited in 
Hughes and Sullivan 1988:4). This indicates that population pressure 
on land was low, and the agricultural system was sustainable. 
Meggitt (1957) noted that Porgeran gardens were larger than those in 
other parts of Enga, averaging between 0.3 and 0.4 hectares in area. 
Bourke and Lea (1982) report per capita (rather than per household) 
garden areas for Enga as a whole ranging from 0.05 hectares in the 
Upper Lai Valley up to 0.17 hectares in the Wapenamanda area. 
Allen (1982) found that three communities in Enga had between 0.24 
and 0.31 hectares of cultivated land per person, while a generally 
accepted average for the highlands is 0.1 hectares of garden per 
person (Robin Hide, pers. comm.). 
Jackson's (1987) survey found significant variations in garden area 
per household within the Porgera Valley (see Table 5.2). Jackson 
hypothesised that variations in household size (for which he had no 
data) may have been significant in explaining the variations in the 
garden area per household, or alternatively 
the Alipis residents may have been using far more land than is normal 
in the Porgera valley-since this is not for cash crops, other reasons, 
including anticipated compensation, would need to be looked into. 
Gardens and wantoks I 167 
Table 5.1 Crop and tree densities in the Porgera area, 1987 
Crop Unit No. per hectare No. per garden 
Sweet potato Mounds 2,100 1,150 
Taro Plants 350 190 
Sugarcane Clumps 140 75 
Banana Clumps 30 16 
Pandanus Plants 125 65 
Tanget Plants 350 190 
Yar (Casuarina) Plants 110 60 
Source: Jackson, R.T., 1987. Social Survey: Porgera, Department of Geography, James 
Cook University for Placer Pacific Pty Ud, Townsville: Table G-2. 
Table 5.2 Porgera garden survey data, 1987 
Community Households Mean gardens Mean distance Mean size Garden area 
surveyed per household from household of garden per household 
(metres) (hectares) (mean) (range) 
Mungalep 10 4.8 575 0.29 1.39 0.63-3.34 
Anawe 10 3.8 613 0.64 2.43 0.45-5.31 
Alipis 10 5.2 2,342 0.64 3.33 1.17-6.14 
Suyan 10 2.8 244 0.19 0.53 0.29-1.18 
Paiam 3 4.3 n.a. 0.14 0.60 0.30-0.86 
Source: Jackson, R.T., 1987. Social Survey: Porgera, Department of Geography, James 
Cook University for Placer Pacific Pty Ud, Townsville: Table G-. 
The SEIS included surveys of 11 gardens amongst SML landowning 
clans. The average total area of an average of four gardens per 
household (with an average of six members) was 0.86 hectares, lower 
than the averages found by Jackson. It was estimated that a five-year 
fallow period would mean that each household required 4.86 hectares 
of garden land, while a ten-year fallow required 8.86 hectares per 
household. 
Food shortages have occurred in the past at Porgera. The valley 
was visited in 1981 as part of an investigation into widespread food 
shortages in Papua New Guinea, carried out for the Director of 
National Emergency Services and Civil Defence (Wohlt et al. 1981). 
The study team noted that short-term (two to three month) food 
shortages were relatively common in Porgera, but longer-term 
shortages, when many Porgerans would have moved to stay with kin 
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in the Wage Valley or the Tari area, were rare. The best explanation the 
team could find for this particular shortage was excessive rain in 
previous months, which gave rise to vigorous sweet potato vine growth 
but poor tuber development. The upper Porgera area was less affected 
than Kairik and Tipinini in 1981, partly as a result of cash income from 
alluvial mining being used to supplement garden foods. Yields from 
gardens being harvested were substantially down on the norm, and 
tubers were generally less than half the normal weight of 500 grams. 
The impact of the mine 
The SEIS noted that the Porgeran subsistence system is adaptable and 
dynamic (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). This is reflected in the way in 
which the system has adapted to the massive social, environmental 
and economic changes which have occurred since the start of mine 
production. The most significant changes which have impacted on the 
gardening system are the loss of land for the mining operation, the 
large influx of non-Porgerans, and the substantial amounts of cash 
which have been paid out by the PJV. 
It was recognised, in studies conducted before the development of 
the mine, that the loss of gardening land within and around the SML 
could create major problems for some people (see Jackson 1987; Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987; Hughes and Sullivan 1988; NSR 1988:57). This was 
expected to be countered by the increasing cash-earning opportunities 
that would be available to the groups most affected. The 
Environmental Plan (NSR 1988) contended that the three most affected 
clans (presumably Tieni, Pulumaini and Angalaini) had 
... already changed their economic base from pure subsistence to cash. 
The effects have been relative material wealth, modem leisure 
activities, a diet dominated by trade store foods and a relatively higher 
nutritional status, compared to outlying villages in Porgera and 
elsewhere in Enga. These economic trends have reduced reliance on 
subsistence agricultural resources. 
At the wider valley scale, the impact of the project on gardening land 
was expected to be minor, as the mine would need only 2 per cent of 
the 230 km2 of potentially cultivable land in the Porgera Valley. A 
number of 'safeguards' were expected to combine to ameliorate any 
adverse effects on gardening land over the life of the mine. These 
included the extension of land under cultivation to currently unused 
areas up to 2,700 m; reduction of fallows at lower elevations; 
introduction of new cuitivars, composting systems and crops; and 
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monetary compensation for gardens lost. Increased cash incomes 
associated with the mine were seen as reducing the dependence on 
gardens for food. In the longer term, with the closure of the mine, it 
was acknowledged that there might be a 'subsistence resource crisis', 
as employment and other sources of funds were lost. 
Three more recent surveys have, as part of wider aims, assessed 
changes in the number of food gardens used by households in various 
parts of Porgera. The household survey carried out at the end of 1992 
(see Chapter 3) asked respondents about the number (but not the area) of 
food gardens they had under cultivation. Bonnell carried out a similar 
exercise in a survey of 96 of the relocation homes (see Chapter 4). The diet 
survey carried out as part of the present study again asked a similar 
question. The results of these surveys are shown in Table 5.3, with the 
emphasis on the communities within the SML and at TIpinini, the area 
least affected by the mine development. This table shows averages for the 
entire valley of 3.1,2.1 and 2.3 gardens per household respectively for the 
three surveys. The differences can be explained partly by the geographic 
spread of each of the surveys, and partly by the target group (relocation 
households versus more general groups). Several trends are evident in the 
data-Apalaka and Yarik appear to have more gardens than most other 
parts of the valley, while Kulapi has significantly fewer. These 
communities will be discussed in more detail below. 
One very significant trend is the number of households in Porgera 
without gardens. This came out particularly in Bonnell's study of the 
relocated households, with 15 per cent of households having no food 
gardens. The diet survey figures showed that, among the SML 
communities, Kulapi had the most serious problem, with 26 per cent of 
households reporting no gardens, while Apalaka and Yarik had figures of 
o and 9 per cent respectively. Other parts of the valley, particularly those 
which had recently experienced large increases in the number of non-
Porgerans living in the community, had significantly higher proportions 
of garden-less households. Of those interviewed at Porgera Station, for 
example, 53 per cent had no gardens in the valley, though it needs to be 
pointed out that most of those interviewed there were not Porgerans. 
Table 5.4, based on occupation fees paid during 1993, shows the 
extent of the impact of mine development on the availability of 
gardening land by subclan group within the SML. The figures 
showing the proportion of the clan land untouched by the mining 
operation are the inverse of the proportion which had been cleared, 
damaged or lost to mine development. The Table shows that certain 
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subc1an groups (particularly the Tieni Waingolo, Yangua and Uape, the 
Pulumaini Ambo, the Angalaini Mapindaka, and the Tuanda Yap ala) 
had lost large amounts of land in absolute as well as percentage terms. 
The Pulumaini losses may have been relatively greater, since these 
involved their lower-altitude gardening lands, and the result was that 
they had been forced to move into areas of primary forest, above the 
altitudinallimits of their previous gardens. 
Access to land at Porgera for an individual is derived from 
cognatic kinship links-that is, through rights to land acquired from 
either parent. The implication of this is that individuals who lost land 
within the SML may well have had rights to land elsewhere-€ither in 
Porgera or further afield. Table 5.4 does not show the extent of subc1an 
landholdings, or access to land, outside the SML boundary. On the 
Table 5.3 Household size and garden numbers in recent surveys 
Survey and Sample size Mean household Gardens per 
community size household 
1. Household survey 1992 
Apalaka/Yarik 32 7.1 3.8 
Tipinini 35 5.7 2.7 
Rest of Porgera 55 7.3 3.2 
Total 122 6.8 3.1 
2. Relocation survey 1993 
Apalaka 15 8.0 2.3 
Yarik 21 7.0 4.0 
Kulapi 24 8.5 1.2 
Rest of Porgera 36 8.5 1.7 
Total 96 8.1 2.1 
3. Diet survey 1993 
Apalaka 12 10.8 4.3 
Yarik 55 8.7 3.2 
Kulapi 19 9.0 1.2 
Tipinini 49 7.6 1.8 
Rest of Porgera 243 7.7 2.1 
Total 378 8.0 2.3 
Sources: Banks, G., 1993. Porgera Social Monitoring Programme: economic modelling 
project-First Report, Unisearch PNG Pty Ltd for Porgera Joint Venture, Port Moresby; 
Banks, G., 1994a. Porgera Economic Modelling Project-Second Report: gardens and wantoks, 
Porgera Social Monitoring Programme Report 3, Unisearch PNG Pty Ltd for Porgera 
Joint Venture Port Moresby;. Bonnell, 5., 1994. Dilemmas of Development: social clulnge in 
Porgera, 1989-1993, Porgera Social Monitoring Programme Report 2, Subada 
Consulting Pty Ltd for Porgera Joint Venture, Thomlands (Qld). 
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other hand, there is no guarantee that individuals who had lost land 
were automatically able to exercise rights to other pieces of their 
subclan's land outside this boundary. Three questions which thus arise 
in the context of loss of garden land are 
.. the extent of subclan land ownership outside the SML 
boundary for those subclans listed in Table 5.4 
.. the extent to which individuals had retained and maintained 
rights to other land outside the SML; and 
.. the nature of the current mechanisms and authorities for 
handling disputes over land, in a context where land was 
being lost to the mine and the population was increasing. 
The continuing economic significance of the subsistence sector, in 
spite of the large amounts of compensation which had been paid out 
Table 5.4 Effect of mine development on land by sl.lbclan within the 
SML,1993 
Clan/subclan Area owned Area untouched by 
inSML mining operation· 
(hectares) (hectares) (per cent) 
TienelWaingolo 299.0 61.9 20.7 
TienelYangua 186.0 37.0 19.9 
Tiene/Uape 269.0 145.5 54.1 
Tiene/Lagima 89.0 78.4 88.1 
Tiene/Kaimalo 32.0 11.0 34.4 
Tiene/Akira 21.0 21.0 100.0 
Pulumaini/Paramba 56.0 38.0 67.9 
Pulumainil Ambo 257.0 157.3 61.2 
PulumainilEpeyea 21.0 
PulumainilYunga 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Anga 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Mamai/Andapo 9.0 9.0 100.0 
MamailKenja 54.0 28.0 51.9 
Waiwa 54.0 32.9 60.9 
AngalainilPiko 40.0 35.1 87.8 
Angalaini/Mapindaka (Yunguna) 103.0 60.3 58.5 
AngalainilWoyopen (Taunga) 67.0 67.0 100.0 
TuandaIYapala 332.0 223.1 67.2 
Tuanda/Ulupa 309.0 289.9 93.8 
Pakean/Ringime 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 2,228.0 1,319.0 59.2 
Source: PJV records. 
I Dilemmas of Development 
by pJV, emerged as a significant finding of the first phase of my study 
(see Chapter 3). The income and expenditure survey carried out in 
1992 highlighted the inequalities in cash income in Porgera, with the 
top 10 per cent of the sample earning 54.8 per cent of the income, and 
the bottom 50 per cent earning just 2.6 per cent of the income. Of the 
sample of 220 interviewed, 40 individuals (18 per cent) reported no 
monetary income in the previous fortnight, and a further 25 (11 per 
cent) reported less than KlO. When asked how they survived, those 
with little or no income were evenly split between those who relied on 
wantoks, and those who lived off food from their own gardens. 
The 1993 diet survey revealed some significant patterns in the 
consumption of different food types, particularly the difference 
between subsistence garden food and store-bought food. Table 5.5 
shows the proportion of respondents in different parts of the valley 
who had eaten tinned fish, rice, sweet potato (from their own garden), 
and greens (from their own garden). A probable interpretation of this 
data is as follows: people within the SML were eating relatively high 
proportions of store-bought food, but a significant proportion were 
also still consuming food from their own gardens. People living in 
communities outside the SML which had experienced large inflows of 
wantoks and others (that is Anawe/Paiam and Porgera Station) had a 
higher proportion of store-bought food and, for Porgera Station at 
least, lower levels of food grown in their own gardens. The 
communities outside the SML which had been less impacted by 
immigration (Mungalep and Tipinini) showed very low proportions of 
store-bought food, and high levels of food from their own gardens-
everyone in Tipinini, for example, had eaten sweet potato (kaukau) in 
the previous 24 hours, and only two (out of 49) had eaten tinned fish. 
Of the 380 people in the total sample, 329 people (87 per cent) had 
eaten kaukau in the previous 24 hours, and 226 (70 per cent) had 
obtained it from their own gardens; 193 (51 per cent) had eaten no 
store-bought food, and 57 (15 per cent) of them had eaten only kaukau. 
Only 28 people (7 per cent) had eaten solely store-bought food. These 
figures underline the fact that the bulk of the population in Porgera 
were still dependent on the subsistence sector for meeting at least part 
of their basic food requirements. 
There is some evidence to support the assumption made in most of 
the studies done prior to mine development, that the loss of gardening 
land would be balanced by more cash and a shift to store-bought 
goods. If Tipinini is taken as a 'control', then it is clear that there was a 
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Table 5.5 Percentage of community members consuming food types 
in the previous 24 hours 
Community Sample Tinned Rice Sweet Greens 
(N) fish (%) (%) potato (%) (%) 
ApalakaIYarik 67 43 48 78 42 
Kulapi 19 68 74 21 42 
Mungalep 53 13 17 89 70 
Anawe/Paiam 84 44 51 75 50 
Porgera Station 96 56 59 47 33 
Tipinini 49 4 2 100 69 
Other 12 33 58 50 33 
Total 380 38 43 70 49 
Source: Porgera diet survey, 1993. 
greater amount of store-bought food being consumed in 1993. 
However, even in the relocation areas most directly affected by mine 
development, the bulk of the population had eaten food from their 
own gardens in the previous 24 hours. There is obviously no linear 
relationship between the amount of cash going into a community and 
the switch to store-bought food. 
There were differences in the foods eaten by male and females. The 
sample was made up of 263 males and 117 females. Fewer women had 
eaten tinned fish (31 per cent) or rice (38 per cent) in the previous 24 
hours than men (42 per cent and 45 per cent respectively). The foods 
eaten also varied by the age of the respondents, with the proportion of 
people reporting kaukau from their own garden rising from 57 per cent 
for the 16-19 age group, to 82 per cent for the 40-49 age group, and 73 
per cent for those 50 years and over. Taro consumption was even more 
influenced by age-from less than 10 per cent of those aged under 30 
years, to 36 per cent of those aged 50 years and over. 
It is also reasonable to expect to find variations in food 
consumption through the fortnightly pay period. As noted earlier, 
the survey was carried out during a government pay week-between 
a week and ten days after the more significant PJV pay Wednesday. 
One would have expected higher proportions of tinned fish, rice and 
other store-bought food to be eaten just after PJV pay days. In SML 
areas, regular payments such as royalties and occupation fees may 
well have influenced food consumption for short periods in the same 
way. Temporal patterns of trade store sales (see Chapter 3) certainly 
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reflected recent PJV-related inputs, and these patterns of expenditure 
were probably closely related to food consumption patterns.5 
In the SEIS, it was estimated that subsistence agriculture was worth 
K1 per person per day, or a total of K3 million per year in the Porgera 
Valley as a whole. The 1993 diet survey showed that this figure had 
probably increased in absolute terms. While there was now greater 
consumption of trade store-sourced foods, there was also a significant 
increase in the size of the population being fed, and most people were 
still reliant on the subsistence sector for many of their food require-
ments. If we assume that, for the valley as a whole, dependence on 
garden foods had dropped by 25 per cent, and prices for store-bought 
food had doubled over the intervening period, it is likely that the 
average figure per person per day for the value of subsistence food 
production (or the cost of replacing it with purchased food) was now 
approximately K1.50. With a population of 12,000 in the valley, this 
amounted to K6.57 million per annum-slightly less than the K7.3 
million of direct PJV cash payments to Porgerans in 1993 (see Chapter 3). 
From the data already presented, it is clear that the subsistence 
sector remained very important to the bulk of the population in 
Porgera. At the same time, the loss of land, the greater amounts of 
cash in circulation, and the influx of outsiders had affected the 
agricultural system in different ways in different parts of the valley. 
Two of the areas which appeared to be under the greatest stress were 
Kulapi and Apalaka, and these were chosen for more detailed 
investigation because they were the areas where most concern was 
expressed by residents and PJV staff. The aim of this exercise was to 
establish, in a preliminary way, the extent to which the subsistence 
gardening sector was under pressure in these two areas. 
Apalaka case study 
Apalaka is a relocation housing area situated at the end of the road 
which services the three relocation areas on the southern bank of the 
Kaiya Valley (see Map 1.1). The Apalaka relocation area was 
established in 1989, and there were 62 relocation houses in the area in 
1993 (with an average of eight persons in each house), as well as a 
considerable number of bush material homes. Part of the relocation 
package included K1,400 to assist with the preparation of new food 
gardens for each household. 
The Apalaka area comprises moderate to steep mudstone ridges 
and slopes, which are generally stable and well-drained. There are 
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small areas of boulder clay colluviums, and local relief can be very 
steep. Soils are generally thin and largely residual, derived from the 
mudstone. Small areas have a greater depth of residual soils or a 
veneer of colluvium (Mules 1993). From my own brief observations in 
the field and from anecdotal evidence, it would seem that rainfall is 
lower at Apalaka than at Alipis. Apalaka, being slightly lower than 
Alipis and situated on a north-facing slope, should also have slightly 
warmer temperatures. Contour maps of the Apalaka area indicate that 
slopes average around 16.5°, though there is great variability, and the 
houses tend to be grouped on the flattest land, leaving the steeper 
slopes for gardens. The gardening areas range in altitude from 2,000 m 
on the banks of the Kaiya River to around 2,450 m on the slopes of 
Waruwari ridge, but most of the gardens are in the range between 
2,100 m and 2,200 m. Air photographs show that the area around Apalaka 
has been used for gardening for many years. A set taken in 1971 shows 
that around 60 per cent of the area which was under cultivation in 1993 
had already been cleared of primary forest for more than twenty years. 
The Tuanda clan has primary rights to the land around Apalaka, 
including most of the land to the west of Yambu Creek, while the 
Waiwa clan owns the remaining 54 hectares immediately adjacent to 
the west bank of the creek. The Tuanda clan also has access to 
gardening land in the upper reaches of the Kaiya, although the 
boundaries of this access are not clear. Five out of 22 households 
interviewed for the garden survey said they had access to land in 
other areas-two in Laiagam, two at Alipis, and one at Yuyan. It is 
likely that some of the social changes brought about by the mine 
(permanent houses, fixed water supplies) had reduced the mobility 
of households within the SML, in the sense that people might no 
longer be prepared to walk considerable distances to gardens, and 
relocated landowners might be less likely to live in 'multilocal' 
households (see Burton 1991:10). These trends would have reduced 
the likelihood of these households maintaining gardens outside the 
SML. 
Twenty-two households were covered by the garden survey in 
Apalaka, 13 of which were resident in relocation houses. A total of 31 
gardens were surveyed in Apalaka, and these included the complete 
garden areas of 11 households (see Table 5.6). For these 11 households 
there was an average of 1.4 gardens per household, averaging 7,173m2 
in area, giving an average of just over 1 hectare of garden per 
household. Assuming a constant average garden size, and extrapol-
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ating to the gardens which were not surveyed, the average area per 
household for all 22 Apalaka households in the survey sample would 
be 2.1 hectares. With a total population of 183 in those households, this 
gives a mean garden area per person of 2,524 m 2-higher than most of 
the comparable Engan figures discussed earlier. A total of 92 pigs were 
distributed between 19 of these households, giving an average of 4.84 
per household, or a pig~to-person ratio of less than 0.5:1. 
The average slope of the 29 gardens inspected in the Apalaka 
survey was 27°, with a range between 12° and 60°. A quarter of the 
sample gardens were on slopes of 35° or steeper. As previously 
mentioned, such slopes are generally regarded as having low 
productivity, high rates of topsoil depletion, and short effective lives. 
Fallow periods, to be effective, must be long. Residents were aware of 
this problem, and expressed concern at the frequent slips and slumps 
which occurred in the steeper gardens. The steep gardens were 
notable for their small uncomposted mounds (yukusi). Large 
composted mounds, up to 2 m in diameter and 1 m high, were 
predominant on the less steep slopes. We were told that, although 
most of the gardens had been cleared for many years, most had also 
been replanted after the relocation programme had been completed 
four years previously. The relatively few newly-planted gardens 
which we saw were being cut out of short scrub and sword-grass 
fallow. It seemed likely, in light of the SEIS findings, that the yields in 
the current gardens would fall rapidly in the next couple of years, 
particularly from the uncomposted mounds. 
Table 5.6 Agricultural resources of Apalaka households, 1993 
Variable 
Households 
Mean size per garden 
Mean gardens per household 
Mean household garden area 
Household garden area range 
Mean household size 
Mean pigs per household 
Mean slope angle 
Source: Porgera garden survey. 
Total households 
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Nearly all of the moderate slopes in Apalaka territory were 
currently covered by gardens (see Map 5.1). A series of air 
photographs of this area (1971,1986,1991) were examined to assess 
the extent of change over the last 20 years. 
• The area between Yambu Creek, the Kaiya River and Anjolek 
Creek had been under cultivation for many years. Even in 
1971, the forest had been cleared to around 2350 m in places. 
• Between 1971 and 1986, some areas had changed from 
gardens to re growth, and some from regrowth to gardens, 
but it is not possible to say whether the extent or intensity of 
cultivation in the area had increased or decreased. 
• Finally, the area covered by gardens had increased from 1986 
to 1991, and with one exception, these gardens were all 
within areas which had been cultivated at some time in the 
past. The exception was that new gardens were being 
created from primary forest at higher altitudes. There were 
only a few very small areas which appeared to have reverted 
from gardens to re growth over this period. In total, it 
appeared that there were now more gardens than at anyone 
time in the past. 
From the 1991 series, it is possible to make an estimate of the area 
being cultivated in 1993, although there are major problems with such 
calculations in areas of steep terrain. Furthermore, it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish current gardens from gardens which had 
been abandoned for one to five years. As a result, the figures which 
follow probably have a large margin of error built into them. Given 
these limitations, the photographs indicate a total area of around 100 
hectares of land available in the territory bounded by Yambu Creek, 
the Kaiya River, the Anjolek Creek, and the ridge crest which runs 
almost directly from east to west (Map 5.1). Over 25 per cent of this 
area was still forested, but much of this was on the walls of steep 
gullies unsuitable for gardening. Another 4 hectares was taken up by 
roads and houses, especially the main settlement of Apalaka. This left 
around 70 hectares in gardens and fallow regrowth. It appears from 
the photographs as if a greater proportion was now under garden 
rather than fallow, and despite the reservations noted above, my field 
observations tended to support this conclusion. 
If we follow the SEIS in assuming a figure of 4.86 hectares of 
garden per household with a five-year fallow period (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987), and ignore the greater average household size 





































































































































found in the garden survey, the 62 relocation households at Apalaka 
would require 280 hectares of land to support the pre-mine 
agricultural system. Even allowing for a 25 per cent reduction in the 
dependence on gardens since 1987, the requirement would still be 
around 200 hectares, which implies that the Apalaka households must 
have had other gardens outside the immediate area defined from the 
air photographs. The implication of all of this is that the existing 
agricultural system at Apalaka would not be sustainable in the long 
term, even with greatly reduced fallow periods, if these people had no 
access to garden land elsewhere. Furthermore, there were numerous 
gardens and fallow areas (around 15 hectares in all) in the Kaiya 
'compensation envelope' which were due to be affected by sediment 
from the dumping of mine waste in Anjolek Creek over the following 
18 months (Parker 1992), and it was possible that additional areas of 
cultivable land would be lost, either by greater bed aggradation than 
anticipated, or by the triggering of new landslips or the reactivation of 
old landslips by the transport of sediment downstream. At the same 
time, access to Tuanda gardening areas to the west of the Anjolek 
would become more difficult, unless some positive steps were taken to 
maintain it. 
Kulapi case study 
The Kulapi relocation area is adjacent to, and south of, the Anawe 
plant site (Map 1.1). The gardens associated with the settlement range 
in altitude from 2,275 m to 2,500 m at the SML boundary, but most of the 
gardens are at an altitude of around 2,400 m. The gardening area 
comprises a mix of undulating mudstone ridges and moderate slopes on 
a boulder clay colluvium resulting from a partially stabilised landslide. 
Slopes are not as steep as those of Apalaka. The area is cut by three 
streams, and has several swampy parts. The soils are peaty / clayey, with 
gravel and large limestone and sandstone boulders, and drainage is 
generally very poor. Although Kulapi is close to the Alipis meteorological 
station, anecdotal evidence suggests that rainfall may be slightly higher, 
and the area is certainly in cloud more often than Alipis and Apalaka. 
Temperatures may be expected to be a degree or two cooler than Apalaka, 
given the higher altitude and fewer hours of sunshine. All these 
factors reduce the rates of growth of agricultural crops (see Chapter 4). 
The present settlement of Kulapi dates from 1988, and was the first 
of the relocation areas to be established. As previously noted, the 
Pulumaini clan has lost large portions of its land to mine 
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development, most notably the area which now comprises the Anawe 
plant site. The Pulumaini had few options for relocation, simply 
because the portion of their land which was not occupied by mine 
installations extends uphill from that site. Air photographs from 1986 
show dense forest cover over most of the area which now contains 
Kulapi gardens. Three clearings of less than a hectare are shown on 
these photographs, the highest of which was at approximately 
2,500 m. The upper limit of cultivation was around 2,350 m. As noted 
above, this is now the lower limit of the garden area. Most of the new 
gardens were cut from primary forest, and still contained large tree 
trunks in 1993. 
In the Kulapi garden survey, 17 households were interviewed, and 
in 13 cases, visits were made to all of the household's food gardens. 
These 13 households had an average of 1.5 gardens each, with an 
average garden size of 2,890 m 2, giving a total area per household of 
roughly half a hectare (see Table 5.7). Extrapolating again to the 
gardens which we did not visit, we obtain a very similar figure for the 
average garden area of all 17 households in the sample. Average 
household size in Kulapi was 11.3, which gives a mean garden area 
per person of just 470.5 m 2• Although the survey data indicate a much 
lower pig-person ratio than at Apalaka, this finding does not tally 
with our general observations in the Kulapi community, which 
appeared to have a larger pig population than any other Porgeran 
community we visited. 
The average slope angle shown on contour maps of the Kulapi area 
is around 11 o. For the 22 gardens inspected in the Kulapi survey, the 
Table 5.7 
Variable 
Agricultural resources of Kulapi households, 1993 
Households 
Mean size per garden 
Mean gardens per household 
Mean household garden area 
Household garden area range 
Mean household size 
Mean pigs per household 
Mean slope angle 
Source: Porgera garden survey. 
Total households 








17° (22 slopes) 
Households with total 








16° (20 slopes) 
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average slope was 17°, with a range between 0° and 35°. Mounds 
varied from quite large (1.5 m diameter) composted manda down to 
small uncomposted yukusi on small areas of steep local relief. The 
gardens at Kulapi were markedly wetter than at Apalaka, with very 
poor drainage. Bonnell (Chapter 4) notes that, when they were first 
cleared, the soils had a high water table, and there was excessive leaf 
mould with a high nitrogen content. Agricultural experts who visited 
the area in early 1989 felt that time would cure the drainage and 
nitrogen problems, though improved agricultural practices would be 
the only remedy for the poor soil fertility. In fact, four years later, the 
drainage problems remained. The poor environment for agriculture at 
Kulapi is confirmed by the fact that relocation gardens took 15 months 
to start producing kaukau, compared to an average of nine months in 
other relocation areas. The diet survey highlights the gardening 
problems faced by the Kulapi people. They appear to have been far 
more dependent on store-bought food than the people at Apalaka and 
Yarik, and a much lower proportion reported eating kaukau from their 
own gardens in the previous 24 hours (see Table 5.5). 
In absolute terms, there was still enough Pulumaini land for 
additional gardens at Kulapi, above the existing limits of cultivation. 
In practical terms, however, it was clear that the soils and climate 
severely restricted yields at the existing altitude, and further 
expansion up slope would not be desirable. Below the existing 
altitudinallimit of cultivation, there were only limited areas of forest 
and fallow remaining. From the 1991 air photographs, it appears that 
there are roughly 50 hectares of land below that limit, of which 5 
hectares had been used for settlements and roads. Small blocks of 
forest made up another 5 hectares, largely unsuitable for cultivation. A 
large proportion of the remaining 40 hectares was currently under 
cultivation, with few areas of fallow (see Map 5.2). The long-term 
implications for the subsistence component of the economy at Kulapi 
were obvious and serious. 
The role of the epo atene in the economy 
The issue of 'outsiders'-the epa atene ('come stay') people-is 
interconnected with many of the other social and economic changes 
that have occurred at Porgera. 'Outsiders' place increasing stress on 
the subsistence sector, they are central to the redistribution of cash out 
of Porgera, and they are usually involved in social problems such as 
law and order (see Chapter 2). Burton (1991:4) comments that 




























































































































































more specifically from the company's point of view, the build up of epa 
atene (non-Porgeran) migrants around the mine area has been 
perceived as substantial and a threat to the harmony of company-
landowner relations, and indeed to development generally. 
The diet and income and expenditure surveys revealed some 
interesting facts about the role of the epa atene in the Porgeran 
economy. Three categories of people are discernible from the 
surveys-those born in Porgera ('Porgerans'), those born elsewhere 
but now living in Porgera ('epa atene'), and those born elsewhere who 
are just in Porgera for a short time, visiting relatives or selling goods at 
the market. These last I call the 'visitors'.6 
In demographic terms, neither of the survey samples showed any 
clear distinction between the three groups, although there was a 
tendency for the Porgerans to be older than the epa atene or the 
visitors. Proportions of males and females varied slightly between 
each of the groups, but the greatest difference was between surveys, 
with the income and expenditure survey as a whole having 14 per cent 
females, and the full diet survey sample having 31 per cent females. 
The most interesting result from the income and expenditure 
survey was the level of income received by each group in the previous 
two weeks (see Table 5.8). The epa atene had an income 50 per cent 
greater than that of the Porgerans, and they had notably higher 
earnings from PJV (K106 compared to K44 for Porgerans), while the 
visitors got more from wantoks (K22 compared to K13 for Porgerans 
and KI0 for epa atene). The diet survey revealed slightly different 
patterns of activity, with more Porgerans in PJV employment, and 
fewer working for other employers or running their own business. 
Porgerans, not surprisingly, had more gardens, while visitors had very 
few, and the epa atene fell midway between the two. Significantly, only 
about 25 per cent of the epa atene had no gardens at Porgera. 
The diet survey showed a clear division between the Porgerans, 
who ate the least store-bought food and the most kaukau and taro from 
their own gardens, and the visitors, for whom the proportions were 
reversed (see Table 5.9). These patterns presumably reflected the 
amount of garden land and the amount of cash to which each group 
had access, but they also point to significantly different economic 
situations and lifestyles for the Porgerans and non-Porgerans in the 
valley. 
The diet survey provides an indication of the variable lengths of 
time for which the epa atene had been living in Porgera (see Figure 
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5.1)? Most of those who had been in Porgera for less than six months 
did not have their own home in Porgera, and were staying with 
wantaks, friends or others, and most of these people had come to 
Porgera to sell food or goods at the markets. The same survey data 
suggest that 34 per cent of the epa atene were from Mulitaka and 
Laiagam, 28 per cent from the Southern Highlands, and 33 per cent 
from other parts of Enga. Similar proportions were found among the 
visitors-20 per cent from Mulitaka and Laiagam, 40 per cent from 
Tari, and 33 per cent from other parts of Enga. 
The non-Porgerans were distributed unevenly within the valley. 
While they accounted for 40 per cent of the total diet survey sample,8 
the proportions in each local community varied from just 4 per cent in 
Tipinini up to 71 per cent of those surveyed at Porgera Station (Table 
5.10). Apalaka and Yarik both had low percentages, perhaps reflecting 
the successful identification of Porgerans (and exclusion of non-
Porgerans) during the relocation programme. However, these sample 
data need to be treated with some caution, because a subsequent 
census of the Kulapi community found a total population of 730, of 
whom only 180 (or 25 per cent) were 'outsiders' (B. Robins, pers. 
comm.). 
A comment by Robert Glasse, regarding Huli social structure and 
dynamics, would seem equally applicable to the situation at Porgera. 
Huli have a number of concepts of affiliation and corporate group 
structure which they use strategically when access to resources is in 
dispute. In my view these concepts cannot be meaningfully assembled 
into a seamless, consistent theoretical construct. Instead Huli employ 
the notions of attachment and detachment according to their indi-
vidual assessment of self-interest at any given moment (1992:248-9). 
The epa atene at Porgera are pursuing the same course. As long as they 
are able to take up residence in Porgera, in accordance with the related 
(though not identical) Engan, Porgeran, and Huli principles of group 
membership, and as long as Porgera is seen as an economically 
attractive venue, when compared to other parts of the highlands, then 
these people will continue to pursue the strategy of settling in Porgera. 
As the mining company is well aware, the 'outsider' issue is 
complex and not amenable to a simple solution. Individual Porgerans 
must to a large degree accept responsibility for the influx of migrants 
within the valley. Not only have individuals allowed epa atene to reside 
in their areas, but many must have actively recruited people to the 
SML in the hope of gaining a greater compensation package (see 
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Table 5.8 Differences in economic status by residency type, 1993 
Porgerans Epo atene Visitors 
Income and expenditure survey sample size 125 49 46 
Mean fortnightly income (kina) 142.66 215.50 150.34 
Diet survey sample size 224 116 30 
Proportion with PJV employment (%) 13 7 
Proportion with a business (%) 13 19 33 
Average number of gardens 2.9 1.3 0.6 
Source: Porgera survey data. 
Table 5.9 Food eaten in the previous 24 hours by residency type, 
1993 (per cent) 
Food type Porgerans Epo atene Visitors 
Tinned fish 25 45 73 
Rice 28 55 74 
Kaukau (own garden) 83 63 35 
Taro (own garden) 21 8 2 
Source: Porgera diet survey. 
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Burton 1991:40). A majority (three to one) of Porgerans, both inside 
and outside the SML, who commented on this issue, when we 
interviewed them at the end of 1992, expressed favourable opinions of 
their epa atene, who were seen to provide additional security to the 
households and communities with whom they resided. Porgerans 
were unwilling to use the law to overcome the lack of customary 
means for removal of unwanted kinsfolk, and their most common 
response to the question of why they could not get rid of the epa atene 
was one which cited the risk of security problems further down the 
Enga Highway. 
Within the SML, the PJV had successfully worked with landowners 
to remove 'outsiders' from communities such as Kulapi. Outside the 
SML, there was no direct way that the company could do anything 
about the problem, though offers were made to provide landowners 
with advice on procedures for evicting unwanted epa atene. Company 
spending in other parts of Enga Province under the Tax Credit Scheme 
Gardens and wantoks I 187 
has partly been intended to reduce the motivation for people in these 
areas to leave home and travel to Porgera. However, until the level of 
government services and economic development in other parts of 
Enga and the Southern Highlands is improved, individuals will 
continue to see Porgera as the place for a new and better life, to which 
a cognatic descent system gives many of them access. 
Conclusions 
Porgera is an area where the physical environment has always limited 
the productivity of the subsistence agricultural system. In the past, this 
has been compensated for by the low population density, allowing a 
low intensity of use. Most of the studies carried out prior to mine 
development considered that these factors would mean a minimal 
impact of the mine on the agricultural system. The system could be 
intensified, and previously untouched areas, such as the zone between 
2,400 m and 2,700 m, could be used to compensate for any loss of 
gardens associated with mine development. Greater amounts of cash 
were likely to bring a switch away from a dependence on garden 
foods to a diet based on store-bought foods. Severe problems were 
only thought likely to occur for small groups of people most affected 
by loss of land. 
After three years of mine operation, several factors had combined 
to make some of these predictions obsolete. The massive in-migration 
of epa atene and other 'outsiders' had stressed the subsistence base of 
the Porgerans in areas within and around the SML. Greater use of 
higher altitude gardens (above 2,400 m) was limited by environmental 
constraints. Perhaps most significantly, the relatively inequitable 
distribution of compensation payments meant that the bulk of the 
population were still dependent on the subsistence sector for their 
basic food requirements. In absolute value, the contribution of the 
subsistence sector to the Porgeran economy had probably more than 
doubled between 1987 and 1993 as a result of local inflation and the 
greater population resident in the valley. 
In the two areas studied in detail, Apalaka and Kulapi, the 
subsistence system appeared to be under increasing stress. At 
Apalaka, there was very little room for expansion of the area under 
cultivation, and additional pressure was about to be placed on the 
existing gardening land by the loss of up to 15 hectares associated 
with the failing waste dump in the Anjolek. The Pulumaini people at 
Kulapi faced a somewhat different problem, in that they were being 
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compelled to construct gardens at high altitudes on poor soils, and the 
subsequent low yields were forcing them to depend on trades tore 
goods to a greater extent than other communities in the SML. Based on 
the evidence it does not seem reasonable to expect cultivation in 
Kulapi to extend up to 2,700 m, Although the cultivation zone had 
extended up to 2,700 m in some other parts of the valley (outside the 
SML), the poor soils and drainage, and the low sunshine hours, seem 
to have made this impracticable at Kulapi. 
Notes 
1 This survey was undertaken by Ben Imbun and five students from 
the University of Papua New Guinea. 
2 Porgera escaped the effects of frosts which hit other parts of the 
highlands in 1981 (Wohlt et al. 1981). 
3 Meggitt (1957) had previously described the system as reverting to 
fallow after the second crop. 
4 Population per square kilometre of potentially useful land (i.e. land 
below 2800 m which is not too steep or too swampy to be 
gardened). 
5 Compensation payments, one particular aspect of the cash 
economy, had another impact on the gardening system at Porgera. 
It was not uncommon practice for gardens to be planted, and 
houses built, by people in anticipation of compensation payments 
being made by the company when the area was needed for mine 
development. This was documented by Pacific Agribusiness (1987) 
and Jackson (1991), and was still occurring in 1993. However, such 
incidents did not represent the real role of gardens for the bulk of 
the Porgeran population, as reflected in the results of the diet 
survey. 
6 The definitions in the two surveys varied. In the income and 
expenditure survey, respondents were asked whether they were 
born in Porgera, and whether they usually lived in Porgera. I 
defined the epo atene as those not born in Porgera, but now living 
there, and 'visitors' were those born outside Porgera who did not 
usually live there. The diet survey again asked if the respondent 
was born in Porgera, but also asked how long the respondent had 
been in Porgera, and whose house the respondent stayed in last 
night, rather than whether the respondent usually lived in Porgera. 
In this case, I defined the epo atene as those not born in Porgera, 
who had been at Porgera for over six months, or had stayed the 
night before in their own house, or in the house of a parent or 
husband. 
7 It is worth noting that responses to this question could have been 
affected by people wanting to assert their perceived right to be in 
Gardens and wantoks I 189 
Porgera by overstating their period of residence, or by older 
people, in particular, citing the first time they had visited Porgera, 
rather than the time when they had taken up residence. 
8 Previous surveys found between 17 per cent (household survey, 
November 1992) and 43 per cent non-Porgerans (income and 
expenditure survey, December 1992). The variations probably 
reflect the difference between the targeted populations (see 
Chapter 3). A figure of around 40 per cent non-Porgeran residents 
in the valley is probably realistic, if somewhat conservative. 
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The next round of relocation 
Glenn Banks 
This chapter differs from the previous ones in that it is focused on a 
particular area, rather than an issue such as economic change. It 
establishes a social and economic baseline for the Kewai people on the 
north bank of the Kaiya River (see Map 1.1) within a Lease for Mining 
Purposes (LMP) which the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) was seeking to 
acquire in 1993. These people were due to be affected by the spoil from 
the PJV's planned Anjolek Creek waste dump, and the company was 
therefore embarking on a compensation and relocation programme in 
accordance with an agreement negotiated with representatives of the 
affected community. The original intention of this study was to 
facilitate the monitoring of those social and economic changes which 
would occur in the community as a result of the company's proposed 
relocation programme. 
Until the end of 1993, the Kewai people had been largely 
unaffected in the physical and material sense by the development of 
the Porgera mine. Although they had been able to both see and hear 
many of the changes occurring on the other side of the Kaiya River, 
they had not yet experienced the loss of land and huge amounts of 
cash compensation that had befallen the communities of the Special 
Mining Lease (SML). This is not to say that the Kewai were totally 
unaffected by the massive changes that had taken place in the 
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previous five years. The people were very mobile, and a significant 
number spent most of their time out of the area, working for the PJV 
or living with wantoks within the SML. Many had lost access to the 
alluvial gold of the Kaiya River as a result of increased sedimentation, 
some had already received compensation payouts, and a few had 
picked up business contracts with the PJY. In addition, their 
expectations and aspirations, based on what they had already seen 
within the SML, were high. The baseline study which follows must be 
seen in this context-as a description of a community which was 
already changing, but which had yet to experience the magnitude of 
changes that had affected the SML communities. 
One other point to note here is that although the brief was to 
establish a socioeconomic baseline for the people of the 'Kaiya River 
LMP', our study took in a wider area than that covered by the LMP. 
This occurred for a number of reasons. First, the mobility of the people 
meant that most had gardens and houses both inside and outside the 
LMP, and that many people who had an interest in the LMP did not 
reside within its boundaries. Conversely, there were some inside the 
LMP boundary who were not likely to lose gardens or require 
relocation as a result of the further development of mining operations. 
At the same time, some people resident outside the LMP boundary 
were liable to be affected by other people relocating to their 
neighbourhood, especially because the proposed relocation road 
would run outside the LMP boundary for most of its length. Finally, it 
was not always obvious on the ground where the LMP boundary 
actually ran. The area covered by our study therefore stretches from 
the Kaiya River almost to the ridge of Mount Tangawundi.1 
A series of detailed interviews form the basis for this report. These 
were carried out over a three-week period in November and December 
1993. Information was collected on the make-up of the household, the 
type of housing, household assets, involvement in the cash economy, 
food eaten in the previous 24 hours, and the number, size and location 
of gardens. Each interview lasted between one and four hours, 
depending largely on the size of the household and the number and 
location of gardens. In total, 45 households were interviewed 
(comprising 381 individuals), and 91 gardens surveyed. Each of the 
gardens was measured, crops were counted, and notes were made on 
the location, the setting, the slope and other relevant details. All parts of 
the LMP and surrounding areas were visited, although a problem was 
encountered at Nikianga, where some Seventh Day Adventist 
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households were unwilling to be interviewed because of rumours 
about our role which were spread by the lay preacher. 
The Department of Enga and PJV records of compensation 
payments made for the Kaiya LMP area during 1993 were collected 
and analysed. Fritz Robinson's detailed relocation study for the Kaiya 
LMP (Robinson 1993) proved very useful, as did the Kewai 
genealogies compiled by both Robinson and Kurubu Ipara (1993). The 
work carried out by Goldsmith (1993) and Mules (1993) provided 
most of the information on the geology and geomorphology of the 
area. Further discussions, formal and informal, were held with Fritz 
Robinson, Geoff Hiatt, Rob Goldsmith, Tona Yongape, Marala (PJV), 
Kurubu Ipara (Department of Enga) and Pawe Lembopa (Councillor), 
and fleshed out the information obtained from the surveys. 
The Kaiya environment 
The following description of the existing environment of the Kaiya 
LMP area varies markedly in terms of detail. The emphasis is on 
economic and, to a lesser extent, social measures from the household 
survey carried out in November and December 1993. Evidence on 
changes in the extent of garden coverage between 1971 and 1991 is 
taken from aerial photographs. Material on the physical environment 
(geology, geomorphology, soils and vegetation), demography, social 
services and political situation is drawn from existing reports and 
conversations with a range of individuals, and is open to correction 
and refinement by those who have (or had) a better understanding of 
the situation than myself. Where appropriate, I have made 
comparisons between the Kewai community and other parts of the 
Porgera Valley, as discussed in previous chapters of this volume, in 
order to provide a clearer picture of the social and economic situation 
of the Kewai people relative to other communities. 
PhYSical environment 
The physical environment of the north bank of the Kaiya River is similar 
to that of Apalaka on the south bank (see Chapter 5). The Kaiya River is 
14.5 kilometres in length, running from an altitude of 3,200m below 
Mount Pangalin in the west down to the junction with the Pongema 
River in the east at an altitude of 1720m (Goldsmith 1993:9-10). The 
lower Kaiya, from the junction with Anjolek Creek to the Pongema, 
comprises a relatively steep V-shaped valley, with slopes between 10° 
and 50°, while the upper part of the valley is wider and flatter. 
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Goldsmith (1993:9) describes the geology of the valley as folded 
and faulted Chin Formation mudstone, with major structural elements 
trending northwest to southeast, although variations in the direction 
of the bedding are significant and have an impact on slope stability. 
The mudstone is generally of low strength, with high rates of erosion 
leading to the development of deep-seated slide blocks. The 
geomorphology of the area is dominated by a series of large dormant 
landslides, which make up the bulk of the flatter (and more 
populated) parts of the valley. Lepalama, for example, is situated on 
such a landslide (see Map 6.1). The headscarps of several of these 
landslides are visible high on the ridge. The soils on the dormant 
landslides are peaty to clayey, and are generally deep and poorly 
drained. On the steeper mudstone, the soils are residual clay and/ or 
perched colluvial veneer, with generally good drainage (Mules 1993). 
The area is split by a number of small streams and creeks which drain 
into the Kaiya River. These generally have low sediment loads, 
although they are capable of moving relatively large amounts of 
sediment after heavy rain. 
It has been pointed out (Chapter 5) that climatic data collected 
from meteorological stations in different parts of the Porgera Valley 
reveal the marked influence of local topography and orographic 
effects on rainfall magnitude and intensity (PJV 1993:6). The area 
under consideration here is mostly at a lower altitude (1,800-2,000m) 
than the Alipis mine site (2,250m), from which the most detailed 
records are available, and can therefore be expected to have higher 
average hours of sunshine, warmer daytime temperatures, and lower 
rainfall. These features were readily apparent during our work in the 
area. 
In 1993, the northern side of the Kaiya Valley was mostly covered 
by primary forest, interspersed with garden areas. The density of 
gardens decreased with altitude, with large tracts of garden and short 
fallow separated by patches of forest close to the Kaiya River, but no 
gardens along the ridgeline which reaches up to 2,500m. This was in 
marked contrast to the southern side of the valley, where the 
relocation areas of Apalaka and Yarik had little forest remaining below 
2,500m (see Chapter 5). A series of air photographs (from 1971, 1986, 
1991 and 1993) show that gardens had certainly been encroaching on 
the forested land on the northern side of the valley for the previous 20 
years, but the remaining forest cover was still in the order of 65 per 
cent of the total area. 

































































































































































































































This 'lower montane' forest is similar to that found throughout the 
rest of Enga Province, the predominant species being beech 
(Nothofagus), with some oak (Castanopsis acuminatissima) and a mixture 
of other species (Pain et al. 1982:35-7). In economic terms, one of the 
most significant tree species is Karuka (Pandanus jiulianetti), which 
appears to be more widespread on the northern side than the southern 
side of the Kaiya. 
The people 
The Kewai clan have primary rights to the area covered by the LMP. 
The boundaries of the Kewai territory extend up to Mount 
Tangawundi, which forms the prominent ridgeline to the north of the 
Kaiya River, down to the Kaiya River itself on the southern side, along 
the Kaiya to the east to a point almost halfway between the Kogai 
junction and the bridge, and for an unknown distance upstream to the 
west, probably as far as Mount Pangalin and the ridge at the head of 
the valley. Significantly, this is the ridge which separates Porgera from 
Paiela. 
As Burton (1991:9) points out, Porgeran 'clans' are simply lines of 
descent, and are named after lineage founders. Given the cognatic 
descent system of the Ipili, membership of the Kewai clan is not fixed 
or determined, and individuals are able to assert multiple clan 
affiliations. In the sort of situation which confronted the Kewai in 
1993, this can lead to a large number of people trying to assert their 
links into the 'clan' so as to gain access to the anticipated benefits of 
relocation and compensation. Within the Kewai 'clan' there are several 
important 'lines' (or 'sub-clans' as they are generally known in 
Porgera), each of which can be divided into further distinguishable 
(though not mutually exclusive) groupings. Figure 6.1 represents the 
genealogy of the major Kewai lines, as far as I have been able to 
ascertain it. 
Like other Porgerans, the Kewai have links with groups to the east 
(Enga), the south (Huli), and especially the west (Paiela). The Kaiya 
Valley was one of the routes into Paiela territory, there are links 
through marriage to the Paielan Komo clan (Peri 1994), and it was 
evident that a relatively large number of Paielan-born people had 
moved into the area during the previous five years. No detailed 
census of the area had been carried out during this period, so no 
accurate estimate of the local population could be made. Company 
staff working on the relocation programme had mapped 130 houses in 
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Figure 6.1 The main lines of the Kewai clan 
the area, most of which were not permanent residences. On the basis 
of our own fieldwork, the genealogical work of Ipara (1993), and 
Robinson's (1993) relocation study, we reckoned that the resident 
population was between 600 and 800, while a total population 
including absent persons could have been as high as 1,000. 
For the 45 households in which we conducted our interviews 
.. household size varied from one to 30, averaging 8.47, and 
yielding a total of 381 residents 
.. there was a virtually identical number of males and females 
(190 to 191) 
.. 163 (or 42.8 per cent) were under 15 years of age 
.. 330 (or 86.6 per cent) were born in Porgera; and 
.. there were 64 other family members absent, who were not 
counted in the total. 
The average household size was towards the higher end of the 
range found by previous surveys in other parts of Porgera, which 
went from 6.8 for a sample of 122 households (Chapter 3), to 11.3 for a 
survey of 17 households in Kulapi (Chapter 5). The fact that many of 
these households were likely to be relocated may account for this 
higher number; the average household size during the first SML 
relocation survey was 13 (Robinson 1991:4). The percentage of 
children under 15, and the percentage of Porgeran-born residents in 
the sample, were more clearly within the range of previous local 
surveys. The balanced sex ratio contrasts with the findings of the 1992 
household survey (Chapter 3), where a higher ratio of males to 
females was found in all parts of Porgera. This may indicate a recent 
movement of families into the Kaiya area. Further evidence of a recent 
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movement of people into the area is contained in the age profile of our 
survey, which shows a large proportion of 25-29 year-olds (see Figure 
6.2). This is unusual in an area from which out-migration could have 
been expected, as this age group would be one of the most mobile and 
thus most likely to leave. Here again, it suggests the movement of 
young people into the area in anticipation of benefits from the 
relocation and compensation packages. 
The population was scattered throughout the area, with three main 
settlements (Kumane Mane, Nikilama and Lepalama), and a tendency 
for groups of four or five houses to be clustered together at garden 
sites. Twenty six (58 per cent) of the households interviewed had more 
than one residence. The general pattern was for a family to live in one 
house for the greater part of the year, but to spend short spells at their 
other home or homes. In some cases, the secondary homes were 
garden houses. Map 6.1 shows the location of the houses (not all of 
which were primary places of residence) revealed in a December 1991 
air photograph, and highlights the scattered nature of the population. 
The population was also very mobile, with people 'commuting' to 
Yuyan, Apalaka and Yarik on a daily basis. Some residents had 
departed the area on a more permanent basis, because the Nikilama 
and Lepalama areas were isolated, even by comparison to Yuyan, and 
they evidently wanted to get closer to the road and all the benefits that 
this would bring, or was thought likely to bring. More recently, 
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individuals and family groups had utilised their links with Tuanda, 
Tieni and other clans to gain better access to the material benefits of 
mine development, and this had further consequences for the proposed 
relocation programme which are discussed later in this chapter. 
Social infrastructure 
This section is based on the responses to interview questions about 
housing, water supply, cooking, cleaning and toilet facilities, with the 
addition of some basic information about access to health and 
educational facilities. 
Two broad types of housing could be distinguished 
.. the 'true' Porgeran house has a low, rectangular profile, with 
a timber frame, double thickness pandanus walls, a palisade 
of vertical or horizontal timber and a pandanus roof 
.. the 'imported' type has a high-pitched roof and square 
design, with kunai thatch being used as roofing material, 
and woven bamboo 'blind' being used for the walls. 
In practice, the distinction had already broken down, because the area 
displayed a wide range of house designs and materials. Canvas and 
heavy nylon sheets ('sails') were found on roofs, there were several 
houses on stilts (a design imported from the Hewa people), and 
cardboard and timber were common wall materials. Of the 59 houses 
which we surveyed, only eight were 'true' Porgeran houses. One 
relocation house had already been built in the area, although the owner 
was not using it because he worked for the PJV and lived in Yarik. 
Cooking was generally done inside the main house over an open 
fire. Only nine (20 per cent) of the households surveyed had a separate 
'haus kuk'. The relocation house was the only one with a stove. 
Firewood was the source of fuel for all of those in the survey. Creeks 
and streams were the main source of water for all the houses except 
for the one relocation house, which had a rainwater tank. For this 
reason, most of the houses were located relatively close to the water 
supply, although the ridge-top settlements were some distance from 
the creeks. Forty-four gallon plastic drums were used as an additional 
store of water by some households. Most of the streams and creeks in 
the area were used by one or more households, but the Kaiya River 
had never been an important source of drinking water, and was 
certainly not used for this purpose in 1993. The Kaiya river was 
previously used for bathing and washing by some households, but 
these activities were now confined to the smaller creeks and streams. 
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All toilets were of the basic pit type (some not even covered) except 
for the relocation house, which had an improved pit, with a concrete 
floor and corrugated iron walls and roof. 
The area apparently had an aid post at Nikilama for some time, but 
this had since been closed, and the nearest medical facility was the aid 
post at Yarik. Bonnell (Chapter 2) has highlighted the serious shortage of 
reliable information about the health status of Porgerans and the 
performance of the local health services throughout the Porgera area, and 
we were unable to obtain any better data for the Kaiya area. Like other 
Porgerans, the Kewai had certainly gained better access to educational 
facilities since 1991. The nearest community school was at Apalaka, and 
there was another one at Yuyan. However, staff resources in both schools 
were stretched, with five teachers for 225 pupils up to Grade 3 at Yuyan, 
and three teachers for 145 pupils up to Grade 1 at Apalaka. Eighty-one of 
the 384 people in our survey had schooling of some kind, though just 26 
of the children were currently attending school. 
Access to this particular part of the Porgera Valley was generally 
difficult. The area had no direct vehicular access, the closest being the 
road from Mungalep to Yuyan (see Map 1.1). People had previously 
gained access to other parts of Porgera along tracks to Yuyan or by 
crossing the Kaiya River. In mid 1993, the Porgera Development 
Authority erected a new footbridge over the river, between Lepalama 
and Yarik. At least eight helipads dotted the area, providing 
convenient access for PJV Lands and Community Relations staff. 
Two churches were active in the area: the Seventh Day Adventist 
church had a lay-preacher, church and compound area at Nikilama 
(with a congregation estimated to be roughly 200 people), while the 
Apostolics had a church at Lepalama. There was a volleyball court at 
Nikilama which was in regular use. Alcohol was not a major problem 
for the community: we were told on several occasions that drinking 
was something that happened at Apalaka or Yarik, not on their side of 
the river, even though some Kewai did presumably cross the river to 
partake in this activity. In the survey of expenditure patterns 
discussed below, no-one reported any spending on alcohol in the 
previous two weeks, and this might have been due to the strength of 
the Adventist church. 
Economic status 
Given its proximity to the alluvial gold of the Kaiya River, this area 
has had longer and greater exposure to the cash economy than other 
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parts of Porgera.2 Until recently, the Kewai were heavily involved in 
alluvial mining, and even in 1993, this was still the largest source of 
income for the local residents. Although this was already a 
diminishing resource, the Kewai, along with others along the Kaiya 
and the Porgera, were due to be compensated for their loss of access to 
it. Nevertheless, the Kewai community is one in which average 
incomes had probably dropped since the start of construction in 1989, 
and this may have had some bearing on the level of expectations 
within the community. 
I shall now discuss the economic status of the Kewai people in 1993 
with reference to the results of our survey, looking specifically at 
amounts and sources of income and expenditure, material wealth and 
assets, and food eaten in the previous 24 hours. The survey revealed 
that the Kewai had a variety of sources of income, the most significant 
of which was alluvial mining. Table 6.1 compares the Kewai figures 
with those obtained in 1992 for other areas of the Porgera Valley (see 
Table 3.8). Table 6.1 highlights several other features of the Kewai 
situation. The figures for royalties and occupation fees were lower 
than elsewhere, while the proportion of households which had 
received PJV compensation was higher, although the value of this 
compensation to date had been relatively low. Almost 50 per cent of 
the households were involved in the sale of crops or produce. The 
proportion involved in a business (11 per cent) was lower than in all 
other parts of the Porgera Valley we surveyed in 1992, but the number 
and proportion (30 per cent) of households involved in alluvial 
Table 6.1 Annual value and distribution of cash income for the Kewai 
community (1993) compared with other parts of Porgera 
(1992) 
1992 Porgera survey (N=122) 1993 Kewai survey (N=4S) 
Income sources Income No. of Kina Income No. of Kina 
(kina) recipients per (kina) recipients per 
recipient recipient 
Royalties 41,308 43 961 1,045 8 131 
Occupation fees 8,454 33 256 140 140 
PJV compensation 241,250 32 7,539 14,254 16 891 
Cash cropping 6,054 41 148 4,610 22 210 
Alluvial mining 18,150 14 1,296 27,577 14 1,970 
No. in business n.a. 30 n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. 
Source: Porgera household survey and Kaiya household survey. 
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mining, and the value of that activity to the community, were 
significantly greater than they were elsewhere in the valley.3 
The data obtained from survey questions relating to income 
received in the past two weeks are shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. 
Sixteen people in the 45 households we surveyed were in paid 
employment. A total of K5,004 was received by these households at an 
average of Kll1.20 per household for the fortnight. The information 
was significantly skewed by one household, which had received a 
K2,OOO compensation payment from PJV during the period in 
question. This was left in the data because it appears to be typical of 
the way that the local economy functions, with a sequence of 
'windfalls' of various sizes and sources occurring to different 
households throughout the year. The data show that 
.. excluding the large compensation payment, alluvial mining and 
money from wantoks provided the greatest source of income to 
the community; PJV wages accounted for 11 per cent of the 
income received, though this figure is certainly an underestimate, 
as several household heads did not know how much money 
their adult children had brought home in wages from PJV 
.. the Kewai income figures were generally below those 
previously found in other parts of Porgera (with the 
exception of Tipinini) in our income and expenditure 
survey.4 There were variations in the significance of the 
'other' category for the Kewai (67 per cent against 5 per cent 
in the rest of Porgera), the lesser importance of wages from 
any source (15 per cent against 48 per cent), and the 
complete absence of any profits from businesses, which 
accounted for 28 per cent of income in the 1992 Porgera-
wide survey (see Chapter 3) 
.. ten households (22 per cent) reported no income for the two 
week period. 
Table 6.2 is based on the answers given to survey questions about 
the ownership of a range of material assets.5 Compared to other parts 
of Porgera, the Kewai generally had fewer material goods than those 
inside or close to the SML, and similar amounts of assets to those in 
Tipinini. This is somewhat surprising, given the long history of 
alluvial mining, and may relate to a focus on consumption rather than 
investment in goods or businesses. Clark (1993) has postulated that 
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there may have been cultural constraints against using the alluvial 
gold from Mount Kare for investment purposes, and the same 
argument may apply in this case. 
This same constraint may also have influenced the patterns of 
investment revealed in Table 6.3. This table highlights both the low 
proportion of families with investments, and the low value of these 
investments, when compared to other parts of the Porgera Valley. The 
figures even understate the extent of this discrepancy, because one 
household accounted for the bulk of the total value (K12,000). The 
survey also revealed that the Kewai had contributed a total of KS,055 
and 132 pigs to traditional exchange (brideprice and compensation 
payments) in the previous 12 months, which meant an average of 
K179 and 2.9 pigs across the 45 households. Twelve households (27 
per cent of the sample) had contributed cash, while 17 households (40 
Table 6.2 Material assets of Kewai households, 1993 
Major assets % of households Minor assets No. per household 
Watch 20 Lamps 1.18 
Radio 27 Axes 2.16 
Tape recorder 16 Spades 2.09 
Sewing machine 4 Shoes 0.64 
Washing machine 0 Mattresses 2.22 
Fridge 2 Pots3.07 
Stove 0 Bush knives 2.09 
T.V. 0 Buckets 0.76 
Video 2 44 gallon drums 0.76 
Generator 2 Blankets 4.20 
Car 0 
Source: Kaiya household survey. 
Table 6.3 Investment patterns among the Kewai and other Porgeran 
communities 
Kewai community (1993) 









Source: Porgera household survey and Kaiya household survey. 






per cent of the sample) had contributed pigs. In other parts of Porgera, 
we had found that 63 per cent of households surveyed contributed 
cash, and 61 per cent contributed pigs, to ceremonial exchanges, which 
meant an average of K2203.18 and 5.4 pigs per household (see Chapter 
3). In summary, our measures of material wealth did not reflect the 
long history of alluvial mining in the Kaiya area, possibly because of 
cultural factors, or else because the mobility of local residents was 
associated with the movement of money out of the area. 
The questions relating to expenditure in the last two weeks 
produced the results shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. Total expenditure 
amounted to K5,125.90, but here again, the figures for the value of 
different types of expenditure are skewed by the distribution to family 
members (included in the 'other' category) of the large compensation 
payment noted earlier. It may be noted that the amounts spent by a 
large proportion of households on store-bought food were 
significantly higher than those recorded in the 1992 Porgera household 
survey, where this category accounted for just 8 per cent of the value 
of expenditure (see Chapter 3).6 On the other hand, savings and 
investments were significantly lower than those recorded in the earlier 
survey-4 per cent as against 32 per cent. 
We do not have much information regarding Kewai people's 
involvement in business. We saw four trade stores during our surveys, 
but all were closed. Three PJV field contracts for the filling of gabion 
baskets had been awarded to the 'Kewai Clan', and several individuals 
had obtained other field contracts for the construction of relocation 
homes, liaison services and the like. Of the 45 households interviewed, 
five were involved in one or more businesses. Four of these had one 
trade store each, while the fifth family had four trade stores, three 
PMV s, and some unspecified PJV contracts. It is likely that individuals 
were involved in other businesses outside the area, but the only 
evidence of this was the five trade stores in Apalaka and Yarik owned 
by Kewai people which we came across in survey work in early 1994. 
The responses to the question about food eaten in the previous 24 
hours revealed some interesting patterns which clearly reflect the 
economic position of the Kewai people. Table 6.4 shows that, 
compared to other parts of Porgera, the Kewai were involved 
significantly in both the cash and subsistence economies. All reported 
eating kaukau (sweet potato), and 79 per cent reported eating greens, 
from their own gardens. These proportions were significantly greater 
than those found in other parts of the valley, with the exception of the 
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Tipinini and Mungalep communities (see Table 5.5), indicating that 
garden food retained a major role in the Kewai economy. It should also 
be noted that 67 per cent of Kewai households reported eating 
pandanus, and 33 per cent reported eating taro, from their own 
gardens in the previous 24 hours. At the same time, the figures 
recorded for rice and tinned fish (70 and 72 per cent respectively) were 
as high as those previously found in the most store-dependent parts of 
the SML. This shows that these communities have the cash to pay for 
such items, and may also reflect changes in dietary patterns that have 
occurred as a result of long exposure to the cash economy. It reinforces 
the view that the availability of cash has brought about a 
'consumption' focus among the Kewai. 
The gardening system 
As in other parts of Porgera, the gardening system is based around 
mounded sweet potato, with a range of other crops also being 
cultivated (see Chapter 5). In our survey of the Kaiya area, we 
measured 91 current gardens, using a tape and an inclinometer, which 
represented 67 per cent of the total of 136 gardens belonging to the 45 
Kaiya households in the survey. The gardens which were not surveyed 
were all at some distance from the houses, and often the interviewees 
were not prepared to spend the time required to take us to them. The 
average size of gardens surveyed was 2,024m2, less than that which we 
found at Apalaka (8,061m2) but similar to that found at Kulapi (2,797 m2). 
Table 6.5 compares the data obtained for those 26 Kewai households 
whose total garden area was surveyed with the corresponding data 
obtained in the Apalaka and Kulapi garden surveys (see Chapter 5). If 
the average garden size is used as a surrogate for the 45 Kewai 
gardens we did not measure, then the average garden area per 
household for the full sample comes to 6,118m2• This is higher than the 
Table 6.4 Percentage of Kewai and other Porgeran community 
members consuming food types in the previous 24 hours 
Kewai community (1993) 
Other Porgeran (1992) 
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Source: Porgera diet survey and Kaiya household survey. 
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Table 6.5 Households with total garden area surveyed in Apalaka, 
Kulapi and Kaiya 
Variable Apalaka Kulapi Kewai 
Households 11 13 26 
Mean size per garden 7,173m2 2,890m2 1 ,958m2 
Mean gardens per household 1.4 1.54 2.11 
Mean household garden area 10,043m2 4,450.4m2 4,486.3m2 
Household garden area range 720-32 ,250m2 425-23,608m2 O-14,225m2 
Mean household size 7.9 11.6 8.47 
Mean pigs per household 2.8 2.4 2.2 
Mean slope angle 30° (14 slopes) 16° (20 slopes) 21 ° (64 
slopes) 
Source: Apalaka, Kulapi and Kaiya garden surveys. 
figure for the 17 Kulapi households surveyed (5,314 m 2), but well 
down on the figure for the 22 Apalaka households (20,959 m2). 
One notable feature of the Kewai gardens was the size of the 
mounds, with a high proportion of new small mounds with one vine 
per mound. It was notable that, unlike the situation at Apalaka, these 
smaller mounds were found on slopes of all angles, not just steeper 
slopes. This may have been the result of a misunderstanding of the 
compensation agreement, whereby the gardeners were under the 
impression that every mound, regardless of size, would be eligible for 
the same amount of compensation. We also noted some unusual 
gardening techniques: large mounds (1.5m in diameter, 0.75m in 
height), with each of the ten or so vines planted on a small mound on 
top of the large mound, and mixed mounds, with a variety of crops 
(pitpit, taro, sugarcane) growing on the mounds in addition to sweet 
potato. Although there were a large number of new gardens, it was 
not clear whether these were the number that would normally be 
expected, or whether they reflected the number of new immigrants 
into the area, or represented an attempt by the existing residents to put 
in extra gardens in the expectation of compensation.7 At the same 
time, the small average number of pigs per household was almost 
certainly related to the presence of the Seventh Day Adventist church 
at Nikilama, because 22 households, mainly in that area, claimed to 
have no pigs. 
Although an estimation of garden area from air photographs is 
difficult for a number of reasons (see Chapter 5), it is apparent from 
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the 1991 series that around 35 per cent of the area bounded by the 
Kaiya River and the ridgeline, between the Anjolek and the Kogai, was 
covered by current or recent gardens (see Map 6.2). This was 
approximately half of the proportion estimated for Apalaka. There 
were several new gardens which would not have shown up on the 
1991 photographs, but primary forest still accounted for well over half 
of the total area. The gardening system thus appeared to be far less 
stressed than that of Apalaka or Kulapi. There was still ample bush 
and fallow land to support the current population under the present 
agricultural system. However, to judge by what had occurred at 
Apalaka and Yarik since the original relocation exercise, this situation 
was likely to change rapidly over the course of the following year. The 
main factors in this process would be the physical loss of land due to 
the spoil, the construction of roads and relocation houses, and the 
greater number of people that the area would have to support 
following the immigration which was expected to occur. 
Political situation 
The development of the Porgera gold mine over the previous six years 
had brought profound changes to most communities within the SML 
and along the highway from Tipinini to Alipis. Large cash payments 
for loss of land, the relocation programme, a large influx of non-
Porgerans, and the creation of new employment and business 
opportunities had brought about a range of other social, economic and 
political changes. One of the most significant of these was the growth 
of Porgeran political organisation, as represented by the Landowners' 
Association, the Community Issues Committee (CIC), the Women's 
Association, and a variety of youth and church groups. 
Yet the Kewai community had been substantially sidelined by this 
process, and had indeed lost the central position which the alluvial 
resources of the Kaiya River had previously bestowed on them. Before 
the creation of the Kaiya LMP Committee, the churches were the only 
significant 'political' organisations in the area, and Pawe Lembopa, as 
the local councillor and CIC member, was the only link to the larger 
Porgeran political scene. The creation of the LMP had now led to a 
further degree of political organisation amongst these people, and gave 
the community much greater direct access to senior PJV personnel. Like 
the SML landowners, their land would now be earning money for them. 
Bonnell's comments on the social, economic and political role of 
women in Ipili culture (Chapter 2) are also relevant to the Kewai 

































































































































































































































situation. In 1993, local women's economic role was still largely confined 
to the subsistence sector, although there were a number of Kewai women 
employed by the PN With their social status and political influence still 
largely confined to the private sphere, women were unlikely to be in a 
position to influence important decisions and processes concerned with 
the impending programme of relocation and compensation. 
Hopes, aspirations, expectations and fears 
As part of the survey we asked the respondents to comment on their 
hopes and fears for the future. We prompted them with questions 
concerning the movement of outsiders into the area, the facilities 
which they would like to see, and their concerns about the 
compensation and relocation programme. The responses indicated 
that people were generally not opposed to the idea of losing some of 
their land to the spoil, or to the proposed compensation and relocation 
programme. 
From the 45 households covered in the survey, the numbers giving 
specific responses to these questions were as follows. 
.. The most sought-after facilities were a school (15 
respondents), an aid post (also 15), road construction and 
improvements (12), a permanent bridge (10), a shopping 
centre or large trade store (8), a government agricultural 
station (8), a new church (6), a locally owned PMV (4), and a 
recreation centre. 
.. Two respondents expressed concern about the loss of land to 
road construction, and one about the loss to the PJV generally. 
.. Seventeen respondents commented on the loss of income 
from alluvial mining due to the waste dump, while eight 
specifically wanted compensation for this. Seven thought 
that the increased sediment in the river was already affecting 
their gardens, and one mentioned the impact on hunting by 
the river bank. Three said that the company should not 
dump waste into the river, and four believed that it should 
carry out an environmental impact study before dumping 
any more. Three people simply stated that 'the river is 
polluted', and one pointed out that the people needed the 
river for laundry and bathing. 
.. Eleven respondents said that they did not want people 
relocating to their area, and 13 wanted compensation from 
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the PJV or the people themselves if this were to happen. 
Three people said they had no problem with this prospect. 
.. Nine respondents were concerned about the question of 
where they could be relocated, and 18 were worried about 
the level of compensation which they would receive for the 
loss of land (including gardens) or for relocation itself. Two 
people said that they would not move if the compensation 
was inadequate. Four people wanted the company to supply 
them with relocation houses, and not just to compensate 
them for moving, while three said that they wanted bigger 
relocation homes than those previously built in Apalaka. 
One person wanted business contracts with the PJV as part 
of the compensation package. 
.. Two respondents remarked that the Kewai had so far missed 
out on the benefits of mine development, and had been 'cut-
off' and 'ignored' by the company, which had been dealing 
only with the SML landowners. Two others felt that there 
had been an unfair distribution of benefits to 'outsiders'. 
It Five respondents had no comments, or were unsure what to 
say, in response to all of our queries. 
These concerns were generally much the same as those brought up by 
community representatives in meetings with PJV staff, the minutes of 
which were made available to me. In many cases, their own questions 
reflected some impatience about the timing of road construction and 
the payment of compensation for the alluvial resource, as well as a 
desire to have some input into the scope and form of the relocation 
programme, including the route of the road. 
The impact of the mine on the Kaiya 
By the end of 1993, the Kewai had experienced little material impact 
from mine development, aside from the loss of access to the alluvial 
resource in the Kaiya River due to sedimentation associated with the 
development of the waste dumps in the Mungrenk and Anjolek 
creeks. Although the extent of the dumping had so far been limited, 
the river was already carrying an increased sediment load which was 
enough to deter all but the most determined alluvial miners. It was 
clear that this resource had provided an important source of cash for 
the Kewai for a number of years, and the loss of access to it had 
affected the incomes of the local people, as well as their attitudes 
towards the mine development as a whole. This loss was almost 
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always the first point which our respondents raised in the interviews, 
and some seemed to be unaware of the fact that the level of 
compensation for it had already been agreed, and that payment would 
take place soon. 
The area had also been affected by the immigration of epa atene, 
especially relatives from Paiela, who wanted to move closer to the 
mine in order to gain a share of the benefits distributed by the 
company, including the relocation and compensation package which 
had recently been put in place. To some extent, this movement 
reflected the misinformation that was circulating in the area: one 
person said that he had been told that the loss of any house, regardless 
of condition, size or type, would make him eligible for relocation. At 
the same time, the Kewai community's' grandstand view' of the 
growth of mine facilities and the settlements at Apalaka, Yarik, Olonga 
and Timorope had raised local expectations to the point where they 
appeared (to PJV staff working in the area) to be much higher than 
they had been before the relocation programme in the SML during 
1988 and 1989. People now wanted roads, schools, aid posts, trade 
stores and cash, and almost everyone expected to receive a relocation 
package. These unrealistic expectations would obviously have some 
impact on local perceptions of the compensation paid for the Anjolek 
waste dump, not only by those directly affected, but also by other 
members of the local community. 
The Anjolek dump 
The Anjolek erodible dump was a part of the overall waste rock 
disposal plan for the Porgera gold mine approved by the PNG 
Department of Environment and Conservation. By March 1994, the 
plan was to dump a total of 72 million tonnes (mt) of incompetent 
(easily eroded) waste material into the head of the Anjolek Creek over 
the following nine years. Another 25mt of colluvium was expected to 
enter the Kaiya river system from the construction of the Mungarenk 
'displacement dump', which was intended to store competent 
material. In the first two years of dumping, over 40mt of incompetent 
material was expected to be delivered into the river system. Parker 
(1992) predicted that, given the proposed dumping schedule, the 
Anjolek run out zone would reach its maximum extent at the 
beginning of 1997, by which time the toe would have migrated some 
two kilometres into the upper Porgera. The toe was then expected to 
retreat to the Kaiya-Pongema confluence, remain there for several 
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years, and then retreat rapidly up the Kaiya with the reduction in the 
rate of dumping. By the end of dumping (in 2002), after delivering 
97mt of material to the system, the runout zone was predicted to have 
just 13.3mt of sediment stored in it (down from a maximum of 3Imt), 
while all the other material should have been carried further 
downstream by fluvial action, as had already occurred with spoil from 
the Anawe dump. 
Parker (1992) estimated that the mudflow would aggrade the bed 
of the Kaiya River, between the Anjolek and Pongema confluences, by 
up to 35m below Apalaka to about 15m at the junction with Taro 
Creek. This aggradation was expected to occur quite rapidly, with the 
toe of the slide reaching the confluence with Taro Creek by the 
beginning of 1995. The mudflow might also reactivate a number of 
large, currently dormant landslides. It was this combination of 
predicted physical effects which had resulted in the negotiation of the 
proposed compensation and relocation package for the Kaiya LMP. 
An examination of the 1991 and 1993 air photographs reveals that 
around 60 per cent of Kewai gardens then fell within the LMP 
boundary, which had been established by reference to the maximum 
possible extent of the impact of the mudflow. A significant proportion 
of these (around 25 per cent) were also within the inner 'compensation 
envelope', which is the area that would definitely be lost to the spoil 
(see Map 6.3). The immediate impact of the dumping of the spoil 
would then be the loss of 15 per cent of the total Kewai garden area. 
While this figure itself is not very high, our own observations in the 
field indicated that the gardens nearest to the river were among the 
most productive. 
The proposed compensation and relocation programme 
The agreement which had been signed between the PJV and the clans 
affected by the proposed Anjolek dump (including the Kewai) was the 
outcome of nine months of negotiation between the various 
landowner agents and PJV representatives. The most significant 
components of this agreement were the relocation package and the 
compensation package. 
The relocation component stated that 
In respect of affected landholders' families, the PJV will: (i) construct 
relocation houses to replace their vacated houses, such relocation 
houses to be of the same construction and built to the same standards 


























































































































































































































































as offered in respect of families relocated for the purposes of the PJV's 
activities under its Special Mining Lease No. 1 - Porgera, such houses 
to be wired to Elcom standards and complete with an external power 
box ready for connection; (ii) provide road access to the main cluster of 
relocation houses; 
The key phrase in the above is 'affected landholders' families', defined 
in the agreement as 
True Landholders (YUU ANDUANE) who had prior to 3rd August 
1992 and still have a primary residence within the LMP area. These 
individuals will appear in the genealogies which are being prepared 
and will be agreed between the PJV and the relevant Landholders; 
Long term relatives, particularly WANA, married into the clan and 
who have a primary residence prior to 3rd August 1992 in the above 
area; and 
Long-term invited outsiders (EPG ATENE) of ten (10) years permanent 
residence in the above area. 
Given the general mobility of the population, and especially the recent 
movements towards the roads and the SML communities, there were 
a significant number of Kewai people who would simply not be 
eligible for relocation under the terms of the agreement, because 
their main place of residence was now outside the LMP area. 
Likewise, the epa atene who had moved in over the last five years 
would not be eligible. 
The relocation package also included the following undertakings 
by the PJV 
.. agreement to meet the reasonable costs of relocating each 
family of eligible landholders, with a payment of Kl,OOO to 
the head of each family for hardship and disturbance, and 
provision of rations to commence on the date on which the 
family no longer had access to traditional gardens, and to 
continue until the food gardens in the new locations were ready 
to harvest, or else for a maximum period of nine months 
.. sympathetic examination of the situation of any relocated 
landowners who were affected in a special or unusual 
manner 
.. construction of an aid post by the main cluster of relocation 
houses, with an extra relocation house for the orderly, subject 
to agreement by the government to staff this facility and 
supply appropriate drugs and medicines 
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.. construction of two more relocation houses for the church 
pastors, although these would remain the property of the 
congregations rather than the pastors 
.. clearing of a sports area for a basketball court and volleyball 
court, and supply of initial sporting equipment for these 
.. construction and maintenance of two footbridges across the 
Kaiya River. 
According to the agreement, relocation would occur' as 
necessitated by the PJV's activities'. Relocation of 40 households in the 
Anjolek area, on the southern side of the Kaiya River, was already 
underway by early 1994. On the northern side, an assessment of the 
value of the forest and 'improvements' in the inner envelope had 
already been completed, and those households which were eligible for 
relocation had been identified. At that stage it appeared that 40 Kewai 
families were due for relocation around the middle of 1994, although 
the actual effects of the spoil might cause this number to increase. 
Recent arguments between the company and the community, and also 
within the community itself, had concentrated on the question of who 
should get a relocation house. Many of the community representatives 
appeared to be arguing less in terms of eligibility under the agreement 
than in terms of 'political correctness', which in this case meant a 
preference for people with some standing in the community. 
The compensation package stipulated rates for various economic 
and non-economic trees, which were based on those paid under the 
SML compensation agreement. These rates were generally somewhat 
higher than those recommended by the Valuer-General, which had last 
been revised in November 1993 (DLPP 1993). For example, a mature 
pandanus (karuka) was valued at K8 in the Valuer-General's schedule, 
Table 6.6 Rates of annual fees payable for the Kaiya lMP 
Type of payment Kina per hectare 
Bush and nuisance compensation 12.30 
Cleared land 9.22 
Damaged land 
Lost land 
Non-Renewable Resources Fund 
Occupation fee 
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but K12 in the Kaiya LMP compensation agreement. Compensation 
payments of this type had already started within the LMP area, 
primarily in respect of the damage done by clearing helipads and by 
surveying and cutting the LMP boundary. By the end of 1993, a total of 
32 claims had been paid, with a total value of K28,848.50. The 
distribution lists contained 216 names, but there was some 
duplication, as some individuals received a share of as many as nine 
of the claims. There were 146 different individuals named on the lists, 
and their receipts ranged from K3,172.60 down to K17.40, with an 
average of K197.59 per person. 
Since the inner envelope contained around eighty hectares of 
Kewai land, and the minimum PJV compensation payment for a 
hectare of bush was K9,OOO, then the Kewai could expect a minimum 
of K720,OOO cash compensation for the loss of these eighty hectares. 
Given that some of the inner envelope consisted of gardens, and the 
compensation rates for these were more than K14,OOO per hectare, the 
total was certain to exceed K1 million. The compensation to be paid 
for the damage caused by building the relocation road to Lepalama 
would make a substantial addition to this total. 
The compensation package also established the rates of the annual 
fees to be paid over the whole LMP area, under the various categories 
shown in Table 6.6. The fees for cleared, damaged and lost land were 
mutually inclusive, so that K27.67 would be paid for a hectare of 
damaged land and K49.19 for a hectare of lost land. The Non-
Renewable Resources Fund was to consist of a series of trust funds 
established 'for the benefit of the landowners and other people of the 
Porgera area'. If we assume that the Kewai had primary rights to 387 
hectares of land inside the LMP, then their total annual receipts under 
this element of the package would be worth at least K9,OOO, and might 
turn out to be worth twice that amount. 
Separate compensation agreements had been negotiated for the 
loss of access to the alluvial resource and for the sedimentation of the 
river system. The agreement for the alluvials involved a single lump 
sum of K311,755 'to be invested or distributed as directed by the 
landowner representatives' of the clans who lived along the Kaiya, 
between the Anjolek and Pongema junctions. The agreement for the 
sedimentation was based on a rate of 1 toea per tonne of material 
dumped in the failing dumps, and in this case also, the distribution 
was to be determined by the landowner representatives. At the end of 
1993, both of these 'heads of agreement' were awaiting government 
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approval of the genealogical studies being carried out by the company 
to determine which groups would be eligible for these monies. 
Overall, the compensation and relocation package offered 
significant benefits for the Kewai, including better access to and from 
the area, improved access to health facilities, significant amounts of 
cash compensation, and superior housing for many local families. 
However, it was already evident that such benefits had not 
guaranteed a long-term improvement in the quality of life (at least in 
Western terms) for the residents of the SML communities. Like them, 
the Kewai stood to lose a large proportion of their lower-altitude 
garden land, and the likely influx of people to the area would put 
further pressure on the remaining land. 
It could also be argued that some Kewai people would not be 
adequately compensated for their losses under the terms of the 
compensation package. For example, the rates of payment for some 
economic crops, albeit higher than those recommended by the Valuer-
General, could still be said to seriously underestimate their current 
value. We watched one morning as six large clusters of nuts were 
knocked from one pandanus tree, and were reliably informed that 
each of these clusters could fetch K4 in Apalaka, or up to KI0 if they 
were roasted and transported to Wabag for sale. While the harvest of 
six nuts from one tree is unusual, and other studies generally give a 
figure of one or two nuts per tree per year (Rose 1982:164), it is hard to 
see how the Kewai would be adequately compensated for the 
permanent loss of pandanus trees by the one-off payment of K12 for a 
mature tree. Such problems may reflect the way that certain crops 
have acquired market values in addition to their value as subsistence 
resources, and it is not clear how they might be resolved. It would not 
be equitable to change the rate paid to the Kewai alone, while a 
substantial increase in the rate paid for pandanus under all 
compensation agreements would probably call into question the 
relative value of some other crops, which might in turn necessitate the 
renegotiation of all these agreements. 
Conclusions 
In 1993, the Kaiya LMP area contained a fairly small population living 
in a relatively isolated situation. They had formerly had access to 
alluvial gold in the Kaiya River and ample land suitable for gardens. 
Many of the Kewai have moved from the area (though not 
permanently) to gain better access to the road at Yuyan and, more 
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recently, the benefits of mine development at Apalaka and Yarik. They 
had lost income in recent years as a result of the increasing 
sedimentation of the Kaiya. Our survey evidence suggests the 
existence of well-established cash consumption patterns, especially 
relating to the purchase of food, and yet the subsistence sector 
remained an integral part of the local economy. 
The creation of the Anjolek failing waste dump was about to bring 
huge changes to the Kewai community. There were great expectations 
that the compensation and relocation package would bring substantial 
benefits to all, and some people were bound to be disillusioned at the 
eventual distribution of the benefits, while a minimum of 80 hectares of 
land would be lost, including 15 per cent of the current gardening area. 
The evidence from other parts of the Porgera Valley, as discussed in 
previous chapters of this volume, shows that the benefits do not 
necessarily mean a positive long-term change for the communities 
which receive them. In particular, cash compensation had mostly been 
consumed or poorly invested, and there were relatively few 
individuals who were in a secure financial position or who had 
secured long-term benefits from such income. These problems were 
not a function of the compensation packages themselves, which were 
seen to be adequate by those who received them, and which appeared 
quite generous to an outsider like myself. But once payments had been 
made or benefits distributed, there was little follow-up action by 
company or (more significantly) government officers to assist and 
advise the recipients on such matters as the best way to invest their 
money or maintain their houses. 
In the Kewai case, the limited flow of information from the mining 
company to the local community was reflected in the abundance of 
false rumours. Several people told us, for example, that they were 
expecting a relocation because they had been told that everyone 
would get a house, and there was widespread ignorance of the terms 
of the compensation agreement for the alluvial gold resource. These 
rumours were feeding the expectations of the local people, while 
senior company personnel placed too much reliance on local 
representatives to pass on the information derived from formal 
meetings between them. These lines of communication did not seem to 
be working too well, either in the Kaiya area or in the rest of the 
Porgera Valley. 
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Notes 
1 The area of the new LMP which lay south of the Kaiya River 
(below Mungalep) was specifically excluded from our terms of 
reference. 
2 Descendants of Joe Searson, the first of the long-term miners who 
arrived in 1948, still live at Kumane Mane. 
3 Although we did not collect systematic data on this point, it 
appeared that much of the current alluvial mining was being 
carried out on irregular trips to Mount Kare, where the Kewai had 
some land rights, but we also saw some alluvial miners working 
(successfully) in the Kaiya area. 
4 It is important to note that the income and expenditure survey 
carried out in late 1992 was directed at individuals, whereas the 
current survey was included as part of a household survey, so 
direct comparison is not possible. 
5 These questions were of two types. In the case of larger or more 
expensive goods, a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer was recorded, while 
in the case of more common items, we asked how many of them 
each household had. In hindsight, it would probably have been 
better to ask the second type of question for all the goods. 
6 No spending on alcohol was reported in the Kaiya survey, although 
this was now included as a separate category of expenditure. 
7 There were two one-person households with no gardens at all. 
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Business as unusual 
Glenn Banks 
This chapter presents the results of four weeks fieldwork at Porgera 
during March 1994, arising in part from a recognition that my earlier 
account of the cash economy (Chapter 3) had not adequately 
addressed the role of 'business'. Since 1990, the value of Porgera Joint 
Venture (PJV) business contracts to local Porgeran businesses had been 
equivalent to the value of all cash payments made by the company in 
the form of compensation, wages and royalties. Given its size, political 
importance and recent history, the business sector in Porgera was a 
major 'issue' in the local community. 
My earlier discussion of this issue left a number of important 
questions unresolved. 
.. Were the businesses owned by Porgerans, or did they lease 
them to, or act as front-men for, larger non-Porgeran 
business interests? 
.. Were the 'Porgeran' business owners native to the Porgera 
Valley or were they 'new' Porgerans? 
.. How were the businesses run, did they have light or heavy 
debt burdens, and what was being done with the profits? 
The rationale for the present study was to 
.. provide an independent review for the company, the 
government and the local community of the results of five 
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years of business development at Porgera associated with 
the construction and operation of the Porgera gold mine 
• provide background material for the review of the Porgera 
Joint Venture's Business Development Plan; and 
• provide a baseline against which the future growth and 
development of the business sector in Porgera could be 
monitored. 
A variety of methods were employed in this study. A survey of all 
formal businesses in the valley was carried out in March 1994, locating 
them on a series of maps, interviewing the owners and establishing a 
database for future information. Our definition of a 'formal' business 
entailed the possession of a large asset such as a building, public 
motor vehicle (PMV) or plant of some kind, thus excluding market 
traders and sellers of second-hand clothes (see Chapter 2). 
In some cases, the owners were not available, in which case the 
interviews were held with the manager or staff of the business. 
Information collected included: the type and ownership of the 
business; its history (including the origin of the initial capital); the 
value of stock, turnover, cash, credit, profits and investments; the 
extent and nature of debt; the accounting system used; business or 
management training levels; employees and wages; problems being 
faced; the owner's future plans; and the type of assistance required 
from the government and the mining company. 
As with all surveys of this type, the quality of the information 
collected relies heavily on the honesty and knowledge of the owner 
concerned. For nearly all the smaller operations, the information 
relating to turnover, profit, credit and stock levels is the store owner's 
own estimate, and in some cases these appear unlikely. Usually, these 
are cases where the owner had little idea of the figures concerned, 
rather than a deliberate intention to mislead, and this serves to 
underline the informal way in which these 'formal' business 
operations were being run. In most cases, we were able to check that 
the figures for stock were reasonably accurate, simply by looking at 
the amount of stock on the shelves. Occasionally, lists of customers 
with outstanding credit were displayed or produced for us to check. 
The relative number of customers in different stores could be roughly 
confirmed simply by counting the number who entered during the 20-
30 minutes that we were in the store carrying out the interview. 
The information collected on each business varied along a 
continuum, from those where only the basic dimensions of the 
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building and its location were recorded, through those where we were 
able to collect limited information about its ownership, to those where 
the entire questionnaire was completed. Some businesses were missed 
as a result of our reliance on the road system: for example, four small 
closed trade stores were present in the Kaiya LMP area in late 1993 
(see Chapter 6). On the other hand, PMV business owners were 
virtually impossible to interview because they spent most of the day 
driving. However, most business operations with fixed assets were 
located very close to the road. 
PJV records of all formal business contracts (excluding labour-only 
contracts) were analysed and discussed with a range of parties, 
including landowner representatives. Discussions about business at 
Porgera were held with a number of people, including PJV staff, 
Porgera Development Authority staff, business owners and managers, 
landowner representatives, and Enga Provincial Government staff. 
Several significant Porgeran businessmenl were interviewed in depth, 
to provide 'profiles' and to gain an insight into the factors behind their 
relative success. Finally, a return visit to Porgera on unrelated 
fieldwork in late 1994 allowed the opportunity to update and correct 
the data in an earlier draft. 
Business at Porgera: some issues 
In this section, I discuss some general issues which have influenced 
the development of business at Porgera. These include the philosophy 
behind business development, the basic constraints of both the 
Porgeran setting and the mine development, the limitations of 
Porgeran attitudes to business, and the issue of umbrella companies 
verses multiple business entities. 
The philosophy of business development at resource projects 
Local and provincial business development has been an integral part 
of resource developments in Papua New Guinea for some time. 
Initially, the mining development agreements placed emphasis on the 
local (i.e. Papua New Guinea) supply of goods, along with 
employment, training and localisation issues. Included in the original 
1967 Bougainville Copper Agreement was a requirement (Clause 9(a)) 
that, 'so far as is reasonably and economically practical', the company 
should use supplies, plant, machinery and equipment manufactured 
or produced in the country. The renegotiated 1974 agreement 
contained a new clause (Clause lOA) which related to the conduct of 
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the company's business advisory services. These were to be made 
available on 'as widespread a basis as is reasonably possible to all 
areas of the Bougainville District'. The second and final section of this 
clause stated that the company 'shall not be required to spend more on 
its said business advisory services in any year than the amount so 
spent by it in the year ending the 31st December 1974'. 
The original 1976 Ok Tedi Agreement contained a large section on 
local business development. In summary, this stated that 
.. the company was to promote, support, encourage and lend 
assistance to establishment of local businesses in the area, 
particularly those enterprises supplying goods and services 
to the project or the town 
.. the company was not obliged to lend money to any 
enterprise 
.. maximum use was to be made of Papua New Guinean sub-
contractors, where the price and quality of the service was 
comparable to those obtainable from elsewhere 
.. insofar as it was practical, the company was to give first 
preference to landowners 
.. at least one full time, experienced business development 
staff member was to be employed by the company 
.. a business development programme was to be prepared, 
making provision, where practical, for various specified 
contracting services, for training, and for various types of 
activities and assistance by the company; and 
.. the business development programme was to be reviewed 
annually, with a view to 'securing the maximum benefit to 
Papua New Guineans and local enterprises from the operations 
of the Company and the carrying out of the Project'. 
A draft of the Standard Mining Development Agreement which was 
prepared in late 1985 adopted the Ok Tedi requirements in Clause 21, 
relating to local supplies and business development. 
The Mining Development Contract for the Porgera mine 
development contained one clause (Clause 14) relating to local 
business development. This clause provided the formal context for the 
PJV business development programme 
14.1 The Joint Venturers, in consultation and co-operation with the 
State and the Engan Provincial Government, will: 
(a) Within nine (9) months of the effective date (12th May 1989), devise 
a business development programme which will encourage and assist 
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people from the Enga Province with preference to Porgerans, to 
establish businesses to supply materials, equipment and services to the 
Project, provided that the Joint Venturers shall not be obliged to grant 
or lend money or provide materials to any person or organisation, 
(b) Conduct an annual review of progress being made on the 
implementation of the business development programme and make 
such variations to it as may be required by changing circumstances, and 
(c) Employ full-time staff experienced in setting up and managing 
business enterprises 
i) To assist Papua New Guineans who wish to or have set up 
businesses to service the project; 
ii) To assist in the implementation of the business development 
programme and variations thereof; 
iii) To liaise with the appropriate officials from the State and the 
Enga Province; and 
iv) To provide advice and assistance in the development and 
implementation of long-term business enterprises which can 
continue after the Project is terminated. 
Similarly worded clauses were included in the agreements between 
the national government and the Enga Provincial Government, and 
between the national government and the Porgera landowners. 
Such negotiated guidelines and agreements are generally very 
broad, but in all cases they reflect a concern from the government that 
the projects provide a basis for local business development. A report 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prepared for the Papua 
New Guinea government in 1993 pointed out that business 
development programs and favoured status for PNG suppliers 
amounted to 'implicit taxes' on the operator which effectively lowered 
the national government's own taxation revenue from the project. The 
IMF believed that such implicit taxes were better replaced by direct 
income taxes (Callick 1993:4). O'Faircheallaigh (1985:238) has offered a 
different perspective, noting that 
It can be argued that a number of LDCs [including PNG] have 
concentrated too heavily on a revenue-maximising strategy and that 
the limited 'direct' economic impact of mining is in part due to their 
consequent failure to exploit other economic opportunities generated 
by mineral development. 
Business development has been included in the agreements, and as an 
integral part of the overall approach to new resource developments, 
largely in response to pressure from the local community and the 
relevant provincial government. These parties have been concerned to 
see that they are able to derive maximum economic benefits from the 
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mine development, thus excluding others from obtaining a greater 
share. 
Mining companies have had additional motivations for becoming 
involved in local business development. Clearly, there are economic 
advantages in having local businesses which are able to supply goods 
and services to the mining project at competitive rates. In addition, 
local business development contributes to the maintenance of a social 
environment conducive to the continuation of the resource project, 
and to mitigating its social impact. This is an important factor, because 
it highlights the social and political objectives which underpin 
business development programs at least as much as their economic 
objectives. 
Basic business parameters at Porgera 
There are a number of basic constraints to business development at 
Porgera-location, the pre-existing economy, the nature of the mine 
development, educational standards, the social environment, and land 
availability. 
The location of Porgera, 130km west of Mount Hagen at the end of 
the Enga Highway, places severe economic constraints on business 
development. Transport costs alone effectively rule out the development 
of manufacturing industries which are able to compete nationally or 
even regionally. The proposed Porgera-Tari road would reduce this 
constraint to some extent, placing Porgera in a more central location in a 
regional sense, but the timetable for its construction was unclear in 1994 
(and is still unclear today). Of course, Porgeran businesses are located 
close to the mine itself, and this has conferred advantages on those 
businesses which are able to offer goods and services to the mine. 
Theoretically, if not practically, Porgeran businesses should be well 
placed to compete with Engan and other Papua New Guinean 
companies for contracts from the company. 
The physical environment at Porgera places constraints on business 
development in the area. Firstly, the high altitude, soils and climate of 
the area severely limit its potential for cash cropping (Pacific 
Agribusiness 1987[1]:31-6). There is also a serious lack of stable, 
relatively flat land, a problem underlined by the 1991 landslip at 
Porgera Station itself. On the positive side, the impressive scenery of 
the area could potentially be used as a basis for tourism, and there is 
some possibility for commercial vegetable production, particularly at 
the lower altitudes. 
Business as unusual I 227 
There was a limited amount of business activity in Porgera prior to 
the start of mine construction, but the small scale of the existing 
business sector has continued to act as a constraint on its further 
development. While a larger business sector might have conferred 
economies of scale on the whole area, the limited size of the sector has 
meant that few Porgerans are gaining the necessary skills in business 
management. 
The nature of the mining operation itself places constraints on the 
types of businesses which are likely to be able to supply goods and 
services. The operation is a capital-intensive one, reliant on high-
technology capital equipment and specialised inputs and maintenance 
services. Much of the capital equipment and many of the inputs have 
to be sourced from offshore, or through specialised national firms. 2 
The most plausible area for local business is the supply of basic 
services-such as freighting, transport, supply of food, laundry 
services (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). 
The 'fly-in fly-out' (FIFO) pattern of commuter mining for the non-
local component of the project workforce has been a source of 
considerable concern in the local community. The belief has been that, 
with these workers and their families living in Porgera, there would be 
much greater scope for the development of local businesses. Money 
would 'stop' in Porgera rather than be spent in other parts of Papua 
New Guinea or offshore. A report by an economic consultant engaged 
by the Porgera Landowners' Association provides support for this 
argument, estimating that K12 million has been lost to Porgera each 
year as a result of the FIFO policy (Kiri Consultants 1993). The 
construction contracts alone for the additional houses required by a 
resident workforce would certainly have been a large boost for local 
contractors. However, I doubt whether the on-going economic 
advantages to Porgera would have been as large as predicted in that 
report.3 In any case, the 'FIFO debate' was not going to be decided on 
strictly economic grounds. Quality of life, safety, and other social 
issues have been more important than economic factors in 
determining where the bulk of the workforce resides. 
Educational levels among Porgerans are generally low, and this 
counts against a locally-owned business sector. Experience from 
around the world suggests that, even with higher education levels and 
a business background, around 80 per cent of small businesses will fail 
in their first year. In the analysis of our own survey results, it was 
notable that the six largest businesses in Porgera were owned by 
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people who spoke English. But the general lack of education and 
business experience were not problems which could be quickly 
overcome. While the low educational levels of Porgerans generally 
have meant that joint ventures with outside firms and individuals can 
be an attractive proposition, they have also meant that many 
Porgerans are vulnerable to sharp operators, many of whom have 
come to Porgera with attractive sounding deals for local businessmen. 
The current social environment at Porgera is not conducive to the 
development of a large business sector. Clearly, the low population 
base of the valley (an estimated 12,000 people) places a limit on the 
size and scope of those businesses which are economically viable. In 
addition, the high level of personal violence and inter-clan fighting are 
disincentives to investment in Porgera by both outsiders and 
Porgerans. The costs of security measures, from fences to security 
guards, are high, while the risk of damage to plant, violence against 
staff, and theft of stock all act as disincentives. 
Land, or more precisely the lack of relatively stable freehold or 
leasehold, has also been a major constraint to the development of a 
business sector in Porgera. The lack of secure access to land has 
discouraged a number of large outside businesses from locating in 
Porgera. Locating on customarily owned land adds a further level of 
complexity to the operation of a business. While Porgerans themselves 
are more easily able to locate business operations on their own clan 
land, banks are generally reluctant to lend to businesses without 
freehold or leasehold title. 
Umbrella companies versus multiple entities 
Around all major resource projects, the developer faces the issue of 
whether to establish and support an umbrella landowner company or to 
utilise multiple entities which reflect tribal or clan differences. One 
business development consultant has offered several reasons for 
considering'a single entity to be the best means of representing the local 
people's interest in [dealing] with a developer' (Egan 1994:4), including 
reduced inter-clan jealousy, a focus for the developer's attention, a 
pooling of financial resources, and a uniting influence. The umbrella 
stands as a symbol of the local community's involvement in development 
alongside the mining operation. An umbrella company can also serve as a 
role model for local business people, ideally illustrating how an effective 
business operates. It is also possible for an umbrella company to establish 
a series of small businesses to which it can provide advice and assistance 
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until it is deemed appropriate to sell the business to the manager(s)-in 
essence acting as a 'business incubator'. 
On the other hand, the umbrella company concept has several 
problems. It means putting all your eggs in one basket, and if it gets 
into trouble (as has happened at Bougainville, Ok Tedi, Misima and 
Porgera), this can count against the mining company. Good practical 
management, suited to Papua New Guinea's social and cultural 
environment, is required and again the record on this count is not 
great. A single umbrella company can in some circumstances be seen 
as a branch of the mining operation, particularly if the mining 
company offers management services. Finally, the dividends paid by a 
large company with a broad base of shareholders are not likely to 
satisfy everyone, and there will be local entrepreneurs who feel they 
would benefit more from having their own dealings with the mining 
company. 
In summary, there are advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach, and in theory it should be possible to have a successful 
blend of both. Under this scenario, the umbrella company picks up the 
larger contracts, while individuals and business groups pick up 
smaller ones. This is the approach which has been adopted at Porgera, 
and although business development has not met everyone's 
expectations, I do not believe that exclusive reliance on either an 
umbrella company or individual entities would have provided a better 
result. 
Bisnis is not business 
There are important cultural factors which impinge on the 
development and performance of the business sector at Porgera. These 
factors revolve around the understanding and expectations of 
'business'. In large part, they derive from the pre-existing social and 
economic system of the Ipili. The prior economic system was based on 
mounded sweet potato production, which in turn was used for the 
raising of pigs. The product was partly for subsistence and partly for 
exchange and distribution, both to kin and to non-kin. These 
exchanges and distributions ranged from contributions to relatively 
structured forms of exchange, such as brideprice or death 
compensation payments, to more personal obligations to distribute 
food and other resources to immediate kin. 
Wealth for a man was created through the production of pigs for 
the accumulation of wives, which then increased his capacity to 
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produce more pigs for distribution. Prestige and status was in large 
part linked to distribution, and the extent of the obligations to himself 
which a man could build up. In this sense, then, the aim was to 
maximise net outgoings (Gregory 1980:636). Although rhetorical, 
political and fighting skills were also some of the criteria by which a 
man was judged, this conflation of the production system and social 
status-the entanglement of the economic and social spheres-is most 
significant for this discussion. Distribution of pigs and other goods by 
a man can be viewed as a form of investment-it created obligations 
for the recipients to eventually 'return' the investment (Finney 
1987:10). But, as Gregory (1980) notes, it was an interest-free form of 
investment, which kept both parties in a state of 'mutual reciprocal 
dependence', and the repayment period was flexible. 
The economy was based around a limited range of goods, and 
importantly, the 'leakage' of production out of the system was not 
great. There was some trade between Ipili and other language 
groups, particularly the Enga to the east and the Huli to the south, 
but it is not likely that the extent of resources traded were significant 
when compared to those used for internal distribution and 
consumption, and in any case, every outside trade transaction 
returned some resource to Porgera. There were entrepreneurs in the 
trading system: Ballard documents Huli traders who acted as 
middlemen, and through a series of exchanges of different goods in 
different parts of the valley, eventually obtained up to eight times as 
much as what they had originally traded (Ballard 1994:141). But this 
was done with the intention of putting the traded resources obtained 
back into the exchange and distribution network within Huli 
territory. 
Planning was an integral part of the pre-contact socioeconomic 
system-from the planning of gardens (an annual cycle) to pig rearing 
(at least four years), trips for trade and karuka harvesting (probably 
irregular events), and perhaps most significantly, the planning assoc-
iated with the ongoing maintenance of networks of exchange, distri-
bution, obligation and reciprocity-both inside and outside Porgera. 
There are several obvious conflicts between the pre-contact system 
and the operation of a business in the cash economy. The conflation of 
personal and productive systems, and the pressure of obligations to 
kin, drain resources away from a business. Maintenance of the 
exchange networks, with their emphasis on the maximising of net 
outgoings, clearly clashes with the system of modem business which 
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seeks to maximise net incomings, especially as a means to accumulate 
capital (Pomponio 1992:181). 
In addition, businessmen continually find themselves obligated to 
assist kin in a range of projects (brideprice, school fees, a bag of rice, 
and so on) in such a way that the owner is relying on repayments 
under the relatively flexible traditional system, while the business 
incurs debts in the formal economy. And yet it is often these same kin 
who contributed in some manner to ensure that the business was able 
to start in the first place. 
It is also far easier for individual Porgeran businessmen to leak 
resources out of the local economy in a way which attains little or no 
benefit in either the traditional or modem sphere. Although 
conspicuous consumption of a Landcruiser, for example, may carry 
some prestige value within the community, there are no real benefits 
to an individual's business, in modem or traditional terms, from 
spending on overseas travel. 
Expectations of business by Porgerans are also important. In large 
part, businesses are seen as a means by which a person can 
accumulate resources for use in the traditional sphere-such as wives 
and obligated kin and non-kin (see Finney 1987). Cash, assets and 
capital accumulation per se are not generally seen as ends in 
themselves, but rather as a tool which can be employed to acquire 
status within the community, either through distribution or 
conspicuous consumption, and to further the political aspirations of 
the businessman. 
Individual Porgerans are constrained by, and are able to control, 
these factors to varying degrees in the running of their businesses. For 
Porgerans, they are part of the business environment-it is simply not 
possible to ignore them. The most successful businessmen are those 
who are able to successfully manage the extent to which these 
obligations and expectations impinge on the running of their 
business-a point which Finney (1987:63-4) has made about 
successful Gorokan businessmen. 
The practical implication of all these issues is that, although many 
Porgerans have received large amounts of cash compensation from the 
mine development since 1989, this has not been transformed into a 
sustainable and viable business sector in Porgera. The reason lies in 
the pressures exerted by kin to distribute and contribute to exchange, 
and by the fact that leakage out of the system is far more likely with 
cash than it is with pigs. In light of my previous estimates of the use of 
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compensation payments (Chapter 3), the remainder of this chapter 
will focus on the estimated 20-25 per cent which has been invested in 
local business, and will assess how effective this investment has been. 
Business development 1984-1994 
In this section I trace the development of business in Porgera over a 
period of ten years. The chronology is patchy, and as such is presented 
in three parts. In the first, a brief potted history is provided, drawing 
primarily on records at hand, particularly the Social and Economic 
Impact Study (SEIS) and notes taken by myself during several visits to 
Porgera. The second part traces the development of the umbrella 
Porgeran landowner company, Ipili Porgera Investments Pty Ltd (IPI). 
The rise and fall and rise of JPI provides an interesting illustration of 
many of the problems of businesses at Porgera, and particularly those 
associated with the mine development. The third part presents the 
result of a survey of all businesses in Porgera in March 1994, which 
revealed a number of trends symptomatic of the local business sector. 
Finally, I review the success of the 1990 PJV Business Development Plan 
and, with the benefit of hindsight, discuss its strengths and weaknesses. 
Business at Porgera: a brief history 
The following account is drawn largely from four reviews and surveys 
carried out in 1984, 1987, 1990-91 and 1992-94, respectively, and 
anecdotal information collected from PJV staff and local businessmen. 
The first systematic review of the Porgera business sector is 
contained in Talyaga's (1984) socioeconomic impact study. He noted 
that the 1980 census showed 97 households in Porgera District 
operating trade stores. In 1984, there were 15 trade stores in Alipis 
alone, though only four of these were operating, and all were 'half 
empty'. Twelve of these were owned and operated by local families, 
and the other three by 'other ethnic groups'. All of these trade stores 
had been built with cash accumulated by the individual owners, most 
of which had come from the sale of gold. The 1980 census also found 
that 19 households in Porgera District operated PMV businesses.4 
Again, these were owned and operated by individuals or families, 
although Talyaga (1984:82) notes that they had been purchased on a 
clan basis during the 1970s. They often operated at a loss due to 
'unfamiliarity with economics of transport and lack of knowledge [of 
commerce],. Apart from trade stores and PMVs, a sawmill at Alipis 
(owned by an outsider and commercially of little value) was the only 
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other business activity recorded. Talyaga (1984) concluded the 
economic section of his report by stating that people were participating 
in the cash economy, often being guided by traditional values. There was 
plenty of cash around but 'people lack the knowledge to utilise it 
properly' (Talyaga 1984:83). 
The SEIS (Pacific Agribusiness 1987) reported the results of a 
survey by the PJV Business Development section, which counted 143 
trade stores, 93 of which were operating. On the other hand, it found 
that only seven vehicles were now owned by Porgerans. A number of 
business groups and companies were active in Porgera by this time. 
Several of these had sold 'shares' to Porgerans, though share 
certificates were rarely issued. These included 
.. Ipili Timbers, which operated two mobile sawmills, 
employing 18 local people. It was owned by a man from 
Mount Hagen who had married into the Tieni clan. It was an 
important source of timber for the PJV during mine 
construction. However, its inability to secure access to a 
timber resource at reasonable rates was a problem; at one 
point, leases were issued to two different groups for the 
same resource. The business ceased operating in 1992. 
.. Porgera Brothers and Exploration Pty Ltd was a gold-buying 
operation set up by a Tari man, who had married into the 
Alapklain clan, in conjunction with a national Member of 
Parliament. Porgera Enterprises Pty Ltd was set up by the 
same two men, and had entered into a joint venture with a 
Singapore-based group to sluice for gold. Equipment 
(valued at K30,OOO) had arrived at Porgera, but the company 
had no mining lease, nor even permission from the local 
landowners, and the enterprise had folded. The remains of 
the equipment were still present on the road below 
Mungalep in 1994. 
.. Aiyene Mine Explorations Pty Ltd was formed by members 
of the Waiwa, Tieni and Tuanda clans to act as an umbrella 
company for the Special Mining Lease (SML) landowners. Its 
purpose was primarily to win contracts associated with the 
mine development. Problems were experienced when it was 
discovered that control of the company effectively rested 
with outside interests. 
.. Ipili Amena was a company formed by the Anga and Kewai 
clans of Yuyan to operate trade stores, mining and transport 
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services. Porgera Joint Venture (not to be confused with the 
mining company) was formed as an offshoot of Ipili Amena 
after an internal argument. In a joint venture with Basu 
Coffee, a large steel bulk store was built at Porgera Station, 
but an argument over the ownership of the land on which it 
was located meant that it was unable to operate. 
.. Porgera Yutane Business Group was a Mungalep-based 
private company, the chairman of which was also the 
chairman of IPI. This group had interests in gold buying, 
transport and a trade store, and had plans for a bus service, 
contracts with the PJV or IPI, a picture theatre, and the 
construction of houses for rent. This business later became 
part of Kutato Family Trading. 
.. Mandi Golden Business Group was established to carry out 
mining, operate a trade store, and establish a piggery. 
.. Alipis Development Corporation was an unregistered 
company, established by five Tieni people. At the time, they 
were operating a successful trade store (for which they had 
taken out a K1,500 loan) and running a Dyna truck. They 
had plans to expand into coffee and vegetable buying, the 
operation of a bakery, and the purchase of a 16-seater bus to 
travel between Porgera and Laiagam. 
A subsequent trade store survey carried out by the PJV Business 
Development section in 1990-91 found a total of 72 operating stores in 
the Porgera Valley at that time, excluding the larger wholesale or retail 
businesses. Figure 7.1 shows the geographical spread of weekly 
turnover and stock levels measured in this survey. In the accompanying 
brief report, the author noted constraints on the accuracy of the data 
that were collected, similar to those I have previously noted for my own 
survey data. But it is clear that Porgera Station and Suyan were the 
major centres of retail activity at that time, while the ratio of stock levels 
to turnover appeared to be high throughout the valley. 
Inventory of existing businesses in Porgera 
During the fieldwork conducted in March 1994, I undertook a survey 
of all the existing business operations in the area. This involved 
driving along the roads, from Tipinini westwards, noting the details of 
all commercial structures and, in those cases where the owner was 
present and willing to be interviewed, asking a series of questions 
relating to the business. The entire Porgera Valley was covered over a 
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two-week period. For the purposes of analysis, the valley was divided 
into 11 smaller areas (see Map 7.1). The information on each business 
was entered into a spreadsheet, its location was noted on a map, and 
in many cases a photograph was taken to facilitate the construction of 
a database on formal business activity in the valley. 
In total, 382 business premises were noted during the survey. In a 
number of cases, more than one type of business was recorded for 
each premises, the most popular combination being that of the trade 
store and 'kai bar' (fast food outlet), of which there were 11 examples, 
mostly around Porgera Station. One hundred and nineteen business 
owners were interviewed, and details of ownership were found for 
234 businesses. It is worth reiterating the types of business which, for 
one reason or another, were not included in the survey. These were 
.. market and roadside sellers 
.. PMV and labour-contracting businesses 
.. businesses at some distance from a road; and 
.. a number of ephemeral businesses which may have been 
mapped but whose owners were not interviewed because 
they were not open at the time of the survey. 























































































































In addition, there were six trade stores whose owners were present but 
declined to be interviewed. Two large wholesale/retail businesses (the 
IPI Supa Stoa and Paiam Kumbipara Enterprises) were not included in 
this particular survey, but relevant data were collected later in 
separate interviews, and are included in the discussion which follows 
the presentation of the survey figures. 
The following analysis is divided into three parts. In the first, 
significant findings from the aggregate figures are discussed. In the 
second, the businesses are divided geographically, because there are 
interesting and important differences in the figures for each area. 
Finally, the sample is divided into several different categories of 
business enterprise, which is another useful way in which to analyse 
the current business sector in Porgera. 
The following figures emerge from the aggregate data. 
.. There were 284 trade stores (120 of which were open); 36 
local bakeries; 28 fuel stations; 8 tyre repair shops; 5 chicken 
projects; 3 gold buyers; and 2 sawmills. 
.. A total initial investment of K372,OOO, or an average of 
K3,680 per business, was recorded for a total of 101 
businesses. 
.. General savings were the most common source of seed 
capital, accounting for 38 per cent of businesses. This was 
followed by wages and alluvial gold earnings (22 per cent 
each), PJV compensation (16 per cent), sale of cash crops (10 
per cent), wantoks (6 per cent), and a bank loan (5 per cent). 
Although general savings were the most common source of 
capital for both Porgerans and non-Porgerans, Porgerans 
were more likely to have used PJV compensation and 
alluvial gold earnings, while non-Porgerans relied more on 
wages. 
.. Cash holdings of K57,OOO (an average of K550 per business) 
was recorded for a total of 103 businesses. Bank balances of 
K312,OOO (an average of K9,450 per business) was recorded 
for the 33 businesses which had a separate passbook. 
.. The stock levels of 211 businesses were recorded, but 91 of 
these were businesses which were closed and we were 
informed that they had no stock. For those which were open, 
the total stock was valued at K167,OOO, or an average of 
K1,390 per business. 
.. For the 116 businesses which gave credit, the total credit 
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outstanding was KI44,OOO, or an average of Kl,240 per 
business. Only 15 businesses (or 11 per cent of those 
interviewed) gave no credit. 
• Eight businesses had debts totalling K55,200 (an average of 
K6,900 each), while 103 businesses had no debts. 
• There was a total weekly turnover of K73,OOO for 115 
businesses interviewed, or an average of K635 per business. 
There were an estimated 4,000 customers daily, while the 
businesses had 61 paid staff and 117 unpaid staff. 
• Sixty-four of the businesses had electricity, of which 35 used 
small generators. Porgeran owners accounted for 66 per cent 
of those with electricity. Forty-four businesses had vehicles, 
and 45 had freezers. 
• Sixteen out of 119 owners interviewed had some business 
training, while 89 wanted to attend courses on how to run a 
business. Nine of the businesses had current tax compliance 
certificates. 
The geographical pattern of business activity shows some striking 
differences between areas. The turnover, stock and credit levels by 
area are shown in Figure 7.2. The figures for Paiam Kumbipara and 
the IPI Supa Stoa have been added to those found in the main survey, 
and underline the fact that the commercial heart of Porgera is the 
Station area. Indeed, it seems to have become even more dominant 
than it was in 1990-91, though this situation was likely to change with 
the development of the Paiam township. 
There was also a significant difference between the areas along the 
main road leading up to the SML (from Tipinini through to Anawe) 
and those within or through the SML (Kulapi to Yuyan and Apalaka). 
This point is highlighted in Table 7.1, which divides the survey data 
between these two geographical areas. Clearly, the first of these areas 
has a more professional business sector, with more trained managers, 
more paid employees, higher weekly turnover and, most strikingly, a 
far higher level of business bank savings. This appears to equate with 
a significantly lower percentage of Porgeran business owners, 
implying that 'outsiders' with business experience are taking a 
significant share of the Porgeran business sector. It is notable that 
Yokolama, the one location within the SML which has a low 
percentage of Porgeran owners (46 per cent), is also the location 
within the SML which has the highest turnover and highest credit 
levels. It is likely that turnover would have been increasing for short 
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Table 7.1 Summary of differences in business activity by area, 1994 
Up to the SML In or through the SML 
Number of businesses 209 173 
Number interviewed 69 50 
Percentage Porgeran owned 60 88 









K256,004 (average 4,196) 
K62,500 (average 961) 
K43,332 (average 774) 
K307,598 (average 11,830) 




Source: Porgera business survey. 
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K115,859 (average 
Ki0,710 (average 214) 
K13,417 (average 285) 
K4,000 (average 571) 




periods within the SML, as royalties and compensation were paid 
out, though many SML residents tended to shop in Porgera Station 
anyway. 
We make a number of observations about the more specific spatial 
pattern of business activity. 
.. Tipinini had 26 businesses, with less than 1 per cent of the 
total turnover in the valley, but over a third of the cash 
holdings, thanks to one temporarily cash-rich business. 
e Kairik had 40 businesses with 8 per cent of the total valley 
turnover. 
e Paiam had 30 businesses, but only 44 per cent of the 18 for 
which ownership could be determined belonged to 
Porgerans. Weekly turnover was K4,040, or 6 per cent of the 
total for the valley. Five of the owners had management 
training, the highest of any area. 
co Suyan had 47 businesses, and the highest weekly turnover in 
the valley (44 per cent of the total), as well as the highest 
number of customers. Half of the 20 businesses for which 
ownership could be determined were owned by non-
Porgerans. But it should be noted that the Ela Motors outlet 
is included in these figures, and this accounted for the bulk 
of Suyan's weekly turnover. 
e Porgera Station had 40 businesses, with the highest initial 
investment, the highest credit levels, largest bank balances, 
and highest stock levels. Weekly turnover was second only 
to Suyan, and accounted for 19 per cent of the total valley 
turnover.s Over half the total debt recorded in the survey, 
half of the kai bars, the greatest number of stores with 
electricity, and 45 per cent of the paid staff, were located in 
Porgera Station. Sixty per cent of the businesses were 
Porgeran owned, where ownership could be identified. 
.. Anawe had 26 businesses, with 86 per cent being Porgeran 
owned. These stores accounted for 7 per cent of the weekly 
turnover of the Porgera Valley. 
co Kulapi also had 26, and all of the 21 for which ownership 
could be determined were Porgeran owned. Turnover was 
low, accounting for just 2 per cent of the survey total. 
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• Yokolama had 17 businesses in a very small area below the 
Yoko One camp. Only 46 per cent of the 13 businesses for 
which ownership could be determined were owned by 
Porgerans. Weekly turnover from the survey was 4 per cent 
of the survey total. Levels of credit were particularly high in 
Yokolama. 
• Yuyan had 26 businesses, spread along a 5-kilometre stretch 
of road from the bridge over the Kaiya River to just short of 
Politika. Ninety-five per cent of the 21 for which ownership 
could be determined were Porgeran owned. Weekly 
turnover accounted for just 1 per cent of the survey total. 
Stock levels were very high, reflecting the historical 
importance of Yuyan as a trading centre which has declined 
with the growth of the Porgera mine. None of the businesses 
had positive bank balances. 
• Panandaka had 18 businesses, which accounted for 3 per 
cent of the total weekly turnover. The value of stock was the 
lowest of any area, none of the businesses had positive bank 
balances, and 86 per cent of the 14 for which ownership 
could be determined were Porgeran owned. 
• Mungalep had 32 businesses, including some on the stretch 
of road leading down to the Kaiya River. Ninety-five per 
cent of the 21 for which we were able to determine 
ownership were Porgeran owned, and turnover accounted 
for just 1 per cent of the valley total, although we were told 
that several more stores were generally open than was the 
case on the day of our visit. Credit levels were the lowest 
found for any area. Again, none of the owners interviewed 
had any money in a business bank account.6 
• Yarik (including Timorope) had 29 businesses. Eighty-one 
per cent of the 27 where ownership could be established 
were Porgeran owned. Turnover accounted for 2 per cent of 
the valley total, and none of the owners interviewed had any 
money in a business bank account. Fewer customers were 
reported in Yarik than in any other area. 
• Apalaka had 25 businesses, with a weekly turnover of just 2 per 
cent of the survey total. Of the 20 businesses for which I was 
able to establish ownership, 95 per cent were Porgeran owned. 
A number of relatively distinct types of business operations could 
be discerned from the survey results, and I will divide the sample into 
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four main categories. Clearly, not all businesses fit exactly into one or 
other of these categories, but they are useful as tools to discuss some 
of the main issues raised. 
The first category, which contains at least a third of the survey 
sample, is made up of small-scale unsuccessful experiments in 
business, which are normally trade stores with corrugated iron rooves, 
corrugated iron walls, and wooden or dirt floors, measuring about 4 
by 3 metres. One typical example was a store opened in 1989, after the 
owner received a Kl,500 compensation payout in connection with the 
upgrading of the highway to Porgera. He purchased K300 worth of 
stock from the IPI Supa Stoa, but after this was sold it was not 
replaced. Income and profit from the store was used for personal 
consumption. The store closed in mid 1990 and had not been reopened 
by 1994. 
The second category consisted of small-scale ephemeral businesses. 
These were either 'failed experiments' in the making, or part-time 
stores with more social than economic value. One such store was 
established in 1992 with a K3,000 compensation payment which the 
owner received from the PJv. The roof and walls were of corrugated 
iron, and the dirt floor measured 6 by 5 metres. The store had Kl,200 
worth of stock and KI00 of credit outstanding. Stock was purchased 
from Mount Hagen on an irregular basis. Turnover was of the order of 
K20 per day, with around 20 customers spending an average of Kl 
each. The owner stated that the store was his 'garden', and 
emphasised that it was not run on a strict business footing. 
The third category consisted of medium-sized retail businesses, run on 
a more formal basis. The owner of one such business had come from 
Wabag and was leasing a 180 square metre building, with corrugated iron 
roof and walls and a concrete floor, from a local Porgeran for Kl,600 a 
week. The business had electricity, a freezer, and a hot food servery. The 
owner began operating in late 1993 with K600 worth of stock. At the time 
of our survey, the business had K8,000 worth of stock, cash of K200, and 
credit outstanding of K700, despite the deposit scheme which the owner 
was trying to enforce. Seven staff were then being employed. 
The fourth category comprised the largest and most serious business 
operations. One such wholesale and retail business occupied a building 
measuring over 250 square metres in area, with corrugated iron walls 
and roof, and a concrete slab floor. It was established in 1988 with 
K4,000, largely from money earned on the Mount Kare goldfield. The 
business had a pool table and dartboard, generator, a vehicle, a freezer 
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and a hot food servery. The business had about KlO,OOO in cash, credit 
outstanding of Kl,500 and stock valued at K8,000. Turnover was around 
K300 per day, with about 100 customers spending an average of K3 
each. The business employed four paid staff and two unpaid family 
members, with a wage bill of around KIOO per week. It was owned by a 
Porgeran with no formal management training. 
From the survey data, I estimate that the approximate breakdown 
of the 382 businesses would be: 67 per cent in the first category (failed 
experiments); 18 per cent in the second (ephemeral businesses); 12 per 
cent in the third (medium-sized retail); and 3 per cent in the fourth 
(wholesale and retail). 
The Ipili Porgera investments story 
IPI was incorporated as a company on 25 August 1983, at the initiative 
of several prominent landowners and the management of PJv. 
Commercial operations began in 1984, with a security contract from 
the mining company and a movie theatre in Alipis. Shares were 
promoted among the local landowners, and by 1985, around 5,000 
shares, valued at Kl each, had been issued and paid for. A limit of 500 
shares for anyone individual was written into the Memorandum of 
Association. At this stage, the PJV provided direct management, while 
four Porgerans sat on the board as trustee directors. 
The rise of and fall of IPI is shown in Figure 7.3. The graph shows a 
rapid but controlled rate of growth from 1984 to 1989. Shareholding, 
assets and turnover increased, and the company diversified into new 
areas, such as wholesale, retail, hospitality and construction, primarily 
by means of joint ventures. Joint venture partners were generally well-
established companies with proven track records, such as Sullivans, 
Pangia and Poons. During this time, the PJV controlled IPI's strategic 
policy and ran the business on a day to day basis. Dividends were 
paid over this period (see Table 7.2), the net worth of the company 
increased rapidly, shareholders were happy, and the company 
appeared well-placed to pick up a large number of the contracts 
associated with the construction and operation of the mine. The SEIS 
noted that, as of 14 April 1987, there were 2,687 shareholders, of 
whom 2,014 were males and 673 female (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). 
April 1989 was a turning point for the company for a number of 
significant reasons. Firstly, the PJV stood aside from the management 
of IPI, though it retained an advisory role to the board. This decision 
was made primarily because of the perceived conflict of interest 
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between being the principal source of contracts and being the manager 
of the largest local contractor. IPI's independent accountant and 
adviser, who had been with the company since 1983, became the 
general manager. In 1990, he instituted a new policy direction and 
style of management, with three stated objectives 
• to increase the wealth of the shareholders 
• to be self-sufficient in management in order for IPI to 
establish and control its own businesses; and 
• to provide employment for Porgerans and technical and 
management training for local businessmen. 
One of the manifestations of this policy was the disassembling of the 
existing joint ventures. Another was a revaluation of the company's 
assets which allowed for a substantial loan to be obtained from the 
Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation (PNGBC). 
This major shift in management policy coincided with the letting of 
the major construction contracts for mine development and associated 
infrastructure, such as Suyan township and Kairik airstrip. IP! picked 
up many of these contracts, but deficiencies in its management 
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the company accumulated trading losses of around K1,500,OOO during 
1991 and 1992. The newly formed Ipili Porgera Construction was the 
major source of these losses. The extent of the problem was not clear at 
the time, due partly to the rapid increase in the size of the business, and 
partly to the fact that the company operated without a full set of accounts 
during that two-year period. The full extent of the problem only became 
obvious in early 1993, when an audit of the books was carried out, and a 
set of 1991 accounts was prepared. To make matters worse, the landslip at 
Porgera Station caused a substantial writing down of the value of IPI's 
equity, effectively stripping K1 million from the balance sheet. A further 
K250,OOO had already been expended on drawings and initial works for a 
commercial centre at the station, and this was added to the losses. 
These three factors-the push for 'self-sufficiency in management', 
the rapid expansion in the size of the business, and the landslip at 
Porgera Station-placed IPI in a situation where it was unable to 
continue trading without the support of the bank, its principal creditor. 
In a tripartite agreement between the board of IPI, the PNGBC and 
Placer Niugini, signed in December 1993, a plan was devised whereby a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of tlle PJV, known as Yelgun, would be 
appointed as manager in an effort to reconstruct the company. 
By mid 1994, IPI was reduced to a core of profitable businesses: the 
Supa Stoa, the Mountain Lodge hotel, a newly established fuel station, 
a collection of rental properties, a security service, and a 30 per cent 
share in IPI-Poons joint venture which held the PJV's catering contract. 
The medium-term plan was to try and reduce the debt burden 
inherited from IPI Construction, whose interest payments were barely 
covered by the current trading profit. There was some hope (though 
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Note: In 1989, shareholders were given a bonus 2-for-1 share offer, hence the increase in 
the volume of shares in 1990. 
Source: IPI records. 
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provincial governments, or by the PNGBC, which was partly based on 
the argument that IPI was the only landowner company in PNG which 
had not previously received government assistance. 
By November 1994, the situation had improved markedly. An 
interest rate reduction was granted by the PNGBC on the outstanding 
debt, and all arms of the company were trading well. The collapse of 
the Umi bridge near Lae had badly affected supply (and thus trade) 
for a month but, despite this setback, it was anticipated that the 
company would achieve a profit of K300,OOO for 1994-the first year-
end profit since 1988. Working capital was now a positive factor in the 
balance sheet, and this had allowed for expansion into new, generally 
small enterprises, such as body hire, asset recovery, and glove 
cleaning. 
To understand the significance of this story, it is necessary to 
consider what IPI meant to the local community, and also what it 
meant to the PJv. The financial failings of IPI were brought up at a 
Community Issues Committee (CIC) meeting between Porgera 
landowner representatives and PJV Community Relations and 
Business Development staff in early 1993. The minutes of the meeting 
record that the landowner representatives were 'shamed' by the 
failure of IPI. They saw the role of IPI as that of picking up the big 
'spin-off' contracts from the mine development, while other Porgerans 
got the small contracts. One leading representative said that the 
landowners saw IPI as an umbrella or mountain under which they 
could all shelter as Mount Waruwari was gradually removed by the 
process of mining. It is clear that IPI was seen as a symbol of the 
contribution of the mine to development in Porgera, which reflected as 
much on the Porgerans as it did on the PJv. Several landowner 
representatives were calling for IPI to be wound up and its assets 
divided up amongst the Porgeran people, yet there appeared to be a 
certain element of self-interest in this proposal, from those 
representatives who might hope to gain the distribution of assets. The 
general feeling, as reflected by comments at the CIC meetings, 
appeared to be that local people wanted IP! to succeed, and they 
appreciated the PJV's continued willingness to assist with the 
management of the company. 
The PJV became involved again in the management of IP! for two 
related reasons: first because of its importance to the Porgerans, and 
the political pressure which the community thus exerted, and second 
because the failure of IPI would reflect badly on the PJV at the local, 
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provincial and national level. There was also an element of social 
insurance involved, since there was a risk that the failure of IPI could 
be used as a weapon by groups within the community which were 
generally opposed to the mining company. The PJV's resident mine 
manager, who was also the managing director of Yelgun, said that IPI 
was a 'flagship'-a visible sign of the PJV's involvement in the 
community and its contribution to the development of Porgera. On the 
other hand, he did not envisage a long-term role for Yelgun in the 
management of IPI, and if the directors lost their battle to keep the 
company alive, the short-term political fall-out might have to be 
accepted as part of the least expensive long-term option. 
Porgera Joint Venture's business development efforts 
I have already pointed out that the PJV has an obligation to provide 
business development services in Porgera. A business development 
plan was first developed in 1987 to provide guidance for the direction 
of the company's business development efforts. This was updated in 
1990, after the signing of the Mining Development Contract, and was 
approved by the Department of Trade and Industry. This plan was due 
for a further update and revision in 1994. I shall briefly discuss the 
1990 plan before reviewing the directions and efforts of the Business 
Development office in 1994. 
The 1990 Business Development Plan (PJV 1990a) included a 
discussion of the constraints on business development in Porgera and 
Enga, similar to that presented earlier in this chapter, and a review of 
both business development programs in general and the activities of 
the PJV Business Development section in particular. In the section 
dealing with the implementation of the plan, the objectives of the PJV 
Business Development section were described as follows 
[t]o assist the peoples of Papua New Guinea, but particularly the 
peoples of Enga Province, to improve their economic infrastructure, 
particularly close to the mine, to a point where they can have a 
meaningful and profitable input to the mine. The economic 
development will be of a nature that will facilitate a smooth transition 
for the social changes accelerated by the mine development. The 
infrastructure should be large enough to create an internal life of its 
own and not be 100% dependant on the mine market. The 
infrastructure will be based on commercial enterprise, not on 
Government or Mining company subsidies. 
One point which needs to be stressed here is that the PJV was 
concerned to support and assist commercial, sustainable businesses; it 
248 I Dilemmas of Development 
was not interested in handouts. In line with this policy, and in contrast 
with some other resource developers in PNG, the PJV gave neither 
loan guarantees nor seed capital. There was also an implicit emphasis 
on assisting Porgerans to succeed in business in Western terms; there 
were no romantic ideas of adjusting Western business practices to fit 
the Porgeran environment. Such an 'alternative' plan, if it could be 
devised, might succeed in the short term, but almost certainly would 
not lead to a long-term, sustainable business sector at Porgera. This is 
not to say that the PJV's business development assistance failed to 
reflect the difficulties of the Porgeran business environment; only that 
this was secondary to the main concern to establish commercially 
viable businesses. The strategy adopted to achieve this objective above 
was to develop a commercial business centre at Porgera Station 
through which Porgerans and other Engans could be involved in a 
wide range of commercial activities. The schedule to the Business 
Development Plan listed 110 opportunities for future business 
development in a 'function list', detailing the timing and experience 
required to carry out each function. Of these 110 functions, 12 implied 
the presence of non-Engan interests as joint venture partners. 
Approximately one-third of them had been established by 1994. The 
biggest impediment for most of the rest had been the lack of land for 
commercial development. 
In 1994, the PJV Business Development section had a professional 
staff of eight-two expatriate managers, three accountants, and three 
business development officers (two in Porgera and one in Wabag)? In 
the Porgera office, much of their effort was directed at the 
maintenance of existing contracts, primarily assisting the contractors 
with administrative and accounting functions. The demand for such 
assistance had grown since the Internal Revenue Commission required 
that all PJV contractors have a current Tax Compliance Certificate. The 
Business Development section also had an important reporting 
function, compiling quarterly reports for the Department of Trade and 
Industry Goods and Services Committee (DTIGSC) on the PJV's 
compliance with the various development agreements, as well as 
attending its quarterly meetings.8 Another focus was the discovery 
and negotiation of new contract opportunities arising from the current 
mining operation. There were a number of projects in the pipeline 
(both mine-related and non-mine related), including 
.. the recovery and resale of low-cost mine assets 
.. various services connected to the development of Paiam 
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township, including a bank, a pharmacy, a commercial 
centre, a PJV Community Affairs office building, a motor 
dealer, and tyre sales; and 
• the revitalisation of a viable local sawmill, following the 
closure of the two which were covered by our own survey. 
There was also an initiative to establish 'offshore' investment 
programs for individual Porgerans, which could be considered as a 
more sustainable use of compensation funds, even if it meant that 
capital was lost to the local Porgeran economy in the short term. For it 
could reasonably be argued that it was more productive and 
sustainable to have the returns from these investments enter the local 
economy over time than to have the capital injected immediately into 
a business which was likely to fail. 
The bigger picture 
It is clear that the Porgeran business community had a very limited 
range of activities and options in 1994. This was a characteristic shared 
with most other rural areas of Papua New Guinea, the main difference 
being that Porgera had far more money to spend. On the other hand, 
Porgera is a difficult business environment, even for a well managed 
business. Apart from the location constraints and the lack of secure 
land titles, the local economy has also suffered from an uneven level 
of PJV inputs, most especially in respect of monthly variations in the 
amount of compensation payments (see Chapter 3). The volatile 
social environment has increased security costs for businesses, both 
the cost of insurance and the wages of security guards, while the 
banks have grown nervous about lending money for businesses in 
Porgera. 
For Porgerans, the social and cultural obligations which follow 
from possession of a successful business reduce their ability to 
continue to reinvest funds into the business. In the case of IPI, the 
demands made by directors on the company (for vehicles and other 
perks) may not have been the main cause of the company's financial 
problems, but do serve to illustrate the way in which personal and 
business interests seem to invariably become confused. Interestingly, 
only one of the successful Porgeran businessmen we spoke to felt that 
he had this problem under control. The others all noted this as the 
biggest problem which their businesses faced, and were well aware of 
the potential impact of the intrusion of personal matters into the 
business sphere (see Finney 1987:63-4). 
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There are ways for businessmen to reduce the pressure to 
distribute their business earnings. Biersack (1980) has observed that 
conspicuous wealth and consumption make a person more vulnerable 
to the requests and expectations of kin, although the sharing of this 
wealth and consumption is also the means by which prestige has been 
obtained in the past. Several Porgeran trade store owners had found 
that they were better off renting out their shops to non-Porgerans and 
simply collecting the rent, because this was a less visible form of 
accumulation. A number of Porgerans were investing in other parts of 
the Highlands, in Port Moresby and even overseas, partly as a means 
of keeping a distance between their wealth and their kin obligations, 
partly to reduce the visibility of their capital accumulation, and thus to 
limit the pressure to distribute these resources, and partly because of 
the greater investment opportunities which existed outside Porgera. 
The other major finding of our own survey was the almost total lack of 
business training among Porgerans. Although business experience can be 
a substitute for formal training, it is unlikely to be useful if the businesses 
continually fail. Training in all the most basic aspects of business 
management was in high demand in the community, and would 
undoubtedly have improved the performance of many of the businesses 
surveyed. On the negative side, the training of businessmen and women 
would lead to the closure of many of the stores, because the reason why 
the area has been able to support so many stores is that most have been 
run unprofitably. The PJV Business Development section involved the 
Small Business Development Corporation in running business training 
courses in Porgera. These were initially well attended, but the level of 
attendance subsequently declined as a result of various problems in the 
organisation of the courses. Our own survey results suggested that there 
was still a demand for training courses among local business owners, and 
a new training programme had been developed in November 1994, 
which covered basic business and book-keeping skills. 
Mining company contracts 
The supply of goods and services to the PJV has been arranged through 
contracts which are issued in accordance with Clause 14 of the Mining 
Development Contract. The essential features of this clause are repeated 
in each of the quarterly review reports submitted to the DTIGSC. 
[P]reference [will] be given to: 
1. Porgerans; 
2. Engans; 
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3. Other Papua New Guineans; 
4. International companies, 
provided: 
1. there is no impact on schedule; 
2. the specifications are adhered to; and 
3. the cost is competitive. 
Contracts at Porgera have been a source of contention, at both the 
local and provincial levels, largely because of misconceptions about 
what a 'contract' is. In addition, the PJV has been unnecessarily 
defensive in its presentation of the contract figures, which therefore 
merit closer examination. In this section, I shall also consider the types 
of contract which have been issued, and their real value to the 
Porgeran business community. 
The numbers 
The construction and operation of the Porgera mine have been handled 
by separate entities-Placer Dome Construction and the PJV 
respectively. As a result, despite the substantial temporal overlap 
between these two phases of development, contracts have also been 
divided between these two categories. The third (June-September) 
quarterly review report to the DTIGSC for 1993 (PJV 1994) provided 
details on the final figures for the construction phase, because 
construction officially ended with the completion of Stage IVa in 
October 1993. 
.. A total of 322 construction contracts were awarded between 
14 February 1989 and the end of October 1993, with a total 
value of K184,344,863. 
.. Porgeran contractors (including joint ventures) received 80 
contracts (or 25 per cent of the total number) with an actual 
value of K29.16 million (or 16 per cent of the total value). 
.. Other Engan contractors (including joint ventures) received 88 
contracts (or 27 per cent of the total number) with an actual 
value of K34.17 million (or 18 per cent of the total value). 
The report went on to state that such figures I demonstrate clearly that 
the terms of the SML agreement ... have been met during the four 
stages of construction at Porgera'. 
The fourth (October-December) quarterly review report for 1993 
provided comparable data on the contracts awarded under the 
heading of I operations'. 
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.. A total of 721 operations contracts were awarded between 
1983 and the end of December 1993, with a total value of 
K99.8 million. 
.. Porgeran contractors (including joint ventures) received 353 
contracts (or 49 per cent of the total number) with an actual 
value of K24.4 million (or 24.4 per cent of the total value) of 
these contracts. 
.. Other Engan contractors (including joint ventures) received 
198 contracts (or 27.4 per cent of the total number) with an 
actual value of K28.9 million (or 29 per cent of the total 
value) of these contracts. 
The report also noted that recent increases in the value of contracts 
awarded to Ipili-speakers 'indicates the maintenance of the preference 
clause'. 
Closer examination of the Porgeran contract figures shows why 
they have been contentious. Of the 80 Porgeran construction contracts 
.. 31 went to youth or women's groups for 'environmental 
rehabilitation' (tree planting)-these were all relatively 
small, labour-only contracts 
.. 18 were for plant hire, and two were for road maintenance 
equipment 
.. 17 were for construction projects, including the PJV 
Environment and Assay buildings, Paiam school, relocation 
housing, Suyan township housing, and the like 
.. 12 were for freight, garbage disposal, and catering services. 
Twenty-eight of the contracts, including all the construction contracts, 
went to IPI, either separately or in association with joint venture 
partners. Only 14 of the Porgeran contracts were worth more than 
K500,000 (six for plant hire, three for catering, and five for 
construction), and ten of these went to IP!. 
Rather than examine the full total of 353 operations contracts 
awarded to Porgerans, it is more manageable to discuss the 57 
contracts which were still current in 1994. These contracts were 
generally representative of the range of operations contracts awarded, 
except for the fact that they excluded the 'field contracts', which I shall 
discuss separately. Of these 57 contracts 
.. 19 were for bus hire 
.. 14 were for plant hire 
.. seven were freight contracts 
.. three were for hire of labour 
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.. three were for security services 
.. two were for catering services 
.. two were for garbage collection; and 
.. there was one contract each for incinerator operation, SML 
fence construction, market construction, sewage truck, 
cleaning, vegetable supply, and animal capture and disposaP 
These contracts had a total value of just over K18 million, which 
represented about three-quarters of the value of all the operations 
contracts awarded to Porgerans to date. But an important qualification 
needs to be made about the value of these contracts. In all but three 
cases, they were paid on a 'rates' basis, which meant that the value of 
the contracts as represented in the quarterly reports was an estimate of 
what the contractor could usually be expected to earn over the life of 
the contract. In practice, few Porgeran bus, freight and plant 
contractors were actually able to realise these amounts for a number of 
reasons, including an inability to provide reliable service, occasional 
lack of work, and maintenance problems. The bus hire situation 
illustrates this perfectly. There were 21 PJV bus hire contracts in 1994, 
although it was acknowledged by the company that there was only 
work for 15 buses. The greater number of contracts was required so 
that, on anyone day, at least 15 buses would turn up for work. This 
was because there had been problems with buses failing to turn up, 
especially during holiday periods when the owners were apparently 
liable to use them for personal business. 
As a result, there was a substantial difference between the expected 
value of the contracts and the actual amount paid to date. The fourth 
quarterly report, for example, showed that, while the total value of the 
contracts awarded to Porgerans was K24.4 million, the amount 
actually paid to Porgeran contractors to date was only K15 million. 
The actual value of contracts paid was only being adjusted at the end 
of those contracts. 
A further point raised by the landowners was that the full value of 
any contract awarded to a joint venture between a Porgeran and a 
non-Porgeran entity was being counted as the value of a 'Porgeran' 
contract. For example, the full value of the IPI-Poons catering contract 
was included in the Porgeran category, despite the fact that IPI only 
held a 30 per cent interest in the joint venture. Of course, the 
proportion of the total value of the contract which actually remained 
in Porgera might well have been greater than the equity share of the 
Porgeran partner in the joint venture, once the value of local wages 
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and other local purchases was taken into account, but the PJV was 
preparing to acknowledge the point at issue by amending its method 
of calculating Porgeran contract values. 
Given the local cultural constraints on business development and the 
high-technology inputs required by the mining company, the contract 
figures reflect well enough on the PJV's efforts. With a few exceptions, 
Porgerans were given all the contracts which they were qualified to carry 
out. Porgeran representatives have sometimes argued that Porgerans 
should be given contracts even if they are not qualified to carry them out, 
as they will pick up the necessary skills as they go along or else 
subcontract the work to someone else, but this is simply not feasible when 
one considers the often highly skilled nature of the mining operation and 
the tight schedules which require that contracts be completed quickly. 
What is a contract? 
The 'contract' has been seen by many Porgerans as the key to success 
in business, but the reality of the Porgeran business environment in 
1994 was that a PJV contract had more status value than economic 
value. There were remarkably few Porgeran contractors who were 
actually making money from the project. Furthermore, most of the 
value of many Porgeran contracts was accounted for by goods (for 
example fuel and plant) purchased from outside Porgera, and there 
were some contracts to which the Porgeran contractor was 
contributing very little indeed. I shall now consider a number of 
specific contract types in order to assess both their projected and 
actual profitability, and the proportion of the value of 'Porgeran' 
contracts which actually accrued to Porgerans. Four specific types of 
contracts are discussed: freight, bus hire, field contracts, and 
operational contracts. In each case, a typical contract (rather than any 
actual contract) is considered in light of the figures discussed with me 
by the contractors themselves and by PJV staff. 
A bus contract was typically listed as being worth K60,OOO over 
two years, though this figure underestimates the amount that could be 
earned, because it represents the average of what was actually being 
realised by the contractors. Bus contractors were paid at a rate of K30 
per hour. Assuming a five-hour day and a six-day week, this would 
have meant a gross income of K900 per week or K45,OOO per year. The 
bus contracts were put together in such a way that a Porgeran could 
use his contract as a means of obtaining a bank loan to buy a new 
PMY, worth around K34,OOO, and payoff the loan over the two-year 
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life of the contract. Repayments on such loans were about K1,600 a 
month in 1994. In theory, then, after two years, the bus contractor 
should own the bus and have made a significant profit which can be 
reinvested in the business. In practice, none of the bus owners were 
making profits of this order, and after two years, most of the buses 
were not in a suitable condition to continue operating on a PJV 
contract. The main problem was the lack of spending on repairs and 
maintenance, which in turn led to the owners being unable to provide 
a consistent and reliable service. 
If we look at the budget breakdown (Table 7.3) in terms of final 
destination of the money being spent, we can safely say that all of the 
loan repayments and at least 75 per cent of the running costs (fuel, 
tyres and repairs and maintenance) accrued to non-Porgeran 
businesses, leaving a maximum of 42 per cent of the contract value to 
accrue in Porgera. Furthermore, most of the bus drivers were non-
Porgerans recruited by the Porgeran contractor, thus reducing the 
proportion even further. And since the number of bus contracts 
exceeded the volume of available work, for reasons already 
mentioned, there would only be an average of 3-4 hours of work for 
each bus on those days when all the buses showed up for work-
barely enough to meet the financial commitments of the owners. ID 
Although I could not construct a budget for a typical freight 
contract the following information does allow some comments to be 
made. In 1994, the PJV was paying K165 per tonne for freight from Lae 
to Porgera. For a typical 24-tonne load, this was equivalent to K3,970 
per trip. A semi-trailer should be able to average four loads a month, 
while a twin-steer truck could complete five, and some of the new 
trucks were managing more. Average annual income should therefore 
Table 7.3 
Item 
Typical two-year bus contract budget, 1994 
Kina 
Loan repayments for bus purchase 
Driver's wages 
Fuel 
Tyres and tubes 
Repairs and maintenance 
Profit 
Total 
Source: PJV Business Development records. 








have been K190,000 for a semi-trailer and K238,000 for a twin-steer. 
The PJV provided some assistance with fuel and tyres, and sometimes 
also had backloads needing transport down to Lae. The contractors 
could also secure backloads from other sources, and some of the 
larger, non-Porgeran companies were certainly doing so. The PJV 
considered that its freight rates had a K10 per tonne 'Porgeran factor' 
built in to cover the additional expenses involved in working in the 
Porgeran environment. The company's own estimate was that there 
should have been a profit of K1,000 per trip for the operators. And yet, 
like the bus owners, all the Porgeran freight contractors were in 
trouble, and this could once again be put down to a lack of 
maintenance and a lack of management. Freight contracts do require 
greater organisation than bus contracts, and even one missed trip could 
cost the operator a great deal. Several Porgerans had previously shown 
that it was possible to make profits from freight contracts, but only one 
or two had used the profits to consolidate their businesses, and at least 
one previously successful freight contractor had subsequently folded 
due to a lack of attention to the maintenance of the business. 
The incinerator contract held by a Porgeran business group 
highlights many of the problems of what I caU 'operational contracts' 
in the Porgeran business environment, and also the means by which 
these can be overcome. The PJV had constructed the high-temperature 
incinerator to dispose of the combustible waste generated by the mine. 
The contract to operate the incinerator was originally awarded to the 
business group in May 1993. In December 1993, a garnishee order was 
taken out on the contract earnings by a creditor of one of the two 
principals. Apparently, the money was owed for personal expenses 
which were unrelated to the business group. With assistance from the 
PJY; the group was able to continue operating, and the money was 
repaid. The principal involved agreed to step aside, and the contract 
was transferred to the other principal's own business group. In March 
1994, Kulapi villagers living in the vicinity of the incinerator 
complained that this person was feeding his pigs on garden waste 
which should have been burnt in the incinerator. This claim was 
vehemently denied by the person involved, who believed that others 
in Kulapi were jealous of his success. 
These two incidents highlight the way in which personal matters 
come to impinge on all types of businesses in Porgera. Unless the 
business owner is able to deal with such problems, the contract will be 
lost, and the business will fail. In the case of this particular contract, 
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the support of the PJV was essential for survival. The business group 
was paid a guaranteed set rate each week, and employed eight staff, 
including the principal. Three of these staff were Porgerans, while the 
rest were from other parts of Enga. The projected cashflows showed 
that wages accounted for about 60 per cent of the value of the contract, 
other running costs accounted for about 25 per cent, and the 
remainder was potentially profit. When interviewed in late March 
1994, the principal was finding the contract rather tight financially, but 
felt that he would be able to reduce costs to give a better return. The 
ongoing nature of the incinerator contract was typical of several of the 
operational contracts awarded to Porgerans: the sewage truck and the 
rubbish contract were two other examples. They allowed a steady 
source of income which could potentially be used as a source of long-
term investment inside or outside Porgera. 
Most of the operations contracts issued by 1994 were 'field 
contracts'. The PJV's contract listing indicated that these were a 
relatively recent phenomenon, because it showed that more than 180 
field contracts had been issued to Porgerans since February 1993, but 
it seems that they had simply not been captured by the contract 
reporting system before that time. Field contracts are generally short-
term, labour-only contracts which are relatively low value and thus 
not even regarded as 'business' by some Porgerans. They have been let 
for revegetation, scrub clearing, relocation garden clearing, relocation 
house construction and the like. Most have been let to individuals, 
youth groups or women's groups. Although they were generally 
valued at less than K2,000, the field contracts had the advantage that 
virtually all of this value accrued to Porgerans. In this respect, ten 
K2,000 field contracts are worth as much as a KlOO,OOO contract from 
which only 20 per cent of the value stays in Porgera. On the other 
hand, the potential for investment of funds derived from the field 
contracts has rarely been realised, and this point has commonly been 
overlooked because the field contract has not had the status of the 
higher value, capital intensive contracts. 
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Notes 
1 Businesswomen, while not totally absent, were very rare. 
2 In the first half of 1994, 47 per cent of the value of PJV Warehouse 
purchase orders went to national suppliers. 
3 The consultant made unrealistic assumptions, such as treating 
Porgera as a 'closed' economy, and then constructed a model of this 
economy which contained faulty equations, with input figures 
which misrepresented the relevant factors. 
4 Gibbs (cited in Pacific Agribusiness 1987) had counted 25 
'passenger vehicles' owned by the Ipili in 1979. 
5 If the IPI Supa Stoa and Paiam Kumbipara operations were 
included in the figures, the predominance of Porgera Station as the 
economic heart of the valley would be further underlined. The 
current IPI Supa Stoa weekly turnover (one-third retail and two-
thirds wholesale), for example, was equal to that of all other 
business combined. 
6 By November 1994, business in Mungalep had virtually ceased to 
exist as a result of a large-scale tribal fight which had destroyed a 
number of the trade stores surveyed in March. The largest 
businessman in Mungalep was one of the central protagonists. 
7 The Wabag office was intent on revitalising the Enga Vegetable 
Marketing Depot as a source of supply for the PJV caterers at 
Porgera, as well as other regional markets, and on providing 
assistance to reopen the local pyrethrum factory. 
8 The government had two business development officers of its own 
based in Porgera, but their capacity to operate independently of the 
PJV's Business Development section was limited by their lack of a 
vehicle. 
9 I would query some of these figures. The market construction 
contract, for example, was awarded to the 'Hiwanda landowners', 
who are thought to reside in the Southern Highlands Province, 
while two of the plant hire contracts were no longer current, and 
there appeared to be duplicate records for security, garbage 
collection and catering. Removal of these anomalies reduced the 
number of Porgeran contracts to SI. 
10 By November 1994, the devaluation of the PNG kina had changed 
the financial parameters substantially. A new PMV now cost 
K57,OOO, and the cost of fuel, tyres and repairs had also gone up. 
The PJV had increased its contract rate from K30 to K33 per hour. 
The profitability of bus contracts also seemed to have improved, 
because half of the contractors had made enough money to buy 
new buses since April that year. IPI owned three of the bus 
contracts, and were managing several others for local Porgeran 
owners. 
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Porgera-whence and whither? 
Aletta Biel"sack 
Ipili speakers span two valleys-the Porgera Valley, home of the 
eastern Ipili, and the Paiela Valley, home of the western Ipili (Biersack 
1995a). Porgerans and Paielans share a language, a culture, and a 
common, but also divergent, history. In the past, and still today, 
marriage, travel, and trade linked Porgera with Paiela to the west, the 
Tari basin to the south, and Enga-speaking areas to the east of Porgera. 
Their position today, however, is not merely a regional one. Colonial 
and post-colonial history, and in particular the gold mining for which 
Porgerans are justly famous, have exposed them to global markets, 
multinational corporations, and the state of Papua New Guinea, with 
its own laws, provincial government system, and international 
partnerships. The categories that are ubiquitous in this volume-the 
Special Mining Lease (SML), the SML clans and sub-clans (here called 
lines), and the SML landowners-signify novel entities and statuses. 
The SML is itself a fiat of the state of Papua New Guinea. The SML's 
boundaries were established to facilitate the investments of the 
Porgera Joint Venture (PJV), an amalgamation of several multinational 
corporations in partnership with the state of Papua New Guinea. 
Understanding the tensions and dynamics of gold mining depends 
upon understanding how the SML lines, and those designated as the 
SML 'landowners' (yu anduane), interact with neighbours at the valley, 
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regional, and provincial levels (cf. Jorgensen 1996; Sagir 1997). Since 
the SML has arisen from the needs of the PJV and the powers of the 
State of Papua New Guinea, global capital and the state are fully 
implicated in any analysis of that interaction. 
Today, there is a general 'breakdown of law and order', the refrain 
of Bonnell's insightful and rich report (Bonnell1994). Tribal fighting is 
recurrent and disruptive. Is this escalation in conflict an inevitable 
trauma of development, a by-product of capitalist penetration and 
processes of 'modernisation'? Or is it better understood as the complex 
outcome of the interaction of local and national (or global) orders of 
determination? Here I shall argue that the task of accounting for this 
escalation, as well as explaining why the situation is not more 
explosive than it actually is, requires that we conceptualise Porgera as 
the subject of plural, cross-cutting, sometimes mutually reinforcing, 
but also sometimes contradictory orders of determination. The conflict 
of today should be understood in terms of the way that new, mining-
related concepts of entitlement and endowment interact with 
traditional mores and, more specifically, the way that the SML zone, 
an artefact of global capital and state jurisdiction, interacts with 
antecedent social networks, themselves rooted in traditional social 
organisation. My argument, in a nutshell, is that the interaction is 
complex. On the one hand, the privileges of a few are bolstered 
through the codifications of mining, but on the other hand, the 
openness and inclusiveness of Ipili society is informally preserved. 
The greater the exclusiveness, the greater the conflict; yet the sharing 
of wealth and other resources levels economic disparities, promotes 
harmonious relations, and upholds traditional values and morality. 
My discussion begins with the 'whence?' of the title, with a 
summary of the salient features of the traditional system. It proceeds 
to the title's 'whither?', exploring the fractures and tensions of the 
mining era as a by-product of multiple orders of determination 
operating in conjunction. Using my own research in the Porgera-
Paiela region,! as well as the abundant information supplied by the 
reports of the Porgera Social Monitoring Programme, I shall then 
suggest how the recent codifications which stem from mining interact 
with anterior arrangements, and how, in effect, the seemingly 
innocuous institutions of kinship and marriage are politicised and 
deployed in 'altered contexts' (Gewertz and Errington 1991) to enable 
SML people to informally negotiate their own agreements with 
constituencies lying beyond the SML border. 
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An open society 
From line to social field 
Anthropologists have often tended to assume that 'societies' are made 
up of bounded, static groups. We have known, ever since John 
Barnes's pathbreaking article on 'African models in the New Guinea 
Highlands' (Barnes 1962) that such an assumption does not square 
with the facts of life in Papua New Guinea. Even in those PNG 
societies which have patrilineal or matrilineal 'rules' of descent, actual 
groups are formed by other criteria and tend to be flexible in their 
boundaries and composition. Barnes (1967) went on to challenge the 
application of 'African models' to the Enga, with their supposedly 
rigid rules of patrilineal descent and group formation. Roy Wagner's 
equally provocative article of 1974 shockingly asked: 'Are there social 
groups in the New Guinea Highlands?' 
In this context, Ipili society-anomalous yet also brilliant at every 
turn, and with an unsurpassed fluidity, openness, and ability to 
respond organisationally to every contingency without loss of 
integrity-assumes enormous theoretical importance. Worldwide, 
cognatic descent is a rarity, the Ipili version is conspicuous in both the 
New Guinea context and the anthropological literature. Recruitment 
to the line is through female as well as male members, and all line 
members can be classified as tene ('base people') or wana ('girls').2 This 
contrast does not distinguish the children of a line of male 
descendants from all the rest, as would happen in a patrilineal regime. 
Rather, it separates the children of line men from the children of line 
women. Thus (as I have been told repeatedly by Ipili themselves), the 
children of male wana are tene, and the children of female tene are 
wana. What is important is the sex of the linking parent, not the sex of 
a line of descendants. The distinction, in short, is a matter of gender, 
not of descent. 
Since the children of both men and women are line members, any 
one person is affiliated with multiple lines: with the lines of the 
mother and with the lines of the father. Porgerans typically list 
multiple line memberships, some through their mother and some 
through their father. The model appears to recognise eight line 
memberships, four matrilines and four patrilines, although actual 
listings of line affiliations vary in length. Now, if everyone has plural 
line memberships, the members of anyone line are also members of 
other lines, and lines intersect or overlap in their memberships. 
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Consequently, and in stark contrast to unilineal systems, there are no 
discrete, mutually exclusive groups in Ipili society, nor is the line a 
functional unit in most (if any) social settings. This is where Wagner's 
shocking question becomes relevant. The groups that form and 
function precipitate out of a field of actors that cuts across particular 
line boundaries, and it is upon such fields that analysis must focus. 
How, then, do these fields form? The cognatic rule guarantees that 
all lines will intersect. These points of intersection are thickened 
through the express preference for concentrating marriages between 
lines. Typically, A and B lines intermarry not just once but many times, 
producing members of line A who are also members of line B, and vice 
versa-in short, a group of people who are As and Bs. If As and Bs 
intermarry, then many As and Bs will have joint membership in the 
two lines. Under the circumstances, As and Bs participate in a field of 
relations in which some As are also Bs (or vice versa), while some As 
are not also Bs, and some Bs are not also As. Ipili constantly allude to 
such fields in their own sociological statements. In Ipili idioms: those 
who are As and Bs are 'in between' (tombene nga) A and B; those who 
are As but not Bs are 'true' As; and those who are Bs but not As are 
'true' Bs. A group which precipitates out of such a field would mostly 
be comprised of A-Bs, with some 'true' As and some 'true' Bs. Ipili 
action groups have closely related people (A-Bs, for example) at their 
core, with 'true' members of other lines represented on the margins of 
the field. Fields such as this function with respect to marriage 
sponsorship, local group formation, and mobilisation for a variety of 
collective efforts. 
The formation of such fields is the express purpose of marriage. In 
explaining line exogamy, Ipili state that, if a man from one line marries 
a woman from another line, then the cognatic rule means that their 
children will be 'in between' the two groups. The purpose is to extend 
and consolidate networks, increasing societal cohesion and peace. A 
person belongs to all of the lines of both his or her parents, and is thus 
positioned 'in between' parental lines, equally or impartially 
committed to one and all. Should war break out between any two 
lines, those who are members of both lines are expected to maintain 
their neutrality. Smalley (1983:9) pointed out that cognatic descent 
'minimises conflict' because '[a] man cannot fight cognates who reside 
in other lines within the Ipili'. This pacification effect of cognation is 
also well documented for Ipili speakers living in the Paiela Valley 
(Biersack 1980, 1990, 1991, 1996). 
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Lines tend to have more than one line with which they intermarry. 
Line A would not concentrate its marriages with line B alone, but 
would 'exchange women' with several lines-with lines C and D, for 
example. I use the term 'affinal cluster' to designate a line and all the 
other lines from which it typically draws its spouses-its 'woman 
suppliers' (wanda atata pene) (Biersack 1995b, 1996). The word 'affinal' 
indicates that it is specifically marriage that is the source of the 
cluster's cohesion. Line A may have a cluster that includes lines B, C, 
and D, but line B may have a cluster that includes lines A, D, and E. In 
this way, affinal clusters interlock. Each line is positioned within an 
affinal cluster, and these affinal clusters intersect. This network 
structure is the real integument of Ipili society. 
The cluster and the field in which it is embedded are fluid, open, 
malleable. They can be expanded through the accretion of further 
woman-supplying lines, and they can be consolidated through a 
further concentration of marriages between particular lines. The 
texture and scope of the network depends upon actual marriages. 
Clusters come into and go out of existence, expand or contract, 
depending upon specific events and the aggregated decisions that 
particular actors take in the face of them. Ipili marriage is best 
understood as an instrument of self-organisation (Biersack 1991) in the 
face of ecological and political contingencies. Wars, famines, droughts 
and pestilence have been among those factors that have governed the 
choice of spouse; and today mining is also important. To understand 
Ipili society is to understand the suppleness and historicity of its 
networks, their flexibility and responsiveness to changing 
circumstances. Marriage is the specific instrument that allows for 
event-sensitive adaptation without loss of organisational integrity. 
However people marry, structured fields will form so long as 
marriages are concentrated to some degree between lines. 
Networks, land ownership and travel 
Lines own specific blocks of land (yu), and these blocks are subdivided 
among the lines. The members of anyone line are 'owners' (anduane) 
of the block of ground belonging to the line, and may exploit the line's 
estate by gardening and/ or residing on it. Anyone person, as the 
member of multiple lines, may garden and/ or reside on any and all of 
the estates belonging to his or her lines. Ideally, a person visits or 
resides on all of his or her estates, the estates of the father and the 
estates of the mother, thus activating the various segments of his or 
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her network. Co-residence for longer or shorter periods is required to 
preserve ties which tend to lapse with any prolonged absence, as do 
rights in land (Ipara 1994; Pacific Agribusiness 1987:16).3 Line 
members who live 'outside', and who do not come to visit and lend 
their support to line members living 'inside', on the line estate, can 
become persona non grata in the homeland. But access to estates will 
also depend on contingencies such as the availability of land and 
whether the local group is recruiting for military purposes, or 
fattening pigs for a major prestation, and thus wanting to build up its 
numbers. 
Once a person marries, he or she is expected to visit or reside with 
members of his or her spouse's lines, no less than with members of the 
lines to which he or she belongs. Spouses should live together, and 
they should do so on a range of estates, the estates of the wife's lines 
as well as of the husband's lines. In a pattern that has also been 
reported for the Huli to the south (Glasse 1968; Allen 1995), Ipili rotate 
among kinspeople and affines, visiting for longer or shorter periods, 
or even establishing dual or multiple residences (Biersack 1995b, 
1996). This 'coming and going' (pua ipu pua) of spouses anticipates the 
movements of the couple's children once they achieve adulthood. The 
children will be 'in between' the parents' lines, and owners of all of 
their parents' estates, and they will be expected to live on these 
estates, among their matrikin and patrikin. A husband and a wife 
rotate among each other's estates in order to introduce their children 
to all their relatives, mapping through their own itineraries the 
anticipated travels of their own children. Of course, the children will 
eventually marry and move among their own affines, and not just 
among their consanguines, widening still further their social and 
geographical orbit. 
Within this general pattern of movement among relatives by birth 
and marriage, there is some variation by gender. A married woman is 
expected to live initially among her husband's kin. This does not 
always happen, nor is it a strict rule. However, the very expectation 
that a woman would move to her husband's place upon marriage, and 
not vice versa, makes sons seem more crucial than daughters to 
residential continuity and gardening succession, at least in the short 
term. Over the course of the marriage, the couple is expected to live in 
the wife's as well as the husband's places, and this means that, in the 
long if not the short run, residential continuity is achieved as much 
through daughters as through sons. In general, mobility, flexibility, 
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openness, and network breadth are the ideals, and, all other things 
being equal, daughters and sons-in-law are as crucial to network 
building and network maintenance as are sons and daughters-in-law. 
The expectation that a bride will join her husband, and not the other 
way around, reflects a certain male (rather than agnatic) bias in the 
culture, which also assures that men and not women are leaders, and 
that men rather than women dominate the most important arenas of 
prestige competition (Biersack 1995b). Today, mining is perhaps the 
most important such arena. 
The special status of the spouse 
Spouses have a special line status, not as line members but as line 
affiliates. A member 'takes' the name of the group's ancestor and is 
reckoned as a descendant or mandi yene (literally 'he or she who has been 
borne') of the ancestor. Since lines are exogamous, the spouses of 
members are never mandi yene. The spouse of an Angalaini line member is 
'woman's husband' (wana akalini) or 'man's wife' (akali wetene) of 
Angalaini (and all his or her other lines). As such, he or she is considered 
as an 'owner' of the estate of his or her spouse's line, and is expected to 
assume certain responsibilities towards his or her affines. Husbands and 
wives own gardens and pigs together, and they also give and receive pigs 
as domestic partners. Together they produce wealth, and together they 
deploy this wealth to support each other's kin. 
Together they also reproduce, and it is as parents that their 
affiliation with each other's lines is ultimately to be explained. By the 
rule of exogamy, a Porgeran ideally marries a person who belongs to 
lines other than his or her own lines. And yet, by the cognatic rule, a 
married person always bears members of his or her spouse's lines. If 
an A man marries a B woman, his children will belong to lines A and 
B, the A man becoming the progenitor of members of his wife's B line 
and the B woman becoming the progenitrix of members of her 
husband's A line. In recognition of the A man's role in spawning 
members of B line, he is wana akalini of B line and 'owner' of the estate 
of the particular grouping within the line to which his wife belongs. In 
recognition of her role as bearer of the next generation of A people, the 
B woman is akali wetene or 'wife of a man' of A line, and 'owner' of the 
estate of her husband's particular grouping within the line. Smalley, 
who 'lived and worked' with Porgerans from the early 1960s onward, 
reported this feature of the Porgera system in his 1983 genealogical 
study. 
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It is a fact, that once the full bride price has been paid, a child 
produced, the incoming member is accepted as having full title and 
rights to his wife's land and is entitled to compensation. Conversely, a 
female, who marries in has title to the husband's land and assets 
through her offspring (Smalley 1983:6). 
Hosts and guests (epo atene) 
The scope for movement is enhanced through the host-guest 
relationship. In brief, a person can reside and garden anywhere that a 
'landowner' grants him or her permission to reside and garden, and 
regardless of whether that person is a landowner in the area. 
Landowners-members of the corporate line as well as their 
spouses-typically grant use privileges to kith and kin. Let us assume, 
for example, that there are three men: Ml, M2, and M3. Ml belongs to 
lines A and B, is married to a woman who is a member of lines C and 
D, and lives on the estate of a particular grouping within A line. M2 is 
a member of line B but not of line A, and he wishes to join Ml on the 
estate of the grouping within A line. If Ml grants M2 permission to 
move in, M2 becomes Ml's guest or epa atene, 'someone who comes to 
stay'. Now imagine M3. He belongs to line C, or to lines C and D, but 
not to line A or line B. He, too, wishes to live with Ml. If Ml authorises 
him to do so, M3 will join him on the estate of the grouping within A 
line to which Ml belongs as Ml's affinal guest. Since spouses 'own' 
the estates the groupings within each other's line, spouses can also 
serve as hosts. For example, M3 would be as much the guest of Ml's 
wife as of Ml; and the same is true of M2, who is the affine of Ml's 
wife. 
Epa atene reside where they do at the sufferance of a host, someone 
who grants them rights of usufruct and sojourn. The hallmark of the 
class is not, as Banks (1994a:25) suggests, that guests come from 
outside the Porgera Valley, but that, regardless of where they originate, 
they are not owners of the estate on which they reside. Morally, a 
person is bound to host relatives, and this means that a line functions 
as a magnet, attracting guests from all sectors of the affinal cluster in 
which the line participates. The rule of exogamy requires that lines 
draw to themselves spouses ('men's wives' and 'women's husbands') 
from the outside; and the ability of landowners to extend hospitality to 
those of their relatives who are not themselves owners of the 
particular estate, and who are in search of resources and domicile, 
means that line members host a number of guests-allies, supporters, 
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neighbours, and friends. The mixed composition of any Porgera 
hamlet-the juxtaposition of line members, their spouses (also 
'owners'), and the guests of both of these-is symptomatic of a sort of 
open-door policy, a policy that rejects line parochialism in favour of 
inclusivity. 
There is one further aspect of hospitality that is important. By 
definition, a guest does not belong to the descent unit which owns the 
estate on which he or she resides. Consequently, the guest may marry 
in, drawing spouses from the landowning line. A guest who marries 
an 'owner' of the hosting line becomes himself or herself a landowner, 
and his or her children will be owners as well-hence natives of the 
land. Line exogamy facilitates the transformation of a guest and non-
landowner into a spouse and landowner, and the cognatic rule ensures 
that the offspring of such unions will be incorporated in perpetuity as 
members of the corporate and hosting line. Thus are outsiders 
converted into insiders. 
Marriage and regional networks 
Marriage, it is said, creates 'roads' or 'bridges' between lines-idioms 
that reflect the physical movement between the estates of 
intermarrying lines which are created by marriage. Lines represent 
districts, and the full inventory of parental and spousallines maps the 
geographical reach of a person's network. The scope of a person's 
network is always established through a marital history: the marriages 
of his or her great grandparents, grandparents, and parents, as well as 
his or her own marriage. The 'roads' that such a marital history creates 
may be quite long, from one end of the Porgera Valley to the other, 
from the Porgera to the Paiela valleys, and from as far as Lake 
Kopiago in the west to various groups of Enga speakers in the east. In 
principle, these networks may extend to Mount Hagen or Port 
Moresby, or even to Australia and America. 
We know, from consultants and researchers writing in the 1980s, 
that marriage relations were already far-flung. Writing in the early 
1980s, Kundapen Talyaga reported that, in a sample of 15 marriages 
entered into by the future SML landowners, 36 per cent of the spouses 
were from Porgera, but 25 per cent were from Paiela, 11 per cent were 
from Wage (an Enga-speaking area), and 6 per cent from Tari (Talyaga 
1984:35). In a larger sample of 32 marriages, Talyaga discovered that 
28 per cent of the spouses were drawn from Tari and another 33 per 
cent from Laiagam and Wabag (ibid:47). Smalley's sample was much 
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larger. In a survey of nine lines, he noted that there was a heavy 
concentration of marriages with Engans, but Huli people from the 
Tari basin were also chosen as spouses (Smalley 1983:2-3). From my 
own five-week stay in Tipinini, at the eastern edge of the Porgera 
Valley, in 1993, I came to know the extent of intermarriage between 
Porgerans living there and the Enga and Huli people to the east, 
northeast, south and southwest. Similarly, members of the Kewai line 
living just north of the Kaiya River are said to have 'links with groups 
to the east (Enga), south (Huli) and the west (Paiela), (Banks 1994b:8).4 
While Smalley's and Talyaga's statistics stem from the 1980s, 
intermarriage with neighbouring ethnic groups was commonplace in 
earlier periods. An earlier patrol report (Laiagam PR No. 1 of 1960-61) 
mentions intermarriage with Enga, Huli, and Duna (see also Biersack 
1995a:11-12), and even a cursory reading of the Tiyini (a.k.a. Tieni) line 
genealogy drafted by Father Phil Gibbs in 1981 (and reflecting previous 
as well as contemporaneous marriages) reveals the extent of 
intermarriage between Porgera and the southern end of the Paiela 
Valley. Of the 708 marriages which he recorded, 284 (or about 40 per 
cent) of the spouses come from the Paiela Valley, whose heartland, as 
well as its southern end, are well represented in the sample. In addition, 
a smattering of spouses came from Tari, Lake Kopiago, and the Hewa 
country, from Tumbiam, Laiagam, Wabag, and Wage (all Enga-speaking 
areas), and even from Mount Hagen, the Simbu area, and Australia. 
Given the plurality of line memberships and affiliations, and the 
geographical scope of a person's network, the task of distinguishing 
Porgerans from non-Porgerans becomes difficult, if not specious. If 40 
per cent of the spouses of Tiyini line members are Paielans, then a 
significant number of the landowners of the Tiyini estate are Paielans, 
and the children of these will be both east and west Ipili-'in between'. 
During my two-month stay at Porgera Station in 1995-96, I rarely came 
across anyone who, though residing in the Porgera Valley, did not have 
at least one, and often many more line affiliations outside it. These 
cross-cutting ties enlarge the spatial scale of anyone person's activities; 
they render travel across districts, valleys, and regions safer than it 
would otherwise be; and they are proactively cultivated for these very 
reasons. By the same token, they render the Porgera Valley utterly porous. 
Marriage and the circulation of wealth 
Income is ideally shared among all blood kin. Thus, if a person who is 
a member of lines A, B, and C receives wealth, then he or she should 
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distribute this wealth to the members of all three lines, not just to the 
members of one or two of them, even if the wealth has been received 
through his or her membership of only one of them. In other words, to 
the extent that cognatic descent positions actors interstitially, it 
institutionalises a circulation of wealth across line boundaries. 
Part and parcel of the diplomatic function of marriage is the flow of 
wealth which it inaugurates between the bride's and the groom's sides 
along the 'road' which marriage opens up. Married couples co-own 
gardens and pigs because they are expected to produce the wealth 
which funds the prestations of their relatives by birth and marriage. 
Bridewealth instigates a flow of wealth between the two sides, and 
this is perpetuated in the next generation through the couple's 
children and their distributions. The express purpose of the union is to 
produce 'in between' children-children who, by virtue of their 
network position, will share their wealth with the father's and the 
mother's side alike, thus uniting them. 
Ipili mores endorse sharing among kith and kin. A major award 
should never be pocketed; it should be distributed. Individuals have 
multiple line affiliations, some by birth and some by marriage, and it 
is the full range of affiliations that is honoured in any distribution. 
Consequently, wealth flows within affinal clusters and across line 
boundaries; it does not, and should not, stay within line boundaries. 
To the extent that marriages are geographically far-flung, wealth 
circulates at the regional and not just the local level, across valley 
ridges and ethnic divisions. This aspect of Porgeran society-its 
tendency to set wealth in motion within a wide network of kith and 
kin-is fundamental to understanding its traditional dynamics, and it 
is the key to fathoming the tensions and expectations engendered by 
today's gold mining era. In brief, any situation which privileges some 
lines over others, and even Porgerans over non-Porgerans, will create 
valley-wide and regional conflict. 
Porgera today: an open-and-shut case 
Porgera social organisation creates tremendous flexibility. A person 
has many options. He or she may live on the estate of a matriline or a 
patriline, on the estate of a spouse, or as a guest on the land of a 
foreign line, provided that some relative who is a landowner extends 
residential privileges. If a conflict develops among neighbours, it is 
always possible to find a safe haven elsewhere, among other kith and 
kin. There are many potential hosts to accommodate altered 
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circumstances. During a war, a person can recruit allies or flee from 
enemies; during famine, more fertile ground can be sought; if an aid 
post or school has opened up, a person can move nearby it to make 
use of it. Marriage itself is a tool for adapting to changing 
circumstances. Through marriage, new 'roads' can be opened up, new 
niches exploited, and existing networks strategically expanded. In 
short, Ipili speakers deploy their system as a contingency-sensitive 
resource. How, then, have Porgerans and others used it in an era of 
large-scale mining? Is it equally useful to everyone, or is it problematic 
for some? Reading between the lines of the other chapters in this 
volume, one can glimpse a pair of conflicting tendencies: towards a 
continuing openness, through marriage and hospitality, but also 
towards the imposition of restrictions and exclusions. 
The host-guest relationship today: preliminary observations 
Today, Porgerans themselves appear to be shifting closer to the mine 
(Banks 1993:19), and immigrants flood the area. Fritz Robinson, a 
former PJV community affairs officer, has estimated that about 3,000 
outsiders arrived in Porgera between 1989 and 1994 (Robinson 1994b); 
and Banks has more recently estimated that epa atene comprise 'up to 
40 per cent of the population of the [Porgera] valley' (Banks 1996:233). 
Robinson (1994b) fears that this high level of immigration will place 
Porgera at risk: newcomers are interested in immediate rewards, 
rather than in the 'gradual growth of the local economy', and if the 
trend continues, he predicts that there will be a 'gradual demise of the 
Eastern Ipili as a discrete group'. Bonnell, too, has warned against the 
potential for 'chain migration', which 'could cause the Ipili culture to 
be extinguished through marriage' (1994:65). 
Robinson's doomsday prediction reflects the kind of negativity 
towards the newcomers which Porgerans themselves, overwhelmed 
by the onslaught of immigrants, sometimes express. Nevertheless, 
Porgerans appear to be complicit in this immigration. As Banks 
observes, far from passively suffering the incursions of outsiders 
individual Porgerans must to a large degree accept responsibility for 
the influx of migrants within the valley ... Not only have individuals 
allowed epa atene to reside in their areas, but many must have actively 
recruited people to the SML (1994a:28). 
Bonnell also implies that an understanding of the newcomers as 
'squatters' is problematic, because the newcomers live in Porgera at 
the behest of their Porgeran hosts. 
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A squatter is a person who settles on land without authorisation. As 
most non-Porgerans residing in Porgera have landowner permission 
to reside, it is more accurate to say Porgera has an outsider [rather 
than a squatter] problem (Bonnell1994:83). 
For all the disadvantages of a heavy influx, Porgerans stand to gain 
much by tolerating rather than stemming the flow of immigrants. 
Among the newcomers, Engans are the most heavily represented: 34 
per cent are from Mulitaka and Laiagam, 33 per cent from elsewhere 
in Enga Province, and 28 per cent from the Southern Highlands 
Province (Banks 1994a:27). The same is true of shorter-term 'visitors': 
20 per cent are from Mulitaka and Laiagam, 33 per cent are from other 
parts of Enga, and 40 per cent are from Tari (ibid.). Engans are the 
ethnic majority in Enga Province, and before the expansion of gold 
mining operations in Porgera in the 1980s, their political and cultural 
dominance in the province was unchallenged. Yet today, as Bonnell 
notes, '[m]any angry Engan people complain they have received no 
benefits from the PJV' (1994:91), and she alludes to the blackmail to 
which some Engans have resorted in their quest for a piece of the 
Porgera pie, as when making the road from Mount Hagen to Porgera 
impassable, especially for PJV vehicles. 'In order for the PJV to secure 
road access through Enga province, Engans needed to perceive that 
they were receiving benefits from the PJV' (ibid.). Banks himself links 
the immigration problem to Engan highway blackmail, reporting that 
'[t]he most frequently raised response to why they can't get rid of the 
epa atene is the fear of security problems further down the Enga 
Highway if they did eject people' (1994a:28). As any Engan is quick to 
point out, especially today, when Ipili gold attracts all the attention, 
Enga Province belongs to Engans, not to Ipili. Allowing, even 
encouraging, Engans to live in Porgera might placate a group which 
substantially outnumbers Ipili speakers and is politically dominant. 
Immigration also appears to accord the western Ipili (or Paielans) 
some access to mining-generated revenues. My own guess is that 
Paielans account for a significant number of the immigrants whom he 
labels as coming from 'other parts of Enga'. In his report on the Kewai 
line living just north of the Kaiya River, for example, Banks notes that 
'it was evident that a relatively large number of Paielan-born people 
had moved into the area in the last 5 years' (Banks 1994b:8; see also 
Bonnell1994:83). My own observations the Porgera Valley have 
certainly left me with the impression that there has been a significant 
influx of Paielans. 
272 I Dilemmas of Development 
Migration gives people greater access to the benefits of mining. For 
this reason, Porgerans themselves are moving around, relocating 
closer to the mine. Banks remarks of the Kewai line members that 
'individuals and family groups have utilised their links with Tuanda, 
Tieni and other [SML] lines to gain better access to the material 
benefits of the mine development' (1994b:1O-11). By shifting their 
place of residence, people who would otherwise be sidelined have 
greater proximity to the action and access to the benefits of mining. 
The Kewai line is not an SML line, while SML line members living in 
the Paiela Valley-indeed, all people living in the Paiela Valley-are 
not eligible to receive royalties or compensation. However, as a guest 
living in Porgera, a Paielan or an Engan has a greater chance of being 
employed by or through the mine, partaking in the distribution of 
royalties, living in a relocation house, tapping into mining-generated 
wealth through entrepreneurial activities, and enjoying the 
infrastructural, educational, and other improvements which are 
among the spinoff benefits of mining (see Enga Provincial 
Government 1989) than they would have if they had stayed at home. 
Hosts cannot easily say no, and it is good diplomacy to say yes, 
because a guest is a friend and an ally, not an enemy. 
Interethnic marriage 
Without a doubt, Bonnell's most interesting finding is that, despite 
decades of missionisation and exposure to a monogamous European 
culture, and despite extensive monetisation, polygyny is presently on 
the rise (see Table 4.9). In families which the PJV has relocated, 
monogamous men had greatly outnumbered polygynous men before 
the relocation occurred, but after the relocation, polygynous husbands 
marginally outnumbered monogamous husbands (see Table 4.8). 
Males converted compensation money into new wives (Bonnell 
1994:70). 
Interethnic marriage did not begin with gold mining, as suggested 
by Smalley (1983:2-3), but it has certainly been intensified with 
mining (Table 4.9). According to Bonnell (1994:7), '64.5% of the wives 
acquired after relocation (that is after receiving large compensation 
payments) were non-Porgerans'. By intensifying marriage with their 
neighbours, Porgerans arguably deploy a traditional device for 
creating and sustaining amicable relationships between potentially 
hostile groups. Marriage inaugurates a flow of wealth between the 
bride's and the groom's side, initially through the bridewealth which 
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the groom pays to the bride's side, and subsequently through the 
presentations and sharing that characterise affinal relationships. 
Despite the fact that the royalties from mining belong to the members 
of SML lines, and despite all the efforts to favour Porgerans over other 
groups, interethnic marriage allows the dispersion of mining-
generated revenues beyond the boundaries of the SML lines, even 
beyond the Porgera Valley, along the 'roads' which marriage opens up 
at the regional level. Also, since a person is considered an 'owner' of 
spousal estates on the grounds that he or she will bear future line 
members, marriage effectively widens the group of landowners in the 
gold-mining context. Like immigration, interethnic marriage creates 
goodwill and 'security' in an environment that would be destabilised 
if any group or groups had a monopoly of mining proceeds. 
There is an obvious connection between immigration and 
interethnic marriage. All landowners, including spouses, can host 
guests. Intermarriage facilitates chain migration, as Bonnell notes. The 
relationship between marriage and immigration can also work in 
reverse, with immigration facilitating marriage instead of the other 
way around. Traditionally, as I have already pointed out, guests 
sometimes married into the host group, becoming 'women's 
husbands' or 'men's wives', and thus line affiliates, 'owners' of the line 
estate, and parents of line members. While the previous chapters do 
not establish this point too clearly, Bonnell does show that the Engans 
and Southern Highlanders who are heavily represented amongst the 
immigrants are also heavily represented amongst the new wives of 
relocated men. Whereas, before relocation, 10.4 per cent of wives were 
from Laiagam and 5.9 per cent of wives were from Tari, after 
relocation, the percentage of Laiagam wives jumped to 17.3 per cent 
and the percentage of Tari wives increased to 29.4 per cent (Table 4.9; 
see also Smalley 1983:2-4). After relocation, there were also more than 
four times as many wives from Kandep as before relocation, although 
the overall percentage was still under 10 per cent (Table 4.9). 
The host-guest relationship and marriage have always had 
strategic uses. In the past, guests facilitated interline marriage, 
warfare, and production for exchange. Today, it could be argued, the 
host-guest relationship and interethnic marriage are key devices for 
positioning Porgera within a developing regional politics which places 
pressure on Porgerans, and specifically on members of SML lines, to 
share their mining-based income with those groups located outside 
the SML area, even among non-Porgerans (see Jorgensen 1997b). 
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Rule of custom, rule of law 
While it is easy to make the case that the porosity of units has been 
preserved in the mining context-through the use of marriage and 
hospitality to incorporate outsiders, for example-it is also true that 
the various codifications of mining have had restrictive effects, and 
that there is considerable ambivalence among SML landowners about 
allowing outsiders to access resources. 
Consider, for example, the criteria for determining eligibility for a 
relocation house. To qualify for a relocation house, a guest living in 
the SML area had to have lived there for at least ten years, and a 
member of one of the SML lines had to have lived there for more 
than three (originally five) years (Bonnell1994:14-15; Robinson 
1991).5 In the case of both the SML and the Kaiya River LMP just 
north of it, absentee members of landowning lines were passed over 
entirely. It was entirely predictable that those who were eliminated 
from consideration-short-term guests and SML line members who 
did not meet the residency requirements-would challenge these 
guidelines. 
These apparently simple criteria were not simple in practice. There 
were a number of different perception [sic] operating. Someone who 
had been living with relatives in Paiela or Tari, but who had visited the 
SML (and perhaps stayed a month or two) considered themselves [sic] 
fully eligible (Robinson 1991). 
Contributing to the level of disputation in the Porgera Valley is the 
fact that codifications as such, because they narrowly specify criteria 
and are rigid and insensitive to circumstances and mitigating factors, 
will always be problematic. Operating principles tended traditionally 
to be plural, ambiguous, conflicting (cf. Emst in press; Jorgensen 
1997a). There were no principles that could not on principle be 
challenged; and resolutions and settlements were necessarily 
negotiated through adversarial processes-hence the Ipili penchant 
for muscle-flexing and disputation. Any effort to codify, particularly 
for the purpose of exclusion, necessarily founders on that fact: 
codification as such will always be contested. Hence, the agreements 
associated with the two relocation programs could only be hammered 
out over a protracted period, and the conditions for awarding a 
relocation house were relaxed again and again. The fact that the 
number of relocation houses has swelled over the years suggests that 
narrow codifications and interpretations have been challenged by 
groups who, although disenfranchised by emerging regulations, have 
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successfully pressured both the PJV and the SML landowners to bend 
the rules in the name of other values and principles (see Bonnell1994; 
Robinson 1991). 
Codifications have sometimes subtly reinterpreted received 
categories in ways which have undermined the openness of the 
system. Among the Ipili, there is parity between tene and wana, the 
children of male line members and the children of female line 
members. Together with the rule of line exogamy, the parity of tene 
and wana guarantees the openness of each particular line, for together 
they mean that every marriage of every member of a line results in the 
incorporation of people who are also members of other lines. Yet the 
procedures of the mining era subtly undermine this parity. Those named 
as 'agents' to distribute royalties are mostly tene, rather than wana. 
In accordance with custom, some ... Wana landowners and persons with 
affiliated land rights have also been appointed as Agents to participate 
in the distribution of compensation payments. This is normally done to 
ensure that the decisions to distribute compensation in relation to who 
receives compensation and how much, are made collectively. In the 
event of a disagreement amongst the distribution committee, a decision 
of the Yuu tenes will usually prevail (Ipara 1994:14-15). 
Typically, then, compensation would flow from the PJV to tene and 
thence to wana. In 1995, the Department of Mining and Petroleum's 
Acting Liaison Officer in Porgera, Morep Tero, assured me that, 
whereas the 'agents' tended to be tene, the wana and tene received 
equal shares. However, one son of a Tiyini (a.k.a. Tieni) woman 
complained to me that he was receiving a smaller share of royalties 
than were the tene of his line. He even suggested that the tene had 
removed the names of wana from the lists. 
There is also a marked ambivalence towards guests among SML 
residents, for, however diplomatically useful it is to extend hospitality, 
guests are competitors for resources and allocations. Robinson (1994b) 
recounts that landowners have expressed a preference for either 
keeping the mining-related jobs for themselves or else reserving them 
for Porgerans rather than for outsiders. Also, some Porgeran 
landowners appear to regret having to share with mere sojoumers the 
compensation paid for houses, gardens and trees which have been 
destroyed in the course of mining. 
Compensation is for the damage to improvements ... which are owned 
by the occupier, not for the land itself ... but the landowners often argue 
that they are entitled to a share of whatever is given to their guests 
(Banks 1996:231). 
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Although some Porgerans may feel that they cannot live without the 
'squatters' and immigrants, others may well feel that they cannot live 
with them. 
For its part, the PJV may place subtle pressure on landowners to 
restrict the number of people who realise mining benefits, on the theory 
that its own interests are better served by narrowing the circle of 
beneficiaries. It is obvious from the evidence presented by Banks (Chapter 
5), and also from my own conversations with PJV personnel, that some 
Porgerans have looked to the PJV for support in curbing the 
encroachments of outsiders. The PJV has shied away from playing an 
open and official role in monitoring immigration into the valley, but 
'indirectly, PJV has offered to provide advice on procedure to landowners 
who want to evict unwanted epo atene' (Banks 1994a:28). In effect, SML 
landowners and the PJV are thus colluding in their eagerness to place a 
limit on the distribution of endowments (see Jorgensen 1997b). 
Conclusions 
The present mining situation creates vast differences in income between 
SML-Iandowning lines and other lines, between places within and 
without the SML, and even among the SML lines. Compare, for 
example, the income of Apalaka, which lies within the SML, with the 
income of Mungalep, Anawe and Kewai, all of which lie just beyond the 
SML, and again with the income of Tipinini at the eastern perimeter of 
the Porgera Valley (Table 6.1). Compare also the landholdings of Tiyini 
(a.k.a. Tieni) line with those of Angalaini, Mamai, Waiwa, or Anga 
(Table 5.4) for an indication of the range of mining-related income 
among the SML lines themselves. Likewise, the various groupings 
within these SML lines have differentiallandholdings, with a 
corresponding differentiation in their mining-related incomes. But is 
conflict best understood in terms of class formation and class 
antagonism pure and simple, as an antagonism between the haves and 
the have-nots, or is the source of friction more complicated? 
The SML is an artefact of multinational investment and national 
legislation and, as such, represents the exogenous forces of global 
capitalism and the nation-state. Yet it has been superimposed upon 
anterior grids, upon the networks of kith and kin which marriage has 
generated, and these grids also have causal force. The differences in 
mining-related wealth and income frequently arise among people who 
are related by blood and marriage, and among whom sharing is 
mandated by traditional morality (see Filer 1990). In these cases, 
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economic disparities distinguish rich from poor relatives, people who 
have and who should therefore give from people who do not have and 
who should therefore receive. The outcome, at least for the many 
people living in the Porgera Valley and the wider region who are 
related to SML residents, would be something closer to 'tribal' war 
than to class war. This 'tribal' war is provoked in an altered context 
(Gewertz and Errington 1991), the context of mining and state-
legislated jurisdictions and rights, and must be attributed to a 
conjuncture of the local and the national or global. 
One could productively ask why the law and order problem is not 
worse, why the situation is not more explosive than it is. Today, as 
before, marriage and hospitality are used to build and exercise 
networks, but the effort is specifically to undercut any polarisation of 
rich and poor which mining might create. The point is again the same: 
this peace, like the war it undercuts or forestalls, is explicable in terms 
of the duality of forces in play; for the peace, like the war, is made 
among relatives. 
In actual fact, the principal beneficiaries of mining evince 
conflicting responses to the economic opportunities and social and 
political challenges which mining creates. On the one hand, the 
porosity which all boundaries traditionally possessed, given certain 
mechanisms for inclusion, continues because of the strategic 
deployment of these same mechanisms. On the other hand, there is a 
novel tendency towards boundary maintenance and exclusion, and a 
new and insidious parochialism. The previous chapters portray 
Porgeran society as poised amid competing precedents, temptations 
and strategies. There is a mixture of orders of determination which are 
now in play-a matter of culture and political economy, of 
contradictory principles, codifications and impulses. This conjuncture 
is unique, volatile, possibly unstable. Consequently, there is no 
trajectory, no teleology, no master narrative that can orient us 
adequately in the process, no development theory that might offer 
guidelines to the various 'stages' of Porgera's unfolding history. What 
is needed instead is an ethnography of change which captures the 
disparate discourses, ideologies, and values in play in an ambivalent 
and uncertain time. 
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Notes 
1 Fieldwork in the Porgera Valley was conducted initially under an 
award from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological 
Research in 1993, and subsequently, from December 1995 to 
February 1996, under a Fulbright Research Fellowship. I have also 
conducted archival research on Porgera in the National Archives of 
Papua New Guinea; the PNG National Research Institute, and the 
Department of Political and Social Change in the Research School 
of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. My 
research among the western Ipili of the Paiela Valley was 
undertaken initially from 1974 to 1978, and was funded by a 
National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant and the Rackham 
School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan, with write-up 
support from the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Center for the 
Continuing Education of Women at the University of Michigan. 
Further research in the Paiela Valley was conducted in 1993 and 
1995, with Wenner-Gren and Fulbright funding. 
2 The term wanaini (literally' girl's son') can be used of the sons of 
female members. 
3 See Allen (1995) and Glasse (1968) for Huli parallels. 
4 All page references are to the original consultancy reports, rather 
than the edited versions included as chapters of the present 
volume, because the wording of some quotations has changed 
during the editorial process (Ed.). 
5 According to Banks (1996:229), the settlement for housing to those 
who were relocated was as follows. The landowners received a 
relocation house, built at a site of their own choosing, K1,OOO for 
the inconvenience of relocating, a K1,400 allowance for the making 
of new gardens, and the covering of subsistence needs for up to 
nine months while the new gardens matured. Those epa atene who 
did not merit a relocation house were compensated for their loss of 
gardens, trees, etc., given K500 for the inconvenience, and shipped 
back home (see also Chapter 4, this volume). 
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Evidence of the 'new 
competencies'? 
John Burton 
In this chapter, I review the knowledge of Porgera history and society 
that mine management has sought to acquire, since proving the 
prospect in the 1980s, for use in its dealings with the mine area 
community. In a more general context, the kinds of skills and 
knowledge required to do this professionally have been advocated as 
the 'new competencies' of mining (Davis 1995). Conversely, attention 
to these matters in the industry is acknowledged to have been patchy 
over the years, and shortcomings have been blamed for the onset of 
lesser or greater crises, such as those which have occurred at Ok Tedi, 
Panguna, and other places. Senior industry figures make a direct link 
between performance in the 'new competencies' and the exposure of 
their investors' capital to financial risk, and this is certainly the public 
face of the mining and petroleum industries in Papua New Guinea. 
At Porgera, the resources attached to dealings with the mine area 
community have not been negligible: over 500 families had been 
relocated and provided with new houses by 1995, about K60 million 
worth of business contracts had been let to Porgerans, about K30 
million had been paid out in compensation for clearance of bush, 
crops and houses on land required for mining, and sundry lesser 
benefits had flowed to the community (Banks 1997). At the same time, 
more staff were deployed by the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) in 
280 I Dilemmas of Development 
Community Relations and Lands functions, notably with the 
realisation that law and order problems on the Enga highway would 
not be dealt with by state agencies, to the point where about 85 people 
were thus employed across the province-a far greater number than 
ever used at any other mining or petroleum project in Papua New 
Guinea (Bonnell1994:112). 
Nonetheless, the scale of the benefits has only a partial connection 
with the 'new competencies'. Of the 85 staff positions, only a handful 
were managerial, and perhaps only two or three incumbents held 
tertiary qualifications, none at higher than degree or diploma level.1 
Much has been made of the hiring, at all sites, of ex-members of the 
Australian administration-notably those with long field experience-
and it is certainly true that, with the demise of the field services since 
Independence, more recently trained field officers simply are not 
available to carry out the practical tasks of day-to-day community 
dealings. But excellence 'in the bush' at the edges of an organisation is 
not the same thing as the entrenchment of bush intelligence at its 
heart. 
I must acknowledge the limitations of method that face the 
reviewer of 'new competencies' in the mining industry. For example, 
should the scope be limited to mine management, or extended to 
include the collectivity of junior staff, middle managers, consultants, 
journalists, church representatives, public relations officers, 
government staff and others who make up most of the knowable 
interface between the mining operation and the community? Also, as 
most managements conduct their business behind closed doors-or, 
more precisely, publicly document only a few of the myriad decisions 
that are taken each day-what allowable steps of inference can bridge 
the gaps that will necessarily be left between public pronouncements 
and private deliberations? I suggest that the best way to overcome this 
problem is to focus on the outwardly assessable capabilities and 
actions of the collectivity of people mentioned above. It would be ideal 
to have a great deal more inside knowledge, but this should not be a 
handicap in examining evidence of an organisation's outward actions 
(Table 9.1). 
This exercise can have an orthodox 'research and development' 
model as its point of departure, in which case the logical direction of 
argument will be vertically down the table. But one might also adopt 
company self-interest and protection against mine closure-a well-
defined, but minimal performance criterion-as the point of 
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Table 9.1 Assessable capabilities in relation to social issues at PNG 
mining operations 
Capability Externally assessable actions 
Observation and research 
of social issues 
Analysis and reporting 
Representation to decision makers 
Management emphasis 
Implementation and follow-up 
Demonstrated capacity to collect 
appropriate knowledge 
Demonstrated capacity to conduct analysis 
of social issues, to interpret correctly and 
highlight points of relevance, and to present 
these to others through 
reporting. 
Demonstrated capacity to channel 
information on social issues to decision-
making points within the organisation. 
Uptake of this information in the 
development of clearly articulated 
management strategies and policies. 
Demonstrated capacity to make use of 
information on social issues to in an explicit 
way to defend the project against 
unnecessary risk. 
departure, in which case the argument may proceed in the opposite 
direction: 'We need information to defend the shareholder's 
investment against risk: so what kind of information do we need?' My 
own view, and that of many mining company executives, would be 
that the minimalism of this second line of argument means sailing too 
close to the wind; it is simply reckless. 
Unfortunately, agreement at the level of corporate rhetoric ('our 
programs are second to none') is a far cry from actually meeting 
objectively sound performance standards. What I want to demonstrate 
in this chapter is that what managements say that they aspire to, and 
even believe that they achieve, is different from what they are actually 
able to achieve. I shall call this difference a 'performance evaluation 
gap'. Several such gaps are possible, and they have knowable and 
predictable causes. I should add that the purpose of this exercise is not 
purely academic; gaps of this nature, if they exist in any area of 
management, expose business enterprises to risk. 
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Baseline research during the period of exploration 
Prior to the development of the mine, the only ethnographic accounts 
of the Porgera area which were based on anything more than a short 
visit to the area (for example, Meggitt 1957) were those written by 
Father Philip Gibbs (1975, 1977), the Catholic priest at Mungalep 
mission. On the other hand, very detailed ethnographic work had 
been done in some adjacent areas of the highlands (see Feil1987; 
Ballard 1995). 
At all recent mining projects in Papua New Guinea, the Social and 
Economic Impact Study (SEIS) has formed the basis of the company's 
dealings with the mine area community. In the Porgera case, it is 
surprising that the SEIS consultancy team did not include an 
anthropologist (Pacific Agribusiness 1987). For their discussion of the 
social environment, the authors evidently made some limited inquiries 
of their own, but also gave a lengthy summary of relevant information 
from Biersack's (1980) doctoral thesis on the nearby Paiela people, 
alternatively referred to as the 'west' or 'western' Ipili in the literature 
(see Biersack 1995a). One member of the SEIS team later noted the 
availability of other studies of neighbouring peoples, such as 
Goldman's work on the Huli, but said that 'Biersack had written the 
only specifically Ipili work that I could find' (Robinson 1991:1). He 
added that he was unable to understand it, though he encouraged 
ethnographers to continue their work: 'If the studies are made and the 
writing is accessible then the studies will be widely used and have an 
important and beneficial effect on the people' (ibid:7). 
This is a clear declaration in favour of applied anthropology, and 
an example of the 'agreement in principle' with the need to make as 
much use of available sources as possible. In which case, one wonders 
why the SEIS team did not consult Wohlt's (1978) doctoral thesis, 
based on his work at Yumbisa village in Kandep District, which is as 
close to the southeastern part of Porgera as Paiela is to its 
northwestern part (see Biersack 1995a: Map 2). Wohlt dealt at length 
with the dispersal, across the western Engan region, of the branches of 
a genealogical group known as Molopai, and the rights and 
obligations of individuals at the various places where members of this 
group had settled. The same highly flexible social structure is found in 
Yumbisa as in Porgera, and much the same vocabulary is used for its 
component parts.2 Wohlt's genealogies show that the Bipe people of 
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Kairik (Burton 1991:25-6) are Molopai people, while others are found 
in Tari, Paiela, Kandep and Laiagam. His analysis throws into question 
whether the Ipili people even 'exist' in the same way as, say, Motuans 
or Hageners do-as 'tribal' groups subsuming locally bounded 
subgroups, whether these be territorial clans or the dispersed cognatic 
structures found in Porgera. They begin to look far more like the local 
representatives of regionally dispersed 'genealogical groups', lumped 
together under one name only because they live in one place as 
neighbours (see also Wohlt 1995). 
The ethnographer's first reflex on discovering such regional links 
must be to uncover as many as possible and map them out. There are 
frequent references in the SEIS to the land rights which Porgerans hold 
in various parts of the valle~ by pursuing cognatic links of kinship, 
and to the flexible manner of reckoning relatedness to other people. 
The authors were correctly concerned with the 'severe vulnerability' of 
the system once gold production started (Pacific Agribusiness 1987 
Appendix B:6), but do not seem to have grasped the regional breadth 
or generational depth of genealogical reckoning,3 and could only 
make limited suggestions as to how to plan for the impact which this 
might have. Wohlt's work could have helped them in this respect. In 
the event, the restriction of access to land within the valley has shown 
itself to be a minor nuisance compared with the problems caused by 
the mass immigration of genealogically connected people from 
Laiagam, Kandep and Tari. This was to become the most serious 
socioeconomic impact on Porgera within a very short span of time, 
and was to preoccupy Fritz Robinson in his subsequent work on 
relocation for the PJV (see Robinson 1991:3-4, 1994b). 
Why did the SEIS authors not consider Wohlt's work? Does this 
count as a 'failure', and was their understanding of Ipili society 
compromised as a result? What lessons can be drawn for the 
management of social impact at all mining projects? 
First, the quotation above suggests that, if anthropologists only 
write well, then the results will be 'widely used' by the mining 
company. Obviously this is not true; Wohlt writes luminously well, but 
his work was not used.4 I suggest that the reason only partly lies with 
the mix of specialisations among the members of the SEIS team and 
their lack of immersion in highlands ethnography. Their greatest 
enemy was shortage of time.5 A single field period of six weeks in 
April-May 1987, which included the certain distraction of frequent 
meetings with company and government officials, seems to have been 
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all that was available to the main study team. It is vanishingly unlikely 
that serious analytical knowledge of the social system could have been 
obtained under these conditions. 
Second, I believe that their neglect of Wohlt's work did count as a 
failure, and the portrayal of Ipili society did fall short of providing 
useful insights into Porgeran society. I will not dwell on which detail is 
correct and which is incorrect, but rather refer to the nature of 
ethnographic understanding itself. Anthropologists make frequent 
references to entering the field with an over-simplistic or 
inappropriate knowledge of the people they are going to study. This 
leads to periods of intense but unstructured data collection, at which 
point confusion reigns, the society appears chaotic and patternless, 
and its members inconsistent and even illogical. Kenneth Read 
(1965:32), already an experienced field ethnographer, wrote of post-
war Goroka that 'for weeks after my arrival I knew the valley only as a 
visitor knows a strange city'. Peter Lawrence had the same problem 
among the Garia of Madang Province: he probably unravelled their 
cognatic kinship system (which bears close comparison with that of 
the Ipili) during his doctoral fieldwork in 1949-50, but his full account 
of it (Lawrence 1967, 1984) was delayed for years because his 
colleagues were not equipped at that time to make sense of the 
extreme flexibility of Garia social arrangements. If a person of 
Lawrence's analytical skills required many subsequent visits to the 
Garia to 'nail' their social system to the satisfaction of his readership, it 
is very unlikely that a social impact study team, without an 
anthropologist, would properly characterise Ipili society in a matter of 
weeks. 
To be frank, the SEIS authors should have owned up to this, but 
instead presented 'data' of a quality that is embarrassing to mention, 
such as a land tenure survey based on a questionnaire administered to 
Grade 6 schoolchildren (Pacific Agribusiness 1987 Appendix B:9). 
When, in the report's findings, it is claimed that 'Ipili society and land 
tenure were studied in detail' (Pacific Agribusiness 1987:95), the writer 
or writers are having us on. 
Third, important lessons can be drawn from this. At Lihir, Filer and 
Jackson (1989:43) mused over the inability of managements to judge 
the competence of consultancy work, and the 'insight [this] gives into 
the way that an image of traditional social structure is ... established 
[at] a major mining development'. I can confirm that a particular 
image of the project area became fixed at a very early stage of 
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exploration at many other mining operations in Papua New Guinea 
(see Burton 1997). The basis of an early impression is serendipitous. 
Apart from anything else, contacts between company and community 
during early exploration are likely to be particularly haphazard and 
unrepresentative of later, more permanent dealings. But a constant 
bugbear is the hiring of inexperienced consultants in the early stages 
of exploration, typically followed by the use of a one-stop-shop 
general consultancy firm which employs well-qualified specialists 
who are then enjoined to cover fields other than their own. This is 
harmless enough if, to take a hypothetical case, all urban geographers 
may be expected to grasp the key issues in major specialisms of this 
discipline. But asking a neophyte to stray into the ethnography of a 
previously unresearched society is a reckless practice. The key issues, 
the fieldcraft, and the complex nature of relationships with informants-
to name but a few things--do not come packaged as off-the-shelf 
knowledge. Let me demonstrate this point with another Porgera example. 
The SEIS was preceded by the collection of genealogies among 
some Special Mining Lease groups by Father Gibbs (1981, n.d.) and by 
two former PJV employees, whom I shall call A and B, in 1982 and 
1984 respectively. Gibbs had basic training in anthropology (1975), had 
spent many years at Porgera, and had a relationship of a special 
nature with his congregation: in other words, he had the prerequisites 
for proper ethnography which I have just mentioned. Having gone 
over his genealogies myself, I can vouch for the fact that his work was 
of excellent quality and was highly reliable. But I also had to dissect 
the shortcomings of N s and B's genealogies when I began work at 
Porgera in 1990 (Burton 1991:2-3). It is sufficient to say that A counted 
so many people twice (without noticing) that he made a probable total 
of 6,000 people into more than 11,000. B, for his part, knew of Gibbs' 
work, but said it was unnecessary for him to read it. Even worse, his 
'agnatic' bias, originating from a place in Papua New Guinea which is 
organised quite differently from Porgera, led him to discard 
genealogical connections through women-a critical error in a society 
where connections through women are very important indeed. 
I mention these points, not to put down A and B, but to draw 
attention to the poor level of performance evaluation in relation to 
social studies undertaken by company managements when 
undertaking mine planning studies. This is far from just being a 
Porgeran problem. Filer and Jackson's remarks above derive directly 
from the lack of competence which A demonstrated again at Lihir, 
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where Kennecott were his next employers; they describe at some 
length (1989:43-50) the difficulties which they experienced in undoing 
A's confusions at this new site. Coming onto the Lihir scene a little 
later, I still found it necessary to deal at some length with the failings 
in management strategies for understanding the local land tenure 
system (Burton 1994a, 1994b). 
Yet another amateur genealogist whom I encountered at Porgera in 
1990-let us call him C-had been employed by Conzinc Riotinto 
Australia at the Hidden Valley prospect in Morobe Province. C's work 
was even worse than A: s, and his material on Hidden Valley contained 
nothing which I have been able to use in any way during my own 
subsequent work in that area (Burton 1996). 
All of these examples demonstrate a corporate inability to review 
specialist information, and a contradictory attitude to anthropology. 
The work cannot be 'welcomed' on the one hand, but lie unused and 
unreviewed on the other. I suggest that this failing is due to the 
absence of the know-how needed to turn ethnographic observations 
into management strategies which can be implemented. Elsewhere, I 
have written (1996:i) that the sentiment expressed in the search for the 
'new competencies' is frequently overwhelmed by an anti-academic 
feeling which is revealed in a propensity to 'fly by the seat of our 
pants' after all. 
Companies can surely do better than this when the stakes are so 
high. We can argue that they have not yet hired the Masters of 
Business Administration with first degrees in this or that social 
science-a fair criticism-and play this off against an accusation that 
anthropologists write in an 'inaccessible' way (as Robinson complains), 
but I prefer to point to lack of continuity between the SEIS approval 
process, the submission and approval (by the state) of an Environmental 
Management and Monitoring Programme (EMMP), and the actual 
implementation of that programme. In the Porgera case, the SEIS 
'ended' three years before the first gold was poured, and implemen-
tation of the EMMP began a year after this event. Hence a four-year 
'performance evaluation gap' which coincided with what Bonnell 
(1994:12) terms the 'period of maximum social disruption' at a mining 
project-the construction phase. Needless to say, I can only describe 
these kinds of gaps as having the potential to inflict grave damage on 
any project. The Community Relations staff will be working flat out 
during this phase, and cannot be expected to shoulder the extra 
workload of ensuring a continuity of research and planning functions. 
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Reporting and planning in the period of operations 
The person who is primarily charged with the job of implementing the 
SEIS at a mining project is the Community Relations Manager.6 This 
person is in a difficult position because he (all have been male to date) 
must get on with the day-to-day dealings between the project and the 
community, which are 'operational tasks', as well as being responsible 
for upgrading the knowledge contained in the SEIS and other baseline 
studies, and for longer range strategic planning in consultation with 
corporate-level executives. In practice, these tasks do not go together 
at all. It has been demonstrated at sites throughout the length and 
breadth of Papua New Guinea that operational matters expand 
enormously and overwhelm the capabilities of the Community 
Relations staff to do anything else. What remains is usually called 'fire 
fighting' by insiders. 
The EMMP 
In formal terms, what is expected to happen is that the EMMP will be 
drawn up by the company to implement the recommendations of the 
Environmental Plan, which in turn may contain as few as a hundred 
words on social issues distilled from the SEIS and various baseline 
studies. The EMMP is a document required under the Environmental 
Planning Act 1978, which regulates those projects which have been 
developed since it came into force.7 
At Porgera, the EMMP was drafted in 1990, just before production 
began, and finalised a year later. The 35-page draft EMMP document 
contains two paragraphs on management of the social environment 
(PJV 1990b:8.13). In the framework setting out the 12 components of 
the 'long-term environmental monitoring' programme, which range 
from 'generated sediment tonnages' to 'trace metals in human scalp 
hair', social monitoring is not mentioned at all. 
It was into this rather unordered state of affairs that I came to start 
my own work at Porgera in 1990. Although I was not party to it at the 
time, one of the two sentences in the draft EMMP referred explicitly to 
my project-saying that it was about to start. With an environmental 
scientist (Saem Majnep) present for part of the time, I and two 
students from the University of Papua New Guinea then did social 
and human ecological mapping and census work over a period of 
about six weeks between June and October. This included a full census 
of Porgera, which was carried out by about 25 Porgeran assistants 
working in parallel with government enumerators during the 1990 
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national population census.8 Our reports were completed by May 
1991 (Majnep 1990; Burton 1991). In the next version of the EMMP, the 
paragraphs referring to long-term monitoring of the social 
environment were changed to read 
[a] demographic survey was carried out in June 1990 to collect data on 
human settlement in area around the mine. The results will be used in 
the assessment of changes in the population that are associated with 
mine construction. The timing of subsequent surveys will be 
determined by agreement with the PNG Government and will depend 
upon the significance of any changes determined from the 1990 data. 
A socio-economic liaison committee has been formed comprising 
representatives from Porgera, Enga Provincial Government and PJV to 
monitor issues of concern to local people. Although communication 
channels are well established with the local people by means of the 
PJV Community Relations Department, the committee will establish a 
formal link between the PJY, the community and the Government (PJV 
1991:8.13). 
But such correspondence as I have retained shows that our reports 
languished for 14 months before proposals for follow-up work 
brought about a formal response. Then, from mid 1992, contacts 
between Unisearch and the PJV were renewed, and these led to the 
commissioning of new work by Glenn Banks and Susanne Bonnell 
which began in November 1992. Even at this stage, there was still no 
framework for long-term monitoring. 
The inaugural meeting of a Porgera Social Monitoring Steering 
Committee, chaired by the social planning officer in the Department of 
Environment and Conservation (DEC), was held in Porgera on 4 
March 1993. This represented the 'formal link' to the state regulatory 
body mentioned in the EMMP. The meeting set my colleagues and I 
the task of writing a plan for what was termed the 'Porgera Social 
Monitoring Programme', and we completed this task in June 1993 
(Burton and Filer 1993). We recommended two streams of reporting 
.. Stream A to be carried out by specialists (economic 
modelling study, social change study, census project 
continuation, health study, etc.); and 
.. Stream B to be handled by means of internal company, 
government and non-government organisation reporting. 
From 1993, annual reports were to summarise and combine the 
outputs from both streams. 
Since our document was laboriously assembled after consultation 
with other parties to the Steering Committee, and built on earlier 
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documents which had dealt with similar issues, it was unlikely to 
have been technically defective. At least, no other party responded by 
saying so. But here lies the problem-no other party responded at all! 
The upshot was that some of Stream A proceeded, but other parts 
were dropped, the Steering Committee failed to establish its own 
priorities, and there was no supervision of the programme by the 
company's Environment Manager, who was the designated point-of-
entry for EMMP matters. The coordinating role which ought to have 
been played by the state regulator (DEC) was downgraded to that of a 
passive receptor, incapable of effective comment, and perhaps 
politically compromised by events being played out at other mines 
(see Bonnell1994:118). 
Comparison with other projects 
At the time, I had some difficulty in making sense of these outcomes, 
because my proposed census project was the first casualty amongst 
the parts of the monitoring programme which were dropped. 
However, my subsequent involvement in the design and implemen-
tation of social monitoring programs at several other projects has now 
provided me with a broader perspective on these events. 
At Ok Tedi, no monitoring programme was required under the 
enabling legislation, but the political situation by 1991 had made the 
neglect of basic research downstream of the mine an increasingly 
untenable course of action. A Unisearch-based monitoring 
programme, coordinated by Colin Filer and myself, and involving a 
team of specialist fieldworkers, produced 12 reports over a four-year 
period from 1991 to 1995 (see Filer 1991, 1997b; Kirsch 1995; Burton 
1997). While this may sound like a successful exercise, it proved to 
have been commissioned by one section of management as a means of 
stirring another, then somnolent, section into action (Filer 1996). The 
achievement of the project's goal was also its weakness, because the 
target of the ploy was antagonised by it, and field officers were denied 
access to our findings for five years, including the crucial years of the 
Ok Tedi litigation. 
At Kutubu, I wrote a short 'annual report' for Chevron in 1993 
(Burton 1993) summarising the equivalent of 'Stream B' data on the 
company's behalf for presentation to the DEC-though belatedly 
catching up with 1990 and 1991 data only. To the best of my 
knowledge, this elicited no comment from the Department. Although I 
lost track of this project for a long period thereafter, new information 
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confirms that no similar reports were written in subsequent years. The 
lack of a formal structure for this work was its obvious weakness: the 
information presented fell into a bureaucratic void, and no action was 
taken on recommendations to upgrade Chevron's internal reporting 
system to the Porgera specifications. I presume that this was due to the 
absence of any local equivalent of the Porgera Social Monitoring 
Steering Committee, and to confusion about the point-of-entry for 
such monitoring work. 
At Lihir, as already mentioned, the Environmental Plan contained 
three paragraphs on the proposed management of the social 
environment (NSR 1992), and the unresponsiveness of Kennecott 
management, then based far away in Salt Lake City, meant that no 
initiative was taken to maintain the process of social impact 
assessment until the Australian government's Export Finance 
Investment Corporation obliged the new operator, Rio Tinto Zinc, to 
do so as a condition of the project's sovereign risk insurance. Yet this 
also seems to have meant that social monitoring reports are hidden 
under a dysfunctional blanket of confidentiality (see Filer 1998), while 
the consultant responsible for this work has been hampered by 
management directives concerning her avenues of communication 
with company staff and community members. 
In each of these cases, we see performance evaluation gaps of 
several kinds. Management 'turf wars' are evident at most projects as 
a factor in disrupting the effective implementation of proposals. A 
serious difficulty everywhere, including at Porgera, is the lack of a 
clear point-of-entry to the company for social monitoring feedback 
and reports.9 All consultants report confusion: reporting is variously 
to the Environment Manager, to an Executive Manager, to the General 
Manager, to a steering committee that does not meet (as at Porgera), or 
to a financial institution. Worse, the point-of-entry can change between 
proposal and report, or from one report to the next. One thing is clear: 
at no project have the reports gone, in the first instance, to the 
Community Relations Manager! 
This is a structural form of disruption, but its effect is similar to the 
gap in time between the SEIS and development of the EMMP. A 
period of paralysis occurs as various actors consider what to do next. 
It is very likely that this will coincide with the most critical phase of 
the project, when realignment of the local political process occurs, and 
new, unanticipated forms of impact arise. I have mentioned elsewhere 
the parallel difficulties being experienced by the Community Relations 
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Manager in the early stages of a new project. A multiple increase in the 
operational workload, connected with the rush of compensation and 
lands work at this time, always coincides with an exhausting struggle 
by the Community Relations Manager to retain the priorities of his 
department in the face of an increase in the number of line managers 
during project construction, and the intervention of 'rogue players' 
engaged in reorganising the management structure in ways that pitch 
Community Relations staff into unnecessary competition with other 
sections or departments for the attention of the Mine Manager. I 
calculated that it took an average of 5.3 years for the community 
relations managers at three projects to win an upgrading of their 
department's activities to recover the ground lost since the days when 
community liaison staff and exploration geologists were the only 
people on site (Burton 1995:3; also Bonne1l1994:1l1). 
internal reporting 
In light of these considerations, it is not surprising that I have only 
mentioned the activities of Community Relations departments in 
passing. It goes without saying that these departments carry the 
workload of daily dealings with the community, and simple 
observation shows that this is an exhausting assignment. What kind of 
internal reporting are Community Relations staff able to accomplish in 
the course of a year? 
At Porgera, different people could come up with different lists of 
the most important problems faced by the Community Relations 
Department since the end of the exploration phase. It is worth making 
a comparison of one possible list with the permanent record we have 
of each item (Table 9.2). 
All staff complete written monthly reports for the Community 
Affairs Manager, who summarises this for the quarterly reports given 
to the Joint Venture Partner meetings (Glenn Banks, pers. comm.). This 
certainly draws attention to immediate needs, and shows what 
responses have been made to current problems, but it does not provide 
the 'big picture' of how effective Community Relations programs really 
are. Theoretically, there is plenty of scope for those involved with the 
work to do this, because they do possess the most intimate knowledge 
of what is going on. But it does not happen because staff are too busy 
with other matters. Among the reports listed in Table 9.2, only the short 
papers by Robinson (1994a, 1994b, 1994c) and Hiatt (1995) could be 
said to exemplify this kind of 'in-house' product. 
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Two cases are instructive in this respect. Susanne Bonnell was hired 
to work as a welfare officer in the PJV Community Relations section, 
and especially to implement the recommendations contained in 
Robinson's earlier relocation study (Robinson 1988:7; Bonnell1994:18). 
When I liaised with her at the time of my census project in 1990, it was 
obvious that she had no time to set about writing anything, let alone to 
evaluate her own work. After resigning from this job, and spending 
some time away from the project, she was re-hired as a consultant to 
do this type of evaluation without having the burden of operational 
work. 
Another person was one of two experienced former patrol officers 
on staff in 1990, who was given the job of negotiating land usage 
agreements along the route of the 80km-long transmission line from 
the Hides gas project to the Porgera mine. The work was carried out 
under enormous pressure from landowners and a tight deadline set 
by the mine development plan. No sooner was the work finished 
than he was laid off, notwithstanding the fact that most of the 
agreements had been rushed, and a strong element of 'subjectivity' 
remained in the land investigations (Robinson 1991:6). My own 
observations confirmed that there was no time, given the deadline 
imposed by the engineers, to make the more thorough inquiries that 
this vital pieces of infrastructure really merited. Close to the 
anniversary of the relevant agreements, the same officer was taken 
on as a consultant to handle the annual lease payments, but he was 
soon idle again, and spent the next two years seeking work before 
taking up a position in the Community Relations department of 
another mining company. 
Both cases illustrate the inability of staff in salaried positions, who 
know that they are rushing important tasks, to either slow down and 
devote more time to them or to achieve anything resembling an 
adequate level of documentation of what they have done. In the first 
case, the staff member was permitted the breathing space to do this, 
and has written a report (Bonnell1994 and this volume) which should 
actually have been part of the internal documentation of the 
operational work of her section. In the second case, the staff member 
was left high and dry. No evaluation of the power line work was done, 
and the predicted demolition of power pylons10 took place a couple of 
years later. The cost of repairs and downtime for the mine easily 
outweighed the miniscule savings achieved by laying off the 
investigating officer before his work was properly documented. 
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Conclusions 
The point of my discussion is not to prove the truth of the old proverb 
that 'a stitch in time saves nine'-even if the incidence and cost of 
well-known breakdowns in company-community relations suggest 
that a stitch in time can actually save the entire suit of clothes. 
Everyone concerned with social issues in the mining industry already 
knows this. The problem is that the industry fails to entrench the high 
priority, continuity of effort, and level of resources which is needed for 
the management of social issues. Common sense says that this should 
happen automatically, but in most situations the pace of mining 
construction far outruns the concurrent capabilities of those who 
handle these social issues to make credible and appropriate responses 
as a project evolves. 
Explanations 
A partial explanation comes from the indeterminate nature of social 
impact crises, when compared to the more definable parameters of 
engineering or the physical environment. Bridge designers, for 
example, face calculable fears about what their creations must 
withstand, so that their specifications for construction are credible and 
usually uncontroversial. By contrast, the worries of social planners in 
relation to mining impacts are frequently as convincing as a vague fear 
of the dark to the engineers and geologists who form the bulwark of 
mine management. 
A universal problem is that agreements made at a political or 
legislative level are used by company executives as a guide to internal 
policy for far too long after they have ceased to reflect current political 
realities-if they ever did. This was clearly the case at Panguna and 
Ok Tedi, where the projects were regulated under their own acts of 
parliament. To overcome this particular shortcoming, a more flexible 
format was adopted in the guideline agreements for the Porgera 
project. Following a 'forum process' designed for local stakeholders to 
sort out their own positions, the agreements comprised a formal 
contract between the government and the mining company, and a 
separate set of Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) between the 
national government, the Enga Provincial Government, and the local 
landowners (West 1992). A similarly localised form of bargaining took 
place over the Lihir project, resulting in an Integrated Benefits Package 
which the Construction Manager described as the local 'bible'. 
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But these innovations have done almost nothing to address the 
problem of making adequate resources available for the urgent tasks 
of community relations. This department is repeatedly sent into the 
battle for mine construction without sufficient staff, buildings, 
vehicles, computers, radios, and other basic facilities (see Bonnell 
1994:112; Burton 1995). The ink was hardly dry on the Porgera MOAs 
when it became obvious that neither the national government nor the 
provincial government was going to uphold its responsibilities in 
respect of local development issues. Internal correspondence shows 
that, in early 1990, the company's senior Community Affairs staff were 
'sceptical about the capability of the E.P.G. [Enga Provincial 
Government] to monitor and address socio-economic problems', and 
requested an expanded role for their department. They also warned 
that they personally had no time to spare, given their existing 
workloads, to pursue this expansion or even to oversee it. It appears 
that one major distraction at this juncture was a debate with senior 
executives over the company's localisation planll 
The justification for .. .long term expatriate incumbents is the 
Bougainville experience. The BCL Department of Community Affairs 
had been reduced to a few national officers who were reluctant to 
convey the approaching storm of malcontent to Management (Hiatt 
1990:3). 
The Community Affairs Manager won a partial victory, and the 
expansion required to cope with operational work was achieved-by 
about 1993. But office facilities had yet to be improved, and Bonnell 
was still echoing the above comments in 1994. 
Future concerns also include the sensitive issue of localisation ... If 
Community Affairs is totally localised there is a danger of senior mine 
management becoming isolated from the needs, concerns and attitudes 
in the community. This would have an adverse impact on both the 
community and mining operations-which appears to have been the 
case in Bougainville (Bonnell1994:112). 
In fact, raising the spectre of Bougainville and questions about 
localisation should have been long dead methods of argument. The 
principle of 'best practice' applies when any in-country issue-
inappropriate legislation, failing administration, and cultural or 
'conflict of interest' problems-makes any activity come up short of 
what can be judged to be the best (and safest) attainable standard. Yet 
the PJV has been able to mount only intermittent efforts to bridge the 
research and planning deficit, given that it has proved too difficult to 
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push the national and provincial governments into fulfilling their 
capacity-building commitmentsI2 and their obligations to 'develop 
and monitor the social and economic strategy of the Porgera project' 
(Hiatt 1990:2). By 1997, action had been taken on only some of the 
issues identified in 1990, and few of the specific monitoring 
recommendations made by Banks and Bonnell in 1994 had been 
implemented.13 
Comparison with responses to environmental fears 
In this context, it worth briefly examining the company response to 
fears of environmental damage in the Lower Porgera/Lagaip / 
Strickland river system. In August 1995, the company contracted a 
CSIRO consultancy team to undertake a comprehensive review of 
the mine's impact on the river system; the team reported in 
December 1996 (CSIRO 1996). I have a particular interest in the 
issues at stake, having written several reports myself on downstream 
communities in the Ok Tedi-Fly river system, including the Middle 
Fly flood plain area (for example, Burton 1994c). As my own 
knowledge of Ok Tedi Mining Limited's environmental programs 
would have led me to expect, the CSIRO report called for a 
significant expansion of the PJV's environmental research and 
monitoring capabilities, notably an upgrading from 'narrow 
focused' compliance monitoring (the 'minimalism' I discussed in 
the introduction to this chapter) to 'monitoring for impact' (CSIRO 
1996, Recommendation ES5). 
By and large, I have no specialist criticisms to make of the content 
of this report. 14 It was an appropriate response to the realisation that 
environmental fears might jeopardise company operations, and the 
threat of lawsuits from aggrieved landowners (see Table 9.2). But we 
may also note that the team recruited to undertake this study included 
no less than four professors and another four Ph.D. holders, and we 
may wonder why such a battery of 'big guns' was never wheeled out 
to deal with the social monitoring programme. I appreciate that 
operational community relations matters are now much better 
resourced than they were previously, and I hasten to add that the 
quality of the work undertaken by Banks and Bonnell is not in 
question. IS Neither of these things are at issue. The imbalance is 
between the degree of seriousness with which the two sectors have 
been taken in the overall process of planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of company operations. 
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Various reasons can be put forward to explain this disparity. There 
is every likelihood that physical environmental data and recommen-
dations fall into a scientific 'comfort zone' for executives with 
traditional mining industry backgrounds, whereas the same people 
find it harder to accept the discursive nature of social science as 
having a comparable validity. At the same time, the socially-generated 
risks to mining projects, especially in Papua New Guinea, often come 
to the surface in a political form, thus bringing social research and the 
formulation of social policies into collision with the prerogative of 
senior executives to handle the company's external political affairs. 
This may be termed a problem of managerial demarcation.16 The 
result is a reduction of capacity to deal with social issues, both within 
the company and among government agencies and other organ-
isations involved with the Porgera project. A much greater share of the 
agenda handled by executives acting intuitively, or using' common 
sense', at a level of political relations is really amenable to the more 
formal treatment we see given to environmental issues. Better 
performance can be achieved through better information about the 
social environment, better analysis of it, the development of proactive 
management strategies, and a more rigorous follow-up (see Table 9.3). 
For this to happen, there needs to be a more critical level of over-
sight by managers, and review processes need to be more systematic 
than any yet seen at a major mining project. Company staff need still 
more engagement with what Davis (1995:2) calls the 'soft skills that 
are, in fact, hard skills', so that they have the expertise to be able to 
recognise and lose their fear of this engagement. It is regrettable that 
this can only be achieved, under present circumst-ances, by pulling 
apart the record of what has (or has not) happened, rather than by 
offering a forward-looking prescription for how to go about evaluat-
ing company performance in social areas. But this will be possible in 
due course, and I hope to have given a hint here (albeit by pointing to 
gaps in the record) that the most basics steps are not speculative and 
are capable of measurement. Indeed, they fall squarely into the realm 
of management structures, good planning, meaningful consultation, 
and above all, the precautionary principle and the avoidance of risk. 
The desired outcomes, if this has not been spelled out already, are a 
swifter and more sure-footed responsiveness to crisis, more agile 
organisations able to anticipate and steer away from risks of socio-
political origin, and an enhancement of the capacity to bring benefits 
to both investors and landowner communities on a long-term basis. 
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Table 9.3 Demonstrated capabilities in relation to social issues at 
Porgera 
Item 
Observation and research 
Analysis and reporting 
Representation to decision makers 
Management emphasis 
Implementation and and follow-up 
Notes 
Demonstrated at Porgera 
Observation: a good capacity to see what 
happens daily. 
Research: negligible capacity due to 
workload; weak interest in matching 
environmental research capabilities 
in area of social issues. 
In the organisation: poor capacity (other 
than internal memos, monthly reports). 
Use of external consultants: at a low level 
and discontinuously; hampered by shifting 
points-of-entry and problem of demarcation. 
Use of external planning team: no interest 
shown. 
A much improved capacity since the start 
of operations. 
In the organisation: slow visible responses 
betray inability to escape short-term 
exigencies. 
In the industry: declarations not matched 
by guidelines or definition of standards 
(e.g. absence of Codes of Practice). 
Extremely slow. Self-handicapped in aim to 
be pro-active. 
1 Outside Porgera, in particular, the numbers are generally made up 
of assistants with a Grade 6-10 education. 
2 Yumbisa has the terms yami and tata, while Porgera has yame and 
tata, for 'family' and 'genealogical branch' respectively. 
3 A figure of three generations before the present is mentioned, but I 
did not take long (in 1990) to find a genealogy spanning 14 
generations. In point of fact, in Papua New Guinea, the Ipili stand 
out, along with the Huli, as having notably deep and well-
organised genealogical knowledge. Another howler is the 
statement that 'the Ipili have lost much of their oral tradition in 
recent decades' (Pacific Agribusiness 1987:5). No serious 
ethnographer could possibly characterise the Ipili as having 'lost 
their culture' (in which oral tradition is an integral part). 
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4 It is not conceivable that his doctoral dissertation was too recent to 
be noticed. Wohlt was employed by the Enga Provincial 
Government in the implementation phase of the Enga Yaasa 
Lakemana development programme. Both the baseline study for this 
programme (Carrad et al. 1982) and Wohlt's own technical papers 
on subsistence farming were mentioned in the SEIS. 
5 An acknowledgment of this point appears on the first page of 
Appendix B, 'Factors shaping Ipili society' (Pacific Agribusiness 
1987). 
6 'Community relations' and 'section' or 'department' are used 
generically in this chapter. In fact, the Division of Community 
Affairs at Porgera comprised three sections: Community Relations, 
Lands, and Business Development (see Bonnell1994). Note also 
that the phrase 'Community Relations Department' is used in the 
Porgera EMMP (PJV 1991:8:13). 
7 Of currently operational mining projects, only Ok Tedi is regulated 
under its own act, which dates back to 1976. 
8 Provincial elections coincided with the national census week in 
July, and Porgera's census was put off at short notice. My work was 
a consultancy for the PlY, while operational costs for the assistants 
were borne by the Porgera Development Authority. Training of the 
assistants and field coordination were handled in my absence by 
Susanne Bonnell, and the census was carried out during the week 
of 1-5 October 1990. 
9 I am grateful to Glenn Banks for discussion of this particular point. 
10 This was predicted in the course of normal conversation in 1990, 
because the Bougainville crisis had begun with the demolition of 
pylons in 1988. 
11 I do not possess an archive of PJV's internal memoranda. I happen 
to have this one because the next two paragraphs requested a 
census be done and suggested that I undertake it. 
12 Notable among failed national government commitments in the 
area of social and economic development were the non-existent 
'long term economic development plan' and the 'Porgera District 
Hospital' -a joint national-provincial government commitment 
which was due to be honoured by 1992, but which had not opened 
five years later. 
13 The census of Porgera which I had hoped to complete was a 'vital 
project' in 1990 (Hiatt 1990:3), was proposed and supported in mid 
1991, was accepted in our early 1993 proposals, then dropped 
again in July 1993. Several company employees did genealogies 
and censuses in the 1993-94 period, but a 'comprehensive census of 
the whole of Porgera District' was still being recommended in 
Bonnell's report (1994:120). 
14 Actually, I have a major criticism. The hydrological discussion in 
Chapter 4, concerning the reversal of flow in the Herbert River 
between Lake Murray and the Strickland (CSIRO 1996:5-4), fails to 
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mention the dominant role of El Niiio events in the human and 
natural ecology of the lagoonal systems of the Fly River flood plain 
(Burton 1994c:9-1O, Appendix C). An innocent mistake? I can only 
hope that the omission has been rectified in the proposed 'program 
of integrative investigations in the flood plain and the Lake Murray 
region' (C5IRO 1996, Recommendation E58). 
15 At the time, Glenn Banks was a doctoral student at the Australian 
National University. He has since completed a dissertation on the 
socioeconomic impact of the Porgera project (Banks 1997). 
16 In my view, the demarcation lines are usually drawn in the wrong 
place, because the industry is rarely able to distinguish the turmoil 
within a society, which finds outward expression in political form, 
from the political process of a society's external affairs. But there is 
no space here to examine the incidence and consequences of this 
failure. 
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